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cash, $744. One certificate of $1,000 was indorsed and sold by him at its market value, sixty-five cents on a dollar, and was redeemed by the board from his assignee at its face value, in payment of special taxes due to the district. Three certificates, (less cash received,) of the face value of $9,100, he exchanged at par for «sewer certificates,' so called, bearing interest at eight per cent. per annum, and other interest-bearing securities of the District of Columbia, all payable on time. The interest-bearing securities he sold at their market value, sixty-five cents on a dollar. Five certificates, of the face value of $16,520.75, he indorsed and sold at about their market value, seventy cents on a dollar, and they were funded by his assignee into District of Columnbia three-sixty-five bonds issued under the act of June 20, 1874, c. 337, (18 St. 116.)
Before selling his interest-bearing securities, for which he had exchanged his auditor's certificates, the claimant asked the treasurer what they were worth, and where he could sell them at par, and the treasurer replied: •I do not know where you can get par for them; do as others are doing, and sell them the best way that you can.""
Upon the foregoing findings of fact the court of claims decided, as conclusions of law, as follows: "(1) The claimant has no cause of action, and is not entitled to recover on the demands sued upon. (2) The defendant is entitled to recover $500 from the claimant, as set up in the counter-claim, for overpayment made through an error in adding the account, upon a final settlenent of which he was overpaid that sum. 19 Ct. Cl. 230. * Judgment was rendered accordingly, and the claimant appealed to this court.
The nature and history of the auditor's certificates, and of the so-called sewer certificates, and other securities issued by the District of Columbia, as well as the legislation of congress relating to them, have been fully stated in opinions delivered by the court of claims in other cases, and need not be recapitulated. See Fendall v. District of Columbia, 16 Ct. Cl. 106; adams v. Same, 17 Ct. Cl. 351; Morgan v. Same, 19 Ct. Cl. 156. It is enough for the purposes of this case to observe that the sewer certificates and other interestbearing securities of the district were negotiable instruments, and that the auditor's certificates were not negotiable, but were merely evidence of the debt of the district to the claimant under its contract with him. If he had kept the auditor's certificates, he could doubtless have recovered against the district the full amount of the debt of which they were the evidence.
But the facts found show that he has so dealt with these certificates as to prevent him from maintaining this suit. The amount of some of the certificates he has been paid by the district in money. Others of the certificates he has sold and assigned for value, and thereby transferred the equitable title in them to the assignee, and authorized him to receive payment of their amount from the district; and the payment of that amount in full by the district to the assignee is a discharge of so much of its debt to the claimant. Cowdrey v. Vandenburgh, 101 U. S. 572; Foss v. Lowell Savings Bank, 111 Mass. 285. The remaining certificates he has exchanged with the district for an equal amount of its negotiable securities, payable on time, with interest, and he has since sold those securities for their value in the market. The district is liable to the purchaser, either upon those securities themselves, or upon the other bonds since taken by him instead of some of them; and cannot be also held liable to the original creditor for the same amount or any part thereof. Harris V. Johnston, 3 Cranch, 311; Emblin v. Dartnell, 1 Dowl. & L. 591.
The conversation, which is found to have taken place between the treas. urer of the district and the claimant before he sold the negotiable securities, has no tendency to prove any authority or any intention of the treasurer to make a new or different contract in behalf of the district.
1113 U. S. 243)
HARVEY and another 0. UNITED STATES.
UNITED STATES 0. HARVEY and another.
(February 2, 1885.) 1. GOVERNMENT CONTRACT-ACTION FOR LABOR AND MATERIALS--EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
BY COURT OF CLAIMS.
In this case, before reported in 8 Ct. Cl. 501 ; 12 Ct. Cl. 141; 13 Ct. Cl. 322; and 105 U. S. 671, the court of clainis (18 Ct. Cl. 470) awarded to the claimants $16,250.95, for labor done and materials furnished by them in constructing coffer. dams, and in performing the work necessarily connected therewith, and preliminary to the mason work for the piers and abutments referred to in the contract. That court proceeded on the view that the claimants had no right to
on the testimony of experts introduced by them as to the value of the work, but should have kept and produced accounts of its cost and expense; but it gave to the claimants the benefit of the testimony of experts introduced by the United States, as to Buch value, in awarding the above amount. Held, that the claimants could not be deprived of reasonable compensation for their work, because they did not produce evidence of the character referred to, when it did not appear that such evidence existed, if the evidence they produced was the best evidence accessible to them,
and it enabled the court to arrive at a proper conclusion. 2. BAME-AMOUNT AWARDED.
On evidence thus rejected by the court of claims, this court awarded to the
claimants for the above-named work $40,093.77. 8. BAME-Loss AXD DAMAGE.
The court of claims having awarded nothing to the claimants for loss and damage from the reduction by the United States of the dimensions of piers and abutments, made subsequently to the making of the contract for doing the mason work thereof, on the view that it had before made an allowance for such loss and damage, this
court, being of a ditferent opinion, allowed $4,574.80 therefor. 4. SamE-INTEREST.
Under section 1091 of the Revised Statutes, and the ruling in Tillson v. United States, 100 U. S. 43, interest cannot be allowed on the recovery, and there is nothing in the special act of August 14, 1876, c. 279, (19 st. 490,) which authorizes the allowance of interest. Appeals from the Court of Claims. Enoch Totten, for Harvey. Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, for United States. • BLATCIIFORD, J. This case was before this court at October term, 1881, and is reported as Harvey v. United States, 105 U. S. 671. The history of it is there fully given, and, in connection with the reports of it in 8 Ct. Cí. 501, 12 Ct. Cl. 141, and 13 Ct. Cl. 322, what occurred in it prior to the decision of this court can be fully understood. The court of claims had dismissed the petition of the claimants, filed August 30, 1876, under the special act of congress passed August 14, 1876, c. 279, (19 St. 490.) This dismissal involved the rejection of two items sued for in such petition: (1) Labor dune and materials furnished by the claimants in constructing the coffer-dams, and in performing the work necessarily connected therewith, and preliminary to the masonry work for the piers and abutments, $75,000; (2) loss and damages, resulting to the claimants in consequence of the reduction of the dimensions of the piers and abutments, made subsequently to the making of the contract, $33,600. The decision of the court of claims in regard to item (1) was that the claimants had not shown that the written contract did not express the intent of both parties as to the coffer-dams, and that, even if that court were satisfied that the claimants executed the contract in mistake of their rights, there was no evidence that the defendants shared the mistake. Its decision in regard to item (2) was that it would be disposed to regard the case, on the facts, as one for equitable interposition, for the purpose of further inquiry and the ascertainment of the rights of the parties in equity, if it had jurisdiction, but that the statute did not authorize it to entertain those considerations, because, in the proceedings before it, it could hear and determine
only claims for labor done and materials furnished by the claimants under their contract with the defendants.
This court held that the ruling of the court of claims in regard to item (1) -the coffer-dams—was erroneous, and that, by the actual contract between the parties, the claimants were not to do any of the work covered by the claim made by them under item (1,) and that the written contract must be reformed accordingly. As to item (2,) this court held, that the court of claims had placed too limited a construction upon the special act of congress, and that its power, under that act, extended to reforming the contract in respect to permitting the officers of the United States to materially vary the plans for the piers, so as to essentially change the obligations of the parties. The decree of the court of claims was reversed, and the cause was remanded, with directions to proceed in it according to law and in conformity with the opinion of this court.
The court of claims (18 Ct. Cl. 470) proceeded to determine what the claim. ants did in constructing coffer-dams, and in pumping the water from the space inclosed in them, and in excavations for the preparation of the beds for the masonry. It held that, as the claimants had been notified, at the outset, that the defendants expected them to do such work, and had, on their part, notified the defendants that they would do it and would hold the defendants liable for the cost and expense, it was their duty to keep and produce accurate accounts thereof, and they could not prove such cost and expense by the evidence of experts as to the value. But the court gave to them the benefit of the testimony of experts introduced by the defendants, and, on that testimony, awarded to the claimants $16,250.95 for the labor done and materials furnished by them in constructing coffer-dams, and in performing the work necessarily connected therewith, and preliminary to the mason work for the piers and abutments referred to in the contract, the same being on account of item (1) above referred to. A judgment having been entered against the United States for that sum, both parties have appealed to this court, the claimants contending that $75,000 should have been allowed for item (1,) and the defendants that nothing should have been allowed.
In regard to the view adopted by the court of claims, that the claimants have no right to rely on the testimony of experts introduced by them, but should have kept and produced accounts of the cost and expense of the work, we are of opinion that the claimants cannot be deprived of reasonable compensation for the work they did because the evidence they produce as to the proper amount of such compensation is not of the character referred to, when it does not appear that such evidence ever existed. If they produce the best evidence which is accessible to them, and it enables the court to arrive at a proper conclusion, that is sufficient. We think such evidence is found in the estimate made by Mr. Abbott. Taking as correct the statement made by the court of claims as to the work done by the claimants and the defendants, re spectively, in constructing coffer-dams, in pumping, in excavating, and in preparing the beds for the masonry, we arrive at these results, as to the work done by the claimants: They made the coffer-dam at Davenport abutment; that at pier 1; part of that at pier 2, (it being completed by the defendants;) all but the inside dam of that at pier 4; one-third of that at the upper rest of the draw; that at the pivot pier of the draw; that at the lower rest of the draw; and that at the island abutment. They did the pumping at the Davenport abutment; at pier 1; at the pivot pier of the draw; at the lower rest of the draw; and at the island abutment. They made the excavation at the upper rest of the draw, and that at the island abutment. They prepared the bed for the masonry at the Davenport abutment; at pier 1; at the upper rest of the draw; at the pivot pier of the draw; at the lower rest of the draw; and at the island abutment.
Applying to the above work the estimates of Mr. Abbott, instead of those
of Messrs. Scott and Stickney, which the court of claims adopted, we have these results, presuming that, as Mr. Abbott's estimates are not made in separate specific items for dam, pumping, excavating, and preparing bed, respect. ively, in any case except that of the Davenport abutment, we have proceeded on the basis of taking, (in regard to pier 2, pier 4, and the upper rest of the draw, where alone it was necessary,) as and for Mr. Abbott's separate speci. fic items such proportion of his aggregate estimate as the corresponding specific item in the corresponding aggregate estimate of Mr. Scott bears to such last-named aggregate estimate: • Davenport abutment-dam, pumping, and preparing bed,
$2,668 35 Pier 1-dam, pumping, and preparing bed,
4,668 00 Pier 2-part of dam, (the court of claims said that it had no means of know
ing how much work the defendants did, and it deducted nothing therefor;
we follow that suggestion, and allow the claimants for all the dam,) 4,147 86 Pier 4-all but the inside dam, (the court of claims said that it had no means
of knowing how much work the defendants did, and it deducted nothing therefor; we follow that suggestion, and allow the claimants for all the danı,)
5,793 83 Upper rest of draw-one-third of dam, of excavation, and of preparing bed, 2,475 25 Pivot pier of draw_dani, pumping, and preparing bed,
4,842 56 Lower rest of draw-dam, pumping, and preparing bed,
3,698 19 Island abutment-dam, pumping, excavation, and preparing bed,
3,780 98 Total,
$32,075 02 Mr. Abbott says that his estimates "are based upon cost of material and labor, and intended to cover cost alone;" that 40 per cent. is a “reasonable per cent. of advance for contingencies and profits;” and that, with unusual floods in the river, 40 per cent. would be a minimum allowance. The avi. dence shows that the claimants met with great difficulties because of foods and high water. Mr. Van Wagenen's estimate is $36,000. We have concluded to add 25 per cent. to the $32,075.02,—that is, $8,018.75,--making in all $40,093.77.
As to item (2,) that relating to loss and damage resulting to the claimants in consequence of the reduction of the dimensions of the piers and abutments, made subsequently to the making of the contract, the claimants have appealed because nothing was allowed therefor. The court of clainis held that if the *claimants were entitled to recover any sum in respect of that item the sum was $3,066.42. But that court was of opinion that, in its judgment in favor of the claimants, in the suit at law, for $42,306.49, it had, in allowing $22,238.49, under item 5, as amended, “for handling, cutting, preparing, and setting stone for and in the piers and abutments" allowed the following item: "Stone received and handled, not set, and ready as backing to the 1,527 yards of the next preceding item,"—that is, the 1,527 yards of stone dressed, not set,—“an equal quantity, viz., 1,527 cubic yards, at $11 per yard, less $2, which it would have cost to set it, $13,743.00.' That in such allowance it had allowed a profit of $8.65 a yard on the 1,527 yards of undressed backing stone, being $13,208.55, which had been paid to the claimants; that this was an allowance to the claimants of profits on masonry not constructed by them; and that, although it could not be recovered back, its payment must operate as a bar to any further recovery for the same thing. We find, how. ever, that in the suit at law item 3 claimed was “for loss of profits incurred by the unlawful reduction of the dimensions of the piers and abutments, $33,600;" and that, in its conclusions of law, in the suit at law, the court of claims held that the claimants were not entitled to any recovery under item 3. Moreover, that court allowed the $13,743 referred to, as a part of item 5. as amended, (above quoted,) for doing to the stone in question everything but setting it, it being undressed stone; in other respects, prepared. We are unable to perceive how such allowance can be classed as an allowance for loss
and damage from a reduction of the dimensions of the piers and abutments. We think the proper allowance for item (2) is this: 449 yards for the three piers of the draw, at $10 per yard, equal $4,490; and 10 3-5 yards for pier 1, at $8 per yard, equal $84.80; total, $4,574.80.
The only remaining question is as to interest, which the court of claims disallowed. We think that under the ruling in*Tillson v. United States, 100 U. S. 43, interest cannot be allowed on either of the items in question. We do not see anything in the special statute,-act of August 14, 1876, c. 279, (19 St. 490,) —which takes the case out of the rule prescribed by section 1091 of the Revised Statutes.
The judgment of the court of claims is afirmed for the full amount of the award made to the claimants, and an additional amount of $23,842.82 is allowed for the labor done and materials furnished by the claimants in constructing coffer-dams, and in performing the work necessarily connected therewith and preliminary to the mason work for the piers and abutments referred to in their contract, the same being an additional allowance on account of item (1) in their petition filed August 30, 1876; and the said judgment is reversed so far as respects item (2) in that petition, and the sum of $4,574.80 is allowed for that item; and this cause is remanded to the court of claims, with a direction to enter judgment accordingly.
(112 U. S. 514)
THE ELIZABETH JONES.
(December 15, 1884.) 1. COLLISION-SCHOONER-BARK-Fault.
A schooner was sailing E. by N., with the wind 8., and a bark was close-hauled on the port tack. The schooner sighted the green light of the bark about half a point on the starboard bow, about three miles off, and starboarded a point. At two miles off she starboarded another point. As a result the light of the bark opened about two points. The bark let her sails shake and then filled them, twice. The schooner continued to see the green light of the bark till the vessels were within a length of each other, when the bark opened her red light. At the moment the vessels were approaching collision, the schooner put her helm hard a-starboard and headed N. E. At that juncture the bark ported, and her stem struck the starboard side of the schooner amidships, at about a right angle. Held, that the bark
was in fault, and the schooner free from fault. 2. SAME-CROSSING COURSES.
If the case was one of crossing courses, under article 12 of the rules prescribed by the act of April 29, 1864, c. 69, (13 St. 58,) the schooner being free and the bark close-hauled on the port tack, the bark did not keep her course, as required by article 18, and no cause for a departure existed under article 19, and she neglected
precautions required by the special circumstances of the case, within article 20. 3. SAME-ACTS IN EXTREMIS.
The final porting of the bark was not excusable, as being done in extremis, because
it was not produced by any fault in the schooner. 4. SAME-DECREE AFFIRMED.
The decree of the circuit court was affirmed, without interest. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.
Wirt Dexter, for appellant. Robert Rae, for appellee.
BLATCHFORD, J. On the twelfth of August, 1873, James R. Slauson and William R. Pugh filed a libel in admiralty, in the district court of the United States for the Northern district of Illinois, against the bark Elizabeth Jones, to recover damages for the total loss of the schooner Willis, owned by them, and of the freight money on her cargo, through a collision which occurred between the two vessels shortly before 2 o'clock A. M. on the eleventh of No.