« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »
the scope of the original patent, not indicated therein as the invention of Al. len, and not described, and a substantially new and different invention. That the commissioner intended that the extension should not be granted unless there should be a disclaimer of all claim to have No. 1,948 cover a machine with a stationary die and a movable bunter, and that the second disclaimer filed was such a disclaimer, and that the patent extended cannot be held to be one which covers, by any claim, the defendant's machine, is, we think, entirely clear.
The commissioner, in his decision, says that the “interpolations of new matter” in No. 1,948 “have been disclaimed,” and that such disclaimer renders “the scope of the patent unequivocally that of the invention originally described and illustrated in drawing and model." The disclaimer is referred to as limiting the scope of the patent, that is, the extent of its claims, and as reducing such scope and extent to what the drawings and model illustrated, namely, a movable die and a stationary bunter, to the exclusion of a stationary die and'a movable bunter. The commissioner adds that it had been the subject of much contention in the application for the extension whether the modification of having a stationary die and a movable anvil, which, he said, it was admitted, effected materially superior results in heading the larger sizes of shells, was, in legal contemplation, an equivalent construction mechanically improved, or a substantive invention, and that he is so entirely convinced that the matter introduced into the reissue, describing the holding die as stationary and the bunter as movable, was new matter, describing a substantially different invention from the original, possessing different functions, that he had required, as a condition precedent to extension, that this new matter should be absolutely disclaimed. The new matter introduced into the reissue in respect to the moving of the bunter or die, E, was introduced into the descriptive part by inserting the words “or that” (the die, E,) “may be carried against the die, D, by similar mechanism to F and H';" but it was also introduced into the two claims by the use of the words “substantially as described" in those claims. This reissue took place under section 13 of the act of July 4, 1836, c. 357, (5 St. 122,) which provided for a surrender and the issuing of a new patent “for the same invention" "in accordance with the patentee's corrected description and specification." This provision was repeated in section 53 of the act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, (16 St. 205,) now section 4916 of the Revised Statutes, with the additional enactment that “no new matter shall be introduced into the specification. But where new matter was, even before the act of 1870, introduced into the description, and in such manner as to enlarge the claim, and cause the patent to be not “for the same invention," the reissue was invalid to the extent that it was not for the same invention.
It is quite clear that Allen had not, before the granting of the original patent, made any machine in which the die, D, was stationary and the bunter movable. If that arrangement was a "new improvement of the original invention," and was invented by Allen, and after the date of the original patent, he could, under section 13 of the act of 1836, have had a "description and specification" of it "annexed to the original description and specification,” on like proceedings as in the case of an original application, and it would have had “the same effect, in law,” from “the time of its being annexed and recorded," "as though it had been embraced in the original description and specification;" or he could have applied for a new patent for the improvement. Such last-named provision of section 13 of the act of 1836 was repealed by the act of 1870, and was not re-enacted therein, nor is it found in the Revised Statutes. But it was never lawful to cover, by the claims of a reissue, an improvement made after the granting of the original patent. The statute in force in regard to disclaimers, when the disclaimers were filed in this case, was section 54 of the act of 1870, which provided “that whenever, through
Inadvertence, accident or mistake, and without any fraudulent or deceptive intention, a patentee has clained more than that of which he was the original or first inventor or discoverer, his patent shall be valid for all that part which is truly and justly his own, provided the same is a material or substantial part of the thing patented; and any such patentee, his heirs or assigns, whether *of the whole or any sectional interest therein, may, on payment of the duty required by law, make disclaimer of such parts of the thing patented as he shall not choose to claim or hold by virtue of the patent or assignment, stating therein the extent of his interest in such patent. Said disclaimer shall be in writing, attested by one or more witnesses, and recorded in the patent-office, and it shall thereafter be considered as part of the original specification, to the extent of the interest possessed by the claimant and by those claiming under him after the record thereof." This word “claimant" is an evident error, for “disclaimant," as "disclaimant” is the word used in section 7 of the act of March 3, 1837, c. 45, (5 St. 193,) which was the first statute providing for a disclaimer. This error is perpetuated in section 4917 of the Revised Statutes.
It is a patentee who “has claimed more than that of which he was the original or first inventor or discoverer," and only "such patentee,” or his assigns, who can make a disclaimer; and the disclaimer can be a disclaimer only “of such parts of the thing patented as he shall not choose to claim or hold by virtue of the patent or assignment." A disclaimer can be made only when something has been claimed of which the patentee was not the origina: or first inventor, and when it is intended to limit a claim in respect to the thing so not originally or first invented. It is true that, in so disclaiming or limiting a claim, descriptive matter on which the disclaimed claim is based, may, as incidental, be erased, in aid of or as ancillary to the disclaimer. But the statute expressly limits a disclaimer to a rejection of something before claimed as new or as invented, when it was not new or invented, and which the patentee or his assignee no longer chooses to claim or hold. It is true that this same end may be reached by a reissue, when the patentee has claimed as his own invention more than he had a right to claim as new; but if a claim is not to be rejected or limited, but there is merely “a defective or insufficient specification,”-that is, description, as distinguished from a claim,--the only mode of correcting it was and is by a reissue.
It is apparent that the commissioner, when he said that the disclaimer affected “the scope of the patent,” and that the matter introduced into the reissue was "new matter, describing a substantially different invention from the original, possessing different functions,” and that he had required it to be absolutely disclaimed, “as a condition precedent to extension,” meant that he had required such new matter-that is, the arrangement of a stationary die and a movable bunter—to be disclaimed, as an invention of Allen, covered by the reissue.
What was done was in accordance with this view. In the first disclaimer, that of February 4, 1874, it is said that, by inadvertence, accident, or mistake, the words, “or that may be carried against the die, D, by similar mechanism to F and H',” were inserted in the descriptive part of No. 1,948, and were not in the descriptive part of the original patent. Thereupon the petitioners disclaim, not such descriptive words as a description merely, but they disclaim “the movable die, E, as being of the invention of” Allen, but with this limitation or reservation: “except in so far as the same, by fair construction, may be deemed the mechanical equivalent of the die, E, described and shown" in the original patent and its drawings. It was sought to reserve the question of the mechanical equivalency of the stationary die and movable bunter with the movable die and stationary bunter, and not have the disclaimer absolutely reach and cover the former, but still leave the claims to cover it. Bu thi was evidentiy not satisfactory to the nmissioner, and
he required a further disclaimer. So the one of February 13, 1874, was Aled, which states on its face that it “is absolute, and is filed as an additional disclaimer" to the first one, “in which certain reservations were made.” In this second disclaimer the language as to the inserted words is the same as in the first, and the statement of disclaimer is that the “petitioners disclaim the said movable die, E, (called a bunter,) as being of the invention" of Allen, “thus leaving the description of said die, E, the same as shown in the" original patent and drawings. The reservation was expunged. The effect of the disclaimer was to limit the claims of the reissue to a machine with the stationary die, E, shown in the original patent and drawings, and to prevent their any longer covering, even if they had before covered, a movable die, E, or bunter. * Such was the effect of the disclaimer on the reissue without reference to the extension. But the certificate of extension itself states that the executrix had “filed a disclaimer to that part of the invention embraced in the following words: or that may be carried against the die, D, by similar mechanism to F and H','” and what is extended is No. 1,948 with such disclaimer. After an extension has been obtained on the condition precedent of making such disclaimer, the disclaimer cannot be held inoperative as respects the extended term.
We regard this case as falling within the principles laid down in Leggett v. Avery, 101 U. S. 256. There the original patent was issued in October, 1860. It was surrendered and reissued in June, 1869, and extended in October, 1874. As a condition of obtaining the extension, the patentee disclaimed the specific claims which the defendants in the suit were charged with infringing, the extension having been opposed, and the commissioner having refused to grant it unless the patentee would abandon all but one of the six claims of the reissue, there having been but one claim in the original patent. This was done, and the extension was granted for only one of the six claims, which one the defendants had not infringed. Three days after the extension was granted a reissue was applied for, including substantially the claims which had been thus disclaimed. The reissue was granted, two of the claims in it being for substantially the same inventions which had been so disclaimed before the extension, and for different inventions from the invention secured by the patent as extended. A reference to the record of the case in this court shows that the commissioner decided that the extension would be granted provided the disclaimer should be filed, and that the disclaimer concluded with the words, “reserving right to reissue in proper forin.” This court held that the coinmissioner erred in allowing in the second reissue claims which had been expressly disclaimed, because the validity of such claims had been considered and decided with the acquiescence and express disclaimer of the patentee; and that this was a fatal objection to the validity of the second reissue.
The acquiescence and disclaimer must be regarded as equally operative to prevent those who hold the reissue in suit, whether in respect to the time before or after the extension, from being heard to allege that persons who use machines with a stationary die, D, and a movable bunter, E, infringe the claims of the reissue. The disclaimer was one of the fact of invention. It could not lawfully be anything but a disclaimer of the fact either of original invention or of first invention. It was not merely the expunging of a descriptive part of the specification, involving only the propriety of inserting such descriptive part in the specification, but it was a disclaimer of all claim based on such descriptive part, because the claims were made to cover such descriptive part by the words “substantially as described,” in the two claims. The question of fact is not open now as to whether Allen invented at any time the stationary die, D, and movable bunter, E, or as to whether it was, or is, or could be, a mechanical equivalent for the movable die, D, and station. ary bunter, E, because those questions are concluded by the disclaimer. It is
conceded by the plaintiff that if, by the operation of the disclaimer, it is estopped to say that a stationary die, D, and a movable bunter, E, are the equivalent of the movable die, D, and the stationary bunter, E, the defendant does not infringe. The decree of the circuit court is reversed, with costs to the United States Cartridge Company, on both appeals, and the case is remanded to that court, with direction to dismiss the bill, with costs.
(113 U. S. 293)
(January 26, 1885.) 1. MORTGAGE-CONFISCATED PROPERTY-Rights or MORTGAGEE- PARTIES TO FORECLOS
URE PROCEEDINGS—TITLE OF PURCHASER.
A mortgagee of property which was confiscated subsequently to the mortgage, and judgment of condemnation had upon it, under the laws of the United States, has, notwithstanding such judgment of condemnation, a valid subsisting mortgage, superior to any estate in the mortgaged property acquired by the judgment of con. demnation, or which could be acquired by a sále made by virtue thereof; and a decree of foreclosure, and a sale under such decree, will carry to the purchaser the entire estate in the mortgaged premises, provided the necessary parties were made
to the foreclosure proceedings. % SAM E-Pac DE NON ALIENANDO CLAUSE-FORECLOSURE-DEPENDANTS.
When a mortgage contains the pad de non alienando, the mortgagee may enforce his mortgage by proceeding against the mortgagor alone, notwithstanding the alienation of the property, and all those claiming under the mortgagor, whether directly or remotely, will be bound, although not made parties. SAME-MORTGAGOR-HEIRS-PRIVITY-EFFECT OF FORECLOSURE AS TO HEIRS.
There was, between a person, whose life-estate was condemned under the act of congress of July 17, 1862, and his heirs, such a privity that the heirs are bound by a suit and decree to enforce a nortgage, executed by their ancestor, containing the
puc de non alienando, to which the ancestor alone had been made a party defendant. 4. SAME-DECREE or Court-COLLATERAL ATTACK-DEFENSE.
The decree of a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be collaterally attacked by averring and proving that there was a good defense to the suit, if the defendant bad
chosen to make it. 6. SAME— CONDEMNATION UNDER CONFISCATION LAW-VALIDITY OF MORTGAGE - JORIS
DICTION OF District Court.
In a suit for the coudemnation of property under act of July 17, 1862, there was no jurisdiction in the district court of the United States to pass upon the validity of a mortgage on such property. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.
Albert Voorhies, for plaintiffs in error. Henry J. Leovy and Henry C. Miller, for defendants in error.
Woods, J. This was an action brought in the civil district court for the parish of Orleans, in the state of Louisiana, by the plaintiffs in error, heirs of Bernard Avegno, deceased, two of whom, being minors, were represented by his widow, as their tutrix, against the defendants in error, to establish their title to certain real estate in the city of New Orleans, and to recover possession thereof. The case was tried by the court without a jury, and judgment was rendered for the defendants. Upon appeal to the supreme court or a the state, the judgment of the civil*district court was affirmed. To reverse : that judgment of affirmance, the plaintiffs have brought this writ of error. The pleadings and evidence disclose the following facts:
On April 3, 1862, Bernard Avegno, being the owner of the property in dispute, executed a mortgage thereon to Israel C. Harris to secure promissory notes made by Avegno, payable to his own order and indorsed by him, amounting in the aggregate to $36,500, which he delivered to Harris. The mortgage contained the pact de non alienando, by which the mortgagor agreed not to sell, alienate, or incumber the mortgaged property to the prejudice of the mortgage. The notes and mortgage were afterwards transferred by Harris
to Charles Morgan. The mortgage being still in force, on January 20, 1865. the United States filed, in the district court for the district of Louisiana, a libel of information against the mortgaged property, of which Bernard Avegno was still the owner, to condemn it as confiscated, under the act of July 17, 1862, entitled "An act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes,” (12 St. 589,) for the offenses of its owner, Avegno. A writ of seizure was issued to the marshal, who, in his return, dated February 14, 1865, stated that he had seized and taken into his possession the property libeled.
Morgan, the mortgage creditor, intervened in the suit for confiscation, claiming to be paid out of the proceeds of the property the amount due on his mortgage. The district court, on August 1, 1865, wade a decree condemning the property in question as forfeited to the United States, and ordering it to be sold, and dismissing the intervention of Morgan, on the ground that his morto gage "could not be acknowledged.” The decree of condemnation made by the district court was not followed by a sale of the forfeited premises, nor were any proceedings taken under it. Afterwards, on June 25, 1867, Morgan filed his bill in the circuit court for the district of Louisiana against Avegno, for the enforcement of his mortgage. On July 11, following, the court made a decree, under which, on December 21, 1868, the property was sold by the marshal and purchased by Morgan,*to whom, on December 26, the marshal made a deed therefor. On March 1, 1869, Morgan conveyed the premises to the defendants. On August 12, 1872, Bernard Avegno died, leaving the plaintiffs, who are his children, as his heirs at law. They claim title to the property sued for under Bernard Avegno as his heirs. The averment of their petition is “that, by reason of such confiscation and forfeiture, all right, title, interest, and ownership of Bernard A vegno (deceased) was absolutely divested; that said real estate was during his life-time forfeited to the United States; but that the naked ownership thereof was then vested in your petitioners, who were his legitimate children, living at the time of the rendition of said decree and judgment of condemnation and forfeiture; that on the twelfth day of August, 1872, Bernard Avegno died, whereupon the title and interest of the
United States in the said property came to an end, and said life-estate was to terminated, your petitioners being therefore entitled to the full ownership thereof."
*It is plain, and is not disputed by the plaintiffs, that if there had been no proceeding instituted by the United States for the condemnation of the property, and no intervention therein by Morgan, he would have acquired a good title to the preinises, by his purchase thereof at the sale made under the decree of the circuit court rendered upon his bill to enforce his mortgage, and his deed therefor to the defendants would have vested in them a good and indefeasible title. The plaintiffs contend, however, that the title so conveyed is void, for two reasons: First, because the judgment of condemnation divested Avegno of all interest and estate in the forfeited premises, and the circuit court was, therefore, without jurisdiction to render a decree for the sale of the property in the suit brought to foreclose the mortgage to which Avegno was the only defendant; and, second, because the district court dismissed Morgan's intervention on the ground that his mortgage “could not be acknowledged," and because this was, in effect, the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which Morgan was a party, declaring his mortgage to be void, and he and those claiming under him were bound by that judgment. We do not think that either of these grounds is well taken.
The interest of Morgan as a mortgagee was not divested or affected by the judgment of condemnation rendered by the district court. Day v. Micou, 18 Wall. 156; Claims of Marcuard, 20 Wall. 114. Notwithstanding the judg. ment of condemnation, therefore, he had a valid subsisting mortgage superior