*331

ror which may be corrected by the usual modes of correcting such errors, but that the court had jurisdiction to decide upon the matter raised by the plea, both as matter of law and of fact, cannot be doubted. This article 5 of the amendments, and articles 6 and 7, contain other provisions concerning trials in the courts of the United States designed as safeguards to the rights of parties. Do all of these go to the jurisdiction of the courts? And are all judgments void where they have been disregarded in the progress of the trial? Is a judgment of conviction void when a deposition has been read against a person on trial for crime because he was not confronted with the witness, or because the indictment did not inform him with sufficient clearness of the nature and cause of the accusation? It may be confessed that it is not always very easy to determine what matters go to the jurisdiction of a court so as to make its action when erroneous a nullity. But the general rule is that when the court has jurisdiction by law of the offense charged, and of the party who is so charged, its judgments are not nullities. There are exceptions to this rule, but when they are relied on as foundations for relief in another proceeding, they should be clearly found to exist.

The case of Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 166, is relied on here. In that case the petitioner had been tried, convicted, and sentenced for an offense for which he was liable to the alternative punishment of fine or imprisonment. The court imposed both. He paid the fine, and made application to the same court by writ of habeas corpus for release on the ground that he was then entitled to his discharge. The circuit court, on this application, instead of releasing the prisoner, set aside its erroneous judgment, and sentenced him to further imprisonment. This court held that the prisoner, having been tried, convicted, and sentenced for that offense, and having performed the sentence as to the fine, the authority of the circuit court over the case was at an end, and the subsequent proceedings were void.

In the present case no verdict nor judgment was rendered, no sentence enforced, and it remained with the trial court to decide whether the acts on which he relied were a defense to any trial at all. We are of opinion that what was done by that court was within its jurisdiction; that the question thus raised by the prisoner was one which it was competent to decide,—which it was bound to decide; and that its decision was the exercise of jurisdiction. Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 202; Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 23; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 653; S. C. 4 SUP. CT. REP. 152; Ex parte Crouch, 112 U. S. 178; S. C., ante, 96.

Without giving an opinion as to whether that decision was sound or not, we cannot grant the writ now asked for, and it is therefore denied.

(113 U. S. 332)

MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF QUINCY. UNITED STATES ex rel. JACKSON.

(February 2, 1885.)

TAXATION-LAWS OF ILLINOIS LIMITING APPLICABILITY TO EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS-JUDGMENT ON MUNICIPAL BONDS.

Neither the act of the legislature of Illinois of 1869, from which the city of Quincy derived authority to issue bonds in payment of its subscription to the stock of the Missouri & Mississippi Railroad Company, nor any general law of the state, forbids, expressly or by necessary implication, taxation to the extent necessary to meet the obligations thus incurred."

2. SAME-APPLICATION OF PROVISION LIMITING TAXATION IN A CHARTER.

The limitation as to taxation imposed by the charter of the city of Quincy had reference to its ordinary municipal debts and expenses.

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois.

Geo. A. Anderson, for plaintiff in error. Carl E. Epler, for defendant in,

error.

*HARLAN, J. The relator, Jackson, recovered a judgment in the court be low against the city of Quincy, Illinois, for the sum of $9,546.24, with costs of suit. There are no funds in its treasury out of which the judgment can be paid, and its corporate authorities have refused, upon demand of the relator, to satisfy it, in the only way in which it can be paid, by a levy of taxes for that specific purpose. The judgment in the present action, which was commenced by a petition for mandamus, requires the city council of Quincy to levy and collect a special tax sufficient to discharge the amount thereof, with interest from the date of its rendition, and also the costs of this and the former action. We have only to inquire whether the corporate authorities of the city have the power under the laws of Illinois to levy and collect such a tax.

By an act of the general assembly of Illinois, amendatory of the special charter of the city, approved February 14, 1863, it is provided that "the city council of said city shall have power to levy and collect, annually, taxes * * on all real and personal property within the limits of said city, to pay the debts and meet the general expenses of said city, not exceeding fifty cents on each one hundred dollars per annum on the annual assessed value thereof."

By an act, approved March 27, 1869, it was declared that "the acts of the city council of the city of Quincy, from June 2, 1868, to August 28, 1868, in ordering an election on the proposition to subscribe the sum of $100,000 to the capital stock of the Mississippi & Missouri River Air-line Railroad Company, and the subscription to said stock, and all other acts of said council therewith, are hereby legalized and confirmed." Under the authority conferred by this act, negotiable bonds of the city were issued, and the judgment in the first action was for the amount of certain coupons of bonds embraced in that issue. The authority of the city, after the passage of the act of March 27, 1869, to execute bonds in payment of stock subscriptions therein referred to, was sustained in City of Quincy v. Cooke, 107 U. S. 549; S. C. 2 SUP. CT. REP. 614.

*Subsequently, by an act approved May 30, 1881, it was provided that all cities, villages, and incorporated towns in Illinois not then having, by their respective charters, the power to levy and collect as high a rate of taxation as 1 per cent. annually upon their taxable property, should thereafter have power to assess, levy, and collect annually upon the taxable property within their re spective limits for all corporate purposes--in addition to all taxes which any such city, town, or village was then, or might thereafter be, authorized by law to levy and collect to support and maintain schools, erect school buildings, and for all other school purposes, and to pay interest on its registered bonded indebtedness-such an amount as their respective corporate authorities might prescribe, not exceeding in any year the rate of one per cent. of the assessed valuation of such taxable property, as equalized by the state board of equalization for the preceding year; the said rate to be in lieu of all other rates and items of taxation then provided and authorized in such charters, for all purposes other than for schools, the erection of school buildings, and all other school purposes, and for paying interest on the registered bonded indebtedness of such city, town, or village. Laws Ill. 1881, p. 59.

It is conceded by the case before us that the revenue of the city for its fiscal year ending March 31, 1885, to accrue from the taxes it could levy under the act of 1881, after meeting its necessary current expenses and other demands prior to that of the relator Jackson, will be insufficient to pay his judgment interest, and costs.

On behalf of the city it is contended that when these bonds were issued, the act of 1862 prohibited any annual levy of taxes "to pay the debts and v.5s-35

988.

988.

meet the general expenses of the city," in excess of 50 cents on each $100 of the assessed value of its real and personal property. To this it may be replied, as was done in Quincy v. Cooke in reference to similar language in the original charter of the city, that the act of 1863 related to debts and expenses incurred for ordinary municipal purposes, and not to indebtedness arising from railroad subscriptions, the authority to make which is not implied*from any general grant of municipal power, but must be expressly conferred by statute. When the legislature in 1869 legalized and confirmed what the city council had previously done touching the subscription to the stock of the Mississippi & Missouri River Air-line Railroad Company, and thereby authorized bonds in payment thereof to be issued, it could not have been contemplated that indebtedness thus created would be met by such taxation as was permitted for ordinary municipal purposes. In giving authority to incur obligations for such extraordinary indebtedness, the legislature did not restrict its corporate authorities to the limit of taxation provided for ordinary debts and expenses. In Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 660, the court, after observing that the validity of a contract, which can only be fulfilled by a resort to taxation, depends on the power to levy the tax for that purpose, said: “It is therefore to be inferred that, when the legislature of the state authorizes a county or city to contract a debt by bond, it intends to authorize it to levy such taxes as are necessary to pay the debt, unless there is in the act itself, or in some general statute, a limitation upon the power of taxation which repels such an inference." So, in U. S. v. New Orleans, 98 U. S. 393: "When authority to borrow money or incur an obligation, in order to execute a public work, is conferred upon a municipal corporation, the power to levy a tax for its payment, or the discharge of the obligation, accompanies it; and this, too, without any special mention that such power is granted. This arises from the fact that such corporations seldom possess-so seldom, indeed, as to be exceptional-any means to discharge their pecuniary obligations except by taxation." The same question arose in Ralls Co. v. U. S. 105 U. S. 735, where it was said: "It must be considered as settled in this court that when authority is granted by the legislative branch of the government to a municipality, or a subdivision of a state, to contract an extraordinary debt by the issue of negotiable securities, the power to levy taxes sufficient to meet at maturity the obligations to be incurred is conclusively implied, unless the law which confers the authority, or some general law in force at the time, clearly manifests a contrary legislative intention." Again: "If what the law requires to be done can only be done through taxation, then taxation is authorized to the extent that may be needed, unless it is otherwise expressly declared. The power to tax in such cases is not an implied power, but a duty growing out of the power to contract. The one power is as much express as the other. See, also, Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 501; S. C. 1 Sup. CT. REP. 442. The doctrine announced in these cases is sustained by U. S. v. County of Macon, 99 U. S. 582, upon which the plaintiff in error relies; for, in that case, the very act, conferring upon the county authority to make a subscription to the stock of a railroad corporation, made special provision for a tax to meet the subscription, and thus negatived the inference that the legislature intended to permit any taxation beyond that allowed by that special act and the general laws of the state.

These decisions cover the present case; for, in the first place, neither the act of 1869, from which the city derived authority to issue negotiable bonds in payment of its subscription, nor any general law of the state, forbids, expressly or by necessary implication, taxation to the extent necessary to meet the obligations thus incurred; and, in the second place, the limitation imposed by the city's charter upon its power of taxation had reference to its ordinary municipal debts and expenses.

In reference to the act of 1881, it is only necessary to say that, if it refers

288.

888.

to indebtedness for railroad subscriptions, the limit imposed by it cannot be made to apply to indebtedness created prior to its passage, accompanied, as the latter was, with power in the city, at the time it was created, to impose taxation sufficient to discharge it.

Judgment affirmed.

(113 U. S. 435)

PRENTICE . STEARNS.1

(March 2, 1885.)

DEED-LAND Intended to BE CONVEYED-DESCRIPTION-Intention of GRANTOR-HOW DETERMINED.

That rule of interpretation which rejects erroneous particulars of description when what is left in the deed sufficiently identifies the subject of the grant, is adopted only in aid of the intention of the grantor as gathered from the instrument itself, read in the light of the circumstances under which it was written.

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota.

This is an action at law to recover possession of real estate and damages for its detention, the plaintiff in error being plaintiff below, and a citizen of Ohio, the defendant being a citizen of Minnesota. The real estate in controversy is described in the complaint as an undivided one-half of real estate situated in the county of St. Louis and state of Minnesota, viz.: "Lot eightytwo (82) and the east half (E. ) of lot eighty-four, (84,) in block two, (2,) in Duluth proper, third division, according to the recorded plat thereof on file in the office of the register of deeds of St. Louis county, state of Minnesota." The question is upon the plaintiff's title. The action was tried by the court, the intervention of a jury having been waived by the parties, and the findings of fact and conclusions of law were separately stated. The facts found are as follows:

(1) That the treaty made and concluded on the thirtieth day of September, A. D. 1854, between the United States and the Chippewa Indians, of Lake Superior and the Mississippi, whereby said Indians ceded to the United States certain territory lying adjacent to the head-waters of Lake Superior, contained the following provision, viz.: "And being desirous to provide for some of his connections who have rendered his people important services, it is agreed that Chief Buffalo may select one section of land at such place in the ceded territory as he may see fit, which shall be reserved for that purpose and conveyed by the United States to such person or persons as he may direct." (2) That said treaty was ratified, pursuant to a resolution of the United States senate passed on the tenth day of January, 1855, by the president of the United States on the twenty-ninth day of January, 1855.

(3) That the said Chief Buffalo, pursuant to said provision of said treaty, and on the day of the date thereof, to-wit, September 30, 1854, by an instrument of writing, executed by him and filed in the office of the United States Commissioner of Indian affairs at Washington, D. C., selected the land to be conveyed thereunder by the United States, and appointed the persons to whom it was to be conveyed, as follows, viz., after reciting the foregoing provision of said treaty: "I hereby select a tract of land one mile square, the exact boundary of which may be defined when the surveys are made, lying on the west shore of St. Louis bay, Minnesota territory, immediately above and adjoin ing Minnesota Point, and I direct that patents be issued for the same, according to the above-recited provision, to Shaw-bwaw-skung, or Benjamin Arm

18. C. 20 Fed. Rep. 819.

*437

strong, my adopted son; to Matthew May-dway-gwon, my nephew; to Joseph May-dway-gwon and Antoine May-dway-gwon, his sons, one quarter section to each." That the land Buffalo had in view and intended in such designation is not included, nor any part thereof, in the patents subsequently issued by the United States to the relatives of said Buffalo named above, which patents are hereinafter referred to.

(4) That said Matthew, Joseph, and Antoine, under date of September 17, 1855, executed and delivered to said Armstrong an instrument assigning to him their right, title, and interest under said appointment and selection of Chief Buffalo.

(5) That said Benjamin D. Armstrong and wife, on September 11, 1856, made, executed, acknowledged, and delivered to the plaintiff herein, a deed of conveyance, a copy of which is hereto attached, marked Exhibit B, and made a part of these findings. That a large portion of the land embraced within the courses and distances of said deed is covered by water, and that portion which is not covered by water in said description is land which Chief Buffalo had in view and intended to embrace in his selection as aforesaid, but does not embrace the land involved in this suit.

(6) That said deed from Armstrong to plaintiff was duly recorded in the county of St. Louis, territory of Minnesota, on the fourth day of November, A. D. 1856.

(7) That the piece or parcel of land, the title to which is involved in this action, is situated in said county of St. Louis, territory (now state) of Minnesota.

(8) That the said Benjamin G. Armstrong and wife, on the twenty-seventh day of August, 1872, executed and delivered to the plaintiff the confirmatory deed, a copy of which is hereto attached, and marked Exhibit C, and made a part of these findings, which deed was duly recorded in the county of St. Louis, state of Minnesota, September 2, 1872.

(9) That the tract of land which Chief Buffalo had designated as his selection on the day of the treaty did not correspond with the section lines when the land came to be surveyed into sections, and the United States land department decided that the Buffalo designation of the land was too indefinite to enable patents to be issued therefor; and, furthermore, the land thus designated by Buffalo was found to be occupied by, and was thereby claimed by, certain Indian traders under said treaty, and after a lengthy correspondence and investigation in respect thereto by the interior and Indian departments, the matter was finally adjusted by said relatives withdrawing their claim to the land so designated by Buffalo and consenting to accept other land in lieu thereof to be selected by the Indian department; whereupon the commissioner of Indian affairs, by its agent, and by the direction of the said interior department, and with the approval of the president, and assent of the said relatives named as aforesaid by said Buffalo, selected certain other lands, aggregating 682 acres, and situated in four different government sections, as shown by diagram hereto attached, and marked Exhibit D, and apportioned the same among said relatives. A copy of the report of the secretary of the interior to the president upon the final selection of said land is hereto attached, marked Exhibit E, and made a part of these findings. That on the twenty-third day of October, 1858, patents for the land so apportioned were duly issued to them by the United States, one of which patents was issued to said Armstrong, and a copy of which is hereto attached, and marked Exhibit F. That the land involved in this suit is a part of the land embraced in said patent to said Armstrong.

(10) That the chief, Buffalo, died in the month of October, 1855, and before the land conveyed by the government to his appointees under said provision of said treaty was finally selected, and without any action on his part under said provision of said treaty subsequent to the appointment of the persons to