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of different states as aforesaid, which can be fully determined as between them, and your petitioners are actually interested in such controversy; that the controversy in said suit between plaintiff and your petitioners, as made by the pleadings, is wholly distinct and separate from that between the plaintiff and the St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Company." Upon this petition the state court removed the suit, but the circuit court of the United States remanded it. To reverse this order of the United States court the appeal was taken. • There is but one controversy in this case, and that is as to the duty of the railroad company to transfer to Wilson the stock standing in the name of the Seligmans on its books and to issue new certificates therefor. Upon the one side of that controversy is the plaintiff, a citizen of Missouri, and on the other the railroad company, a Missouri corporation. The sole purpose of the suit is to establish the duty and enforce its performance. This cannot be done without the presence of the company, for it is upon the company itself that the decree must operate. The Seligmans are made parties only in aid of the principal relief which is asked. As the stock stands in their names on the books, the company may well claim a judicial finding in the cause which shall bind them, if upon the final hearing a transfer is ordered. The suit, there fore, is in truth and in form against both the company and the Seligmans op a single cause of action, and cannot be removed unless the separate answer of the Seligmans introduces a separate controversy. This we have held in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ide, ante, 735, is not necessarily the effect of separate issues under separate defenses to the same action. No relief whatever can be granted unless it is found to be the duty of the company to transfer the stock, and as to that controversy the company is an indispensable party Central R. Co. of N. J. v. Mills, 113 U. S. 249; S. C., ante, 456; Thayer v. Life Ass'n, 112 U. S. 717; S. C., ante, 355.
The order remanding the cause is affirmed.
(113 U. 8. 727) COOPER MANUF'G Co. OF MOUNT VERNON, OHIO, 0. FERGUSON and another,
(March 16, 1885.) 1. INTERSTATE COMMERCE-COLORADO STATUTE-CORPORATIONI-AGENCIES.
The statute of Colorado, passed in the year 1877, entitled "An act to provide for the formation of corporations,” cannot be construed to impose upon a foreign corporation limitations of its right to make contracts in the state for carrying on commerce between the states, for that would make the act an invasion of the exclusive
right of congress to regulate commerce between the several states. 2. SAME-ARTICLE 15, & 10, Const. Colo., AND ACT OF 1877, CARRYING OUT ITS PROVISIONS.
The obvious construction of article 15 of section 10 of the constitution of Colorado, (1876,) and of the statute passed by the legislature of that state in 1877, providing for the formation of corporations," is that no foreign corporation shall begin doing business in the state, with the purpose of pursuing it or carrying it on, until it has tiled a certificate designating the principal place where the business of the corporation shall be carried on in the state, and naming an authorized agent, residing in such principal place of business, upon whom process may be served. It cannot require such a certificate as a prerequisite to the doing of a single act of business, when there is no purpose to do any other business or have a place of business
in the state. In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado.
• Section 10 of article 15 of the constitution of the state of Colorado, adopted in 1876, and still in force, provides as follows: “No foreign corporation shall do any business in this state without having one or more known places of
"S. C. 4 Fed. Rep. 498.
business, and an authorized agent or agents in the same upon whom process may be served.” To carry into effect this clause of the constitution, the legislature of Colorado, in the year 1877, in an act entitled "An act to provide for the formation of corporations,” enacted as follows:
"Sec. 23. Foreign corporations shall, before they are authorized or permitted to do any business in this state, make and file a certificate, signed by the president and secretary of such corporation, duly acknowledged, with the secretary of state, and in the office of the recorder of deeds of the county in which such business is carried on, designating the principal place where the business of such corporation shall be carried on in this state, and an author. ized agent or agents in this state residing at its principal place of business upon whom process may be served; and such corporation shall be subjected to all the liabilities, restrictions, and duties which are or may be imposed upon corporations of like character organized under the general laws of this state, and shall have no other or greater powers."
Section 26 of the same act provided that a failure to comply with the provisions of section 23 should render the officers, agents, and stockholders of the corporation individually liable on all its contracts made while the corpo ration was so in default.
These provisions of the organic and statute law of the state being in force, the plaintiff in error, which was a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Ohio, and having its principal place of business at Mount Vernon, Ohio, on February 22, 1880, at the county of Larimer, in the state of Colorado, entered into a contract in writing of that date with the defendants, who were citizens of Colorado, by which it was agreed that the plaintiff should sell to the defendants, and deliver to them on the cars at Mount Vernon, in tho-state of Ohio, a steam engine and other machinery, in consideration whereof, the defendants were to pay the plaintiff the price stipulated in the contract for such machinery.
This suit was brought by the plaintiff on August 10, 1880, to recover of the defendants damages for their breach of the contract. The defendants, among other defenses, pleaded—First, that when the contract was entered into, the plaintiff had not made and filed the certificate required by section 23 of the act of 1877; second, that at the time of making the contract the plaintiff did not have a known place of business in the state of Colorado, and did not have an authorized agent or agents in the state upon whom process might be served. The plaintiff demurred to both these answers, because they did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the action. Upon the hearing of the demurrer the judges of the circuit court were divided in opinion, and the presiding judge being of opinion that the demurrer should be overruled, it was overruled accordingly, and the plaintiff electing to stand by its demurrer, judgment was entered against it dismissing its suit, and for costs. By the present writ of error the plaintiff brings that judgment under review.
The certificate of division of opinion recites the facts above set forth, and states the question upon which the judges differed to be: “Whether the tenth section of article sixteen" (fifteen) “of the constitution of the state of Colorado, and the twenty-third section of an act of the general assembly of the state of Colorado, passed in the year A. D. 1877, entitled an 'Act to provide for the formation of corporations,' were, or either of them was, under all the circumstances stated, and the various acts passed by the legislature of the state of Colorado, a bar in this action.”
Walter H. Smith, for plaintiff in error. Thos. M. Robinson, for defendant in error.
•Woods, J. The right of the people of a state to prescribe generally by its constitution and laws the terms upon which a foreign corporation shall be allowed to carry on its business in the state, has been settled by this court. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168;
Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410. The plaintiff in error does not deny this right, but insists that, upon a proper construction of section 10 of article 15 of the constitution of Colorado, and of section 23 of the act of 1877, its contract with the defendants was valid, and that its suit should have been maintained. As the clause in the constitution and the act of the legislature relate to the same subject, like statutes in pari materia, they are to be construed together. Eskridge v. State, 25 Ala. 30. The act was passed by the first legislature that assembled after the adoption of the constitution, and has been allowed to remain upon the statute book to the present time. It must therefore be considered as a contemporary interpretation, entitled to much weight. Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264; Adams v. Storey, 1 Paine, 90. It must be conceded that if the contract on which the suit was brought was made in violation of a law of the state, it cannot be enforced in any court sitting in the state charged with the interpretation and enforcement of its laws. Ū.s. Bank v. Owens, 2 Pet. 527; Groces v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 449; Harris v. Runnels, 12 How. 79; Brown v. Tarkington, 3 Wall, 377; Davidson v. Lanier, 4 Wall. 447; Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall. 342; Wheeler v. Russell, 17 Mass. 258; Law v. Hodson, 11 East, 300; Little v. Poole, 9 Barn. & C. 192; Thorne v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 80 Pa. St. 15; Allen v. Hawks, 13 Pick. 82; Roche v. Laid, 1 Allen, 441; In re Comstock, 3 Sawy. 218.
So far as appears by the record, the plaintiff had no principal place of business, nor any place of business whatever, in the state of Colorado, and the making of the contract set out in the complaint was the only business ever done by it, or that it ever purposed to do, in that state. The question, therefore, is whether, upon a true construction of the constitution and statute, the making of the contract which the plaintiff seeks to enforce, was, under the circumstances stated, forbidden. The contention of the defendant in error is that the prohibition against the doing of any business in the state by a for. eign corporation, except upon the prescribed condition, includes the doing of one any single and isolated act of business whatever. Thus broadly stated, it is clear that the interpretation of the defendants cannot be sustained. In a case involving the construction of the statute, the supreme court of Colorado held that a foreign corporation might, without complying with the provisions of the statute, maintain an action in the courts of the state to recover damages for trespass to its real estate. The court said: “The prohibition extends to doing business before compliance with the terms of the statute. We do not think this an abridgment of the right of a foreign corporation to sue. It ex. tends only to the exercise of the powers by which it may be said ordinarily to transact or carry on its business. To what extent the exercise of these powers is affected we do not decide.” Utley v. Clark-Gardner Lode Min. Co. 4 Colo. 369. So it is clear that the statute cannot be construed to impose upon a foreign corporation limitations of its right to make contracts in the state for carrying on commerce between the states, for that would make the act an invasion of the exclusive right of congress to regulate commerce among the several states. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168. The prohibition against doing any business cannot, therefore, be literally interpreted.
Reasonably construed, the constitution and statute of Colorado forbid, not the doing of a single act of business in the state, but the carrying on of business by a foreign corporation without the filing of the certificate and the appointment of an agent, as required by the statute. The constitution re quires the foreign corporation to have one or more known places of business in the state before doing any business therein. This implies a purpose, at least, to do more than one act of business; for a corporation that has done but a single act of business, and purposes to do no more, cannot have one or more known places of business in the state. To have known places of business it must be carrying on or intending to carry on business. The statuto
passed to carry the provision of the constitution into effect makes this plain, for the certificate which it requires to be filed by a foreign corporation must designate the principal place in the state where the business of the corporation is to be carried on. The meaning of the phrase “to carry on,” when applied to business, is well settled. In Worcester's Dictionary the definition is: “To prosecute, to help forward, to continue; as to carry on business.” The definition given to the same phrase in Webster's Dictionary is: “To continue, as to carry on a design; to manage or prosecute, as to carry on husbandry or trade.” The making in Colorado of the one contract sued on in this case, by which one party agreed to build and deliver in Ohio certain machinery and the other party to pay for it, did not constitute a carrying on of business in Colorado.
The obvious construction, therefore, of the constitution and the statute is that no foreign corporation shall begin any business in the state, with the purpose of pursuing or carrying it on, until it has filed a certificate designating the principal place where the business of the corporation is to be carried on in the state, and naming an authorized agent, residing at such principal place of business, on whom process may be served. To require such a certificate as a prerequisite to the doing of a single act of business, when there was no purpose to do any other business or have a place of business in the state, would be unreasonable and incongruous.
The case of Potter v. Bank of Ithaca, 5 Hill, 490, tends to support this conclusion. The charter of the bank provided that its operations of discount and deposit should be carried on in the village of Ithaca, and not elsewhere. The cashier discounted a note in the city of New York, for the purpose of securing a demand due the bank, and the fact that the note was discounted in New York city was set up as a defense to a suit on the note. In giving judgment for the bank, NELSON, C. J., said the statute “obviously relates to the regular and customary business operations of the bank, and does not apply to a single transaction like the one in question." A similar ruling was made in Suydam v. Morris Canal & Banking Co. 6 Hill. 217. See, also, Graham v. Hendricks, 22 La. Ann. 523.
We base the conclusion that the demurrer to the defendant's answer should have been sustained, upon the interpretation we have given to the constitution and statute, and do not find it necessary to decide whether their provisions invade the exclusive right of congress to regulate commerce among the several states. We have examined all the cases cited by the defendants to support their interpretation. In none of them was the statute construed similar in its language or provisions to the constitution or statute under consideration, and the cases can have no controlling weight in the present controversy.
We are of opinion that there was error in the judgment of the circuit court. The judgment must therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings, in conformity with this opinion; and it is so ordered.
MATTHEWS, J., concurring. Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD and myself concur in the judgment of the court announced in this case, but on different grounds from those stated in the opinion. Whatever power may be conceded to a state to prescribe conditions on which foreign corporations may transact business within its limits, it can not be admitted to extend so far as to prohibit or regulate commerce among the states; for that would be to invade the jurisdiction which, by the terms of the constitution of the United States, is conferred exclusively upon congress.
In the present case, the construction claimed for the constitution of Colo
1 In re Comstock, 3 Sawy. 218; Bank of British Columbia v. Page, 46 Or. 31 ; Thorne v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 80 Pa. St. 15; Roche v. Ladd, 1 Allen, 441; Rising Sun Ins. Co. v. Slaughter, 20 Ind. 520; National Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Pursell, 10 Allen, 231; Cincinnati Mul. Assur.
v. Rosenthal, Ill. 85; Æl Ins. Co. v. Hurvey, 11 Wis. 412.
rado, and the statute of that state passed in execution of it, cannot be extended to prevent the plaintiff in error, a corporation of another state, from transacting any business in Colorado which, of itself, is commerce. The transaction in question was clearly of that character. It was the making of a contract in Colorado to manufacture certain machinery in Ohio, to be there delivered for transportation to the purchasers in Colorado. That was commerce; and to prohibit it, except upon conditions, is to regulate commerce between Colorado and Ohio, which is within the exclusive province of congress. It is quite competent, no doubt, for Colorado to prohibit a foreign corporation from acquiring a domicile in that state, and to prohibit it from carrying on within that state its business of manufacturing machinery. But it cannot prohibit it from selling in Colorado, by contracts made there, its machinery manufactered elsewhere, for that would be to regulate commerce among the states. In Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, the issuing of a policy of insurance was expressly held not to be a transaction of commerce, and therefore not excluded from the control of state laws; and the decision in that case is predicated upon that distinction. It is, therefore, not inconsistent with these views.
(113 U. S. 742)
(March 16, 1885.) 1. REMOVAL OF Cause — PETITIONER MUST FIRST Show CAUSE-PETITION NOT ENOUGH.
A state court is not bound to surrender its jurisdiction, by removal under the act of 1875, until a case is made which, on the face of the record, shows that the petitioner is entitled to such a removal. The mere filing of a petition is not enough, anless, when taken in connection with the rest of the record, it shows on its face that the petitioner has, under the statute, the right to take the suit to another tri
bunal. 2. Same-TIME OF FILING PETITION-FIRST TERM AT WHICH CASE TRIABLE.
The act of 1875, C. 137, (18 St. 470,) provides that the petition for removal must be filed at or before the term at which the cause could be first tried, and before the trial; that is, the first term at which the cause could have stood for trial had the
parties taken the usual steps as to pleadings and other preparations. 3. SAME-EFFECT OF HEARING ON DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT.
There cannot be a removal after a hearing on a denurrer to a complaint because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska.
Chas. 0. Whedon, for plaintiffs in error. Walter J. Lamb and E. E. Brown, for defendants in error.
WAITE, C. J. This is a writ of error to reverse a judgment of the supreme court of Nebraska, on the single ground that the supreme court decided that the district court of Lancaster county had jurisdiction to proceed with the suit after a petition for the removal thereof to the circuit court of the United States had been made and filed in the district court. The transcript, which has been returned with the writ, is evidently very imperfect, and it purports to contain only a part of the record below. It is not authenticated by the clerk as a full transcript, and it shows on its face that much which is important to a correct understanding of the case has been omitted. From what has been returned, however, it sufficiently appears that the suit was originally brought in the district court of Lancaster county, by Milo F. Kellogg against Luke Lavender, James E. Phillpot, John S. Gregory, E. Mary Gregory, Thomas J. Cantlon, R. F. Parshall, and perhaps some others, to enforce the specific performance of a contract in writing, entered into on the thirtieth of July, 1872, between the plaintiff Kellogg and the defendant Lavender for the sale by Lavender to Kellogg of certain lots in Lincoln, Nebraska. The price to be paid was $2,500. Of this amount $500 was paid in hand, and for the re maining $2,000 Kellogg executed two notes of $1,000 each, payable to the