aumber of old and well-known devices for changing rotary into horizontal or rectilinear motion. The testimony shows that the devices long used for this purpose are a pinion or segment of a pinion whose teeth interlock with the teeth of a straight bar or rack or a rigid lever attached at one end to the rock-shaft, and having on the other a pin or roller working in a slot formed on the door or shutter to be moved. Sometimes the slot is in the lever, and the pin or roller is on the door or shutter. These devices perform the same functions in substantially the same manner, and have long been recognized as mechanical equivalents. The device covered by the patent of O'Haire, therefore, consists of a rock-shaft with a lever attached for the purpose of giving the shaft a rocking motion, combined with a well-known and longused device by which the rocking motion was changed into a rectilinear motion and communicated to the door of a car. No one of these devices can be claimed as new. If there is any ingenuity displayed in the contrivance described in the O'Haire patent, it must, therefore, be in the combination of these devices to attain a result. The claim of the patent is for such a combination. But in our opinion this combination was anticipated by the patents of both Douglass and Brown before mentioned.

The inventions described in these patents are for the opening and closing of outside shutters from the inside of a house, without opening the windows; and they consist of a rock-shaft passing through the wall of the house, to which a rocking motion is imparted from the inside of the house, in the one case, by a knob, and in the other, by a lever or handle on the inner end of the shaft. By means of a pinion on the outer end of the rock-shaft, applied to a toothed rack on the shutter, a rectilinear sliding motion is imparted to the shutter, which is thus opened and closed. The rock-shafts in these patents are iden-" tical with the rod or shaft in the O'Haire patent; the lever in the Brown patent, by which the rock-shaft is moved, is the same as the lever in the O'Haire patent, and the knob in the Douglass shaft is its well-known equivalent; and the contrivance by pinion and rack for transmitting motion from the rockshaft to the shutter is the well-known and long-used equivalent of the devices used for a similar purpose in the O'Haire contrivance. We find, therefore, that none of the separate elements of the devices described in the O'Haire patent are new, nor is the combination new. So far, therefore, we find no patentable invention in the contrivance described in the patent under consideration. It was said by this court, in Smith v. Nichols, 21 Wall. 112, that "a mere carrying forward a new or more extended application of the original thought, a change only in form, proportions, or degree, the substitution of equivalents, doing substantially the same thing in the same way by substantially the same means, with better results, is not such invention as will sustain a patent." So, in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Locomotive Truck Co. 110 U. S. 490, S. C. 4 SUP. CT. REP. 220, Mr. Justice GRAY, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The application of an old process or machine to a similar or analogous subject, with no change in the manner of application and no result substantially distinct in its nature, will not sustain a patent, even if the new form of result has not before been contemplated." These authorities are pertinent. See, also, Vinton v. Hamilton, 104 U. S. 485; Blake v. City and County of San Francisco, ante, 692.

If, therefore, there is any patentable novelty in the O'Haire contrivance, it is in the placing of the rock-shaft inside the bar to which the hand-straps are attached. But the plaintiff's counsel, in order to bring the device used by the defendant within the monopoly of the O'Haire patent, insist that this is no part of the patented contrivance, and the testimony shows that the defendant does not use it. We are of opinion, therefore, that, construing the patent of O'Haire, in view of the state of the art at the date of its issue, as we are compelled to do, in order to leave any ground whatever on which it can be sustained, the defendant does not infringe.

*155

We have next to consider the patent granted to the plaintiff, dated March 30, 1875, "for an improvement in signaling devices for street cars." The specification thus states the object of the contrivance described in the patent "The prevalence of street cars managed by the driver, without the aid of a conductor, makes it necessary that every possible facility should be provided for him as well as the passengers. The ordinary street car has a signal-bell located at each end, with a bell-strap attached thereto, which runs centrally along the ridge or highest part of the ceiling. This strap, as thus located, is inaccessible to many passengers. My improvement is intended to remedy this trouble, and consists in a new combination and arrangement, with a street car, of bells or gongs and of the cords or straps which operate them, whereby passengers can, without rising from their seats, signal to the driver. This is of primary importance to invalids, ladies, and children, and that more especially when the car is crowded."

The device covered by the patent consists of the placing of two bells attached to the rafters of the bonnet or hood of the driver's platform, one at each corner of the front end of the car. To the hammer of each bell is attached one end of a bell-cord, the other end of which is attached to the inner side of the rear wall of the car, the cords being led along the lower margin of the ceiling, one on each side the car, from which bell-pulls or hand-straps are suspended at intervals within easy reach of the seated passengers, so that they, without rising from their seats, can ring the bell. The claim was as follows: "In a street car two bell-cords, each provided with a system of pull-straps, and arranged in such manner as to pass along the lower margin of the roof on the opposite sides of the car and connect directly with a signalbell or gong attached to the outside of the driver's end of the car, substantially as and for the purposes set forth." We are of opinion that there is no patentable invention described in this patent. Bell-straps or cords running from one end of an omnibus or street car to the other, under the middle of the ceiling, were well known and in common use years before the application of Stephenson for his patent. The fact that they were so placed and used is mentioned in the specification. The evidence also establishes the fact, that before the year 1870 it was a common practice to attach pendant bell-pulls or hand-straps to this central cord so as to bring it within easier reach of the passengers. The evidence shows that many of the cars in which such hand-straps or bell-pulls were used were built and sold in New York. The use of such pendant hand-straps, long before the application of Stephenson for the patent now under consideration, is conclusively proven.

It is also shown by the evidence that as early as the year 1861 a bell-cord or strap running along the sides of the cars above the heads of the passengers was publicly used on streets cars in Boston and Philadelphia, and the same arrangement of the cord or strap was shown in the patent of Charles Carr, issued July 5, 1870. When, therefore, the patent of Stephenson for his improvement in signaling devices for street cars was applied for in March, 1875, the only advance in the art which his specification showed was the applying to the cords running along the sides of the cars of the bell-pulls or hand-straps which had before then been attached to the cord running over the middle of the aisle. This, in our judgment, did not require the least degree of ingenuity, and cannot be called invention. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How.248; Stimpson v. Woodman, 10 Wall. 117; Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192; S. C. 2 SUP. CT. REP. 225; Slawson v. Grand-street R. Co. 107 U.S. 649; S. C. 2 SUP. CT. REP. 663; King v. Gallun, 109 U. S. 99; S. C. 3 SUP. CT. REP. 85; Phillips v. City of Detroit, 111 U. S. 604; S. C. 4 SUP. CT. REP. 580. The patent, therefore, by which the plaintiff seeks to embrace in his monopoly such an arrangement of the signal-cords and hand-straps of a street car is void. The third patent, which the plaintiff avers is infringed by the defendant, is for the improvement in street cars granted to John Stephenson, the appel

lant, September 7, 1875, on an application dated August 7, 1874. It is thus described in the specification: "In running street cars it has been found to be a serious source of trouble to have the driver continually turning around to ascertain when it is necessary to stop to permit passengers to enter or leave the car, as such constantly takes away his attention from his horses, and that frequently when it is most required. To obviate this trouble is the object of my present improvement. My invention, for this purpose, consists in combining a mirror with the front hood of the car, it being so arranged in connection therewith, and with an opening in the front end of the car, as to give to the driver a clear view of the inside of the car and through the entrance door of the latter, and that without the necessity of his having to turn around for such purposes, thereby enabling him, without withdrawing his attention from the horses, to see when it is necessary to stop, either to receive a passenger or to allow one to get out. This mirror is set at a small angle to a horizontal plane, so that its upper edge will project rearwardly beyond its lower edge, it being placed at such angle as will enable it, through the opening, F, in the front end of the car, to give the best view of the interior of the car, and through the glass windows of the entrance door, A.”

The claim was as follows: "The combination of a bonnet, E, provided with a mirror, C, with an opening, or an opening covered by a transparent medium, F, in the front end of a street car, substantially as and for the purposes set forth."

A combination is patentable only when the several elements of which it is composed produce by their joint action a new and useful result, or an old result, in a cheaper or otherwise more advantageous way. The elements of which the combination described in this patent is composed were all old and well known. They were a mirror, the hood of a street car over the driver's platform, and a glass panel in the front end of the car over the door. We are of opinion that the alleged combination of these three elements, as de scribed in this patent, is not patentable. There is, in fact, no combination, but a mere aggregation of separate devices, each of which performs the function for which, when used separately, it was adapted, and does not contribute to any new result, the product of their joint use. The result attained is merely the reflection of an object in a mirror. The hood and the glass panel in the end of the car do not change in any degree the function of the mirror. It is used as a mirror only. The function of the hood is not changed by the mirror or glass panel, or both. It is a hood only on which, as in the wall of a room, the mirror is hung. The use of a glass, instead of a wooden panel, in the front end of the car, simply removes an opaque obstacle between the mirror and the object to be reflected by it. Neither one of the three elements of the alleged combination performs any new office or imparts any new power to the others, and combined, they do not produce any new result or any old result more cheaply or otherwise more advantageously. There is, therefore, no patentable combination.

This conclusion is illustrated and confirmed by the following cases: Hailes v. Von Wormer, 20 Wall. 353; Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U. S. 347; Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U. S. 310.

It results from the views we have expressed that the decree of the circuit court dismissing the bill was right. It is therefore affirmed.

1. PLEADING-California-POSSESSION OF LANDS-EQUITable DefensE.

The system of pleading in civil cases in the courts of California permits an equitable defense to be set up in a special court, by way of cross-complaint, in the answer to an action for the possession of lands.

2. PUBLIC LAND-CHARGING Legal HOLDER OF Patent Grant AS TRUSTEE-CASE NEOESSARY TO BE PRESENTed.

To charge the holder of the legal title to land, under a patent of the United States, as a trustee of another, and to compel him to transfer the title, the claimant must present such a case as will show that he himself was entitled to the patent from the government, and that in consequence of erroneous rulings of the officers of the land department upon the law applicable to the facts found, it was refused to him. It is not sufficient to show that there may have been error in adjudging the title to the patentee.

In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of California.

*This case comes before us from the supreme court of California. The plaintiff in the court below, the defendant in error here, is the holder of a patent of the United States for certain lands situated in Humboldt county, in that state, issued to him under the pre-emption laws upon proof of settlement and improvement, and the present action is to recover their possession. In his complaint he alleges his ownership in fee of the premises on a day designated, the entry thereon of the defendant without license, and the subsequent withholding of them; also, that the value of the annual rents and profits of the premises is $800, for which sum and the restitution of the premises he prays judgment. The answer of the defendant denies the several allegations of the complaint, and sets up in a special count, by way of cross-complaint, various matters, which, as he insists, constitute in equity a good defense to the action and entitle him to a decree; that he has an equitable right to the premises; that the plaintiff holds the title in trust for him; and that the plaintiff should be required to convey the same to him.

The matters set up as grounds for equitable relief are the previous settlement upon the premises and their improvement by the defendant, and certain proceedings taken by him to acquire the title under the pre-emption laws, which were disregarded and held insufficient by the land department of the government, but which he contends establish his right to the patents.

It appears from the record and findings of the court that in October, 1862, the defendant purchased from his brother William, then in occupation of the land, the possessory right of the latter to the premises and his improvements thereon, received a deed from him, and immediately thereafter went into possession, which was held until March 23, 1865; that on that date, in consideration of $600 partly paid in cash, and partly payable in installments, the defendant contracted to convey the premises and improvements to the plaintiff Dilla, who thereupon was put into possession and continued in possession until the fifth of May, 1868; that he was then evicted under a judgment obtained by the defendant upon the contract of purchase, and the latter was restored to the possession. In July, 1869, the defendant removed to Arcata, about 20 miles distant, and remained there until October, 1871, when his family went back to the land, followed by himself in December. In April, 1872, he moved to Mattole, about 80 miles distant, and there remained until August, 1874, when he again returned. In October following he again moved to Arcata and did not return until March, 1875.

The land was surveyed in 1873, and the plat thereof filed in the land-office in October of that year, On the third of that month the defendant Bohall filed his declaratory statement, alleging settlement on October 22, 1862, and

claiming the land. On the twenty-sixth of December following, the plaintiff Dilla filed his declaratory statement, alleging settlement under the pre-emption laws on the twenty-fifth of March, 1865, and claiming the land. A contest thus arose in the local land-office between these parties as to which was entitled to the land under the pre-emption laws. The register and receiver of the land-office differed in their judgment, the receiver holding that the land should be awarded to Dilla, and the register that it should go to Bohall. The contest was thereupon transferred to the general land-office at Washington, and the commissioner sustained the claim of Dilla, holding that, from the time of his settlement in 1865, until ejected in 1868, he had fully complied with the law; that his absence since then was compulsory, as he was unable to make a residence on the land without being in contempt of the court, under whose judgment he was evicted; that his non-residence was for that reason excusable, and should not be allowed to work against him. But as to Bohall, the commissioner held that his residence on the land had not been continuous since his settlement, but had been interrupted by residence elsewhere for several periods; and that the occupation of tenants during such periods did not satisfy the provisions of the pre-emption laws, which required the continuous personal residence of the pre-emptor; and therefore his claim was rejected. The decision of the commissioner was affirmed on appeal by the acting secretary of the interior. It is upon this ruling, charged to be erroneous, that the defendant relies to maintain his claim for equitable relief. The local state court upon these facts, and others not material to the case, adjudged that the defendant was entitled to the decree prayed; but the supreme court of the state held otherwise, and reversed the judgment; and, as there was no finding as to the value of the rents and profits of the premises, ordered a new trial if the plaintiff so elected. Upon the filing of the remittitur in the lower court, the plaintiff waived his privilege of a new trial, and the court thereupon, on the pleadings and previous findings, gave judgment for the plaintiff, which was affirmed by the supreme court of the state; and this judgment is brought here for review.

W. W. Cope, for plaintiff in error. Walter Van Dyke, for defendant in

error.

FIELD, J. The system of pleading in civil cases in the courts of California permits an equitable defense to be set up in a special count, by way of crosscomplaint, in the answer to an action for the possession of lands. The crosscomplaint is in the nature of a bill in equity, and must contain its material allegations, disclosing a case which, if established, would entitle the defendant to a decree enjoining the further prosecution of the action, or directing that the title be conveyed to him. This equitable defense is, therefore, to be first considered, for, according to its disposition, will the necessity exist for further proceedings in the action at law, in which the legal title of the parties will alone control. Quinby v. Conlan, 104 U. S. 420; Estrada v. Murphy, 19 Cal. 248, 273; Arguello v. Edinger, 10 Cal. 150.

We do not think the claim of the defendant to the equitable relief he seeks can be sustained on the grounds stated in his answer or cross-complaint. To charge the holder of the legal title to land under a patent of the United States, as a trustee of another, and to compel him to transfer the title, the claimant must present such a case as will show that he himself was entitled to the patent from the government, and that in consequence of erroneous rulings of the officers of the land department upon the law applicable to the facts found, it was refused to him. It is not sufficient to show that there may have been error in adjudging the title to the patentee. It must appear that by the law properly administered the title should have been awarded to the claimant. Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 647; Boggs v. Merced Min. Co. 14 Cal. 279, 363. It is therefore immaterial, for the decision of this case, what our judgment may be upon the conclusions of those officers as to the possession