« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »
course of the proceeding against him are to be determined by the court to whose jurisdiction he has been subjected, and no other court is authorized to interfere to prevent it. Here the right of the prisoner to a discharge depends alone on the sufficiency of his defense to the information under which he is held. Whether his defense is sufficient or not is for the court which tries nim to determine. If, in this determination, errors are committed, they can only be corrected in an appropriate form of proceeding for that purpose. The office of a writ of habeas corpus is neither to correct such errors nor to take the prisoner away from the court which holds him for trial, for fear, if he remains, they may be committed. Authorities to this effect in our own reports are numerous. Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 202; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 166; Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 23; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 374; Ex parte Virginia, Id. 343; Ex parte Rowland, 104 U. S. 612; Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 375; S. C. 1 SUP. CT. REP. 381; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 653; S. C. 4 SUP. CT. REP. 152. Of course, what is here said has no application to writs of habeas corpus cum causa, issued by the courts of the United States in aid of their jurisdiction upon the removal of suits or prosecutions from state courts for trial under the authority of an act of congress. Denied.
(112 U. S. 205)
FOSTER, Co. Atty., etc., v. STATE OF KANSAS ex rel. JOHNSTON,
Atty. Gen., etc.
(November 10, 1884.)
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LAWS AGAINST LIQUOR TRAFFIC.
A state law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is not repugnant to the constitution of the United States.
2. PRACTICE REMEDY BY Quo Warranto in Kansas.
The remedy by information in the nature of a quo warranto in Kansas is a civil proceeding.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REMOVAL FROM OFFICE.
A state statute regulating proceedings for the removal of a person from a state office is not repugnant to the constitution of the United States, if it provides for bringing the party against whom proceedings are had into court, and notifying him of the case he has to meet; for giving him an opportunity to be heard in his defense; and for the deliberation and judgment of the court.
In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas. On motion to dismiss, with which is united a motion to affirm. See S. C., ante, 8.
W. Hallett Phillips, for plaintiff in error.
A. L. Williams, for defendant
*WAITE, C. J. This record shows that the attorney general of the state of Kansas commenced proceedings in quo warranto in the supreme court of the state against John Foster, county attorney of Saline county, to remove him from office, because he had neglected and refused to prosecute persons who were guilty of selling intoxicating liquors in the county in violation of a statute of the state known as the prohibitory liquor law. [See 3 Pac. Rep. 534.] Among other defenses relied on by the defendant was one to the effect that the statute under which the prosecutions were to be instituted was in violation of the constitution of the United States, and therefore void. It was also claimed that the writ of quo warranto in Kansas was a criminal proceeding, and that under the constitution of the United States the defendant was entitled to a trial in accordance with the Criminal Code of Procedure. The court ruled against the defendant on all these claims and defenses, and charged the jury that the sections of the prohibitory liquor law involved in the proceeding were not repugnant to the constitution of the United States. The trial resulted in a verdict against the defendant, and a judgment thereon removing him from office. This writ of error was brought to reverse that judg
ment, and the state now moves to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction, and with that has united a motion to affirm. This can be done under rule 6, § 5, of this court.
As the question of the constitutionality of the statute was directly raised by the defendant, and decided against him by the court, we have jurisdiction, and the motion to dismiss must be overruled; but, as every one of the questions which we are asked to consider has been already settled in this court, the motion to affirm is granted. In Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, it was decided that a state law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors was not repugnant to the constitution of the United States. This was reaffirmed in Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, and that question is now no longer open in this court. In Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, S. C. 4 SUP. CT. REP. 437, it was decided, at the last term, that the remedy by information in the nature of quo warranto, in Kansas, was a civil proceeding, and in Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 U. S. 480, that a state statute regulating proceedings for the removal of a person from a state office was not repugnant to the constitution of the United States if it provided for bringing the party against whom the proceeding was had into court, and notifying him of the case he had to meet; for giving him an opportunity to be heard in his defense; and for the deliberation and judgment of the court. Affirmed.
Ex parte BARKSDALE and others, Petitioners.
MANDANUS-WHEN IT IS TO ISSUE.
A wa of mandamus is not ordinarily granted when the party aggrieved has an. other ad.ate remedy.
(112 U. S. 181)
Motion for Leave to File a Petition for Mandamus.
WAITE, C. J. This motion is denied. A writ of mandamus is not ordinarily granted when the party aggrieved has another adequate remedy. No formal allowance by the circuit court of a writ of error from this court to review a judgment of that court is required. Davidson v. Lanier, 4 Wall. 453. The writ issues in a proper case as a matter of right, but, when sued out, seeurity must be given, and a citation to the adverse party signed. This se curity may be taken and the citation signed by a judge of the circuit court, or any justice of this court. No action of the circuit court as a court is required. It does not appear from the petition that any application has been made to either of the judges of the circuit court to approve security or to sign a citation. If they should refuse on application hereafter, resort may be had to either of the justices of this court. It will be time enough to apply for a
mandamus when all these remedies have failed.
Ex parte ROYALL, Petitioner.
(November 10, 1884.)
APPEAL AND WRIT OF ERROR-HABEAS CORPUS-ACTS OF FEBRUARY 5, 1867, AND MARCH 27, 1.868.
The supreme court has no jurisdiction under the form of an appeal or writ of error to review a decision of a circuit court upon a writ of habeas corpus, in the case of a person alleged to be "restrained of his liberty in violation of the constitution or any law or treaty of the United States." Such an appeal was given by the act of February 5, 1867, c. 28, (14 St. 385,) but it was taken away again by the act of March 27, 1868, c. 34, (15 St. 44,) and has never been restored.
Motion for Leave to File a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
Wm. L. Royall, for motion. WAITE, C. J. The petition which we are asked to grant permission to file prays for a writ of certiorari commanding "the clerk of the circuit court of the United States for the Eastern district of Virginia to certify to this court a full, true, and perfect transcript of the record, judgment, and proceedings had in the circuit court," under a writ of habeas corpus, issued by that court on the application of the petitioner, for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of his detention by the hustings court of the city of Richmond for trial upon an indictment found against him in that court. The circuit court refused to discharge the prisoner, but, on his "stating that he intended to apply to this * * court to review the order made by the circuit court," that court admitted him "to bail, the condition of his bond being that he should appear here on the first day of the present term, * and if this court should fail to make any order in the case, then to appear before the circuit court, and abide by the further order of that court." The petition further prays that this court "may make all such other orders as * * * petitioner's case may require, and as may be necessary to give him the full protection of the constitution and laws of the United States. That the cause of * * petitioner's unlawful custody may be inquired into, and that the erroneous judgment of the circuit court may be reviewed and reversed, and petitioner restored to the liberty which he has been illegally and unconstitutionally restrained."
This court has no jurisdiction, under the form of an appeal or writ of error, to review a decision of a circuit court upon a writ of habeas corpus in the case of a person "alleged to be restrained of his liberty in violation of the constitution or of any law or treaty of the United States." Such an appeal was given by the act of February 5, 1867, c. 28, (14 St. 385,) but it was taken away by the act of March 27, 1868, c. 34, (15 St. 44,) and has never been restored.
(112 U. S. 193)
In Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 103, it was held “that, in all cases where a circuit court of the United States has, in the exercise of its original jurisdicdiction, caused a prisoner to be brought before it, and has, after inquiring into the cause of detention, remanded him to the custody from which he was taken, this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, may, by the writ of habeas corpus, aided by the writ of certiorari, review the decision of the circuit court, and, if it be found unwarranted by law, relieve the prisoner from the unlawful restraint to which he has been remanded." The jurisdic tion is acquired by this court in such a case through its own writ of habeas corpus, and, until that is issued, there is no power to proceed. In the present case no such writ is asked for, and, as the circuit court has not yet remanded the prisoner to the custody from which he was taken, he is in no condition to apply for one under the ruling in Yerger's Case. We know of no authority in the circuit court to take a bond from a prisoner brought before it, by its own writ of habeas corpus, to appear in this court to answer that writ. It follows that, if we had before us the record which it is sought to bring up by the certiorari, we could not proceed to a review of the decision complained of, and the motion for leave to file a petition for the writ is denied.
GREAT WESTERN INS. Co. v. UNITED STATES.
(November 10, 1884.)
1. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS AS TO THE "ALABAMA CLAIMS."
Section 1006 of the Revised Statutes denies to the court of claims jurisdiction over claims depending on treaties with foreign governments, and hence that court cannot order the payment of losses out of the fund received by the United States from Great Britain as indemnity for the destruction of vessels by the Confederate steamer Alabama.
2. SAME CLAIMS UNDER A TREATY-ACT OF JUNE 25, 1868-JURISDICTION OF COURT of CLAIMS UNDER SPECIAL ACT OF CONGRESS.
Claims under treaty stipulations are not brought within the act of June 25, 1868, and when jurisdiction over such claims is conferred by special act, the authority of the court of claims to hear and determine them is limited and controlled by the provisions of such special act.
8. SAME CASE OF ATOCHA-SPECIAL POWERS OF COURT IN THAT CASE.
In no case has congress conferred upon any judicial tribunal the power to adju dicate as a class claims under a treaty with a foreign government; and in the Case of Atocha, when a reference of a single claim was made to the court of claims, its action was rather in the nature of a commission to ascertain the facts than a judicial tribunal, as in other cases, and hence no appeal was allowed.
4. SAME-ALABAMA CLAIMS-PROPER RESORT-COMMISSION.
The proper resort for the adjudication of treaty claims like the Alabama Claims, is a commission such as congress has appointed from time to time for that purpose. Appeal from the Court of Claims.
E. Y. Bell, A. J. Millard, S. G. Clarke, and E. B. Smith, for the Great Western Ins. Co. Sol. Gen. Phillips, for the United States.
MILLER, J. This is an appeal from a judgment of the court of claims dismissing a petition for want of jurisdiction. This was not done on a demurrer or plea, but on the following motion: "The assistant attorney general, on behalf of the United States, moves the court to dismiss the petition in this cause for the reason that it does not disclose a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the court." The motion on hearing was sustained, and it is this judgment of dismissal we are asked to review.
The petition sets forth that the claimant was an insurance company engaged in the business of insuring against losses by sea, and that it insured, in numerous cases, vessels, cargoes, and freight, owned by citizens of the United States, against war risks during the civil war between the United States and the Confederate states; that by reason of the losses and destruction of the vessels and cargoes so insured, inflicted by the Confederate cruisers Alabama and Florida, this claimant paid the sum of $309,635 to the owners of the vessels and cargoes, and that claimant not only became by law subrogated to rights of such owners against the parties who caused the loss, but took assignments of the claims from the losers to itself. The petition then alleges that the British government, by its laches and unfriendliness, in permitting these cruisers to be built, fitted out, and furnished with supplies within its dominion, became responsible for the losses inflicted on the owners of the vessels and cargoes captured and destroyed by them; that petitioner placed these claims in the hands of the secretary of state with the evidence to prove them against that government. The negotiation, treaty, and award known as the Alabama Claims Treaty and the Geneva Award are then set out, with the allegation that the sum now claimed by petitioner entered into and constituted a part of the $15,500,000 which was awarded to the United States in satisfaction of all claims of this character.
It is alleged that the money so awarded was paid to the United States, by reason of which and certain subsequent dealings with this money, which was finally paid into the treasury of the United States by order of congress, an implied contract arose on the part of the defendants to pay to the claimant the amount of the losses thus set forth, with interest thereon, which is alleged to be over $500,000. The names of the vessels, and the amounts insured in each case on vessel, cargo, and freight, are shown by a schedule attached to the petition. From this it appears that 12 of these vessels were captured by the Alabama, and 8 by the Florida. The names of the owners of the vessels, cargoes, and freight are distinctly set forth, and the amounts paid to each.
The claimant, in its petition, places the right to recover on the ground that by virtue of the transactions between this government and Great Britain, anc the receipt by the former of the money paid by the latter on account of these
claims, the United States became a trustee for the claimant to the amount of its loss, and liable to pay the same; or, as expressed in another form, the money was received by the government for the use and benefit of the petitioner, and when it was paid into the treasury became indebted to petitioner for that amount. The same ground is assumed in the argument of counsel in this court, the claim being treated essentially as indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received to the use of plaintiff.
If, therefore, the claim is well "founded on a contract, express or implied, with the United States," within the meaning of section 1059 of the Revised Statutes, and is not forbidden by any other act of congress, the petition should not have been dismissed; but if it does not present such an implied contract, (for there is no pretense of an express contract,) or if, for any other reason, the case is one of which the court of claims is forbidden to entertain jurisdiction, then the judgment of dismissal was correct.
The case has been mainly argued here on the proposition that the transaction does raise an implied promise on the part of the government of the United States to pay appellant the amount of money paid by it on account of the losses inflicted by the Alabama and Florida, or such proportion of that loss, if it be any less than the whole, as was covered by the award. And the judgment of the court below is defended largely upon the ground that no such legal obligation or contract arises from the transaction. The opinion of the learned chief justice of the court of claims is an able presentation of this view. But the judgment of that court is also defended on the ground that whatever may be the moral or the legal obligation of the government to the appellant growing out of the treaty, the award, and the receipt of the money, it does not present a case cognizable in the court of claims, both because the acts of congress creating the court and conferring its jurisdiction were not intended to embrace this class of cases, and because they were in express terms excluded from it. If this latter proposition be sound, we deem it inappropriate to express any opinion on the other, because the fund in the treasury, paid under the Geneva Award, has been already largely distributed under the decisions of one special commission appointed for that purpose, whose powers have expired, and is now under administration by another commission created for the same purpose by another act of congress. And although it is said that neither of these commissions could, under the law of its creation, take cognizance of appellant's claim, it is matter of public notoriety that the subject of claims of this class is occupying the attention of congress, and bills on that subject are now pending before it. Under these circumstances we do not think it appropriate to express an opinion on the legal or moral obligation of* the government in the matter, unless it is in the line of a plain duty.
The question of jurisdiction is the one raised by the motion, and is always to be decided before the court can properly inquire into the merits, and we are of opinion that, even if the circumstances recited in the petition can be held to raise an implied obligation on the part of the United States, the court of claims is forbidden to take jurisdiction in this class of cases. Section 1066 of the Revised Statutes enacts that "the jurisdiction of said court shall not extend to any claim against the government not pending therein on December one, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, growing out of or dependent on any treaty stipulation entered into with foreign nations or with Indian tribes." This language is comprehensive and explicit. If the cause of action grows out of a treaty stipulation, the court cannot entertain it. If it is dependent on any such stipulation, the same result follows. In any ordinary or usual sense of the words here used, appellant's claim, as set forth in the petition, grows out of the stipulations of the treaty of Washington. The allegation is that the United States took charge of the claim of petitioner against Great Britain for the injuries inflicted by the Alabama and the Florida; that, by a treaty on that subject, Great Britain stipulated that she would pay this claim