eternity of the world.) And if the universe be co-existent with its author, it must perpetually emanate from his nature, and be dependent on it, like the fhadow on its forming fubftance. But in this case, its archetype must be contained in the effence of its author; for every cause is that primarily, which its effect is fecondarily. And hence we infer, that if the fenfible universe be replete with forms of every kind, the exemplars of thofe forms, muft fubfift in immaterial perfection, in the artificer of the world. Ifthis fenfible world, then, be formed according to the exemplar of that which is intelligible; may we not fay, with the great Plotinus, that it is requifite universal animal fhould there primarily fubfift in perfect vital energy, containing all things in its omniform effence. "Hence (fays. he *) the heavens are there a divine animal, replete with ideal ftars. Earth too does not there fubfift folitary, but is much more vital than this corporeal earth, for it is full of intellectual life. The fea too is there, and all water fubfifting in life, and an ever-abiding stream. For how is it poffible that any thing not vital, can be the progeny of life itself? He, therefore, who enquires from whence animals originate in the intelligible world, might as well enquire from whence all life, and foul, and univerfal intellect, arofe. For here there is nothing indigent nor defective, but every thing is perfect and exuberant. Here they all flow from one fountain,, not as from a certain spirit, or heat, but as if from an univerfal quality, poffeffing and preserving in itself, all qualities; fuch as sweetness, accom-panied with fragrance. of fmell, the vigour. of wine, and the ftrength of all juices, bright colours, and whatever is per-ceived by the tafte." * Ennead vi. lib. vi.. 3. Such 3. Such then are the arguments which the Platonic philofophy affords in defence of ideas; the existence of which was fo evident to Plato, that, in the Sophifta, he compares those who oppose the friends of ideas to the giants of old, warring, as it were, on celeftial fouls, and fuch as are engaged in fublime investigations. Let us now confider to what univerfals these lucid beings are confined; fince, according to the Pythagoreans and Platonists, there are not ideas of all univerfal conceptions. "For, in the first place (fays Syrianus *), there are no ideas of things evil and base, because these subsist in nature rather by a privation and absence of ideas. And, on this account, they are faid to exist contrary to nature. Nor, fecondly, of negations, for these are deftructive of the bound and limitation which is attributed to every thing from the unifying and comprehending nature of ideas; and hence, feparation is rather the result of material infinity than of that which is formal or ideal. Nor again, are there any ideas of things which at different times receive a variety of conditions. For thefe participate of tranfmutation from à moveable caufe, but not from the immoveable and ftable illuftration of ideas. Nor again of parts, fuch as the hand, head, fingers, and the like. the causes of things exifting entire, produce whole fpecies and forms, not divided about the parts of thefe, like the reafons of nature. But neither did thefe wife men place in intellect the determinate caufes of accidents in bodies, fuch as fweetnefs and whitenefs. For they confidered that natural reasons were fufficient for the production of accidents. Nor again, of compofites, as of a wife man. For For In his commentary on the 2d, 12th, and 13th books of Aristotle's Metaphyfics, page 60. A Latin tranflation only of this invaluable work is extant; but I have fortunately a copy in my poffeffion, with the verfion every where corrected by the learned Thomas Gale, and with large extracts from the Greck. fince ideas are fimple, they prefide over the fimple effence of every thing. But the compofition and divifion of things is the business of our intellect; ideas, at the fame time, and that intellection which is co-ordinate to ideas, being exempt from all thefe, on account of superlative fimplicity. Neither, therefore, muft we establish ideas of things generated from diffimilars, fuch as mules; nor of fruit produced by engrafting from different trees. For all these have a posterior and adventitious generation, and are not the work of nature alone, nor of nature proceeding according to her own reasons, but, as it were, compelled to labour contrary to her own determinations. Hence it is manifeft, that all art, which imitates nature, and alone ministers to the use of mortal life, is feparated from the cause of ideas. But neither are the works which, depending on the purpose of the foul, are perfected by a concourse of many causes, and which we are accustomed to call the operations of fortune, to be conjoined to the cause of ideas. For things which are there perfected, are eternal, and subfift perpetually the fame, free from the nature of contingent events. It remains, therefore, that ideas must be confined to univerfal and perfect effences, and to whatever confers to their natural difpofition; as for instance, to man, and every thing perfective of man, fuch as wisdom and virtue. For ideas exifting as the generative and energetic. caufes of the perfection of every thing, diftribute being to effences, and convert them to the inexhaustible plenitude of their own omniform natures." 4. But let us now confider the nature of numbers; for. as every form is a number, according to the Pythagoreans *, a fpeculation of this kind must afford no small light to the See Proclus on Plato's Theology, p. 226. VOL. I. b ardu arduous investigation of ideas. Will it not, therefore, be proper, in the first place, to enquire, with the great Plotinus *, whether multitude is not a departure and distance from one, fo that infinity itself is a feparation from unity in the extreme, because it is no other than innumerable multitude; that on this account it becomes evil; and that we contract a fimilar nature when departing from intellectual unity, we are divided by fenfible multitude? For a being then properly becomes many, when no longer able to remain collected in itself, the fame, it is diffused abroad, and thus, being difperfed, is varioufly extended; fo that when, by diffufion, it is abfolutely deprived of unity, it becomes perfect multitude, deftitute of that universal cement, which unites one part with another. But whenever the conciliating one is prefent, then that which was fcattered and diffused, becoming permanent by its bounding power, paffes into magnitude. But if any one should deny the subsistence of unity, afferting that one is no where to be found, which is not fome particular one; and should hence affirm, that what is called one abftractedly, is only a certain affection of the foul towards any being; we afk, what prohibits the appellation of effence, from being nothing more than an affection of the foul, and confequently the existence of being, a delufion? For we predicate unity of particulars with as great propriety as being. well aware, that philofophers of the prefent day will anfwer, that we have an evident proof of the reality of being, from its agitating the foul, and becoming apparent in the phantafy to which we reply, that in like manner, the foul is agitated, and the imagination influenced about the For every individual as much excites the perception: of one, as of being. one. Ennead vi. lib. 6, . I am Befides, Befides, it is neceffary to enquire whether we behold this paffion and conception of the foul, as one or multitude. And again, when we fay not one, we do not then poffefs one from the thing itself; for we fay that one is not contained in that individual. And hence we must poffefs one in our own nature, and this muft refide in the foul, feparate from that which is denominated fome particular one. But here it may be objected, that the one we poffefs is received from externals, and is nothing more than a conception of the mind, produced by the thing itself. For it will be faid, that as multitude is nothing besides a number of individuals, which are called many, fo one is nothing. besides one thing; and is formed by thought feparating that one particular from others. To this we reply as follows: How can it be confonant to reason to suppose that the conception of one arifes from the fenfation of fome one particular fubject? For one particular man, who is difcerned by fenfe, is by no means the fame with one itself, fince, if this were the cafe, thought could never predicate one of that which is not a man. Befides, as cogitation, on beholding the different pofitions of things, affirms that this is here or there, fo when it perceives an individual, it pronounces one; for that paffion is not vain, nor does it affert one of a non-entity. Nor must we think it predicates one, because this individual is different from another; for when cogitation affirms fuch a thing is this, and not another, it declares, in the mean time, that the other is one, Likewife when it affirms that any thing is this alone, it then declares, that what is alone is one: on which account, it predicates one, prior to alone. Befides, if there be multitude, it is neceffary that one fhould antecede; fince when it predicates many, it pronounces more than one. And when b 2 |