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have now and then happened, and swept all away, except (it may be) two or three perfons that have efca. ped, and begun the world again upon a new fcore. This is the only refuge that the Atheist hath to fly to, when he is preffed with this and the like arguments. But he cannot poffibly efcape this way for these univerfal inundations must either be natural or fupernatural. If they be fupernatural, (as any man that confiders well the frame of the world, and how hard it is to give a natural reafon of them, would be inclined to think), then indeed it is easy to conceive, how a few of mankind, and no more, fhould efcape; because this will depend upon the pleasure of that fuperior being which is fuppofed fupernaturally to order these things. But this is to yield what we have all this while contended for, viz. That there is a God. But if they be natural, which the Atheist muft fay, then there is nothing to restrain them from a total deftruction, not only of mankind, but of all the beafts of the earth. This the Atheist cannot deny, not only to be very poffible, but exceeding probable; because he grants it to have come fo near the matter, that but very few escaped, and no doubt with great difficulty. Now, it is the greatest wonder in the world, that a thing, according to their own fuppofition, fo likely to happen, fhould never have fallen out in an infinite duration. Will any man have the face to fay, that a thing is likely, which did never yet happen from all eternity? One would think, that not only whatever is probable, but whatever can poffibly happen, fhould be brought about in that space; fo that, if mankind had been from eternity, it had, in all probability, I had almost faid, been deftroyed from all eternity; but I may confidently fay, long fince ruined.

2. Another probability of the world's beginning is, the account which we have of the original of learning, and the most useful arts in feveral parts of the world. Now, if the world had been eternal, these in all likelihood would have been found out, and generally spread long ago, and beyond the memory of all ages. There are fome arts indeed that are peculiarly convenient to fome particular nations, and others that are only ferviceable to the humour and fafhion of one or more ages.

Thefe

These are not likely to spread; and they may come in, and go out, and return again as often as there is occa fion. But those which are generally useful to mankind in all times and places, if they were once found out, (and who would not think they should in an eternal duration?) it is not imaginable but that they should have been spread innumerable ages fince. Nor can any man give a good reafon how they fhould ever be loft, but by fome fuch accident as an univerfal deluge; which has been spoken to already. But now, on the contrary, the beginnings of learning, and of the most useful arts in feveral nations, is very well known. And I add farther, that where-ever learning and civil arts have come, this tradition concerning the beginning of the world hath been most vigorous, and afferted with the greatest clearnefs and confidence.

3. The feveral parts of which the world confifts, be ing (fo far as, by thofe parts of it which we know, we can poffibly judge of the reft) in their nature corruptible, it is more than probable, that in an infinite duration this frame of things would long fince have been diffolved; especially if, as the Atheist affirms, there be no fuperior being, no wife and intelligent principle, to repair and regulate it, and to prevent thofe innumerable diforders and calamitous accidents, which must in fo long a space, in all probability, have happened to it. This Lucretius, I. 5. alfo urges as a convincing proof, that the world was not eternal.

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Quare etiam nativa neceffe eft confiteare

Hæc eadem; neque enim mortali corpore quæ funt,
Ex infinito jam tempore adhuc potuiffent
Immenfi validas ævi contemnere vires.

"It must neceffarily (fays he) be acknowledged, that "the world had a beginning; otherwife thofe things which are in their own nature corruptible, had never been able, from all eternity, to have held out against thofe forcible and violent affaults which in an "infinite duration must have happened" Nay, thus much Ariftotle himself every where grants, that if the frame of the world be liable to diffolution, it must of neceffity be acknowledged to have had a beginning.

Thefe are fome of the chief probabilities on our fide;

which, being taken together, and in their united force, have a great deal of conviction in them; efpecially if this be added, that there is no kind of pofitive proof fo much as pretended on the other fide. The utmost that Ariftotle pretends to prove is, that the world proceeded from God by the way of a natural and neceffary effect, as light does from the fun which, if it be true, as there is no tolerable ground for it, the world indeed would be without beginning, but not of itself. And thus I have done with the firft confideration I propounded to speak to, viz. That there are fair proofs on our fide, and as convincing as the nature of the thing is ca pable of; but that there is no pretence of proof on the ether. I proceed therefore to the.

2d confideration, That the moft preffing difficulties are on that fide on which there is no proof.

Those who deny a God, and hold the world to have been eternal, and of itself, have only two things to object against us: The difficulties that there are in the notion of a God, and in making the world of nothing. To the first I answer, That we attribute nothing to God: that hath any repugnancy or contradiction in it. Power, wifdom, goodness, juftice, and truth, have no repug nancy in them to our reafon; because we own the fe perfections to be in fome degree in ourielves, and there-fore they may be in the highest degree that is poffible in another. The eternity of God, and his immenfity,, and his being of himself, how difficult foever they may. be to be conceived, yet thefe perfections must be grant ed to be fomewhere; and therefore they may as well, nay much better, be afcribed to God, in whom we suppofe all other perfections to meet, than to any thing elfe. And as for God's being a fpirit, whatever difhculty there may be in conceiving the notion of a fpirit, yet the Atheist muft grant the thing, that there is a being or principle really distinct from matter; or else thew how mere matter, which is confeffed by themselves to be void of fenfe and understanding, and to move neceffarily, can produce any thing that has fenfe, underftanding, and liberty. As to the other difficulty, of making the world of nothing, I fhall only fay this, that though it fignify an inconceivable excefs, of power, yet there can no contradiction be fhewn in it. And it is

every

every whit as easy to conceive, that fomething fhould be caused to be that was not before, as that any thing fhould be of itfelf; which yet must be granted on both fides; and therefore this difficulty ought not to be objected by either.

But then, on the other fide, there are thefe two great and real difficulties. ft, That men generally have al ways believed the contrary, viz. that the world had a beginning, and was made by God. Which is a strong evidence, that this account of the exiftence of the world is more natural, and of a more eafy conception to human understanding. And indeed it is very natural to conceive, that every thing which is imperfect, (as the world, and all the creatures in it, must be acknowledged in many respects to be), had fome cause which produced it, fuch as it is, and determined the bounds and limits of its perfection; but that which is of itself, and without a cause, may be any thing, and have any perfection which does not imply a contradiction. 2dly, Tó affert mankind to have been of itself, and without a cause, hath this invincible objection against it, that we plainly fee every man to be from another. So that mankind is afferted to have no caufe of its being, and yet every particular man must be acknowledged to have a father; which is every whit as abfurd in an infinite fucceffion of men, as in any finite number of generations. It is more easy indeed to conceive, how a conftant and permanent being, fuppofe matter, fhould always have been of itself; and then that that should be the foundation of infinite fucceffive changes and alterations; but an infinite fucceffion of the generations of men, with out any permanent foundation, is utterly unimaginable. If it be faid, that the earth was always, and in time did produce men, and that they ever fince have produced one another; this is to run into one great abfurdity of the Epicurean way; which shall be confidered in its proper place.

And thus I have endeavoured, as plainly and briefly as the nature of the argument would admit, to prove, that the account which the fcripture gives of the exiftence of the world, is most credible, and agreeable to the reafon of mankind; and that this first account which the Atheift gives of it is altogether incredible.

And

And now I expect, after all this, the Atheist will complain, that all that hath been faid does not amount to a ftrict demonftration of the thing. It may be fo. And

if the Atheist would undertake to demonftrate the contrary, there might be fome reafon for this complaint. In the mean time, I defire to know, whether, when both fides are agreed that the world is, and that it muft either have its original from God, or have been always of itself; and if it have been made evident, that on one fide there are fair proofs, both from testimony and reafon, and as convincing as the nature of the thing is capable of, and no pretence of proof on the other; and that the difficulties are most preffing on that fide which is deftitute of proof: I fay, if this have been made evident, I defire to know whether this be not upon the matter as fatisfactory to a wife man as a demonftration? For in this cafe there can be no doubt on which fide the clear advantage of evidence lies, and confequently which way a prudent man ought to determine his affent.

I come now, in the fecond place, to confider the o ther account, which another fort of Atheists, thofe whom I call the Epicureans, do give of the existence of the world; and it is this: They fuppofe the matter of which the world is constituted to be eternal, and of itfelf, and then an infinite empty fpace for the infinite little parts of this matter (which they call atoms) to move and play in and that these being always in motion, did, after infinite trials and encounters, without any counsel or defign, and without the difposal and contrivance of any wife and intelligent being, at last, by a lucky cafualty, entangle and fettle themfelves in. this beautiful and regular frame of the world which we now fee; and that the earth, being at firft in its full vigour and fruitfulness, did then bring forth men, and all other forts of living creatures, as it does plants

now.

This is in fhort the Epicurean account of the origi nal of the world; which, as abfurd as it is, Lucretius,. 1.5. hath very elegantly expreffed in these verfes :

Sed quibus ille modis conjectus materiai,
Fundarit cælum ac terram, pontique profunda,

Solifque

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