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for this I need go no further than my text, which bids men try the fpirits whether they be of God. I do not think this is fpoken only to the Pope, or a general council; but to Chriftians in general; for to thefe the Apostle writes. Now, if St John had believed that God had conftituted an infallible judge in his church, to whofe fentence and determination all Chriftians are bound to fubmit, he ought in all reafon to have referred Chriftians to him for the trial of fpirits, and not have left it to every man's private judgement to examine and to determine these things. But it feems St Paul was likewise of the fame mind; and though he was guided by an infal lible fpirit, yet he did not expect that men fhould blind. ly fubmit to his doctrine: nay, so far is he from that, that he commends the Bereans for that very thing for which I dare fay the church of Rome would have checked them most severely, namely, for fearching the fcrip tures, to fee whether thofe things which the Apoftles delivered were fo or not. This liberty St Paul allowed; and though he was infpired by God, yet he treated thofe whom he taught like men. And indeed it were a hard cafe that a neceffity of believing divine revelations, and rejecting impoftures, fhould be impofed upon Chriftians; and yet the liberty of judging whether a doctrine be from God or not, fhould be taken away from them.

3dly, Our adverfaries themselves are forced to grant that which in effect is as much as we contend for. For tho' they deny a liberty of judging in particular points of religion, yet they are forced to grant men a liberty of judging upon the whole. When they of the church of Rome would perfuade a Jew or a Heathen to become a Christian; or a heretic, as they are pleafed to call us, to come over to the communion of their church, and offer arguments to induce them thereunto; they do by this. very thing, whether they will or no, make that man judge which is the true church, and the true religion : because it would be ridiculous to perfuade a man to turn to their religion, and to urge him with reasons to do fo; and yet to deny him the use of his own judgement, whether their reafons be fufficient to move him to make fuch a change. Now, as the Apostle reasons in another cafe, Hh 2 if

if men be fit to judge for themselves in fo great and important a matter as the choice of their religion, why fhould they be thought unworthy to judge in leffer matters? They tell us indeed, that a man may ufe his judgement in the choice of his religion; but when he hath once chofen, he is then for ever to refign up his judgement to their church. But what tolerable reafon can any man give, why a man fhould be fit to judge upon the whole, and yet unfit to judge upon particular points; efpecially if it be confidered, that no man can make a difcreet judgement of any religion, before he hath examined the particular doctrines of it, and made a judgement concerning them? Is it credible, that God fhould give a inan judgement in the most fundamental and important matter of all, viz. to difcern the true religion, and the true church, from the falfe, for no other end, but to enable him to chufe once for all to whom he fhould refign and inflave his judgement for ever? which is juft as reafonable as if one fhould fay, that God hath given a man eyes for no other end, but to look out once for all, and to pitch upon a difcreet perfon to lead him about blindfold all the days of his life. I come now to the

3. Third thing I propounded, which is, to answer the main objection of our adverfaries against this principle: and likewife to fhew, that there is no fuch reafon and neceffity for an univerfal infallible judge as they pretend. Now, their great objection is this: If every man may judge for himfelf, there will be nothing but confufion in religion, there will be no end of controverfies; fo that an universal infallible judge is neceffary, and without this God had not made fufficient provifion for the affurance of mens faith, and for the peace and unity of his church : or, as it is expreffed in the Canon law, Aliter Dominus non videretur fuiffe difcretus: "Otherwife our Lord had

not feemed to be difcreet." How plaufible foever this objection may appear, I do not defpair, but, if men will lay afide prejudice, and impartially confider things, to make it abundantly evident, that this ground is not fufficient to found an infallible judge upon. And therefore, in answer to it, I defire thefe following particulars may be confidered.

ift, That this which they fay, rather proves what

God

God fhould have done according to their fancy, than what he hath really and actually done. My text expressly bids Chriftians to try the fpirits; which to any man's fenfe does imply, that they may judge of these matters: but the church of Rome fays they may not; becaufe, if this liberty were permitted, God had not ordered things wifely, and for the beft, for the peace and unity of his church. But as the Apostle fays in another cafe, What art thou, O man, that objecteft against God?

2dly, If this reafoning be good, we may as well conclude, that there is an univerfal infallible judge fet over the whole world in all temporal matters, to whofe authority all mankind is bound to submit; because this is as neceffary to the peace of the world, as the other is to the peace of the church. And men surely are every whit as apt to be obftinate and perverse about matters of temporal right, as about matters of faith. But it is evident in fact and experience, that there is no fuch univerfal judge appointed by God over the whole world, to decide all cafes of temporal right; and for want of him the world is fain to fhift as well as it can. But now a very acute and fcholaftical man, that would argue that God must needs have done whatever he fancies convenient for the world should be done, might by the very fame way of reafoning conclude the neceffity of an uni verfal infallible judge in civil matters, as well as in matters of religion: and their Aliter Dominus non videretur fuille difcretus: "Otherwife God had not seemed to "be difcreet," is every whit as cogent and as civil in the one cafe as the other.

3dly, There is no need of fuch a judge, to affure men în matters of religion; because men may be fufficiently certain without him. I hope it may be certain and clear enough, that there is a God, and that his providence governs the world, and that there is another life after this, though neither Pope nor council had ever declared any thing about these matters. And for revealed doctrines,. we may be certain enough of all that is neceffary, if it: be true, which the fathers tell us, "That all things ne"ceffary are plainly revealed in the holy fcriptures." 4thly, An infallible judge, if there were one, is no certain way to end controverfies, and to preferve the Hh. 3:

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unity of the church; unless it were likewife infallibly certain, that there is fuch a judge, and who he is. For till men were fure of both thefe, there would ftill be a controversy, whether there be an infallible judge, and who he is? And if it be true, which they tell us, That without an infallible judge, controverfies cannot be ended; then a controverfy concerning an infallible judge can never be ended. And there are two controverfies actually on foot about an infallible judge; one, Whether there be an infallible judge or not? which is a controverfy between us and the church of Rome: and the other, Who this infallible judge is, which is a controverfy among themfelves, which could never yet be decided: and yet, till it be decided, infallibility, if they had it, would be of no ufe to them for the ending of contro verfies.

5thly, There is no fuch abfolute need as is pretended, of determining all controverfies in religion. If men would diveft themfelves of prejudice and interest, as they ought, in matters of religion, the neceffary things of religion are plain enough, and men would generally agree well enough about them: but if men will fuffer themselves to be biaffed by thefe, they would not hearken to an infallible judge, if there were one; or they would find out fome way or other to call his infallibility into queftion. And as for doubtful and leffer matters in religion, charity and mutual forbearance among Chriftians would make the church as peaceable and happy as perhaps it was ever defigned to be in this world, without abfolute unity in opinion.

6thly, And lastly, Whatever may be the inconveniencies of mens judging for themfelves in religion; yet ta king this principle with the cautions I have given, I doubt not to make it appear, that the inconveniencies are far the leaft on that fide. The prefent condition of human nature doth not admit of any conftitution of things, whether in religion or civil matters, which is free from all kind of exception and inconvenience. That is the best state of things which is liable to the leaft and feweft. If men be modeft, and humble, and willing to learn, God hath done that which is fufficient for the affurance of our faith, and for the peace of his church, without an

infallible

infallible judge; and if men will not be fo, I cannot tell what would be fufficient. I am fure there were herefies and fchifms in the Apoftles times, when thofe who governed the church were certainly guided by an infallible Spirit. God hath appointed guides and teachers for us in matters of religion; and if we will be contented to be inftructed by them in thofe neceffary articles and duties of religion which are plainly contained in scripture, and to be counselled and directed by them in things that are more doubtful and difficult, I do not fee why we might not do well enough without any infallible judge or guide. But ftill it will be faid, Who fhall judge what things. are plain, and what doubtful? The answer to this, in my opinion, is not difficult. For if there be any thing. plain in religion, every man that hath been duly inftruct ed in the principles of religion can judge of it, or elfe it is not plain. But there are fome things in religion fo very plain, that no guide or judge can in reason claim that authority over men, as to oblige them to believe or do the contrary; no, though he pretend to infallibility; no, though he were an Apoftle, though he were an angel from heaven. St Paul puts the case so high, Gal. i. 8. Though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gofpel unto you, than what you have received, let him be accurfed: which plainly fuppofeth, that Christians may and can judge when doctrines are contrary to the gospel. What! not believe an Apostle, nor an angel from heaven, if he should teach any thing evidently contrary to the plain doctrine of the gofpel? if he fhould determine virtue to be vice, and vice to be virtue? No: not an Apostle, nor an angel; because fuch a doctrine as this would confound and overturn all things in religion. And yet Bellarmine puts this very cafe, and fays, "If the Pope fhould fo determine, we were bound to believe “him, unless we would fin against conscience."

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I will conclude this difcourfe, by putting a very plain and familiar cafe; by which it will appear what credit and authority is fit to be given to a guide, and what not. Suppofe I came a stranger into England, and, landing at Dover, took a guide there to conduct me in my way to York, which I knew before by the map to lie north of Dover. Having committed myfelf to him, if he lead me

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