INTRODUCTORY TITLE. Art. 1. The Code of Evidence, which is applicable as well to civil as to criminal cases, will direct judges, other magistrates, ministers of justice and jurors, what proof is sufficient to commit, to indict, and to convict an offender, against the Code of Crimes and Punishments. Art. 2. Where, in this Code, examples are given to illustrate certain, rules of evidence, they are never intended as an enumeration of all the cases coming within such rules. When a limitation to certain enumerated cases is intended, it is unequivocally so expressed. Art. 3. The substantive word judge in this Code means the power which has the right of deciding on the subject matter to which the article in which it is used applies; it may, according to the subject, mean either the magistrate, the jury, or the arbitrator or referee. Art. 4. All the rules of evidence which are laid down to regulate the introduction and declare the effect of proof adduced on the principal matter in dispute in judicial investigation, apply also to the introduction and effect of the same kind of proof on any incidental question, except when it is otherwise expressly provided. Art. 5. Particular provisions in this Code control general rules, but in the particular case only in which they are introduced. Art. 6. By the expression "immoveable estate," or "immoveables," is meant all that is made such by destination or provision of law, as well as by nature. Art. 7. When the word "evidence" is used in this Code, it always means 'legal evidence," as herein defined. Art. 8. In all cases whatever where any thing is declared to be legal evidence, it must be understood to be with the proviso that it is applicable to the issue or fact in litigation. Whether so applicable or not (when there is no express provision) it is left to the discretion of the court to determine. But in the exercise of this discretion great liberality must be used, and no legal evidence excluded that has even a remote application to the question. Art. 9. If in any criminal case the provisions of this Code, for the admission or exclusion of evidence, shall in the opinion of the court be found to have operated unjustly; and in consequence thereof any one is convicted, judgment shall not be pronounced until after the report has been made to the legislature, in the manner hereinafter provided. But if such provision shall operate, in the opinion of the court, in favour of the accused, who shall, in consequence of evidence admitted or excluded conformably to such provision, be acquitted, judgment of acquittal shall be rendered: and in either of these cases (as well as in civil cases, where a verdict has, in the opinion of the court, been unjustly given in consequence of evidence admitted or excluded conformably to such provision) a full report shall be made to the legislature of the case, together with the reasons of the court for thinking the particular provision unjust or inexpedient; and if the legislature shall, at the first session after the report, make the alterations, in substance, as suggested by the court, a new trial shall be given in the civil suit, and to the party convicted in a criminal cause; otherwise judgment shall be given on the verdict. Art. 10. If in the trial of any cause a question shall arise, relative to the admission of evidence for the decision of which no provision is made in this Code, the court shall decide according to such principles as they believe the legislature would have been guided by had the case been foreseen; and shall, in like manner, report the case and their decision, with the reason thereof, to the legislature. And although the legislature should amend this Code in consequence of such representation, or should omit so to do, it shall not affect the decision if it be made in a civil cause. Art. 11. But if the case provided for by the last preceding article be a criminal one, and the principle adopted by the court shall have admitted or excluded evidence, to the prejudice of the accused, which evidence would not have been so excluded or admitted as the Code now stands, and the accused shall, in consequence thereof, be convicted, no judgment shall be had on such conviction, but the defendant shall be discharged. Art. 12. The last three preceding articles relate only to questions on the admissibility of evidence; all questions, as to its credit and weight, when admitted, must be decided by the judge or the jury, to whichever the fact is submitted, except in cases of evidence declared by law to be conclusive. BOOK I. OF THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE, AND OF ITS SEVERAL KINDS. TITLE I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS. Art. 13. Evidence is that which brings or contributes to bring the mind to a just conviction of the truth or falsehood of any fact asserted or denied. Art. 14. From the above definition it results that judges of fact, except in cases of proof declared to be conclusive, are not bound to decide in conformity with the declarations of any number of witnesses, which do not produce conviction to the mind, against a less number, or against presumptions which do satisfy the mind. Art. 15. A conviction produced by evidence, which ought not, according to the rules of true reason, to have that effect, is not a just conviction. But different minds may have different conceptions of what is true reason; the law, in order to secure uniformity of decision on this point, declares what evidence ought, in given cases, to produce, or contribute to produce such conviction, and that evidence is called legal evidence. TITLE II. DISTRIBUTION OF THE SUBJECT. Art. 16. LEGAL EVIDENCE, in relation to its nature, is of two kinds: that which the judge receives from his own knowledge, and that which he derives from other sources; the latter is either testimonial, scriptory, or substantive. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE is that which is offered by the relation of any other person, whether communicated to the judge orally or in writing. SCRIPTORY EVIDENCE comprehends all written evidence other than the declarations of witnesses reduced to writing. SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE is that which is produced by the exhibition of any object which from its nature, situation, or appearance, creates a belief of the truth or falsehood of the allegation in dispute. |