estates.

and Britain, the queen, in order to ease the emperor, and save his troops, stipulated with king Philip for a neutrality in Italy, and that his imperial majesty should have liberty to evacute Catalonia; upon condition of absolute indemnity of the Catalans, with an entire restitution to their honours, dignities, and As this neutrality was never observed by the emperor, so he never effectually evacuated Catalonia; for, although he sent away the main body, he left behind many officers and private men, who now spirit up and assist those obstinate people to continue in their rebellion. It is true indeed that king Philip did not absolutely restore the Catalans to all their old privileges, of which they never made other use than as an encouragement to rebel; but admitted them to the same privileges with his subjects of Castile, particularly to the liberty of trading, and having employments in the Weft-Indies, which they never enjoyed before. Besides, the queen reserved to herself the power of procuring farther immunities for them, wherein the most christian king was obliged to second her: for, his catholic majesty intended no more than to retrench those privileges, under the pretext of which they now rebel, as they had formerly done in favour of France. How dreadful then must be the doom of those, who hindered these people from submitting to the gentle terms offered them by their prince! and who, although they be conscious of their own inability to furnish one single ship for the support of the Catalans, are at this instant spurring them on to their ruin, by promises of aid and protection !

Thus much in answer to Mr. Steele's account of the affairs of Erope, from which he deduces the uni

versal monarchy of France, and the danger of I know not how many popish successors to Britain. His political reflections are as good as his facts. "We must observe," says he, "that the person who seems to be the most favoured by the French king in the late treaties, is the duke of Savoy." Extremely right for, whatever that prince got by the peace, he owes entirely to her majesty, as a just reward for his having been so firm and useful an ally; neither was France brought with more difficulty to yield any one point, than that of allowing the duke such a barrier as the queen insisted on.

"He is become the most powerful prince in Italy." I had rather see him so than the emperor. "He is supposed to have entered into a secret and strict alliance with the house of Bourbon." This is one of those facts wherein I am most inclined to believe the author, because it is what he must needs be utterly ignorant of, and therefore may possibly be

true.

I thought indeed we should be safe from all popish successors as far as Italy, because of the prodigious clutter about sending the pretender thither. But they will never agree where to fix their longitude. The duke of Savoy is the more dangerous for removing to Sicily: he adds to our fears for being too near. So, whether France conquer Germany, or be in peace and good understanding with it, either event will put us and Holland at the mercy of France, which has a quiver full of pretenders at its back, whenever the chevalier shall die.

This was just the logick of poor prince Butler, a splenetick madman, whom every body may remem

ber

ber about the town. Prince Pamphilio in Italy, employed emissaries to torment prince Butler here. But what if prince Pamphilio die? Why then he had left in his will, that his heirs and executors torment prince Butler for ever.

I cannot think it a misfortune, what Mr. Steele affirms, "that treasonable books lately dispersed among us, striking apparently at the Hanover succession, have passed almost without observation from the generality of the people;" because it seems a certain sign, that the generality of the people are well disposed to that illustrious family: but I look upon it as a great evil, to see seditious books dispersed among us, apparently striking at the queen and her administration, at the constitution in church and state, and at all religion; yet passing without observation from the generality of those in power: but whether this remissness may be imputed to Whitehall, or Westminsterhall, is other men's business to inquire. Mr. Steele knows in his conscience, that the Queries concerning the Pretender, issued from one of his own party. And as for the poor nonjuring clergyman, who was trusted with committing to the press a late book on the subject of hereditary right, by a strain of a summum jus, he is now, as I am told, with half a score children, starving and rotting among thieves and pickpockets, in the common room of a stinking jail. I have

*This should be- I cannot think it a misfortune, as Mr. Steele affirms,' &c. not, what Mr. Steele affirms;' which is not grammar.

↑ Upon his conviction he was committed to the Marshalsea; and at his sentence, to the Queen's Bench for three years.

*

never seen either the book or the publisher; however, I would fain ask one single person in the world a question; why he has so often drank the abdicated king's health upon his knees?-But the transition is natural and frequent, and I shall not trouble him for an answer.

It is the hardest case in the world, that Mr. Steele should take up the artificial reports of his own faction, and then put them off upon the world, as additional fears of a popish successor. I can assure him, that no good subject of the queen's is under the least concern, whether the pretender be converted or not, farther than their wishes that all men, would embrace the true religion. But reporting backward and forward upon this point, helps to keep up the noise, and is a topick for Mr. Steele to enlarge himself upon, by showing how little we can depend upon such conversions, by collecting a list of popish cruelties, and repeating after himself an i the bishop of Sarum, the dismal effects likely to follow upon the return of that superstition among

us.

But, as this writer is reported by those who know him, to be what the French call journaler, his fear and courage operating according to the weather in our uncertain climate; I am apt to believe the two last pages of his Crisis, were written on a sunshiny day. This I guess from the general tenour of them, and particularly from an unwary assertion, which, if he believes as firmly as I do, will at once overthrow all his foreign and domestick fears of a popish "As divided a people as we are, those

successor.

VOL. III.

*Parker, afterward lord chancellor,

Y

who

who stand for the house of Hanover, are infinitely superiour in number, wealth, courage, and all arts military and civil, to those in the contrary interest; beside which, we have laws, I say, the laws on our side. The laws, I say, the laws." This elegant repetition is, I think, a little out of place; for the stress might better have been laid upon so great a majority of the nation; without which, I doubt the laws would be of little weight, although they be very good additional securities. And if what he here asserts be true, as it certainly is, although he assert it (for I allow even the majority of his own party to be against the pretender) there can be no danger of a popish successor, except from the unreasonable jealousies of the best among that party, and from the malice, the avarice, or ambition of the worst without which, Britain would be able to defend her succession, against all her enemies, both at home and abroad. Most of the dangers from abroad, which he enumerates as the consequences of this very bad peace made by the queen, and approved by parliament, must have subsisted under any peace at all; unless, among other projects equally feasible, we could have stipulated to cut the throats of every popish relation to the royal family.

Well, by this author's own confession, a number infinitely superiour, and the best circumstantiated imaginable, are for the succession in the house of Hanover. This succession is established, confirmed, and secured by several laws; her majesty's repeated declarations, and the oaths of all her subjects, engage both her and them to preserve what those laws have settled. This is a security indeed, a security dequate at least to the importance of the thing;

and