liable as a general partner, the court stated that "the duty of making such publication is by the statute devolved upon the partners." In Van Ingen v. Whitman, 62 N. Y. 513, the special partner did not, as matter of fact, contribute $30,000 in cash to the general fund, as the certificate stated. There were certain assets which he owned in an old partnership, and he empowered one of the general partners to turn them into cash, which was to be contributed as his payment, and treated as cash, the firm being solvent. But this court held that that was not a compliance with the statute, which required that the payment should be made in cash. Here again the liability rested upon a failure of the individual to do that which the statute required that he should do. It was his own act, or rather his own failure to act, for which he was held responsible. Then there is the case of Durant v. Abendroth, 69 N. Y. 148. There the partnership was to commence on the 1st of January, which happened to be Sunday. The articles of copartnership were drawn up, and the certificate and affidavit made, on the 23d of December, upon which day the special partner gave his check for the amount he was to contribute, dated the 31st of December, and the certificate and affidavit were immediately filed. The check was paid on the 2d of January-the first banking day of the new year-and the cash was thereby paid into the partnership before one particle of business was done under its terms. This court however held that the affidavit was false when made, because at that time payment in cash had not been made, but a post-dated check was given in lieu thereof, and after such check was paid no affidavit was made of the contribution in cash of the amount to be contributed by the special partner. Here again the defendant was held liable because of his own failure to fulfill and comply with the terms of the statute. He had full power to pay in cash at the time the affidavit was made, and if he failed, it was his misfortune. I think it was a very stern and technical application of the statute, because confessedly before one particle of business was transacted by the firm, and on the earliest possible day after the commencement of the term of partnership at which it could be done, the check was paid, and the cash contributed by the special partner to the gen might be, but the question is, can the clerk be compelled by mandamus to record such papers one hour earlier than other papers which came in ahead of them for record? It is his duty to record them all; and can the court say, that because the paper is a short one, he shall record it immediately, and in advance of a paper filed a week, а month, or perhaps three months ahead of it? In other words, is not the clerk doing all that he can be compelled to do when he records papers as of the day when they were left for record, as soon as he reaches them in the regular discharge of his duties? It seems to me so, and yet during all this time the partnership does business at the peril, as to the special partner, of having it declared a general one, and the statement in the certificate as to when the partnership is to commence may be false, owing to a failure of the clerk to make this record; or the special partner, unwilling to take this risk, may endeavor to avoid it by refusing to allow any business to be done until that record is made; although how he can carry out such refusal, or how he can prevent any business being done during this time by the general partners is a little difficult to understand. All this difficulty is avoided by holding what it seems to me is the fair and plain intention of the Legislature, viz., that when the parties have done all that they can do in the way of complying with the terms and conditions of the Limited Partnership Act, and when all that remains to be done is for a public officer (intrusted with the care and custody of the papers filed with him) to perform the duties placed upon him under the provisions of the law, it must be regarded as a compliance by the parties interested with the terms of the statute, and the record must be assumed to be made when the paper goes for the purpose of record out of the control of the individual into the control of the public officer. It is said that the same reasoning would apply to the publication in the newspapers of the terms of the partnership as provided for by the act. But it seems to me an entirely different principle applies there. The duty of making the publication is cast upon the partners; and there is no obligation on the part of the publisher of the paper as there is on the part of the public officer, to do any thing. Again it is a matter of private contract between the partners and the pub-eral fund. It does not seem to me as if the principle lishers of the newspaper; and in that way it is within the power of the partners to see to it that the publication is made within the time required in the statute, and that it correctly states the terms of such partnership. However the effect of a failure to publish is not now before us. It is true, that in the general construction and interpretation of the statute in relation to limited partnerships, courts have inclined to exact a rigid performance of the substance of the statute from those desirous of availing themselves of its benefits. But in all the cases that my attention has been called to, and in all that I have been able to find, where the individual has been held liable for a failure to comply with the terms of the statute, such liability has been based upon a failure to do that which the statute called upon the parties interested, or some of them, to do, and not upon the failure of a public officer to do an act which the statute provided that he should do. Thus in the case of Smith v. Argall, 6 Hill, 479, the publication of the terms of the partnership made in one of the newspapers stated that the special partner had contributed $5,000, when in fact he had only contributed $2.000. It was not claimed that there was any fraud in the statement, but simply a mistake, and as the law cast the duty upon the partners to make the publication, a failure to make it correctly rendered the defendant liable as a general partner. That case is again reported on appeal in 3 Denio, 435, where as the main ground for holding the defendant of that case should be extended. Church, C. J., and Earl,J., dissented from the decision thereof, and Allen, J., did not sit. Upon a subsequent appeal, reported in 97 N. Y. 132, the doctrine is reiterated. A substantial compliance with the terms of the statute, even in the case of a limited partnership, has upon one or two occasions been held sufficient. Thus in Bowen v. Argall, 24 Wend. 496, a publication of the names of the parties was made, in which the name of one partner was printed "Argale," instead of "Argall;" and the court held, that in the absence of any evidence that anybody was misled by it, the mistake was unimportant, and if there were any such evidence, it would have been a fair question for the jury. Again in Bank v. Gould, 5 Hill, 309, the period of the com. mencement of the partnership was erroneously stated as November 16 instead of October 16 in the newspaper. In the absence of evidence that any one was injured, that was also held to be an unimportant mistake, and that the statute was substantially complied with, and the special partner not liable. Some cases in other States have been referred to on the argument in relation to the construction to be given to this act, but upon examination I do not see that very much light is thrown therefrom. The case of Gray v. Gibson, 6 Mich. 300, does not discuss the question at all. It assumes the fact to be as stated in the opinion and then decides some other question. That was a case where they attempted to prove a general partner ship as between the plaintiffs themselves by proving an attempt to form a special partnership, and a failure to record the certificate. The court held such facts did not prove that the plaintiffs were partners as between themselves. At the same time, it assumed that the failure to record the certificate would have rendered plaintiffs liable as general partners as to third persons. The case of Henkel v. Heyman, 91 Ill. 96, affirming 1 Bradw. 145, assumed that the failure of the clerk to record the certificate would not render the special liable as a general partner. In that case the certificate had been taken to the clerk's office for the purpose of being filed, and had been withdrawn; and the court held it was not filed within the meaning of the act. Those are the only cases outside of the State to which my attention has been called, and the only ones I have found upon the subject. One might be said to offset the other, and neither contributes any thing toward a proper solution of the question in hand. In this State some cases have been decided by the Supreme Court which are somewhat analogous to the one now under discussion. By the statute every chattel mortgage, under the circumstances therein named, is absolutely void as against the creditors of the mortgagor, and subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith, unless the mortgage, or a true copy thereof, be filed as directed in the act. It is made the duty of the clerks of towns in whose office chattel mortgages are required by the act to be filed, to provide proper books in which the names shall be entered in alphabetical order of the parties to every mortgage, and also to indorse them on the back, and to enter the number in a separate column in the books in which the mortgages shall be entered. Yet in the cases of Bishop v. Cook, 13 Barb. 326; Dodge v. Potter, 18 id. 193; and Dikeman v. Puckhafer, 1 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 32, it was held that the failure of the clerk to do these things did not affect the rights of the mortgagee, as he had done all that he could do when he delivered the mortgage to the clerk to be filed, and that he ought not to be held liable for the default of the clerk, a public officer, over whose acts he had no control. The cases are not precisely similar to the one under consideration, and yet the principle of non-liability for the default of a public officer, under circumstances somewhat similar, is announced, and I think correctly maintained. Plaintiff cited the case of Frost v. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch. 288, as an instance where the courts have held an individual bound by the neglect of a public officer. The case was where the record of a mortgage mistakenly stated its amount as $300, instead of its actual sum of $3,000; and the mortgagee was held bound by the record in favor of a subsequent bona fide purchaser, relying on the record as correct. The case is entirely unlike the one under consideration. The very life of the system of recording titles and incumbrances thereon depends upon the fact of the record itself being a sufficient source of information for a subsequent bona fide purchaser or incumbrancer; and unless such were the case it would be practically useless to have a record. A mortgagee knows this, and hence is responsible for the truth of the record, as it must be assumed he knows its contents, and knowing it, still allows others to deal with the property on the faith of the correctness of such record. He might fairly be said to be estopped from denying the correctness of the record on the principle applicable to an estoppel in pais. The case is peculiar, and stands on principles which call for such a decision, at the peril of otherwise losing most of the benefits to be derived from a record of titles or incumbrances. It will be noticed the mortgagee is not liable for a failure of the clerk to record at all, but only for a false record. He can easily call the attention of the clerk to the mistake, and it may be instantly remedied; but in the case at bar the partners cannot, as I have shown, compel an immediate record of the certificate. It seems to me the principle of holding an individual responsible for a default of a public officer should not be extended to a case such as is under consideration here. But I think that this court has decided the principle involved in this case in accordance with the views which I take of this statute. I refer to the case of Veeder v. Mudgett, 95 N. Y. 295, which arose by reason of an attempt to enforce the liability of the defendants under the General Manufacturing Act of 1848. I confess I am wholly unable to see any distinction in principle between these two acts. I am unable to see how, if a record of a certificate is necessary in the one case, it is not equally necessary in the other; and as this court has decided that it is not necessary in a case arising under the Manufacturing Act, I am unable to perceive any valid reason why it should be necessary in case of a limited partnership. The statute is no more peremptory in the one case than in the other, and there is no more reason for holding a liability in the one case than in the other. On a line with the decision in the Veeder case, although prior in poiut of time, is that of Cameron v. Seaman, 69 N. Y. 396, which involved the proper construction of section 12 of the Manufacturing Act of 1848. See also Butler v. Smalley, 101 N. Y. 71. I see no reason whatever for establishing a different rule in regard to the formation of limited partnerships, for the purpose of terminating the liability of the individual as a general partner, from that which is held in relation to manufacturing corporations, for the purpose of terminating the individual liability of stockholders. March 6, 1888. Manhattan Co. v. Laimbeer. Opinion by Peckham, J. Andrews, Earl, Danforth and Finch, JJ., concur. Ruger, C. J., and Gray, J,, dissenting. WILLS-REVOCATION-BY RELEASE FROM DEVISEE. -Under 3 Revised Statutes of New York, p. 2, chap. 6, §§ 47, 48, providing that a devise shall not be revoked by any alteration in testator's interest in the property devised, not amounting to an entire divestiture,except by a conveyance, either declaring such alteration to be a revocation, or itself wholly inconsistent with the previous devise, the execution by a remainderman of realty of a receipt for money in full of all interest in the testator's estate, up to date, and all such other property as he may accumulate up to his decease, does not operate as a revocation so as to effect a satisfaction of the devise, where testator dies without altering or revoking his will. The rule of ademption is predicable of legacies of personal estate, and is not applicable to devises of realty. Story Eq. Jur., § 1111; 2 Wms. Ex'rs (5th Am. ed.), 1202; 1 Rop. Leg. 365; Davys v. Boucher, 3 Young & C. 397; Langdon v. Astor's Ex'rs, 16 N. Y. 34. Ademption is the extinction or satisfaction of a legacy by some act of a testator, which is equivalent to a revocation of the bequest, or indicates the intention to revoke; and the rule is applied where the testator is a parent of the legatee, or staud in loco parentis. The question of its application is made to depend upon the declared or presumed intention of the donor. Langdon v. Astor's Ex'rs, supra. The danger of creating an intention from the facts is ordinarily great enough to require in each case that the mind of the court should be wholly satisfied as to the meaning of the testator's act. In the present case, had the testamentary gift been a legacy of personal property, we should say that no doubt could exist as to what was intended by testator at the time of the transaction. We see no reason however for the application of any such rule to devises of real property. During a testator's life-time his will was of course inoperative and ineffectual, and only upon his death does it have any legal operation. The writing which testator took from his daughter was not an agreement in any sense binding upon him, nor was it one which accrued to appellant's benefit. Appellant was no party to it, and no consideration moved from him for its execution. The question is not such as would arise by reason of a transaction between respondent as the legatee and appellant as the residuary legatee, by which she had transferred or released to him, her interest under her father's will in due form. After the writing had been delivered the daughter may have been precluded from asserting her right to recognition in her father's will, but the father was at liberty either to give legal effect to the transaction by changing his will and revoking the provisions in his daughter's favor, or to reconsider any previously-existing intention of altering his provision for her. Although he survived the transaction fifteen years, he did not change his will, and the presumption of a subsequent change of intention on his part from any motive may be entertained without doing any violence to our ideas of strict justice. But a deeper principle underlies the consideration of this question in the effect to be given to our statutes governing the making of wills. A specific devise of real property may be revoked by alteration or alienation of the estate during testator's life (Livingston v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 124; McNaughton v. McNaughton, 34 N. Y. 201), but we fail to see any other mode of effecting such revocation without running counter to those provisions of the statutes which declare what acts shall revoke or alter a will in writing. 3 Rev. Stat. (Banks' 7th ed.), 2286-2288. In these provisions I think I see ample reason for refusing our sauction to the introduction of a doctrine, which while if applicable at this day to legacies of personal property, can work no especial prejudice to rights of property in such application, yet in its application to devises of real property might work great mischief' and tend to endanger the safety of titles which depend for their security upon the conduit of a testamentary devise. The reason for refusing to extend the application of the principle of satisfaction of devises of real estate, which was assigned in the case of Davys v. Boucher, 3 Youug & C. 397, was that to so extend it would repeal that provision of the statute of frauds which applies to the revocation of wills of real estate. The sixth section of the English statute of frauds (29 Car. II, chap.) provided that devises in writing of lands, etc., should be revocable by some other will or codicil or writing declaring the same, or by destruction by testator's act; and that all such devises should remain in force unless destroyed, or unless altered as mentioned by will, codicil or writing witnessed in form. The subsequent passage of chapter 26, 2 Vict., placed the revocation of wills of personalty upon the same footing as wills of realty. 1 Wms. Ex'rs, 106, 107, 130, 131. There is a sufficient likeness in the English statute to ours to make the reasoning applicable here. A rule of law which has heretofore been sanctioned and relied upon, which is in unison with the spirit and with the sense of our statute, and which offers a safe rule of property, is rather to be followed than to be departed from for reasons moving from the circumstances of a particular case. Reference to adjudged cases in the courts of other States only serves to confirm us in the views we have expressed. Clark v. Jetton, 5 Sneed, 229; Allen v. Allen, 13 S. C. 512; Weston v. Johnson, 48 Ind. 1. Feb. 28, 1888. Burnham v. Comfort. Opinion by Gray, J., Earl and Peckham, JJ., dissenting. court, in an action between citizens of the same State, on an agreement in writing, by which plaintiff, the owner of letters-patent already once reissued, granted to defendant an exclusive license to make and sell the patented article, the defendant expressly acknowledging the validity of the patent, and stipulating that plaintiff might obtain reissues, and promising to pay royalties so long as no decision adverse to the patent should have been rendered, that defendant was estopped from denying the validity of subsequent reissues of the letters, is not a decision of any questions arising under the patent laws of the United States, and the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction. It has beeu decided that a bili in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States by the owner of letters-patent, to enforce a contract for the use of the patent right, or to set aside such a contract because the defendant has not complied with its terms, is not within the acts of Congress, by which an appeal to this court is allowable in cases arising under the patent laws, without regard to the value of the matter in controversy. Act of July 4, 1836, chap. 357, § 17 (5 St. 124); Rev. Stat., § 699; Wilson v. Sandford, 10 How. 99; Brown v. Shannon, 20 id. 55. Following those decisions, it was directly adjudged in Hartell v. Tilghman, 99 U. S. 547, that a bill in equity by a patentee, alleging that the defendants had broken a contract by which they had agreed to pay him a certain royalty for the use of his invention, and to take a license from him, and thereupon he forbade them to use it, and they disregarded the prohibition, and he filed this bill charging them as infringers, and praying for an injunction, on account of profits and damages, was not a case arising under the patent laws, and therefore, the parties being citizens of the same State, not within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States; and the judges who dissented from that conclusion admitted it to be perfectly well settled "that where a suit is brought on a contract of which a patent is the subject-matter-either to enforce such contract, or to annul it-the case arises on the contract, or out of the contract, and not under the patent laws." 99 U. S. 558. In the still later case of Albright v. Teas, 106 US 613 a patentee filed a bill in equity in a State court, setting up a contract by which he agreed to assign his patent to the defendants, and they agreed to pay him certain royalties, and alleging that the defendants had refused to account for or pay such royalties to him, and had fraudulently excluded him from inspecting their books of account. The defendants answered that the plaintiff had been paid all the royalties to which he was entitled, and that if he claimed more, it was because he insisted that goods made under another patent were an infringement of his. This court held that it was not a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, removable as such into the Circuit Court, under the act of March 3, 1875, chap. 137, § 2 (18 St. 470). It was said by Chief Justice Taney in Wilson v. Sandford, and repeated by the court in Hartell v. Tilghman, and in Albright v. Teas: "The dispute in this case does not arise under any act of Congress, nor does the decision depend upon the construction of any law in relation to patents. It arises out of the contract stated in the bill, and there is no act of Congress providing for or regulating contracts of this kind. The rights of the parties depend altogether upon common law and equity principles." 10 How. 101, 102; 99 U. S. 552; 106 id. 619. Those words are equally applicable to the present case, except that as it is an action at law, the principles of equity have no bearing. This action therefore was within the jurisdiction, and the parties being citizens of the same State, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State courts, and the only Federal question in the case was rightly decided. Upon the merits of the case it follows from what has been already said that no question is presented of which this court, upon this writ of error, has jurisdiction. Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590. The grounds of the judgment below appear in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, to which, under the existing acts of Congress, this court is at liberty to refer. Fire Ass'n v. New York, 119 U. S. 110; Kreiger v. Railroad, Sup. Ct. Rep., 752. Whether that court was right in its suggestion that it would have no jurisdiction to determine the validity of the second reissue if incidentally drawn in question in an action upon an agreement between the parties, we need not consider; inasmuch as it expressly declined to pass upon any such question, because it held that in this action to recover royalties due under the agreement, the defendant, while continuing to enjoy the privileges of the license, was estopped to deny the validity of the patent, or of any reissue thereof. The decision was based upon the contract between the parties, and the court did not decide, nor was it necessary for the determination of the case that it should decide, any question depending on the construction or effect of the patent laws of the United States. Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 18 How. 289; Brown v. Atwell, 92 U. S. 327. March 19, 1888. Date Tile Manuf'g Co. v. Hyatt. Opinion by Gray, J. ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DECISIONS. - SIGNATURE OF ATTACHMENT- BØND SURETIES PARTNERSHIP NAME.-In the absence of proof to the contrary, it will be presumed that a surety on an attachment bond, who signs the name and style of a partnership, id so with the authority of the other partners, and the attachment issued thereon will not for that reason be declared invalid. We cannot assume from the fact that one of the sureties signed as "Arnold & Shelton," that this name or style represents a partnership; for it is frequently the case that one person does business under a name or style which would indicate that more than one person was interested in it. It is doubtless true that one member of a copartnership has no authority, by virtue solely of the partnership, to bind the firm as surety in a matter not affecting the partnership business; but it is equally true that one member of a firm, by consent of his copartner, may bind the firm as surety in a matter in which the partnership has no interest what ever. The power of a partnership is not limited, as is that of a corporation, to the transaction of such business as falls fairly within the purposes for which it was entered into, but by consent of its members may extend to any transaction not forbidden by law. It may become surety for the payment of the debt or undertaking of another. If it be conceded that "Arnold & Shelton" was the name or style of a partnership composed of two or more persons, to hold the bond invalid because the firm appears to be the Surety, we should have to assume that the bond was executed by a member of the firm without the consent or authorization of his copartners. There is no presumption of law or fact that this is true; but on the contrary, the presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is that the officer whose duty it was to pass upon the sufficiency of the sureties, made inquiry and satisfied himself that the person who signed for "Arnold & Shelton" had authority so to do. Such has been the ruling elsewhere. Danforth v. Carter, 1 Cole, 553; Churchill v. Fulliam, 8 Iowa, 47; Cunningham v. Lamar, 51 Ga. 575. The motion is based solely on what appears upon the face of the bond, and raised no issue of fact on which an inquiry could have been made as to the authority of the person who signed the bond to bind a partnership doing business under the name and style of " Arnold & Shelton." It would seem that in any case in which the authority of one to sign a firm name as surety to such a bond, approved and filed, is questioned, that this should be done by some plea raising an issue of fact, and not by a motion which goes only to the sufficiency of the papers as they appear. Messuer v. Hutchins, 17 Tex. 602; Wright v. Smith, 19 id. 299; Drake Attachm. 133. No such plea was filed. If such a plea had been filed and on inquiry it had been found that "Arnold & Shelton" was the style of a partnership composed of two or more persons, and that this was signed by one member of the firm without authority from his copartner so to sign it, then the attachment and all proceedings under it should have been set aside. The fact that such a result may ensue when the name or style of a partnership is signed to an attachment bond is a very good reason why a clerk should not receive a boud having on it as surety a name which seems to be the name or style of a part. nership. A bond thus signed ought to be rejected by the officer whose duty it is to approve the bond; for he ought not to imperil the rights of parties by undertaking to pass upon the power of one partner to bind his firm as surety, which will most frequently involve a question of law, and in all cases complicated inquiries of fact which he ought not to assume to decide. He must inquire who are the members of the firm, and whether they have all consented that it shall become surety in the given case. If some or all members of a firm are willing to become sureties they can sign or cause to be signed their own names, and thus avoid all question. Legislation upon this matter may be desirable. Tex. Sup. Ct., Dec. 2, 1887. Dannelly v. Elser. Opinion by Stayton, J. CARRIERS-OF PASSENGERS-COUPON TICKETS-REFUSAL TO ACCEPT DETACHED TICKETS.-The defendant, while riding in a car of the plaintiff, tendered in payment of his fare a coupon taken from a ticketbook which contained originally one hundred similar coupons. On each coupon were printed the words, "Not good if detached," and on the cover of the book, "Coupons are to be detached by or in the presence of the conductor, and will be accepted for passage only when accompanied by this ticket." The defendant refused to exhibit his ticket-book or to pay his fare in any other manner than as aforesaid. At the trial he offered to prove that it was the custom of passengers to pay their passage with detached coupons, without showing their books; but the evidence was excluded. Held, that the contract of which the book and coupons were evidence was a reasonable one; that there was no evidence that the plaintiff had rescinded or waived any of the terms or conditions of the contract; and that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Jan. 12, 1888. Boston & M. R. Co. v. Chipman. Opinion per Curiam. · Cattle-NEGLIGENCE-PRESUMPTION.-Eight cows having been safely loaded in a truck at D. for conveyance to B., on the arrival of the train at B. it was found that one had a leg broken, and that three others were injured about the hips and rump. The owner having brought an action for negligence against the railway company, and having proved the injuries and given his opinion that they were caused by undue shunting and jerking of the train, held, that the defendants are entitled to judgment. Stephen, J.: It seems to me that it is impossible to go beyond making a mere guess as to how the injury to the cattle to compel a conveyance of real estate, and for the parti- Mr. Field, the well-known author of a work on cor- NEW YORK CHANCERY REPORTS. The first volume of this important series is at hand, from the house of the Lawyers' Co-operative Publish happened, as to whether the railway company were guilty of negligence, on the one hand, or whether on the other hand, the beasts began to fight amongst themselves. If this had been a criminal case, I do not suppose the plaintiff's counsel himself would have said for a moment that defendants ought not to have been acquitted, as there certainly is reasonable doubt upon the subject. In a civil action a liability may be established on perhaps not quite so much proof as is necessary in a criminal proceeding, but it is essential to have some fact which renders it very decidedly more likely that there was negligence than that there was none. In this case I fail to see any thing whatever to turn the scale seriously one way or the other. The only bit of evidence, or so-called evidence, which was given on behalf of the plaintiff, was evidence of which I will only say that if the motion had been for a new trial only, I should certainly have been in favoring Association of Rochester, N. Y. It embraces the of granting it on the ground of its wrongful admis- first five volumes of Johnson's Chancery Reports, and sion. There is something to my mind almost absurd is a well printed volume of 1260 pages in double columns, at the price of $5. The plan is to publish the in the notion of calling a drover and asking him how he thinks such an accident is likely to have happened. 32 volumes of these reports with the one volume of the Chancery Sentinel, in seven books, for $33, or one Of course he thinks it likely to have happened by the original volume, and a digest for $3. dollar for each railway company's negligence. The evidence of exthe series cannot be over-estimated. The importance on perts ought to be given only in cases where there is a ustified in saying that it is the The publishers are question as to some point of science or art, and ceran Equity Jurisprudence." The foundation of America tainly no such question arises in this case. Smith, J.: any advantages, the first of The real question here is whether or not the plaintiff present edition has m. the second of which is the has fulfilled that burden which is cast upon him of which is its cheapness, and Desty, an experienced and giving some evidence of negligence on the part of the annotation by Mr. Robert D defendant company, or putting it in other words, accomplished editor. The con whether he has given any evidence showing facts inone is another advantage. We consistent with due care having been taken by the de- notation of this volume and may fendant company in the conveyance of these animals. excellent. The publishers have had It is beyond question that in a case like this the their similar enterprises of the New plaintiff must give some affirmative evidence of negli- Law and the United States Supreme gence on the part of the railway company. Putting and we predict for this series an equal pr aside the question put to the expert can it be said that deem it a more important series than th the injuries to the cows--the hair rubbed off the hips law series, for the reason that while our and rump, and one cow with a leg broken-show a adjudications have not been universally or state of facts more inconsistent with the injuries followed, there is hardly any equity lav having been brought about by the restiveness of the country that has not sprung from the adju cattle than by the jolting of the train? I cannot see of Kent, Walworth and the learned vice-ch that it is. Given that state of facts and no more, it of our State. The series is adapted to use seems to me to be equally consistent with the cattle State by the learned labor of the editor. having become restive and one of them having slipped down and got its leg broken, as with the case which was suggested by the plaintiff that the train had been unduly shunted during the progress of its journey from Derby to Bedford. It seems to me that the plaintiff has not shown any thing inconsistent with due care having been exercised on the part of the railway company. The facts are equally consistent with the restiveness of the cows as with the want of due care on the part of the defendants. As regards the evidence of the expert, I am of opinion that the plaintiff in this action, who was a cattle drover and farmer attending markets, was not an expert competent to give evidence as to how the injury was occasioned during the journey on the railway. The question put was in my opinion inadmissible. Q. B. Div., Nov. 15, 1887. Smith v. Midland Ry. Co. 67 L. P. Rep. (N. S.) 813. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. FIELD ON INFANTS, ETC. The Legal Relations of Infants, parent and child, and guardian and ward, and a particular consideration of guardianship in the State of New York, including practice and procedure in Surrogates' courts, and in the Supreme Court and county courts, and the superior courts of cities, in matters of guardianship; and in actions against infants bining five indexes in good success in COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. THE following decisions were handed down Tues day, .ner, nent ite Judgment affirmed with costs-Edward Tack for reargument denied with ten dollars costs. Motion ap ⚫rge +1 F. 1 |