that when it clearly appeared from the complaint that the plaintiff could not in any point of view be entitled to the final relief of injunction as demanded therein, a temporary injunction was unauthorized, and this court would in that case review an order for an injunction pendente lite. With this single exception, the decisions in this court have been uniform to the effect that it will not review orders of this character. We have examined with some care the complaint in this action, and are not prepared to say, as matter of law, that a case may not be proved under its allegations entitling plaintiffs to some portion of the relief sought. March 6, 1888. Strasser v. Moonelis. Opinion by Ruger, C. J. -FORFEITURE BY LANDLORD AND TENANT LEASE DEPOSIT FOR PERFORMANCE OF COVENANT BREACH-PLEADING.-(1) A deposit made by a tenant with his landlord to secure the performance of the conditions of the lease is not forfeited by a breach, by reason of which the tenant was dispossessed. (2) In an action by a tenant against his landlord to recover money deposited as security for payment of rent, sums paid by the landlord for repairs, which the tenant covenanted to make, to be available in defense, must be pleaded as a counter-claim. It is not sufficient to claim to reduce plaintiff's cause of action to the extent of the amount expended. March 6, 1888. Scott v. Montells. Opinion per Curiam. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-DEFECTIVE STREETSICE ON SIDEWALK.-When a sidewalk of a city has been regularly cleared of snow within a reasonable time after it has fallen, but the successive thawing and freezing, varied occasionally by rain, has kept the surface of the sidewalk generally coated with ice from the action of natural causes and the rigor of the climate, and a person is injured by slipping and falling upon such walk, the city is not liable, even if the ice upon which plaintiff slipped was formed by water dripping from a roof. The general facts of this case bring it within the doctrine of Taylor v. City of Yonkers, 105 N. Y. 202. Of course, in a severe and long-continued frost, eave-troughs will fill with ice and conductors freeze, and with a thaw or a rain, icicles will form and water drip to the sidewalk and freeze. The city is not responsible for the construction or sufficiency of the eaves upon the property of individuals. It is not bound to repair them if out of order, and has no authority to directly interfere with their construction. No possible vigilance or care in a large city, and in our climate would avail to prevent such results. The common good and general convenience sometimes brings with it a trace of seeming hardship to individuals. The duty of the municipality is to keep the sidewalks reasonably clean and safe. Snow can be removed without serious difficulty, and where a village permitted it to accumulate on the walk from the slide of an adjoining roof until it forms a positive and dangerous obstruction to travel, we held in the first of the cases above cited that the city was liable; not however because the snow fell from an ill contrived roof, but because having fallen and impeded passage, the corporation did not cause its removal. But ice from the drip of a roof is a different matter. In severe winters it is difficult to remove it. Unreasonable, persistent and extraordinary diligence during the prevalence of freezing weather would alone be adequate to the emergency. Must the city every day chop it off wherever, through miles of streets, the difficulty occurs? Is that a reasonable requirement? The plaintiff's case however failed at another point. This sidewalk through its whole extent for weeks before the accident was coated with ice formed from natural causes, and which the city could not reasonably be required to remove, and was not required to remove. The accident occurred on the 22d day of January, when the thermometer in the morning stood at 20 above zero, at midday 27 above, and in the evening at 19 above. The day before snow fell in the morning, turned into rain at 3:30 P. M., and stopped at 5 P. M. The snow-fall was 4 inches, and the melted snow and rain-fall combined was .25 inch. The freezing of the night and the next day could not have failed to form a new coating of ice, and if, on the morning of the 21st, the walk had been utterly free from snow and ice, the latter would have formed and made the whole walk slippery. Doubtless the new ice came upon the old ice, and possibly some addition was made to that from the drip of the eaves; but it cannot be said upon the evidence produced that the plaintiff would not probably have fallen if not a drop of water had come from the eaves, or that the freezing of that drip was the proximate cause of her fall. Abundant reason and explanation existed in the conceded operation of natural causes, and the jury, as we have heretofore said, were not at liberty to guess at or speculate upon a possible ground of action against the city. We do not know, and it is not possible to say from the proof, that plaintiff slipped upon ice formed from the drip of the eaves. Ice was all over the sidewalks from natural causes, and where no such drip existed. That ice the city, as we have held, was not bound to remove. Are we nevertheless to say that it was required to remove a new coating formed from the freezing of the drip, and was negligent for not doing so? The plain truth of the case, when divested of all artificial reasoning, is that a natural cause of the accident existed for which the city was not responsible, and a possible concurrent cause from dripping eaves may have joined in making the ice, but cannot be said to have itself caused the injury. If it did, the city was no more bound to remove that new coating than the layers beneath. The motion for a nonsuit should have been granted. March 6, 1888. Kaveny v. City of Troy. Opinion by Finch, J. DEFECTIVE STREETS-ICE ON SIDEWALK. A city is not liable to a traveller for injuries occasioned by the slippery condition of a sidewalk, when that condition is shown to be produced merely by smooth ice of recent formation. That this city may be liable to a traveller for injuries occasioned by sidewalks unsafe in consequence of an accumulation of ice, is not to be questioned. Todd's case, 61 N. Y. 506. But here there was no accumulation, and it can scarcely be said there was uneveness at the place of the accident. On the contrary the ice was all in one sheet, just alike," and of recent formation. Three days before the sidewalk "was all right." It had been thawing the day before and the day before that. The sidewalk itself was in good order. A city is not bound to keep its sidewalks absolutely free from ice, and we think the learned trial judge erred in submitting the case to the jury as one in which they might find that it had been guilty of some neglect of duty in regard to it. There was no ground for such speculation. It does not appear that ordinary care had not been exercised to keep the walk safe for use in the usual mode by travellers, nor that it was not so. We are unable to find any evidence that its condition was such as should have been noticed by the officers of the city or its police, and there is no suggestion from any quarter that their attention had been called to it. The situation was one common to all cities in a northern climate and to all sidewalks in such cities-a sidewalk difficult, it may be, of passage, but if so, from the ordinary action of the elements only, and from a formation of ice, which no body of men are competent to prevent, nor under any ordinary circumstances to remove. Something more than a slippery sidewalk must be shown to enable one suffering from it to cast the burden of compensation upon the city. Nothing more appears here, and we think the motion of the defendant for a dismissal of the complaint should have been granted. March 6, 1888. Kinney v. City of Troy. Opinion by Danforth, J. PRACTICE-EQUITY-SUBMISSION OF ISSUE TO JURY -WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS-MOTION FOR NEW TRIALASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-FRAUDEVIDENCE-VALIDITY OF DEBT-JUDGMENT AS EVIDENCE. In an equitable action where under the the Code of Civil Procedure of New York, $$ 971, 972, a question of fact is submitted by the court to a jury, the findings by the jury may be adopted as the facts of the case, or modified or rejected, without prejudice to the rights of the parties; the mode of trial being within the control of the court, and a jury trial not being a matter of right in such cases. (2) Where a jury in an equitable action, the issues being that an assignment was made to hinder and defraud creditors, that certain debts were fictitious, and that property had been concealed, in answer to a question submitted to them, under the Code of Civil Procedure of New York, §§ 971, 972, find that the assignment was not made to hinder and defraud creditors, the proofs being before the court upon which it can supplement the jury's finding, involving the determination of the other issues, the court may, there being no further facts to be tried, under the Code of Civil Procedure of New York, § 1225, confirm the verdict and make its findings covering all the issues, upon which judgment may be entered; and a failure to offer further evidence, or request a further trial, without a suggestion against the mode of trial, constitutes a waiver of any objection to the jurisdiction of the court in making its findings without trying all the issues, while a motion for a new trial is equivalent to an admission that all the issues have been tried. (3) Where the proof relied on to show a fraudulent concealment of property by an assignor for the benefit of creditors is the suppression of an outstanding insurance policy, on which money was afterward collected, the testimony of the assignor that the company being insolvent, he had not supposed the policy was of any value, and had not thought of it since he placed it in the hands of a collector, some years before, is sufficient evidence for the court or jury to say whether it did or did not exonerate him from the charge. (4) Where an assignor for the benefit of creditors explains his omission to refer to certain debts, in a previous examination as surety on a bond, by saying that the examination was a hurried one, and that he supposed he was testifying only as to a part of his property and the debts upon it, and there was evidence of the contracting of the debts and that they were genuine, the testimony justifies the jury and court in finding that these debts were not fictitious. (5) A judgment recovered after an assignment for the benefit of creditors is admissible as proof of the validity of the debt mentioned in the assignment, the genuineness of the judgment and the bona fides of the debt being open to contest; and the admission of such judgment cannot be objected to, on appeal, by the party who offered it in evidence. March 13, 1888. Acker v. Leland. Opinion by Gray, J. RAILROADS STREET-INJURIES TO PERSONS ON TRACK-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-Plaintiff with his companion, who was driving, was passing along a wide avenue about midnight. From the center of the avenue were two railroad tracks: on each side a dirt road. Plaintiff and his companion rode on the right-hand railroad track until they thought they heard a loaded wagon coming on the same track, when they pulled over on the lefthand track, plaintiff making no objections. After they - had gone from 100 to 150 feet they met a dummy engine, which plaintiff first heard when about seventyfive feet distant, but did not see the head-light until it was about fifty feet away. Plaintiff did nothing after he saw it except to call to the engineer to stop. No whistle was blown nor bell rung. Plaintiff testified that he expected to meet the engine about where he did. Held, in an action to recover for injuries sustained by the collision, that a nonsuit ought to have been granted. A verdict in favor of the plaintiff would have been set aside as against the evidence, and in such a case it is the duty of the court to nonsuit. Gonzales v. Railroad Co., 38 N. Y. 440; Neuendorff v. Insurance Co., 69 id. 393. We think the plaintiff was chargeable with the neglect of his comrade. He was conscious of the danger, and apparently made no objection or effort to avoid it. He was engaged in a common employment with McNally. He had full control of his own actions, and though on the safe track, did not object when after telling McNally to turn out, they turned upon the dangerous track. No decision cited conflicts with our view. The present case differs from that where a person accepts a gratuitous ride, as in the cases of Robinson v. Railroad Co., 66 N. Y. 11; Dyer v. Railway Co., 71 id. 228; Masterson v. Railroad Co., 84 id. 247. March 13, 1888. Donnelly v. Brooklyn City R. Co. Opinion by Gray, J. Ruger, C. J., Earl and Finch, JJ., concur. Andrews, Danforth and Peckham, JJ., dissent. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-RIGHTS OF PURCHASERWAIVER OF BREACH-LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSONS.A vendee who upon breach of a contract to convey to him real estate, commences an action to recover damages, and afterward withdraws it and accepts specific performance, is not liable in an action for damages or specific performance to one who in ignorance of his contract and action has contracted with the vendor for a conveyance of the land in question. March 6, 1888. Tamsen v. Schaefer. Opinion by Earl, J. WATER AND WATER-COURSES-PERCOLATION-NEGLIGENT CONSTRUCTION OF RESERVOIR-LIABILITY OF STATE.-(1) Where the State, constructing an embankment for a reservoir, uncovers a large bed of gravel, which is covered with water when the reservoir is full, and makes no attempt to render the bed water-tight, it will be liable under Laws of 1870, chapter 321, for all damages caused by the water percolating from the reservoir through the gravel-bed, and injuring the adjacent land. In cases arising under this statute, the State is therefore to be regarded as occupying the same position as an individual, and the inquiry is solely whether the facts proved would render an individual liable, if established against him. The situation of the gravel-bank skirting the western embankment of the reservoir was plainly visible to every one, and was known to the agents of the State while prosecuting the work of construction. Instead of taking precautions to avoid leakage at this point, they continued the work of denudation until many acres were exposed to the action of the water. That water, however situated, will seek its level through any channel open to it, is a natural law with which every one is familiar, and could not have been unknown to the officers having charge of this work. The attempt to collect a large body of water into a limited space surrounded with a porous and gravelly soil, without taking any adequate precaution to confine it to the receptacle prepared for it, was, upon the face of it, an inexcusable act of negligence in those having charge of such work. and cannot be justified under the known laws governing the motion of fluids. Pixley v. Clark, 35 N. Y. 520; Jutte v. Hughes, 67 id. 267; Mairs v. Estate Ass'n, 89 id. 506. Indeed one of the State engineers upon the work testified that when they were uncovering the | from the right that a land-owner has of lawfully digging on his own land for his own use, even though he thereby interrupts a subterranean current which feeds his neighbor's well or spring, that he has also a right to divert running water into an underground channel and thereby flood his neighbor's land. (2) The statute of limitations is not a bar to this claim. The claim cannot be maintained upon the theory of a permanent appropriation by the State for canal purposes of the land flooded. The cause of action is continuing, and arises from time to time as injury is inflicted upon the claimant's property by fresh percolations and floods, and will continue until the cause thereof ceases to exist. Baldwin v. Calkins, 10 Wend. 170. The evidence in this case tends to show that the claimant has at times been altogether deprived of the use and enjoyment of some of his land, and that other portions have been more or less injured by the flood been less frequent of late years than formerly. It is altogether probable that in the course of time they may altogether cease; but while they continue the claimant is entitled to recover such damages as he can show he has suffered within the period of statutory limitations. Some of the evidence as to damages seems to have been predicated upon the theory of a right to recover as for a permanent injury to the laud flowed; but we think this is not the proper theory of damage and that the claimant must recover for the injuries suffered from time to time as they occur. Uline v. Railroad Co., 101 N. Y. 98. Feb. 28, 1888. Reed v. State; Costello v. State; Poland v. State. Opinion by Ruger, C. J. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AB STRACT. bank on the western side of the reservoir, he observed they were getting into a bed of coarse gravel, and that it might leak if they went deeper. Another engineer, employed in superintending the construction, stated that he observed what was going on in regard to this gravel-bed and told the canal commissioner in charge of the work that he didn't think they would be able to keep any water in the reservoir above this point. He further testified that the effect of removing the soil and earth from the gravel was to open a channel where all of the water from the reservoir might run out, but that if it had been "suitably lined with clay -a large body of which was found within the limits of the reservoir-it would not leak." The only excuse suggested by the engineers for not lining it was the large expense which the State would incur by doing so. The officers of the State seem to have proceeded with their work well knowing that they had exposed surface channels of vast extent, through which the col-ing thereof, but it also shows that such injuries have lected waters of the reservoir must flow off and discharge at some point when its level was reached. That they did not know it would flood the land of the claimant was entirely immaterial, since they must have known that it would discharge upon somebody's land, and was liable to inflict damage thereto. There was no evidence that conflicted in any way with the facts stated, and the only attempt to palliate its force was made by calling one of the engineers of the canal department to testify to his opinion that the work of building the dam and reservoir was done according to the plans and specifications. No plans and specifications were produced on the trial, and the witness does not state that he ever saw them. One of the engineers testified that there were no specifications relating to the exposed gravel. The witness was permitted, under such circumstances, to state that the work was performed by the officers of the State with great care, and the dam was constructed in a good, safe and workman-like manner. Such testimony does not produce a conflict of evidence on the point in dispute, within the meaning of the rule precluding this court from reviewing a question of fact; on the contrary, it leaves the facts unanswered and undisputed, and the legal conclusion to be predicated thereon a question of law alone. In a case quite analogous to this which came to this court from the board of claims its conclusion of fact in regard to the liability of the State for damages occasioned by percolations of water through the banks of the caual, from defective precautions to restrain such waters, was just the reverse of that arrived at in this case. In Clements v. State, 105 N. Y. 621, in which the award was affirmed in this court, it held the State liable for not properly puddling the banks of the canal after raising the level of the water in the canal. In the cases of Heacock v. State, 105 N. Y. 267; Avery v. State, id. 636, and Collins v. State, id. 641, a refusal to award damages for such percolations was reversed by this court, and the claims sent back for a rehearing upon the merits. It is proper to say however that the refusal of the board of claims to make awards in the latter cases did not proceed upon the question of negligence or want of care on the part of the State officers, but was based mainly upon the statute of limitations. But this court held in each of those cases that evidence showing that the water in the canals had been raised by the State in such a manner as to cause them to percolate through the banks and flow upon the premises of adjacent owners, to their injury, required a hearing of the case upon the merits by such board. The rules regulating the rights and liabilities of adjacent owners of land with reference to interference with underground currents and streams have no application to the questions here presented. Pixley v. Clark, supra; Village of Delhi v. Youmans, 45 N. Y. 362. It does not at all follow JURISDICTION-FEDERAL QUESTION-EXERCISE BY CITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS.-The Legislature of Louisiana granted plaintiff company the exclusive privilege of supplying the inhabitants of the city of New Orleans with water, by a charter which provided that nothing therein should be "so construed as to prevent the city council from granting to any person, contiguous to the river, the privilege of laying pipes to the river, exclusively for his own use." Held, that the power conferred upon the city council was not legislative, but administrative, and an ordinance of the city permitting one to lay pipes for his own use is but a license, the validity of which is in no way dependent upon the Constitution or laws of the United States. In order to come within the provision of the Constitution of the United States which declares that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, not only must the obligation of a contract have been impaired, but it must have been impaired by a law of the State. The prohibition is aimed at the legislative power of the State, and not at the decisions of its courts, or the acts of administrative or executive boards or officers, or the doings of corporations or individuals. This court therefore has no jurisdiction to review a judgment of the highest court of a State, on the ground that the obligation of a contract has been impaired, unless some legislative act of the State has been upheld in the judgment sought to be reviewed. The general rule, as applied to this class of cases, has been clearly stated by two opinions of this court, delivered by Mr. Justice Miller: "It must be the Constitution or some law of the State which impairs the obligation of the contract, or which is otherwise in conflict with the Constitution of the United States; and the decision of the State court must sustain the law or Constitution of the State, in the matter in which the conflict is supposed to exist; If or the case for this court does not arise." Railroad Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. 177, 181. "We are not authorized by the Judiciary Act to review the judgments of the State courts, because their judgments refuse to give effect to valid contracts, or because those judgments, in their effect, impair the obligation of contracts. we did, every case decided in a State court could be brought here, where the party setting up a contract alleged that the court had taken a different view of its obligation to that which he held." Knox v. Bank, 12 Wall. 379, 383. As later decisions have shown, it is not strictly and literally true that a law of a State, in order to come within the constitutional prohibition, must be either in the form of a statute enacted by the Legislature in the ordinary course of legislation, or in the form of a Constitution established by the people of the State as their fundamental law. In Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 183, it was said by Mr. Justice Field, delivering judgment: "Any enactment, from whatever source originating, to which a State gives the force of law is a statute of the State, within the meaning of the clause cited relating to the jurisdiction of the court" (Rev. Stat., § 709), and it was therefore held that a statute of the so-called Confederate States, if enforced by one of the States as its law, was within the prohibition of the Constitution. So a by-law or ordinance of a municipal corporation may be such an exercise of legislative power delegated by the Legislature to the corporation as a political subdivision of the State, having all the force of law within the limits of the municipality, that it may properly be considered as a law, within the meaning of this article of the Constitution of the United States. For instance, the power of determining what persons and property shall be taxed belongs exclusively to the legislative branch of the government, and whether exercised by the Legislature itself, or delegated by it to a municipal corporation, is strictly a legislative power. United States v. New Orleans, 98 U. S. 381, 392; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472. Accordingly where the city council of Charleston, upon which the Legislature of South Carolina, by the city charter, had conferred the power of taxing persons and property within the city, passed ordinances assessing a tax upon bonds of the city, and thus diminishing the amount of interest which it had agreed to pay, this court held such ordinances to be laws impairing the obligation of contracts, for the reason that the city charter gave limited legislative power to the city council, and when the ordinances were passed under the supposed authority of the legislative act, their provisions became the law of the State. Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 438, 440. See also Insurance Co. v. City Council, 93 id. 116. But the ordinance now in question involved no exercise of legislative power. The Legislature, in the charter granted to the plaintiff, provided that nothing therein should be so construed as to prevent the city council from granting to any person or persons, contiguous to the river, the privilege of laying pipes to the river, exclusively for his or their own use. "The Legislature itself thus defined the class of persons to whom, and the object for which the permission might be granted. All that was left to the city council was the duty of determining what persons came within the definition, and how and where they might be permitted to lay pipes, for the purpose of securing their several rights to draw water from the river, without unreasonably interfering with the convenient use by the public of the lands and highways of the city. The rule was established by the Legislature, and its execution only committed to the municipal authorities. The power conferred upon the city council was not legislative, but administrative, and might equally well have been vested by law in the mayor alone, or in any other officer of the city. Railroad Co. v. Eller man, 105 U. S. 166, 172; Day v. Green, 4 Cush. 433, 438. The permission granted by the city council to the defendant company, though put in the form of an ordinance, was in effect but a license, and not a by-law of the city, still less a law of the State. If that license was within the authority vested in the city council by the law of Louisiana, it was valid; if it transcended that authority it was illegal and void. But the question whether it was lawful or unlawful depended wholly on the law of the State, and not at all on any provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States. The cases of Water Works v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674, and Water Works v. Water Works, 120 id. 64, on which the plaintiff relied in support of its bill, were essentially different from the case at bar. In each of those cases the validity of the article of the Constitution of 1879 abolishing monopolies was drawn in question by the bill, and relied on by the defendants. Rivers did not contend that his property was contiguous to the river. The St. Tammany Water Works Company had been incorporated since the New Orleans Water Works Company, under a general statute of the State, for the purpose of supplying the whole city and its inhabitants with water. And both those cases were appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States, upon which this court was not restricted to the consideration of Federal questions decided below, but had jurisdiction to determine the whole case. The difference in the extent of the jurisdiction of this court on writ of error to the highest court of a State, and on appeal from a Circuit Court of the United States, as affected by the ground of the decision of the court below, is illustrated by the cases of contracts payable in Confederate currency, or made in consideration of loans of Confederate currency, during the war of the rebellion, and by the cases of promissory notes given before that war for the price of persons sold as slaves. In Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1, this court, reversing a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States in Alabama, held that a contract for the payment of money in Confederate currency was not unlawful. Like decisions have often been made in later cases brought here from the Circuit Courts of the United States. Bank v. Bank, 16 Wall. 483, 497; Confederate Note case, 19 id. 548; Railroad Co. v. King, 91 U. S. 3; Cook v. Lillo, 103 id. 792. Yet in Bethell v. Demaret, 10 Wall. 537, where a suit on a mortgage to secure the payment of promissory notes given for a loan of Confederate currency had been dismissed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, on the ground that the notes and mortgage were nullities, because the Confederate currency, which constituted the consideration, was illegal by the general law of the State, this court dismissed the writ of error, because no statute of the State was drawn in question. And in Bank of West Tennessee v. Citizens' Bank, 14 Wall. 432; 13 id. 9, where the Supreme Court of Louisiana, affirming a judgment rendered by an inferior court of the State before the adoption of article 127 of the State Constitution of 1868, by which "all agreements, the consideration of which was Confederate money, notes or bonds, are null and void, and shall not be enforced by the courts of this State," dismissed a suit to recover money payable in Confederate notes, basing its judgment both upon that article of the Constitution and upon adjudications in that State before its adoption, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Swayne, dismissed a writ of error, and said: "The result in this case would have been necessarily the same if the Constitution had not contained the provision in question. This brings the case within the authority of Bethell v. Demaret,'' above cited. In another case at the same term the disposition by this court of the case of Bank of West Tennessee v. Citizens' Bank was thus explained by Mr. Justice Miller: clined to pass upon the question whether the provision of that Constitution was valid or invalid as an act of legislation, and in relation to the article of the Constitution of the United States against impairing the obligation of contracts, because it was unnecessary, and could have no practical influence upon the result, this court dismissed a writ of error for want of jurisdiction, saying: "It thus appears that the provision of the State Constitution upon the subject of slave contracts was in nowise drawn in question. The decision was governed by the settled principles of the jurisprudence of the State. In such cases this court has no power of review." "Substantially the same question arose in Bank of West Tennessee v. Citizens' Bank, heretofore decided. The writ of error was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The same disposition must be made in this case. "These cases are quite in harmony with the line of cases, beginning before these were decided, in which, on a writ of error upon the judgment of the highest court of a State, giving effect to a statute of the State, drawn in question as affecting the obligation of a previous contract, this court, exercising its paramount authority of determining whether the statute upheld by the State court did impair the obligation of the previous contract, is not concluded by the opinion of the State court as to the validity of the construction of that contract, even if contained in a statute of the State, but determines for itself what that contract was. Leading cases of that class are Bridge Propr's v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 116, in which the State court affirmed the validity of a statute authorizing a railway viaduct to be built across a river, which was drawn in question as impairing the obligation of a contract, previously made by the State with the proprietors of a bridge that no other bridge should be built across the river; and cases in which the State court affirmed the validity of a statute, imposing taxes upon a corporation, and drawn in question as impairing the obligation of a contract in a previous statute exempting it from such taxation. Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Trust Co. v. Debolt, id. 416; Bank v. Debolt, 18 How. 380; Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, 346; New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104; Railroad v. Gaines. 97 id. 697, 709; University v. People, 99 id. 309; Railroad v. Palmes, 109 id. 244; Gas-Light Co. v. Shelby Co., id. 398; Railroad Co. v. Dennis, 116 id. 665. In each of those cases the State court upheld a right claimed under the later statute, and could not have made the decision that it did without upholding that right; and thus gave effect to the law of the State drawn in question as impairing the obligation of a contract. The distinction between the two classess of cases-those in which the State court has, and those in which it has not, given effect to the statute drawn in question as impairing the ob "As it was apparent from the record that the judgment of the court of original jurisdiction was rendered before that article was adopted, we could not entertain jurisdiction when the decision in that particular point was placed on a ground which existed as a fact and was beyond our control, and was sufficient to support the judgment, because another reason was given, which if it had been the only one, we could review and might reverse." Delmas v. Insurance Co., 14 Wall. 661, 666. In Delmas v. Insurance Co., just cited, where the judgment of the Louisiana court was put wholly upon that article of the Constitution, this court therefore took jurisdiction, and reversed the judgment, but said that where a decision of the highest court of a State, "whether holding such contract valid or void, is made upon the general principles by which courts determine whether a consideration is good or bad on principles of public policy, the decis ion is one we are not authorized to review." And in Tarver v. Keach, 15 Wall. 67, as well as in Dugger v. Bocock, 104 U. S. 596, 601, the proposition thus stated was affirmed, and was acted on by dismissing a writ of error to a State court. So in Stevenson v. Williams, 19 Wall. 572, where a judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, annulling a judgment of a lower court, on the ground that the promissory notes on which it was rendered had been given for a loan of Confederate money,was brought here by writ of error, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Field, after disposing of a distinct Federal question, and observing that the aforesaid ground would not be deemed, in a Federal court, sufficient to set aside the judgment, said: "But the ruling of the State court in these particulars, however erroneous, in not subject to review by us. It presents no Federal question for our examination. It conflicts with no part of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. Had the State court refused to uphold the judgment because of the provision in the Constitution of the State, subsequently adopted, prohibiting the enforcement of contracts founded upon Confederate money, a Federal question would have been presented. That provision however does not appear to have caused the ruling." 19 Wall. 576, 577. Those cases clearly establish that on a writ of error to a State court this court had jurisdiction to review and reverse the judgment, if that judgment was based wholly upon the State Constitution; but that if it was based on the previous law of the State, this court had no jurisdiction to review it, although the view taken by the State court was adverse to the view taken by this court in earlier and later cases coming up from a Circuit Court of the United States. In actions brought upon promissory notes given for the purchase of slaves before the war, the same distinction has been maintained. The Constitutions adopted in 1868 by the States of Arkansas, Geor-ligation of a contract--as affecting the consideration gia and Louisiana respectively, provided that the courts of the State should not enforce any contract for the purchase or sale of slaves. In Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 654, a judgment rendered for the defendant by the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Arkansas, in an action on a promissory note for the purchase of a slave, was reversed, because this court was of opinion that the contract was valid at the time when it was made, and therefore its obligation was impaired by the subsequent Constitution. For like reasons this court, in White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646, reversed a similar judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia, and based upon the provision of its Constitution. But in Palmer v. Marston, 14 Wall. 10, where the Supreme Court of Louisiana in a similar action had placed its judgment for the defendant upon the law of the State, as established and acted upon before the adoption of the Constitution of 1868 and since adhered to, and had de by this court, on writ of error, of the true construction and effect of the previous contract, is clearly brought out in Railroad v. Railroad, 14 Wall. 23. That was a writ of error to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in which a foreclosure, under a statute of 1857. of a railroad mortgage made in 1852, was contested upon the ground that it impaired the obligation of the contract, and the parties agreed that the opinion of that court should be considered as part of the record. Mr. Justice Miller, in delivering judgment, after stating that it did not appear that the question whether the statute of 1857 impaired the obligation of the mortgage contract "was discussed in the opinion of the court, and that the court was of the opinion that the statute did not impair the obligation of the contract," said: "If this were all of the case, we should undoubtedly be bound in this court to inquire whether the act of 1857 did, as construed by that court, impair the obligation of the contract. Bridge |