sally void. They are usually voidable at the option of the party defrauded or affected, but they are not absolutely void, except where by reason of the identity of the vendor and vendee, a contract in the eye of the law is impossible." Railroad Co. v. Dewey, 14 Mich. 477, 488; Sheldon v. Estate of Rice, 30 id. 296. In these two cases the doctrine was again asserted, the first being a chancery case, and the other a case at law. In cases of sales by executors, administrators and guardians, the statute expressly forbids them to purchase, directly or indirectly, and declares sales made in violation of that section void. How. St., § 6042. This statute was merely an affirmance of the common law. Attention is called by counsel for the defendants to the remarks of Mr. Justice Elmer, in Runyon v. India Rubber Co., 24 N. J. Law, 475, criticising the former decisions in that State which held that ejectment might be brought by the heirs to recover land fraudulently conveyed by an administrator to himself. And in Obert v. Obert, 12 N. J. Eq. 427, where it is said that "there can be no doubt that according to the decided weight of authority, the principle that a trustee cannot be the purchaser of the trust-estate is a mere rule in equity, and that if proper forms are observed the conveyance is good at law." We think that the principle has a broader foundation than a mere rule in equity. Mr. Justice Cooley, in Sheldon v. Rice, supra, said: "The law esteems it a fraud in such a trustee to take for his own benefit a position in which his interest will conflict with his duty." Mich. Sup. Ct., Nov. 10, 1887. McKay v. Williams. Opinion by Champlin, J.

CRIMINAL LAW-TRIAL-INTERROGATION OF WITNESS BY TRIAL JUDGE.-While it is the right of a trial judge to interrogate witnesses when essential to the administration of justice, yet the practice of so doing, except when absolutely necessary, should be discouraged. The common-law rule conferring arbitrary power upon trial judges has been so far modified by the Code and the advanced civilization of the age as to greatly limit the power, aud in case of its abuse a reviewing court would not hesitate to give a new trial to the unsuccessful party. The question here presented has not been before this court heretofore, and is one of importance, as bearing upon the practice in this State, and also as affecting the authority and duties of the presiding judge. It is insisted that as public prosecutors are provided by law,and at public expense, it should be left to them alone to conduct prosecutions, without any suggestions from the court; that the prosecuting attorneys of the several district courts are selected by the people with a view to their fitness and qualification for the position, and that it is the spirit of the law that trial judges leave the matter of presenting testimony entirely in their hands. As a matter of practice in this State, we think the rule generally adopted by the judges has been to avoid examining witnesses, and to permit the case to go to the jury as made by the attorneys. This of course is subject to the exception above stated, in which case there can be no doubt as to the right and duty of a trial judge. Courts should also see that the examination of a witness is conducted in fairness to both of the litigants, and to the witness. Whether or not the judge has the right to go beyond this, under the provisions of our Criminal Code, might become a serious question. At common law the right was not questioned. In Whart. Crim. Ev. (8th ed.), 3 452, it is said: "The trial court at any period of the examination may put questions to the witness for the purpose of eliciting facts bearing on the issues, and the witness may even be called for this purpose, or a witness not called by the parties may be called and examined by the court. Nor is the court, as to evidence, bound by the rule exclud

ing the leading questions; but an answer, not in itself evidence, brought out by the questions of of the court, may be ground for reversal." This rule has been sustained in Epps v. State, 19 Ga, 102. See also Archb. Crim. Pl. 163; 1 Whart. Ev., §§ 281, 496; State v. Lee, 80 N. C. 484. Assuming that the rule above cited is the correct common-law rule, the question arises, has the Code so far changed this rule as to require a reversal of the judgment in this case upon the conduct of the trial judge? As a matter of law, we cannot say that in this case the trial judge so far exceeded the rule which is claimed to have been established by the Code as to require a new trial for that cause alone. While it is apparent that the course pursued by the trial judge was not prejudicial to plaintiff in error, yet we deem it proper to suggest that the judges have, to a very great extent, been shorn of the arbitrary power conferred upon them by the common law. It is not necessary here to refer to that which is known by every student of the law, that at common law the authority of the trial judge was deemed to be absolute, and in many instances was greatly abused. This power has, to some extent at least, been removed by the beneficent provisions and spirit of the Criminal Code. The trial judge must have the right to superintend the general course of trials of causes before him, as well as the conduct of counsel engaged therein, but this authority should be carefully and moderately exercised. The judge should be so absolutely impartial upon the trial of a cause as to give no ground for suspicion that he has any opinion upon the merits of the cause on trial, and the greatest care should at all times be observed that no act or word should escape which would deprive a judge of the well-earned reputation of American courts for absolute impartiality. While, as we have said, the conduct of the trial judge to which objection has been made cannot be said to have worked prejudice to plaintiff in error, and does not call a reversal of the case, yet we think that where a case presented involving the abuse of judicial authority to the prejudice of an unsuccessful litigant, the reviewing court should not hesitate to reverse the judgment, that a fair trial might be had. Neb. Sup. Ct., Nov. 10, 1887. Fager v. State. Opinion by Reese, J.

CRIMINAL PRACTICE-NEW TRIAL-MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL. At the trial of the accused one of the counsel for the State told the jury that on a former trial the jury "were not out more than one minute in their deliberations, when they returned into court with a verdict of guilty." The district attorney persisted in reading to the jury, as evidence against the accused, written evidence of a witness which had not been put in. Held, on appeal, that where the guilt of the accused is clearly shown by his own testimony, such error in the proceeding will not call for a reversal. For this palpable and serious error we are urged by counsel for appellant to reverse the judgment, and award a new trial, and reliance is placed upon the recent cases of Martin v. State, 63 Miss. 505, and Lamar v. State, 64 id. 687. In Lamar v. State, the error went to the very organization and competency of the jury, the triers of the issue joined. A juror, after evidence had been received, was attacked by the district attorney on a charge of having previously expressed his determination to get upon the jury and acquit the defendant. The juror was, as was said in that case, "thereby put under bonds, as it were, to go against the prisoner, in order to free himself from the charge made against him." The point of that decision was that the act of the State in attacking the juror invalidated the panel, and though the defendant was clearly guilty, the judgment was not permitted to stand, because it was not supported by the verdict of any jury competent to try the issue joined between the accused

and the State. In Martin v. State, the conviction rested principally upon circumstantial evidence sufficiently strong to uphold the verdict, but not so conclusive as to enable us to confidently affirm that a verdict of guilty ought and must have followed from the competent evidence alone. In neither of these cases did we depart from the rule that where the guilt of the accused is clearly and incontrovertibly shown by his own testimony, a mere error in the proceeding will not call for a reversal. Thomas v. State, 61 Miss. 60. The appellant was examined as a witness in his own behalf, and by his own statement it is clearly and unequivocally shown that he committed the crime of which he has been convicted. He in effect avows his guilt as conclusively as though he had pleaded guilty to the indictment. Under such circumstances, though manifest error has intervened, the judgment must be affirmed. Miss. Sup. Ct., Nov. 7, 1887. Lamar v. State. Opinion by Cooper, C. J.

EVIDENCE - DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF SIGNAL SERVICE OFFICER. In an action to recover damages from a railroad company, for injury to tobacco bales from rain, while in its possession, a witness testified that he was a volunteer weather observer, appointed by the United States government, and his record of the weather, on the day the tobacco was in the hands of the defendant, was introduced in evidence to show that it did not rain on that day until 9:45 at night, after the tobacco had passed out of the hands of defendant. Held, that the record of the weather being

official, and made by witness in the course of his public duty, was competent evidence. N. C. Sup. Ct., Nov. 7, 1887. Knott v. Raleigh & G. R. Co. Opinion by Davis, J.

FRAUD-SALE OF LAND-RESCISSION.- Where a person is induced to exchange $3,000 worth of land for 320 acres of land not worth more than from 75 cents to $1.25 per acre in another State, by reason of the false statement of its value made by a person who is represented by the owner as a reliable and trustworthy person, well acquainted with the character and value of the land, he will be entitled to have the trade set aside on the ground of inadequacy of consideration and false representation. Mere inadequacy of price is not per se ground for setting aside a transfer of property, yet it may be so gross and palpable as to amount in itself to proof of fraud; and this in connection with proof of imposition and misrepresentation on the part of the purchaser and his agents, will be sufficient to characterize the transaction as fraudulent in a court of equity. Reed v. Peterson, 91 Ill. 289. Here is a gross disproportion between the properties of the two parties, and false representations in reference to the quantity and value of the Wisconsin land, which are sufficient to bring the case within the rules indicated in Reed v. Peterson. Ill. Sup. Ct., May 12, 1887. Witherwax v. Riddle. Opinion by Craig, J.

WHAT CON

GIFT IN PRÆSENTI-CAUSA MORTIS STITUTES. A mortgagee in extreme sickness and expectation of death, executed a formal written satisfaction of mortgage, and delivered it, together with the note and mortgage, to the mortgagor (who was his brother) as a gift, with intent to discharge and satisfy the same. Subsequently, but as a part of the same transaction, he required the brother to deliver the note, mortgage and satisfaction to an uncle, for the purpose of ascertaining the portion of personal property the brother would be entitled to, in addition to the value of the gift. Subsequently the mortgagee died, and the note, mortgage and satisfaction were redelivered to the brother by the uncle. Held, that the delivery of the note, mortgage and satisfaction by the mortgagee constituted a valid gift in præsenti or

causa mortis. There can be no question but what a person of sound mind, even in extremis, may make a partial as well as a total disposition of his property by will. The same is true in case of a gift as to any property which is the subject of gift. The mere fact that he attempts at the same time, and as a part of the same transaction, to dispose of the whole of his property, but for some cause the disposition is ineffectual as to a part of it, will not prevent its being effectual as to the other part. Here the matters of conveying the land to the sister, and the directions for disposing of the personal property, are not within the issues, and hence not before us for determination. No question of creditors or other claimants is involved. The only question presented is whether what was said and done by the intestate constituted a complete satisfaction and extinguishment of the note and mortgage. A mortgage may undoubtedly by way of gift to the mortgagor completely satisfy the debt, and discharge the mortgage. Moore v. Darton, 4 De Gex & S. 517; Lee v. Boak, 11 Grat. 182; Darland v. Taylor, 52 Iowa, 503; Carpenter v. Soule, 88 N. Y. 251; 42 Am. Rep. 248. Where a gift of personal property is made with intent to take effect immediately and irrevocably, and is fully executed by complete and unconditional delivery, it is certainly binding upon the donor as a gift inter vivos, even if the donor at the time is in extremis, and dies soon after. Tate v. Leithead, Kay, 658; McCarty v. Kearuan, 86 Ill. 292. But where such

intent is not manifest, and the gift is otherwise made, under such circumstances it will ordinarily be re

garded as a gift causa mortis. Rhodes v. Childs, 64

Penn. St. 23, 24; Grymes v. Hone, 49 N. Y. 17. But even such a gift is not complete without delivery. Id.; Wilcox v. Matterson, 53 Wis. 23; Brunn V. Schuett, 59 Wis. 260. Such a gift may be defined as one made by the delivery of personal property by the donor in his last sickness, and in expectation of death then imminent, and upon condition that it shall belong to the donee if the donor dies, as anticipated, without revoking the gift, leaving the donee him surviving, and not otherwise. Rhodes v. Childs, supra; Grymes v. Hone, supra; Ogilvie v. Ggilvie, 1 Bradf. 356; 2 Quar. Law Rev. 446; 21 Am. Law Rev. 734, and cases there cited. But even such a gift is defeated if the donor survive such sickness. Staniland v. Willott, 3 Macn. & G. 664. Here the intestate, as mortgagee, actually delivered the note, mortgage, and satisfaction to the mortgagor personally as a present. True, the intestate subsequently directed the mortgagor to deliver them to the uncle, as he directed Mrs. Adolph Henschel to deliver the deed she had received from him to the uncle. But this was apparently done in order that the uncle might the better ascertain the value of the land conveyed, and thus ascertain the difference in the value of the two gifts thus made, and then divide the personal property so as to make the gifts equal. Under such circumstances, in view of the apparent absence of any hope of recovery, it would seem that the note, mortgage, and satisfaction may be regarded as so delivered to the mortgagor as an absolute gift in præsenti. But even if there was an absence of such intent to make a theu

present and unconditional gift, yet as the delivery by the donor was complete, and he was at the time in his last sickness, and died soon thereafter, without revoking the gift, we must regard it as a valid and binding gift causa mortis. Wis. Sup. Ct., Nov. 1, 1887. Henshell v. Maurer. Opinion by Cassoday, J.

INJUNCTION - TO RESTRAIN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS.-Complainant was the owner of certain picnic grounds within the limits of defendant village, which passed an ordinance declaring public picnic grounds a nuisance, and providing a penalty for allowing their

use for picnics, or any purpose whereby disorderly people are congregated. Complainant was prosecuted seven times for violating the ordinance, was convicted once, and the other suits were pending. Held, that where complainant had not established the invalidity of the ordinance, equity will not interfere by injunction to protect repeated acts of violation of it, and where there are valid provisions in the ordinance, nothing appearing to the contrary, it will be presumed he was prosecuted under them. It is insisted by counsel that a court of equity should restrain these prosecutions in order to prevent the multiplicity of suits. Bills of peace will lie, under some circumstances, for the purpose of quieting and suppressing litigation. It is said however that to entitle a party to maintain a bill on this ground, there must be a right claimed affecting many persons; "for if the right is disputed between two persons only, not for themselves and all others in interest, but for themselves alone, the bill will be dismissed." 2 Story Eq. Pl., §857. In the case of West v. Mayor, etc., supra, the chancellor, quoting from what he had said in Oakley v. Mayor, etc., which was a bill for injunction to restrain prosecution under the market ordinances of the city, uses the following language: "If the objection to the legality of these ordinances was well taken, the complainant has a perfect defense at law, and this court would not grant an injunction to protect him against a multiplicity of suits, until his right to such protection had been established by a successful defense at law, in some of the suits," and cites in support the case of Eldridge v. Hill, 2 Johns. Ch. 281, and concludes: "I am not aware of any case in which this court has sustained such a bill to prevent the defendant from suing at law, where the rights of the party depended upou a question of law merely, and where the defendant in the case at law must eventually succeed without the aid of this court, if the law is in his favor." Eldridge v. Hill, supra, was a bill for injunction to restrain all but one of a series of prosecutions for the erection and maintenance of a nuisance, and to enjoin the bringing of other suits threatened to be brought for its continuance. Kent, C. J., denied the injunction, saying: "No case goes so far as to stop these continued suits between two single individuals. so long as the alleged cause of action is continued, and there has been no final or satisfactory trial or decision at law upon the merits." In McCoy v. Chillicothe, 3 Ohio, 379, it is held that the repetition of actions for trespasses between the same parties is not that multiplicity of suits which will induce a court of equity to interfere by injunction. In this case the bill alleges the pendency of the suit sought to be enjoined, but does not show that the complainant had established the invalidity or the ordinance at law; on the contrary, it is shown that in the only case tried the validity of the ordinance was sustained at law. If the ordinance is valid, as held by the court imposing the penalty mentioned, equity will certainly not interfere to protect the complainant from deserved punishment for its violation, nor because the common-law court may have erred in its judgment as to the complainant's guilt or innocence. Nothing could be more detrimental to society, and provocative of violations of law, than for courts of equity to interfere in such cases by injunction, and thereby protect repeated acts in violation of ordinances, which might each furnish new ground of complaint. While the injunction continued, the functions of municipal government would be suspended, and irreparable injury might thereby ensue. If the municipal law be of doubtful validity, complainant cannot by his willful and repeated violation of his provisions, each furnishing separate grounds for prosecution, and depending upon separate facts, create this ground for equitable interposition, with

out first settling the validity of the ordinance in the courts of laws. If he fears prosecution of other suits, he can refrain from the repetition of his acts in violation of its provisions, until the proper forum has determined its invalidity. The case of Railroad Co. v. Mayor, etc., 54 N. Y. 159, cited by counsel, was a bill to enjoin all but one of seventy-seven suits brought against the railroad company for running its trains into the city without a license as provided by ordinance. The bill attacked the validity of the ordinance, and it was held that a demurrer to the bill was properly overruled, upon the ground that had the suits been brought in a court of record, they could have been consolidated under a statute authorizing the consolidation of causes as a matter of right, and as the magistrate's court in which they were pending was without such power, and as the prosecution of all at the same time separately would be onerous and oppressive, the case was one in the opinion of the court, where equity jurisdiction might properly be invoked and exercised. This case can have no application here, nor does it conflict with the rule announced in West v. Mayor, etc., supra, and kindred cases. The case of Wood v. City of Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 425, relied on by counsel, is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. There the ordinance was clearly void and provided for arrest, imprisonment and imposition of a fine for an act the complainant was clearly authorized by the statutes of the State to do, and it further appeared prosecutions had been threatened, but were delayed and not commenced against him, and the court found that the fact that the ordinance remained apparently in force so that the threatened prosecutions might be brought under it, and the complainant imprisoned before trial, injured his business, and that therefore there being no actual trespass, there was no adequate remedy at law for such injury. In the subsequent case of Davis v. American Soc., 75 N. Y. 362, in which the complainants sought relief from the enforcement of a penal statute upon the ground, among others, that they had not in fact violated the law, the Court of Appeals held that a court of law was a proper forum in which to try that question, and refused the relief, distinguishing that case from Wood v. City of Brooklyn. In this case the ordinance is not claimed to be wholly illegal. That part of the ordinance which prohibits the renting or permitting the use of any yard, ground, etc., for any purpose whereby disorderly persons are congregated, has not received judicial construction, but it would seem to fall clearly within the general powers conferred by law upon this corporation. If there are several prohibitions in an ordinance, some of which are void, and others valid, if a penalty is provided applying to each offense separately, the ordinance may be enforced as to offenses in respect to which it is valid, as if the void portions had been omitted. Dill. Mun. Corp., § 421, and note. The bill is wholly silent as to what portion of the ordinance the prosecutions complained of were brought under, and the presumption would be that they were prosecuted under the valid ordinance. This clearly distinguished this case also from Wood v. City of Brooklyn, and authorities of like import. Ill. Sup. Ct., Nov. 11, 1887. Poyer v. Village of Desplaines. Opinion by Shope, J.

system known as "Industrial Insurance." Schaffer, the plaintiff below, is the beneficiary named in the written application, which was made part of the policy. The fifth condition of the policy provided that "the production by the company of this policy, and a receipt for the sum assured, sigued by any person furnishing proof satisfactory to the company that he or she is the beneficiary, or an executor or administrator, husband or wife, or relative by blood, or connection by marriage, of the assured, shall be conclusive evidence that such sum has been paid and received by the person or persons lawfully entitled to the same, and that all claims and demands upon said company under this policy have been fully satisfied. Held, that payment to the daughter of the insured, who produced the policy and the premium receipt-book, and her receipt, constituted a complete defense to the company against any claim of the beneficiary named in the application. The authorities are conflicting, but there are a number of well-considered cases which hold that where a person who has obtained an insurance upon his life, for the benefit of children or others, keeps the instrument himself, and alone pays the premiums, the beneficiary has no vested rights in the policy, and the insurer has the right to surrender it, and take out a new policy payable to other beneficiaries. In some cases the distinction is taken that where, after the policy is taken out, it is delivered to the beneficiary, or to some one in trust for him, the right to it thereby becomes vested in the beneficiary. This was the condition in Fortescue v. Barnett, 3 Mylne & K. 36. See Garner v. Insurance Co., 32 Alb. Law J. 91; Insurance Co. v. Stevens, 19 Fed. Rep, 671; Barton v. Insurance Co., 3 Atl. Rep. 627. In Landrum v. Knowles, 22 N. J. Eq. 594, the insurance was stated in the policy to be for the sole use of the children of the policy-holder; and it was held by the chief justice, in delivering the opinion of the Court of Appeals, that after the death of the insured, this was as complete a transfer as that to the trustees in Fortescue v. Barnett, supra. But here it will be seen that there is no such condition or provision in the policy, and it does not appear how the beneficiary named in the application could have any equity to require the insured to keep the policy alive, or to control it in any way during the life of the insured. All the cases agree that the contract in the policy must govern. There is no contract or agreement to pay to the beneficiary named in the application. The contract in the policy expressly is to pay to the person or persons named in condition five of the policy before recited, and in the manner therein specified. Conceding that the beneficiary named in the application has a vested interest in the policy, he holds it in accordance with and subject to the conditions of the contract contained in the policy. Condition five of the policy must in that view operate as an appointment, both by the assured and the beneficiary, of persons, any of whom are authorized to recived payment of the sum agreed to be paid. The company has paid in strict accordance with that condition, and is thereby discharged under its express terms, from further liability. The purpose and object of this kind of insurance seem to require the payment to be made in that way, and it should, in good policy, be upheld. N. J. Sup. Ct., Nov. 8, 1887. State v. Schaffer. Opinion by Van Syckel, J.

LIBEL AND SLANDER-CHARGE OF CRIME.- A charge that a postmaster had detained and broken open mail matter imputes to him an act which if done, constitutes an indictable offense under the laws of the United States, involving moral turpitude and infamous punishment, and the publication of such charge is actionable as slander. The words which the complaint alleges the defendant spoke of the plaintiff as

postmaster, while he held that office, unquestionably imputed to him dishonest and corrupt acts done in his office, which in their nature imply moral turpitude, and work social degradation. They charge acts to have been done by the plaintiff, which if done consti.. tute a gross breach of official faith and duty and a degrading and infamous offense under the laws of the United States, punishable by fine and imprisonment at hard labor, and which renders the offender, if he be a postmaster, forever incapable after conviction of holding that office. Such imprisonment is infamous under the laws of the United States, and the disqualification to hold office is certainly a punishment that implies disgrace and infamy. It fixes upon the convicted party a stigma of disgrace and reproach in the eyes of honest and honorable men that continues for life. It is difficult to conceive of a punishment more galling and degrading in this country than disqualification to hold office, whether one be an office seeker or not. Here generally all honest men are eligible to office, to share in the honors and emoluments incident to it. How great the standing disgrace that one cannot, because of crime that imputes corruption in office. McKee v. Wilson, 87 N. C. 301; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935; Mackin v. U. S. 117 U. S. 348; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 777; Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. 1; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 781; Rev. Stat. U. S., §§ 3890, 3892; U. S. v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 82; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35. N. C. Sup. Ct., Nov. 7, 1887. Harris v. Terry. Opinion by Davis, J.

MARRIAGE-ACTION FOR LOSS OF HOUSEHOLD SERVICES OF WIFE.-Although a married woman may recover for such injuries as are personal to herself, the services rendered by her in the household in discharging the ordinary duties of a wife belong to her husband, and the loss of such services occasioned by an jujury to her is his loss, for which he only can recover. Counsel for the city makes the broad claim, that because she was a married woman, her time and service belonged alone to her husband, and that a liability for the same could only arise in his favor. The common-law rule that the husband and wife are one person, and that he has the exclusive right to the labor, service and earnings of the wife, has been wisely and radically changed. A positive enactment of our Legislature has removed many of the restraints and disabilities of coverture, and it contains a provision that "any married woman may carry on any trade or business, and perform any labor or service, on her sole and separate account; and the earnings of any married woman from her trade, business, labor, or service shall be her sole and separate property, and may be used and invested by her in her own name." It also prescribes that she may sue to protect and enforce her rights in the same manner as if she were unmarried. Gen. Stat., ch. 62, § 4. It follows from this that the time and services of the wife do not necessarily belong to the busband, nor does an injury which causes the loss of such time and service necessarily accrue to him. At least a portion of her time may be given to the labor or business done on her sole and separate account. The profits or earnings of such business or labor are her sole and separate property, and cannot be appropriated or controlled by her husband without her consent. So far then as she is deprived of these she suffers a loss which is personal to herself, for which she alone can recover. The fact that she is partially or wholly dependent upon the husband for support does not abridge her right of action, nor transfer to him that which accrued solely to her. Notwithstanding this, we are compelled to hold that the instruction was prejudicially erroneous. The duty devolves upon the husband to take care of and provide for the wife, and he is entitled to her society,

and to her services other than those performed on her sole and separate account. If he is deprived of these services in consequence of an injury inflicted, the loss is his, and the right of action therefore exists in him. The rule fixing the liability for the services of a married woman is fairly stated in a case which arose and was tried in New York, where a statute exists substantially like ours. It was held that the services of the wife in the household, in the discharge of her domestic duties, still belong to the husband, and in rendering such service she still bears to him the common-law relation. So far as she is injured so as to be disabled to perform such services for her husband, the loss is his, and not hers; and for such loss of service he, and not she, can recover of the wrong-doer. But when she labors for another, her service no longer belongs to her husband, and whatever she earns in such service belongs to her as if she were a feme sole; and so far as she is disabled to perform such service by any injury to her person, she can in her own name recover compensation against the wrong-doer for such disability as one of the consequences of the injury, * * * and the money recovered shall be her sole and separate property." Brooks v. Schwerin, 54 N. Y. 343; Minick v. City of Troy, 19 Hun, 253; Railroad Co. v. Dunn, 52 Ill. 260; Townsdin v. Nutt, 19 Kans. 282; 2 Suth. Dam. 723. In the present case the court ignored the distinction, and in effect instructed the jury that the city was liable to Mrs. Agan for all the time which had been lost by reason of her injury, although it appeared that a large part of it had been devoted to the domestic duties of the household. If the instruction had limited her right of recovery to the injury which accrued to her, or had directed that she could not recover for the loss which her husband sustained by reason of her inability to discharge the ordinary duties of a wife, no prejudice would have resulted. The jury were directed to allow for the loss of time, regardless of whether she was engaged in a business of her own, or was performing labor or service on her sole and separate account. Under the testimony and circumstances of the case the instruction was erroneous. Thomas v. Town of Brooklyn, 58 Iowa, 438. Nov. 5, 1887. City of Wyandotte v. Agan. Opinion by Johnston, J.

OUR NEW YORK LETTER.

HE New Year finds four new judges established on Hon. Morgan J. O'Brien succeeds to the place recently left warm-I might say hot-by Judge Donohue. No judge ever worked harder in the discharge of his duties and for a renomination than he. He put aside the ermine with great reluctance, and during the entire period of his incumbency never forgot his politics, his friends, or his Hall. But his politics, friends and Hall were not strong enough to carry him, for he likewise had enemies-bitter ones, some of them-and they arose in their might and slew him. Judge O'Brien is a man of whom good things are expected. He is not more than five and thirty, but was when appointed corporation counsel a few months ago the possessor of a large and important practice, and enjoyed the reputation of being a good all-round lawyer.

Judge Lawrence succeeds himself despite the efforts of those who felt aggrieved by his excise decisions to defeat him. His retention is a matter of congratulation by members of the bar and laymen as well. The defeat of Judge Earnest Hall for re-election to the bench of the City Court is generally regretted, especially as the successful candidates in this branch of the judiciary were comparatively obscure lawyers who have their reputations to make.

No retiring surrogate of this county ever handed the probate seals to a successor with greater honor or more respected than Hon. Daniel G. Rollins, who at once becomes the associate of the leader of our bar, Mr. James C. Carter. He probably put in more hours of work every week of his term than any lawyer in this city, and disposed of more important will cases than any probate judge in this country. His decisions have rarely been disturbed, and the widow and the orphan have often had cause to rise and call him blessed. He retires with the pigeon-holes of his desk cleared, and Saturday filed his decisions in the last two important cases awaiting determination. The first was in the Stevens will case, in which Mrs. Paran Stevens sought to have her co-executor, her daughter's husband, removed. The proceedings were attended with great bitterness on both sides, which finally involved the counsel, ex-Judge Noah Davis and Mr. Burrill. The defense was a general mother-inlaw, and the court sustained the plea.

The other was the famous Paine will case, which had many sensational features, not the least interesting of which was the finding of a handkerchief containing nearly $400,000 in greenbacks, the property of the testator, who was an eccentric miser, who made an obscure but enterprising lawyer his sole heir. Paine lived in a miserable attic, depriving himself of the necessities of life, that his hoard might daily grow. The will was contested as a forgery and for other reasons. The decision finds that the will was genuine; that there was no fraud, but holds that the testator had not the testamentary capacity to make it valid. This decision is discouraging to eccentric misers and obscure and enterprising lawyers, but is full of joy to sundry relatives who discovered their kinship after they heard of the old man's death. The heir under the will had the good luck to die before the decision was filed.

I heard a most remarkable will story recently, the truth of which is vouched for by my informant. All rights are reserved. Authors and playwrights infringing will be prosecuted to the full extent of what should be the law. About a fortnight since I had occasion to require a number of photographs of exhibits for use in a certain trade-mark suit which I was about to bring. Not desiring to entrust to a clerk the arrangement of the necessary details, I went myself to the gallery of a down-town photographer who makes a specialty of legal and commercial photographs, and saw my convincing evidence unloaded from a truck. The operator was a genuine old three-ply Yankee, who used to travel through New England with a gallery on wheels. In the intervals between the development of the negatives, the operator entertained me with the recital of some of his lego-photographic experiences. "Last year, about this time," said he, "a young lawyer came in here, and asked me if I could take a photograph of a legal instrument. I didn't ask him no questions I know my business too well-but just told him that was my particular specialty. He showed it to me without taking his hand off it. I saw them familiar words, In the name of God. Amen,' and I knew it was a will. To all appearances it had not been signed or witnessed. I didn't ask no questions, 'cause I know my business too well. Young Mr. Blackstone almost whispered when he told me that he had good reason to believe that the will had been both executed and witnessed, and said he thought the signatures had been erased. He wanted to know if I could not enlarge the hull business five times. Yes, counsellor,' says I, I kin enlarge it six times, but the paper there where the signatures ought to be is as smooth as the bottom of a baby's foot. I was examinin' it with a pretty strong glass. There aint no erasures, counsellor,' says I, 'not as I thinks any