aforesaid stated the length of the term, and when it should commence, of the officers first elected. There seemed to be no other constitutional provision tending to throw light upon the question in that case.

When we come to a consideration of the provisions respecting the term of a judge of the district court, we observe in the first place that it provides generally, without any restriction, that in each judicial district there shall be elected at general elections, by the electors thereof, one judge, "whose term shall be six (6) years from the first Monday in January succeeding his election and until his successor is duly qualified." Upon the face of this provision it applies as well to a judge elected to fill a casual vacancy as to one elected immediately preceding the expiration of the term of a previously elected incumbent. It makes no distinction in that respect so far as its language goes. It amounts to the same as saying that the term of a judge of the district court elected at any general election shall be six years from the first Monday in January succeeding his election, since a particular general election or one in any particular year or those of particular years are not specified; but the expression is "There shall be elected at general elections."

Section 19 aforesaid, begins with the words "until otherwise provided by law," and though the meaning of those words may seem to be somewhat clouded, we think that they were employed with reference only to the number of judicial districts, and were not intended to qualify the remainder of the section relating to the election of judges of the district court. That view is fortified by a consideration of the two succeeding sections, Section 20, which "until otherwise provided by law," states how the three judicial districts provided for in Section 19 shall be constituted; and Section 21 which permits the legislature, under certain restrictions, to increase the number of districts. Any other construction would leave to the legislature the power to change the term of district judges, which, manifestly, was not intended.

The construction given above to the provision of Section 19 of Article 5, viz.: That it fixes a full term of six years for a judge of the district court elected at a general election, whether elected to fill a casual vacancy or in anticipation of the expiration of a full term, seems not only to be the clear meaning and effect of the section standing alone, but such construction is materially aided by a consideration of the provision made in Section 4 of the same article for filling a vacancy in the office of justice of the supreme court. Though the term of the latter office was fixed by the section at eight years commencing from and after the first Monday in January next succeeding an election thereto, the justices first elected under the constitution were required to classify themselves by lot, so that one of them should go out of office at the end of four years, one at the end of six years, and one at the end of eight years from the commencement of their term. It was then provided:

"If a vacancy occur in the office of a justice of the supreme court, the governor shall appoint a person to hold the office until the election and qualification of a person to fill the unexpired term occasioned by such vacancy, which election shall take place at the next succeeding general election."

Argument is unnecessary to show that this provision as to filling a vacancy in the office of justice of the supreme court was made with the particular purpose in view of continuing the classification of the justices, and to prevent the election for a full term of eight years of more than one justice at the same time. It would seem also that the provision was deemed necessary to accomplish that pur

The reason and necessity of the classification and its continuance is rendered more obvious by the provision in the same section that the justice having the shortest term to serve, and not holding his office by appointment or election to fill a vacancy, shall be the chief justice.

With this provision before the constitutional convention as to the term of one elected to fill a vacancy in the office

of justice of the supreme court, the omission of a similar provision in prescribing the term of a district judge elected at a general election is significant, and leads to the inference that the omission was intended. Clearly the same reason for it did not exist in the case of district judges. There appears to be no reasonable ground, therefore, for restricting the provision of Section 19, as to the term of a district judge elected at a general election to anything short of the plain purport of the language employed.

So construed, and we perceive no other reasonable method of construing the section, what is its effect in connection with Section 20 of the "Schedule?" The latter section is not needed to ascertain the commencement of the regular term of a district judge, since that is definitely provided for in the section above considered. It, however, authorized the judges first elected to serve the intervening time between the date of their qualification and the commencement of the full term in addition to such full term. It may, therefore, by analogy to the case of the state treasurer, be held to fix the time of the ending of the full term. But to apply the principle asserted in the treasurer's case, another essential element is required, viz.: That a provision for filling vacancies shall have been made without providing as to the duration of the authority of the person selected to fill the vacancy. If we are correct in the above construction of the language of Section 19, Article 5, the duration of the authority of the person elected at a general election to fill the vacancy is provided for, the same being six years from the first Monday in January succeeding his election. Thus this case is clearly distinguished from the treasurer's case which is so strongly relied on by counsel for the relator.

We have observed that such has been the popular construction, and we would be aided to some extent by that fact if necessary. That construction has been supported in two opinions of the Attorney General of the state, which, having had reference to a matter of such vital public interest, we may suppose were given general consideration.

In 1896 the question seems to have arisen whether an election for district judge in the fourth district would be required in that year, Judge Metz having been elected in 1894. In an opinion of Attorney General Fowler, dated September 10, 1896, rendered at the request of the Secretary of State to enable him to properly perform his duties with respect to the then ensuing election, it was held that an election in the fourth district was not required, but that the election in 1894 had been properly held, and the term of office of Judge Metz, who had then been elected, would not expire until the first Monday in January, 1901, six years from the commencement of his term. Gen'l Rep. 1897, p. 152.)

(Atty.

Again, in 1898, the question was raised as to the time. for an election to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation in 1897 of Judge Metz, and what the length of the term would be of the one elected. And in an opinion by Attorney General Van Orsdel, who recently occupied the office of a justice of this court, it was held that the election should be held at the general election in 1898, the next general election succeeding the occurring of the vacancy, and that the person elected to fill the vacancy would be elected for the full constitutional term of six years. (Atty. Gen'l Rep. 1898, p. 86.) In both of the opinions the question here presented was ably and fully discussed with reference to the constitutional and statutory provisions as well as the authorities upon the subject. They would not only be persuasive because of the ability and learning of their respective authors, but as coming from the legal adviser of the executive department, and acted upon by the election officers of the state, as well as respected by the people, they are entitled to much weight in our consideration of the question.

Judicial authority is not wanting in support of the conclusion we have reached. We believe a review of the cases to be unnecessary, but the following may be cited as in point and fully sustaining our views. (The Governor v. Nelson, 6 Ind. 496; State v. Thoman, 10 Kan., 2nd. Ed.,

150; Smith v. Cosgrove, 71 Vt. 196; Powers v. Hurst, 2 Humph. 24; Brewer v. Davis, 9 Humph. 208; People ex rel. v. Dubois, 23 Ill. 498; Smith v. McConnell, 44 S. C. 491; Sandsbury v. Middleton, 11 Md. 296; Op. of Judges, 16 Fla. 841; Op. of Justices, 61 Me. 601; People ex rel. v. Townsend, 102 N. Y. 430; State ex rel. v. Corcoran, (Mo.) 103 S. W. 1044; State ex. rel. v. Johns, 3 Ore. 533: People ex rel. v. Weller, 11 Cal. 77; People ex rel. v. Burbank, 12 Cal. 378; Whipper v. Reed, 9 Rich. (S. C.) 5; Crowell v. Lambert, 9 Minn. 267.)

It is evident that the fact that the certificate issued to Judge Matson upon his election in the first district at the election in 1906 recited that he was elected for the remainder of the unexpired term of Judge Scott cannot operate to shorten his term under the constitution and laws. (State ex rel. v. Corcoran, (Mo.) 103 S. W. 1044; Hale v. Bischoff, 53 Kan. 301; Stadler v. Detroit, 13 Mich. 346.) Being of the opinion, for the reasons aforesaid, that the election in 1904 in the third and fourth districts, and in 1906 in the first district, of a judge of the district court in those districts respectively were for the full constitutional term of six years, and, therefore, that there is at this time no vacancy in either of said districts required to be filled at the general election to be held in November of the present year, the writ of mandamus prayed for will be denied, except in the case of the second district. It is understood, however, that an election will be called without the writ in that district. Upon the facts set out in this case, an election of judge of the district court for the second judicial district will be required by reason of the fact that the term of the present incumbent of the office will expire on the first Monday in January, 1909, at which time he will have served the full term of six years under his election in 1902.

BEARD, J., and Scorr, J., concur.