parties interested can not agree, have on its hands, the further duty of apportioning the entire rate among those entitled.

This of course adds to the difficulties of the situation; but making a through rate over a route composed of several lines, and apportioning the same among the component members of the route, does in no wise differ in principle from the fixing of a rate for transportation over a single line. Conceding the right of the public to fix rates on a single line of road controlled and operated by a single company or carrier, the right to fix and apportion a through rate over connecting lines necessarily follows. Legally speaking, in fact, the fixing of the through rate is but the fixing separately of the rate for each carrier for so much of the transportation as is over its own line. In the absence of contract between the carriers, each one of them is bound only for safe carriage over its own line and safe delivery to the next carrier beyond; and each one may, in the absence of legislation, make its own reasonable charge for the service performed on its own line, regardless of the charges made by its predecessors or successors in the transportation.

The question of fixing and apportioning the through rate, so far as it is one of legislative authority, depends on the same principles and limitations as govern the rate-making power of the public on a single line of road. The question of the reasonableness of the rate or share to be received by each carrier for its own service may indeed be influenced by considerations which would not affect its local charges, but still the principle involved is the same.

In regard to the obligations towards shippers of the several carriers whose connecting lines, by virtue of public authority, are operated as a through route, they would seem to be the same and no other than they would be under the original practice of connecting carriers, where each is responsible only on its own road and for safe delivery to the next in the route to destination.

No one of the different carriers, merely because the public has made its road part of the through route, can thereby be any more responsible than it would otherwise be for loss, damage, wrong delivery, or other breach of duty on the part of some other carrier in the route.

So far as the safe transportation and right delivery of freight is concerned, the financial responsibility of any of the connecting carriers on such a route would hardly seem to be of so much importance to the others as is sometimes supposed, since no one of the carriers can be held liable for the default of its associates unless by contract it chooses to make itself so liable. The solvency of any carrier in the route is in this aspect more a question for the shipper than for other carriers. But the question of the responsibilities and duties of the several connecting carriers towards each other involves greater difficulties.

One of these difficulties consists in the necessity of a free interchange of cars between roads operated as a through route. A carrier by railroad, it has been held in some jurisdictions, is bound as such to accept

and to safely haul the cars of other carriers when tendered to it, either loaded or empty, supposing of course the cars to be themselves in fit and safe condition. Legislation explicitly imposing this duty on railways is not uncommon, and it is difficult to see wherein it is objectionable.

But when it is proposed, in furtherance of the design of establishing through routes by public authority, to require the initial carrier into whose car the freight may be loaded to permit that car-or, it may be, a large number of its cars-to pass off its own road on to another, where they may be unreasonably detained or carelessly or wantonly injured without the possibility of redress to the owner, the proposition would seem to involve serious embarrassments.

Moreover, each carrier in a through route may be vitally interested in the solvency and pecuniary responsibility of its associates, so far as it is customary or necessary for any of the carriers to act as well for the others as for itself in the collection of the entire transportation charges. It perhaps seldom or never happens at this day, when traffic passes on a through route over roads belonging to different carriers, that each carrier collects directly from the shipper its own share of the transportation charges. As a general thing the entire amount is paid either to the initial carrier to whom the freight is delivered by the consignor, or to the terminal carrier by whom it is delivered to the consignee. The party to whom the payment is thus made is bound of course to account to its associates for their share thereof.

It may sometimes happen that the amount accumulated in the hands of one of the members of a through route which rightfully belongs to the others is very considerable, and the interest which all have in the solvency and integrity of that one is apparent. Practically the one who collects the entire traffic charge is the financial agent of the others in that behalf. Where through routes are voluntarily formed by connecting carriers all, by the very fact of association under the usual methods of doing business, agree upon the employment of this agent. But where a through route is proposed to be formed, not by voluntary association, but by public authority, it becomes a question how far such authority is competent to compel some carriers to accept the agency of others and intrust the collection of their earnings to parties in whose selection they have no voice and over whose conduct they have no control.

In answer to the suggestion here made as to the obstacles in the way of opening through routes by public authority, it may be said that in the practical management of such routes, where they have been formed by voluntary associations, no serious difficulties appear to have arisen from the sources referred to.

It may be well supposed, too, that whatever official or bureau might be charged with the duty of establishing through routes would be clothed with sufficient discretion in the premises to make regulations looking

to the protection of every carrier in the line against loss or damage from the action of its associates. The number of cars to be furnished by each member of the route, the allowance to be made by each for the use of the other's cars, demurrage for improper detention, and other similar matters relating to the operation of a through route, might thus be provided for. It can hardly be conceded that the due interchange of traffic and of cars at through rates over connecting lines, a practice so well recognized and universally prevalent, can not be enforced by public authority when the public interest requires it and the carriers themselves refuse voluntarily to adopt the practice.

In regard to the payment of balances on account of freight moneys received for connecting lines, to which reference has been made as one of the difficulties in the way of compulsory through routing, it may be observed that such balances for a reasonable period back are, by the current of modern authorities, held to be a first lien not only on the earnings, but frequently on the proceeds of sale of the property of the company from which they are due. This principle, supplemented if need be by legislation to the same end, would seem to afford sufficient protection to each carrier in a route from loss arising from the insolvency of its associates.

But even if it be concluded that the proper public authority may compel the opening of through routes over independent lines of railway, the question must often practically arise, in what cases and to what extent has the Congress of the United States the power to legislate with that object in view. That existing legislation of Congress does not cover the subject, or even do more than barely touch upon it, may be conceded. But it does not follow that Congress has exhausted its powers in this respect.

The question of the power of Congress may perhaps be clearly presented by a hypothetical case: Suppose a quantity of grain is shipped from Chicago by water, marked and consigned to "New York via Buf falo and New York Central Railroad." The vessel which received the grain, however, only undertakes to carry it to Buffalo, and gives a bill of lading accordingly, agreeing to transport to that point and there deliver to the railroad company. The New York Central Road lies entirely within the limits of a single State, and the transportation from Buffalo to New York would be entirely within the same limits. Now, is the railroad company, in respect to its obligations to receive that grain from the vessel at Buffalo and transport it to New York, engaged in "commerce between the several States," or in commerce within the State only? If the latter, Congress confessedly has no jurisdiction whatever over it. Whether the railroad company shall accept the shipment at all, and the terms of transportation, must, if this be the case, depend purely on the will of the company itself, or on the law or regulations of the State, if any such apply to the case. What is the result?

Manifestly that the railroad company, or the State of New York may absolutely prohibit the introduction into that State of the products of other States by way of the port of Buffalo. Such a conclusion seems repugnant to the first principles on which the Federal Constitution is founded. That instrument was in large measure suggested by the commercial troubles growing out of the imposition by some of the States of customs duties on imports from other States; and to admit that any State, or any of its citizens or corporations, can by any means exclude the products of other States from its territory is to concede the Constitution to that extent to be a failure.

Of course if the shipment was originally made from Chicago to Buffalo only to a consignee there, without any definite intention of having it proceed to an ultimate destination further on, then on arrival at Buffalo the shipment would lose its character of interstate traffic; and should it be subsequently sent to New York it would go as intrastate traffic subject only to State regulations.

But the mere fact that the shipment is not to be strictly continuous, or on a through bill of lading or under a "common control management or arrangement" of connecting carriers, can in no wise affect its character as interstate commerce, if in point of fact its origin is in one State and the terminus of the transit on which it is started is in another State. And where the traffic is interstate in its character all agencies participating in it are subject, as to it, to the regulation of Congress. These views not only seem consonant to reason, but they find very clear sanction and support from an authority which in respect to the powers of Congress under the Constitution is final and conclusive-the Supreme Court of the United States.

Thus, in the case of The Daniel Ball (10 Wall., 557) it was said thatWhenever a commodity has begun to move as an article of trade from one State to another, commerce in that commodity between the States has commenced. The fact that several different and independent agencies are employed in transporting the commodity, some acting in one State and some acting through two or more States, does in no respect affect the character of the transaction. To the extent to which each agency acts in that transportation it is subject to the regulation of Congress.

And if the authority of Congress

does not extend to an agency in such commerce when that agency is confined within the limits of a single State, its entire authority over interstate commerce may be defeated. Several agencies combining, each taking up the commodity transported at the boundary line at one end of the State and leaving it at the boundary line at the other end, the Federal jurisdiction would be entirely ousted and the constitutional provision would become a dead letter.

From this it would appear that if traffic originates in one State and is destined to another, it belongs to interstate commerce and the means by which it is transported to its place of destination is immaterial, as is also the question whether the transportation is to be continuous and uninterrupted across State lines, or whether the article carried is to be transported from one vehicle or line of transportation to another at the

State line or in the interior of a State. It is still an article of interstate commerce, and every agency participating therein is, to that extent subject to the regulation of Congress.

It is sometimes true, as said in another case (Coe vs. Errol, 116 U. S., 517), that "the point of time when State jurisdiction over the commodities of commerce begins and ends is not an easy matter to define." So long as their exportation from the State "is a matter altogether in fieri and not at all a fixed and certain thing," the Federal jurisdiction does not attach. But this "does not present the predicament of goods in course of transportation through a State, though detained for a time. within the State. * * * Such goods are already in the course of commercial transportation and are clearly under the protection of the Constitution."

It is perhaps safe to say that wherever commerce is under the protection of the Constitution for the purpose of preventing the imposition of burdens on it by State authority, under the guise of controlling State agencies engaged in such commerce, the circumstances will authorize Congress to impose regulations upon these agencies in respect to such commerce.

The illustration of the New York Central Railroad has been given because it seems, from its peculiar situation and importance in commerce between the States, to present in an unusually forcible manner both the necessity and the constitutional right of Congress to subject it to all proper regulations in respect to the interstate business tendered to or accepted by it.

But the same principles would apply to determine the power of Congress over any other road exclusively in any other State, which is adapted by its location, and is held out by its management, as seeking to participate in traffic which, within the definition above given, is interstate in its character.

In fact it may be said that where the owners of a line of railway, and the State under whose authority it is built, have so located it as to make it a fit and suitable highway for interstate commerce, they must have done so with the anticipation that traffic between the States would necessarily pass over it. In other words it must be presumed that it is dedicated, in part at least, to the purposes of such traffic.

This being the case, does it not necessarily follow that it is subject to the control of Congress, so far as may be proper for the regulation of the interstate commerce in which it participates?

As was said by Chief Justice Waite, speaking for the court in the case of Munn v. Illinois (94 U. S., 113):

Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence and affect the community at large.

When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he in effect grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public to the extent of the interest he has thus created.