In People v. Compagnie Générale Trans-Atlantique, decided at the same time as Turner v. Maryland, the court held void as a regulation of commerce a state law, alleged to be an inspection measure, imposing a tax on every passenger, not a citizen of the United States, from a foreign country landing in the port of New York. In this case it was squarely held that inspection laws, and the words "imports" and "exports" as used in Article I, Section X, Clause 2, of the Constitution, have reference to property exclusively, and not to persons. "We feel quite safe in saying," declare the court, "that neither at the time of the formation of the Constitution nor since has any inspection law included anything but personal property as a subject of its operation. Nor has it ever been held that the words imports and exports, are used in that instrument as applicable to free human beings by any competent judicial authority."

In addition the court go on to say, the law in question is invalid in that it "goes far beyond any correct view of the purpose of an inspection law. The commissioners are To inspect all persons arriving from any foreign country to ascertain who among them are habitual criminals, or pauper lunatics, idiots or imbeciles or orphan persons without means or capacity to support themselves and subject to become a public charge.' It may safely be said that these are matters incapable of being satisfactorily ascertained by inspection. What is an inspection? Something which can be accomplished by looking at or weighing or measuring the thing to be inspected or applying to it at once some crucial test. When testimony or evidence is to be taken and examined, it is not inspection in any sense whatever. Another section provides for the custody, the support and the treatment for disease, of these persons, and the retransportation of criminals. Are these inspection laws? Is the ascertainment of the guilt of a crime to be made by inspection? In fact, these statutes differ from those heretofore held void, only in calling them in their caption inspection laws,' and in providing for payment for any surplus, after the support of paupers, criminals and 89 107 TJ. S. 59; 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 87; 27 L. ed. 383.

diseased persons, into the Treasury of the United States; a surplus which, in this enlarged view of what are the expenses of an inspection law, it is safe to say will never exist. A State cannot make a law designed to raise money to support paupers, to detect or prevent crime, to guard against disease, and to cure the sick, an inspection law, within the constitutional meaning of the word, by calling it so in the title."

In Minnesota v. Barber was involved a state law passed as an inspection measure which required as a condition of sale of fresh meats in the State that the animals from which such meats were taken should have been inspected in the State before being slaughtered. This was a law which, clearly, would be practically prohibitive of the importation of fresh meat from other States, and the law was very properly held void. "If," the court say, "this legislation does not make such discrimination against the products and business of Minnesota, as interferes with and burdens commerce among the several States, it would be difficult to enact legislation that would have that result."

The court also take occasion to repeat that a law, which in its operation, whatever its terms, imposes a burden upon interstate commerce is not to be sustained simply because the statute imposing it applies to all the people of all the States including those of the enacting State.9

91

In Scott v. Donald 92 it was held that where a State recognizes as lawful the manufacture, sale, and use of intoxicating liquors, it cannot discriminate against such articles brought in from other States. "It is not an inspection law," say the court. "The prohibition of the importation of the wines and liquors of other States by citizens of South Carolina for their own use is made absolute, and does not depend on the purity or impurity of the articles." In Patapsco Guano Co. v. Board of Agriculture and Asbell v.

90 136 U. S. 313; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 862; 34 L. ed. 455.

91 See also Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 213; 34 L. ed. 862.

92 165 U. S. 58; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265; 41 L. ed. 632.

93 171 U. S. 345; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 862; 43 L. ed. 191.

94

Kansas the various adjudications of the Supreme Court with reference to state inspection laws are summarized and reviewed.

§ 314. State Quarantine Laws.

The enactment and enforcement by the States of quarantine laws, whether with reference to persons or to property, has given rise to numerous cases in which their constitutionality as tested by the commerce clause has been considered. Quarantine laws are, of course, but a variety of police laws, and their validity is determined as such. That is to say, as declared in Railroad Co. v. Husen,95 "while for the purpose of self-protection it [the State] may establish quarantine and reasonable inspection laws, it may not interfere with transportation into or through the State, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection." In Railroad Co. v. Husen was in question an act of the State of Missouri which provided that "No Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle shall be driven or otherwise conveyed into or remain in any county in this State between the first day of March and the first day of November in each year by any person or persons whatever." This act, claimed to be a quarantine measure, the court held void, saying: "The statute of Missouri is a plain intrusion plain intrusion upon the exclusive domain of Congress. It is not a quarantine law. It is not an inspection law. It says to all natural persons and to all transportation companies, You shall not bring into the State any Texas cattle or any Mexican cattle or Indian cattle, between March 1 and December [November] 1 in any year, no matter whether they are free from disease or not; no matter whether they may do an injury to the inhabitants of the State or not.' Such a statute, we do not doubt, it is beyond the power

of a State to enact."

In Morgan's L. & T. R., etc., Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health a state law was upheld as a reasonable quarantine measure, though admitted to be, in a measure, a regulation of commerce.

94 209 U. S. 251; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485; 52 L. ed. 778.

95 95 U. S. 465; 24 L. ed. 527.

96 118 U. S. 455; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1114; 30 L. ed. 237.

In Rasmussen v. Idaho97 was sustained a law of a State authorizing the Governor thereof, when he had reason to believe that there is an epidemic of infectious disease of sheep in localities outside of the State, to investigate the matter, and if he finds that the disease exists, to make a proclamation declaring such localities infected and prohibiting the introduction therefrom of sheep into the State, except under such restrictions as may seem proper. Distinguishing the act from that held void in the Husen case, the court say: "It will be perceived that this is not a continuous act, operating year after year irrespective of any examination as to the actual facts, but is one contemplating in every case investigation by the chief executive of the State before any order of restraint is issued. Whether such restraint shall be total or limited, and for what length of time, are matters to be determined by him upon full consideration of the condition of the sheep in the localities supposed to be affected. The statute was an act of the State of Idaho, contemplating solely the protection of its own sheep from the introduction among them of an infectious disease, and providing for only such restraints upon the introduction of sheep from other States as in the judgment of the State was absolutely necessary to prevent the spread of disease. The act therefore is very different from the one presented in Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen (95 U. S. 465; 24 L. ed. 527) and is fairly to be considered a purely quarantine act, and containing within its provisions nothing which is not reasonably appropriate therefor."

In Smith v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co.98 were sustained quarantine regulations established by the governor of the State on recommendation of a live stock commission in pursuance of a law whereby the importation of all cattle from the State of Louisiana for a certain period was prohibited, because the commission had reason to believe that anthrax had or was liable to break out in that State.

In Reid v. Colorado9 was sustained a state law prohibiting

97 181 U. S. 198; 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; 45 L. ed. 820. 98 181 U. S. 248; 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603; 45 L. ed. 847. 99 187 U. S. 137; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92; 47 L. ed. 108.

the importing of cattle from south of the thirty-sixth parallel of north latitude between certain dates, unless first kept for ninety days at some State north of that parallel or unless a certificate of freedom from contagious disease had been obtained from the state veterinary sanitary board. These provisions, were, in view of the surrounding circumstances, held to be reasonable sanitary precautions.

In Compagnie Francaise, etc. v. State Board of Health of Louisiana' the subject of state quarantine was again carefully considered, and especially in its relation to the existing immigration and quarantine acts of the General Government. These federal laws, it was held, were not intended to and did not abrogate the existing state quarantine systems.

§ 315. Federal Quarantine Laws.

No legislative power with reference to quarantine is specifically given to the Federal Government by the Constitution, but that government has very broad powers on the subject as incidental to its control of foreign and interstate commerce, admiralty and maritime matters, and foreign relations. To only a moderate extent, however, has this federal power been exercised.?

§ 316. State Game Laws.

Wild game within a State is not, until reduced to possession, private property, but belongs to the State, which is conceded to have a police power to regulate the times and methods by which it may be captured and killed, or when taken, may be sold. In their efforts to protect their game supplies the States have at times enacted game laws the validity of which has been contested as being regulations of interstate commerce. An examination of the case of Geer v. Connecticut will sufficiently illustrate the points involved.

1 186 U. S. 380; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 811; 46 L. ed. 1209.

2 See American Law Review, XLIII, 382, article " Federal Quarantine Laws," for an account of this legislation.

3 161 U. S. 519; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep 600; 40 L. ed. 793.