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in bar of an action brought by a citizen of another State in the courts of the United States, or of any other State than that where the discharge was obtained. The creditor of another State is, however, concluded by the discharge in bankruptcy if, by appearance or otherwise, he has made himself a party to the original insolvency proceedings.

It is thus seen that the power of the States in the matter of bankruptcy does not extend to an absolute release of the debtor from the obligation of his contracts. "The authority to deal with the property of the debtor within the State, so far as it does not impair the obligation of contracts, is conceded; but the power to release him, which is one of the usual elements of all bankrupt laws, does not belong to the legislature where the creditor is not within the control of the court.” 11

The United States is, of course, not under this territorial limitation in the exercise of its bankruptcy powers, and furthermore, it is not limited with reference to the impairment of the obligation of contracts. National bankrupt laws may, therefore, be made applicable to contracts already entered into at the time of their passage."

12

§ 382. Uniformity.

It is, however, required of national bankrupt laws that they shall be uniform. The uniformity is a geographical one. The laws must, in all their provisions, be equally applicable to all of the States, and to incorporated territories.13

By Section 6 of the act of 1898 it is provided that: "This act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the state laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the State wherein they have had their domicile for the six months, or the greater portion thereof, immediately preceding the filing of the petition." A somewhat similar

11 Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 134; 32 L. ed. 491. See also Brown v. Smart, 145 U. S. 454; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 958; 36 L. ed. 773.

12 In re Klein, 1 How. 277 note; Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 857; 46 L. ed. 1113.

13 Quære as to unincorporated territories.

provision appeared in the act of 1867. These exemptions, the character and amount of which are thus made dependent on state laws, have been held not to destroy that geographical uniformity which the Constitution requires.14

In Re Deckert15 the court say: "The power to except from the operation of the law property not liable to execution under the exemption laws of the several States, as they were actually enforced, was at one time questioned, upon the ground that it was a violation of the constitutional requirement of uniformity, but it has thus far been sustained, for the reason that it was made a rule of the law to subject to the payment of debts under its operation only such property as could by judicial process le made available for the same purpose. This is not unjust, as every debt is contracted with reference to the rights of the parties thereto under existing exemption laws, and no creditor can reasonably complain if he gets his full share of all that the law, for the time being, places at the disposal of creditors. One of the effects of a bankrupt law is that of a general execution issued in favor of all the creditors of the bankrupt, reaching all his property subject to levy, and applying it to the payment of all his debts according to their respective priorities. It is quite proper, therefore, to confine its operation to such property as other legal process could reach. A rule which operates to this effect throughout the United States is uniform within the meaning of that term, as used in the Constitution."

And in Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, the court declare: "We concur in this view, and hold that the system is, in the constitutional sense, uniform throughout the United States, when the trustee [under the Act of 1898] takes in each State whatever would have been available to the creditor if the bankrupt law had not been passed. The general operation of the law is uniform although it may result in certain particulars differently in different States."

14 Nor to violate the principle that Congress may not delegate legislative power to the States. Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 857; 46 L. ed. 1113.

152 Hughes 183, Fed. Cas. No. 3,728.

§ 383. Due Process of Law.

Provisions for voluntary proceedings in bankruptcy are not in violation of the due process of law clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, even when, as in the federal act of 1898, there is no requirement as to notice to creditors of the filing of the petition. In the Hanover Bank case the court say: "Congress may prescribe any regulations concerning discharge in bankruptcy that are not so grossly unreasonable as to be incompatible with fundamental law. Proceedings in bankruptcy are,

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generally speaking, in the nature of proceedings in rem. Creditors are bound by the proceeding in distribution on notice by publication and mail, and when jurisdiction has attached and been exercised to that extent, the court has jurisdiction to decree discharge, if sufficient opportunity to show cause to the contrary is afforded, on notice given in the same way. The determination of the status of the honest and unfortunate debtor by his liberation from incumbrance on future exertion is matter of public concern, and Congress has power to accomplish it throughout the United States by proceedings at the debtor's domicile. If such notice to those who may be interested in opposing discharge, as the nature of the proceeding admits, is provided to be given, that is sufficient. Service of process or personal notice is not essential to the binding force of the decree."

§ 384. State Laws Suspended but not Annulled by Federal Bankruptcy Law. Effect of the Law of 1898.

The enactment of a national bankrupt law does not operate to annul state laws on the same subject, but simply to suspend their operation so long as the national regulations are in force. Upon the repeal of the federal law the state laws at once revive, and do not need re-enactment.16 So also a state law passed while a federal bankruptcy law is in force goes at once into force with the repeal of the federal statute.17

The precise effect of the enactment of a federal bankruptcy law in suspending the operation of existing state laws is not definitely

16 Butler v. Goreley, 146 U. S. 303; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 84; 36 L. ed. 981. 17 Palmer v. Hixon, 74 Me. 447.

determinable from the decisions of either the state or federal courts. That a state law covering the same ground as the national act, even though its provisions be not inconsistent therewith, is suspended is generally, though not uniformly, admitted.'s If, then, it be conceded that the intention of Congress was, by the enactment of a bankrupt law, to cover the entire subject, all state laws relating to bankruptcy are suspended while the national law remains in force.19

Even if the view be accepted that by the act of 1898 the general subject of bankruptcy is fully covered there still remains in many cases, the difficulty of determining when state laws relating to general assignments for the benefit of creditors, receivership of corporations, etc., may be held to be in the nature of bankruptcy laws and as such rendered inoperative during the existence of the federal law. The purposes of this treatise do not, however, require a more particular discussion of this point.

COINAGE AND STANDARDS OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES.

§ 385. Coinage.

Congress is given power "to coin money, regulate the value. thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures."

The authority thus given has been freely exercised by Congress but this legislation has given rise to very few constitutional questions.

It is to be observed that power is to be given not only to coin, but to provide what shall be the legal tender value of the pieces

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18 Tua v. Carriere, 117 U. S. 201; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 565; 29 L. ed. 855. See also authorities cited by Professor Williston in article The Effect of a National Bankruptcy Law upon State Laws," in Harvard Law Review, XXII,

547.

19 Differing views have been taken by the different courts as to generality of the federal law of 1898. In Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Colorado, state laws have been held operative as to classes of persons and corporations not coming within the operation of the national law. Upon the other hand, the courts of other States have taken what would seem to be the better view that by the enactment of 1898 Congress intended the general subject of bankruptcy to be covered. See the authorities cited by, and the argument of, Professor Williston.

coined. There has been no question but that the States possess no concurrent jurisdiction. The power is an exclusively federal one.20

§ 386. Weights and Measures.

With reference to standards of weights and measurements, the rule is otherwise, the States being recognized to have power to legislate in the absence of congressional action.

§ 387. Counterfeiting.

COUNTERFEITING.

Congress is expressly given the power" to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States." There is little doubt, however, that, had the power not been expressly given, it would have been held implied in the power given to coin. The power of Congress to prohibit and to provide punishment for the counterfeiting of the coins and securities of foreign countries is considered elsewhere.

§ 388. The Passing and the Uttering of Counterfeit Coins Distinct Offenses.

The passing of counterfeit coins or securities is an offense distinct from that of coining or "uttering" them, but the power to punish the former is implied in the authority to forbid the latter.

With reference to this distinction between the uttering and the passing of counterfeit currency, the court in Fox v. Ohio22 say: "The power is an offense directly against the government, by which individuals may be affected; the other is a private wrong, by which the government may be remotely if it will in any degree, be reached. . . . The punishment of a cheat or a misdemeanor practised within the State, and against these whom she is bound to protect, is peculiarly and appropriately within her functions, and it is difficult to imagine an interference with those duties and functions which would be regular or justifiable."

20 By Section X, Clause 1, of Article I, the States are expressly denied the power to coin money.

21 See p. 256.

22 5 How. 410; 12 L. ed. 213.

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