International H. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 157 Wis. 167. just what the Commission may consider in the way of evidence. It may take into account (1) testimony offered, whether taken ex parte or not, where the parties are afforded an opportunity for rebuttal; (2) such inspection as it may make of the time books and pay roll of the employer; (3) the result of any medical examination that may be ordered. As further bearing on the duty of the Commission to preserve and place before the parties all testimony on which it acted, sec. 2394-19 might be referred to. This section requires the Commission, when suit is brought to set aside an award made by it, to return to the circuit court all documents and papers on file in the matter and all testimony which may have been taken therein. Obviously, this is essential if the court is required to examine the record to ascertain whether there is any evidence to sustain the findings made. The court cannot pass upon such a question unless it knows what evidence the Commission had before it. This same section (2394-19) provides that the findings of fact made by the Commission within its powers shall in the absence of fraud be conclusive. This leads to the query: Is it within the power of the Commission as set forth in the law to make a finding of fact not supported by any evidence whatever? This feature of the law was attacked in the original suit brought to test its constitutionality and was considered by the court, and it was there decided that if the Commission acted outside of its powers its decision was open for review to the extent that decisions of various other bodies are reviewable on certiorari. Continuing, the court said: "In such cases it is considered that clear violations of law in reaching the result reached by the board, such as acting without evidence when evidence is required, or making a decision contrary to all the evidence, constitute jurisdictional error and will justify reversal of the board's action, as well as the failure to take the proper steps to acquire jurisdiction. at the beginning of the proceeding. State ex rel. Augusta v. Losby, 115 Wis. 57, 90 N. W. 188." Borgnis v. Falk Co. 147 Wis. 327, 358, 359, 360, 133 N. W. 209. International H. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 157 Wis. 167. The statute contemplates and provides for a full and fair hearing and that the decision of the Commission shall be based on evidence and not arbitrarily made. It would seem to be clearly outside of its powers to find essential facts that had no support in the evidence. This is one of the grounds specified in sec. 2394-19 on which the courts may review the award made by the Commission. In a number of cases following the decision in Borgnis v. Falk Co., supra, the interpretation there given to the law has been followed. Northwestern I. Co. v. Industrial Comm. 154 Wis. 97, 103, 142 N. W. 271; Nekoosa-Edwards P. Co. v. Industrial Comm. 154 Wis. 105, 108, 141 N. W. 1013; Milwaukee v. Miller, 154 Wis. 652, 144 N. W. 188. The rule in certiorari cases is that, if in any reasonable view of the evidence it will support the conclusion arrived at, such conclusion will not be disturbed for want of support in the evidence. If, however, the finding has no support in the testimony, there was no jurisdiction to make it. State ex rel. Miller v. Thompson, 151 Wis. 184, 187, 188, 138 N. W. 628; State ex rel. M. A. Hanna D. Co. v. Willcuts, 143 Wis. 449, 453, 128 N. W. 97; State ex rel. Augusta v. Losby, 115 Wis. 57, 90 N. W. 188; State ex rel. Edward Hines L. Co. v. Fisher, 129 Wis. 57, 108 N. W. 206. From what has been said it is obvious that there must be some support in the evidence for findings of fact made by the Industrial Commission and that such evidence must be made a part of the record that is returned to the circuit court for review. This brings us to a consideration of the evidence taken on the hearing which is before us and which consists of sworn testimony taken before the Commission and a statistical report compiled and published by the Commission. Sec. 2394-52, sub. 10, authorizes the Commission to collect, collate, and publish statistical and other information relating to the work under its jurisdiction and to make such public reports thereof as it deems necessary. This report was laid before the parties, and might be considered as evidence by the Commission. International H. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 157 Wis. 167. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm. 156 Wis. 47, 145 N. W. 216. There was no testimony given by any witness to the effect that drill-press operators who had the sight of one eye impaired were discriminated against by employers. Whatever evidence is contained in the record to support the finding of the Commission is found in pages 152 to 162 inclusive of a bulletin issued by the Commission under date of March 30, 1913 (vol. 2, No. 6). This bulletin contains statements made by forty-nine different persons who at some time in their lives had lost the sight of one eye. The inquiries were directed to two subjects: (1) The ability to do work after the accident, and (2) the ability to secure employment. Only thirteen of the persons interrogated were interviewed on this specific point. Less than one fourth of the persons interviewed stated that they thought they might have done better had it not been for their injury. The remaining three fourths said their injury had no effect on their earning capacity. No one stated that such an injury would affect the earning power of a drillpress operator. On this report, in part at least, the Commission reached the conclusion, as before stated, that the claimant's ability to do a full day's work in the occupation in which he had been engaged was not impaired. Of the persons specifically asked as to whether they had been discriminated against in the matter of securing work because of the loss of an eye, but one gave an affirmative answer. He said he had been "refused employment, as his ambition was to become a railroad man, but the loss of the eye proved to be a handicap." The others all stated that the injury did not prove to be a handicap in the matter of securing work. This evidence, instead of tending to support the finding of the Commission, if it is of any value, strongly tends to support an opposite conclusion. It cannot be that because one person lost an eye when he was a boy and was thereby International H. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 157 Wis. 167. disabled from entering the railroad service, it follows that the claimant would be refused employment as a drill-press operator because of the partial loss of the sight of one eye. The Commission did not base its finding on evidence laid before the parties or on anything that can be considered evidence under the statutes referred to. In its memorandum decision filed with the award it states what it considered in the following language: "It has caused an investigation to be made of a great many cases where one-eyed men are actually at work in various employments. The result of this investigation is in print and is made the subject of public report. The Commission has given consideration to various compensation acts in this and other countries, and has considered the legislative and administrative rules with reference to compensation in such cases. It has considered the conclusions and results of the United States Pension Board in making pension allowances in cases of similar injuries. The Commission also has before it an award made by the California Industrial Accident Board under a provision in the California Compensation Act, identical with the provisions in this act. "From all of the information that the Commission has at hand, it concludes that under our act the loss of earning capacity because of the loss of the sight of one eye is equal to fifteen per cent. of the employee's earning capacity at the time of the injury. "Therefore an award will go in favor of the applicant based on a loss of fifteen per cent. of his earning capacity as determined by the evidence." This award was made about eight months after the final hearing took place. What compensation acts were considered and what provisions they contained, we do not know, and the parties did not know. The same is true of the legislative and administrative rules referred to, as well as the conclusions of the United States Pension Board which are mentioned. We have no means of knowing whether the statutes referred to are similar to our own or otherwise. It is difficult to see VOL. 157-12 International H. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 157 Wis. 167. wherein any of these things could constitute evidence on which. the finding of fact made could rest. The decision of the California commission was not returned with the record and presumably was not put in evidence. We have examined it and cannot see how it even tends to prove any fact upon which the award here made might be sustained, even if we could consider it. The narrow question here is: Was there any evidence tending to show that the claimant could get steadier work as a drill-press operator with two good eyes than he could with the sight of one impaired? How statutes of other states or rules for their enforcement or rulings of the pension board or of the California commission could affect this question is not apparent. But if they do, the parties were entitled to know what statutes and rules were relied on, to the end that they might present evidence to the contrary, or at least argue to the Commission that they did not tend to establish liability. Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595; State ex rel. Arnold v. Common Council of Milwaukee, post, p. 505, 147 N. W. 50. The circuit court was evidently unable to find any evidence in the record to support the finding of the Commission. The learned judge in his decision said: "In determining whether such findings are supported by the evidence, the court must consider all matters of which judicial notice will be taken. The evidence establishes the fact that the loss of one eye affects the ability of the applicant to judge distances. It is a matter of such common knowledge that judicial notice will be taken of it, that preference will generally be given to men with two eyes, who can correctly judge distances, when they are to be employed upon such machines as that upon which the applicant is working." We entertain a high regard for the opinion of the circuit judge in this as well as in other matters. But we are obliged to disagree with him. The persons interviewed by the Industrial Commission seem to do likewise, and they ought to know what the fact is. If it be true that persons injured as |