Franke v. H. P. Nelson Co. 157 Wis. 241. from the makers, in cash or by seizure and sale of the pianos under the contracts assigned to him, without interference or molestation from the defendants. It is alleged that the right has been violated by the defendants in at least three particulars: (1) By asserting a paramount claim to the securities given by the purchasers; (2) by actually collecting money from them on the strength of such claim; and (3) by forbidding the purchasers to pay plaintiff the amounts due him. As to the pianos which were taken back and resold, the plaintiff asserts the right to have the cash paid on the resale turned over to him, and the further right to have the securities taken on such resale delivered to him. If these rights existed, the complaint shows that they have been flagrantly violated. It is quite clear that the complaint shows a primary right and a violation of such right. The real question presented is: Has the plaintiff an adequate remedy at law? He can commence suits against the makers of the securities which he holds on instalments as they become due, and in such suits the ownership of the securities may be determined by bringing all parties in interest before the court, but it does not follow that such a remedy is adequate. In each instance there are two or more persons who claim to be the sole owners of a chose in action. The debtor does not know which one to pay, and to be on the safe side must refuse to pay any of the claimants. Of course the debtor can wait until suit is brought and then pay the money into court and ask that all claimants to the fund be made parties to the action and then let them fight it out. But such a proceeding involves expense to the purchasers and as many actions as there are contracts. Undoubtedly many of the debtors can ill afford the expense, and if it were otherwise that would be no good reason why they should be subjected to it. The title to the securities being once determined by a judgment of court, the necessity for further litigation will in all probability be obviated. Those desiring to pay will have a Franke v. H. P. Nelson Co. 157 Wis. 241. means of knowing to whom payments may be made, and those who desire to surrender their pianos will know to whom the surrender should be made. As the matter now stands, none of the debtors can with any degree of safety pay the plaintiff or any one else, because if they should pay the wrong party they may be called upon to pay a second or even a third time. The plaintiff asserts the right to collect the amounts due and to become due on some forty-eight musical instruments sold to as many different purchasers. In each instance there is at least one other claimant. This means, in all probability, that if plaintiff is relegated to his remedy at law he will have to bring a large number of suits and to bring them against persons who may be perfectly willing to pay whenever the not unreasonable privilege is accorded to them of knowing definitely who is entitled to the money. The main object and purpose of this suit is to settle that question and to settle it without a multiplicity of suits and without unnecessary hardship to the plaintiff or to innocent third parties. It certainly seems reasonable enough to permit the maintenance of a single action to adjust the rights and the equities of the parties thereto. The action commenced partakes of the nature of the old bill of peace. The prevention of a multiplicity of suits is a recognized head of equity jurisdiction. The action can be sustained on this ground and perhaps on other grounds as well, but this one is sufficient. The numerous controversies that would arise in case relief was sought at law would really be controversies between the parties to this suit, because presumably the debtors would in most cases pay what they owed into court and ask that the various claimants who are parties to this action be brought in to litigate their right to the money so paid. The parties to this action, excepting the Heller Piano Company, derive their title to the securities or supposed securities which they hold from a common source; the matters in dispute are of the same Franke v. H. P. Nelson Co. 157 Wis. 241. nature and have a connection with each other, and all of the parties are more or less concerned in the result. These facts are sufficient to justify a resort to the equity side of the court. 16 Cyc. 66 and cases cited; 1 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. (3d ed.) § 246; New York & N. H. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 17 N. Y. 592, 596 et seq.; Saratoga Co. v. Deyoe, 77 N. Y. 219, 225; Black v. Shreeve, 7 N. J. Eq. 440, 456; Sheffield Waterworks v. Yeomans, L. R. 2 Ch. App. Cas. 8, 11. The contention that several causes of action are improperly united is not well taken. The complaint purports to state but a single cause of action, and no motion has been made to make it more definite and certain by separately stating the different causes of action which the appellant seems to think are stated therein. We think it states but a single cause of action, with which is coupled a demand for relief incidental to the cause stated. It may well be that the plaintiff has not been overmodest in asking relief, but the number of causes of action stated in a complaint is not determined by the comprehensive character of the relief prayed for, and it does not follow that because too much is asked the court is going to grant any greater relief than the plaintiff is justly entitled to. The complaint was also demurred to on the ground that there is a defect of parties defendant, in that the several makers of the contracts for the sale of pianos alleged to have been sold and delivered by the Heller Piano Company to the plaintiff were not made parties. There is probably a sufficiently particular statement of the defect relied on to comply with sec. 2651, Stats., inasmuch as plaintiff could readily ascertain the names of the persons whom the demurrant claims should be made parties, by consulting the contracts which he holds. Baker v. Hawkins, 29 Wis. 576; Murray v. McGarigle, 69 Wis. 483, 34 N. W. 522. It may be that some of those persons are necessary parties to a determination of the controversy which the plaintiff seeks to settle. That fact, if it is a fact, does not appear from the Donovan v. Hoenig, 157 Wis. 250. face of the complaint. The defect, therefore, if there is one, should be taken advantage of by answer, as provided in sec. 2653, Stats. We think, when a final judgment is entered in this action determining and quieting title to the securities in controversy, the debtors may act on such determination and make payment to such parties as the court decides are entitled thereto, and that such judgment will estop the defeated claimants from enforcing their alleged claims against such debtors. Certainly after a judgment is entered quieting title to real estate a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer can rely thereon and deal with the party whose title is quieted without fear of successful molestation from the defeated claimant. We see no reason why the same rule should not apply to chattels where equity has jurisdiction to settle the title thereto. For this reason it is not apparent from the complaint why the debtors should be made parties to this suit. By the Court.-Order affirmed. DONOVAN, Administrator, Respondent, vs. HOENIG and another, Appellants. April 11-May 1, 1914. Vendor and purchaser: Failure to perfect title: Reasonable time: Recovery of money paid and deposited in escrow: Interest. 1. Where, under a contract for the sale of land made on August 24th, a part of the purchase price was paid to the vendor and the remainder was, by agreement, on August 30th deposited in a bank to be held, with the deed, until the vendor should perfect his title if he could do so within a reasonable time, otherwise to be returned to the purchaser, such reasonable time had elapsed prior to November 16th and, the title not then having been perfected, the purchaser could refuse to accept the deed and recover the money paid as well as that deposited. Donovan v. Hoenig, 157 Wis. 250. 2. It appearing in such case that negotiations continued until some time in October and that if the title could then have been made good the purchaser would have accepted the deed, although he had theretofore demanded back the money, a recovery of interest on the amount deposited is allowed only from November 16th, the date of the commencement of the action. APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Calumet county: GEO. W. BURNELL, Circuit Judge. Modified and affirmed. This action was brought to recover $1,450 which was the consideration named in an executory contract for the sale of certain real estate made between the plaintiff's intestate, as vendee, and the defendant Hoenig, as vendor. Fifty dollars was paid down at the time of the making of the contract, and six days later the balance of the purchase money was placed in the hands of the defendant bank to be turned over to Hoenig if he should within a reasonable time clear the title of the property. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to do this, and hence brings this action seeking to recover back $1,400 from Hoenig and the bank jointly, and the remaining $50 from Hoenig alone. Judgment was rendered in accordance with the prayer of the complaint, and the defendants appeal. The case was tried by the court. The facts were not seriously in dispute, and were in brief as follows: August 24, 1912, one John Donovan, the plaintiff's intestate, and Hoenig made a written contract by which Hoenig agreed to sell and convey by good and sufficient deed to the intestate a residence property in Brillion, and the intestate agreed to pay $1,450 therefor, of which $50 was paid down and the balance was to be paid August 30th. The property consisted of two adjoining parcels, which, however, formed but one residence property and constituted the homestead of Hoenig. Both parties supposed that Hoenig had perfect title, and the time between the making of the contract and the payment of the money was apparently allowed so that an abstract might be obtained. On |