ABANDONMENT. See BROKERS.
A claim for an accounting in favor of one beneficially interested in a trust for the receipt of the rents and profits of real estate, is one which survives the death of the beneficiary. Estate of Hemphill, 331
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. See NEW TRIAL, 5. PLEADING, 10. ABUTTING OWNERS. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 13-15, 19, 20. ACCEPTANCE. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3, 4, 6.
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. See ARBITRATION AND AWARD, 1.
ACCOUNTING. See APPEAL, 14, 15. ARBITRATION AND AWARD. EX- ECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 3, 4. TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES.
By whom may be brought-Who may maintain. See DEEDS, 3. TAXATION, 4.
Independent action. See DIVORCE, 6, 7.
At law or in equity? See NUISANCES, 1. PLEADING, 5-7.
Joinder of causes of action. See NUISANCES, 2. PLEADING, 2–8. Bar to action. See ADVERSE POSSESSION, 1. JUDGMENT, 2. TION, 3.
ADOPTED CHILD. See WILLS, 1-3.
ADVERSE PARTY. See APPEAL, 4. DIVORCE, 1. INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY, 2.
Statutes construed: Evidence.
1. Under sec. 4207, Stats., a continuous disseisin of the true owner for twenty years bars his right of action to recover real prop- erty or the possession thereof; and neither sec. 4212 nor sec. 4214 purports to enumerate all the conditions which constitute adverse possession. Zellmer v. Martin, 341
2. Evidence held sufficient to sustain a finding of title in defendant acquired by twenty years' adverse possession. Ibid.
3. Adverse possession must be exclusive of the true owner, but not necessarily exclusive at all times of temporary entries upon the lands by third persons not under claim of title; and in this case defendant's continuity of possession was not interrupted by occasional trespasses by the cattle of other persons straying in from the highway, nor even by such occasional and unin- tentional trespasses by cattle of the plaintiff. Ibid.
Presumptions: Abandonment of lease.
4. Evidence held to sustain a finding by the jury that a lessee of land had abandoned all claim to the property before creditors entered thereon, and to rebut any presumption that they held under an assignment of the lease or were tenants of the lessor. Illinois Steel Co. v. Budzisz, 16
5. The continuous occupancy of the premises by said creditors and their successors for more than twenty years before the com- mencement of an action by the true owner, raised a presump- tion that their possession was adverse. Ibid.
AFFIDAVITS. See APPEAL, 16. NEW TRIAL, 1. PLEADING, 10.
AGGRAVATION OF DAMAGES. See BREACH OF PROMISE OF MARRIAGE, 2, 3. . ALIENATION. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 8–13.
AMBIGUITIES.
AMENDMENT.
Of charter.
See DEEDS, 1. HUSBAND and Wife.
See CORPORATIONS, 1, 6-15.
Of pleading. See PLEADING, 10.
ANSWER. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 10. PARTIES, 2. ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1-5.
APPEAL AND ERROR.
Decisions reviewable: Appealable orders.
1. There can be no appeal to the supreme court except as authorized by statute. Wildes v. Franke, 189 2. An order of the circuit court affirming an order of the civil court of Milwaukee county vacating a judgment of the latter court immediately after its entry, is not appealable under sec. 3069, Stats. 1913. Ibid.
[3. Whether such order of the civil court was appealable to the cir- cuit court, not determined.] Ibid. 4. An order of the circuit court affirming an order of the Milwaukee civil court suppressing an examination of the defendant under sec. 4096, Stats., until after the service and filing of the com- plaint, is not appealable. Baumgarten v. Matchette, 230
5. A motion made by defendant, after a judgment by default, to set aside the service of the summons and all subsequent proceed- ings on the ground that the service was void, is in effect a summary application made after judgment to vacate it for want of jurisdiction, and an order denying such motion is ap- pealable under sub. 2, sec. 3069, Stats. Rix v. Sprague C. M. Co.
Persons entitled to appeal. See APPEAL, 14, 15. Parties: Joinder in appeal.
6. Separate appeals should not be taken by parties who are united in interest so that they constitute really but one party, unless their interests can be better protected thereby. Yates v. Yates,
Assignment of errors. See TRIAL, 3, 4.
Dismissal. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 4. Review: Affirmance and reversal: Material and immaterial errors. See APPEAL, 13. ASSAULT AND BATTERY. BREACH OF PROMISE OF MARRIAGE. COURTS, 6. DIVORCE, 1. EVIDENCE, 3. FALSE PRETENSES, 2. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 12, 13. INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY, 2-5, 7. MASTER AND SERVANT, 11, 14, 23, 31. NEGLIGENCE, 5. RAILROADS, 14. SALES, 1. STREET RAILWAYS, 3. TRESPASS. TRIAL. WILLS, 3.
7. Where certain of the findings in a special verdict are sufficient to support the judgment, alleged errors relating to other findings are immaterial. Athanasiou v. Garton Toy Co.
8. Defendant's negligence being conceded, the fact that the court answered the question relating thereto in the special verdict did not constitute error on the ground that such answer indi- cated to the jury that they should find plaintiff not guilty of contributory negligence. Ibid. 9. Defining correctly, in the charge, a word used in a question of the special verdict, so as to inform the jury of the true mean- ing of such question, is not error even though it informs the jury of the effect of their answer to the question. Ibid. 10. Where an instruction as to a material issue places upon a party a greater burden of proof than the law requires, and the answer is unfavorable to such party, the error is prejudicial. Heine- man v. Old Nat. Bank, 289 11. Denial of a jury trial was not prejudicial error in a case where the rights of the parties rest on undisputed evidence and were for determination upon the record by the court. Thomas v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 635
Determination and disposition of cause: Discretionary powers. 12. Where, on appeal to the supreme court, it appears that "the real controversy has not been fully tried" or that justice has mis- carried, that court may, under sec. 2405m, Stats., give relief regardless of the failure to take proper exceptions or frame proper pleadings, and may direct such procedure in the trial court as shall be deemed necessary to accomplish the ends of justice. Knudson v. George, 520
Same: Mandate on reversal. See DAMAGES, 6.
13. In an action against L. and D. for personal injuries, the special verdict exonerated L. but found D. silty of negligence. Be- cause of a supposed error in the charge respecting the liabil- ity of L., an order granting a new trial was made upon plaint- iff's motion and also, in form, upon the motion of D., but in fact all questions raised by D. were decided against him. Upon an appeal by L., D. appeared as a respondent. It appearing that the charge was correct, the order for a new trial is re- versed and judgment on the verdict directed in favor of L. against plaintiff and in favor of plaintiff against D. Lederer,
Appeal from Milwaukee civil court. See APPEAL, 3.
Appeal from county court. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 4. 14. H., one of the executors of a will, was also one of the residuary legatees. His co-executor alone prepared and filed what pur- ported to be the final account of the executors. The residuary legatees filed objections to and contested the allowance of cer- tain items, and from the judgment allowing them H. appealed as executor. Held, that he was not precluded from appealing in that capacity on the ground that as executor he had asserted the correctness of the account and had objected to it only as residuary legatee. His intention being manifest, the formal objections filed by him as such legatee might, if necessary, be treated as having been made by him as executor also. Will of Hyde, 462 15. One executor may, without the consent or participation of his co-executor, appeal from an order or judgment of the county court which in his judgment does injustice to a residuary legatee. Ibid.
Appeal from police justice: Affidavit of good faith.
16. Under sec. 10, ch. VII, of the Baraboo city charter (Laws of 1882, ch. 21), upon appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the police justice of that city, an affidavit of good faith is not necessary. Baraboo v. Stone, 397
APPEALABLE ORDERS. See APPEAL, 1-5.
1. A lease of water for power at a rental of $6 per horse power per annum provided for a renewal for a second term of ten years at a rental to be fixed by arbitration. At the end of the origi- nal term no arbitrators were appointed, but the lessee contin- ued for about three years to use the water and pay rent at the old rate, the lessor giving receipts in full for part of the time, and afterward receipts "on account." Arbitrators were then by agreement appointed "to determine the annual rental which [the lessee] ought in justice to, and shall, pay to the [lessor] for said premises and power, during said renewal period,' specifying the entire ten-year term; and in making the next payment, prior to the award, the lessee stated that it was made subject to the terms of the arbitration agreement and that if the decision should establish a lower rental the lessor would be charged with the excess paid during the period covered by said agreement. Held, that these facts sustained a finding of the court that there was no accord and satisfaction as to the rent accruing prior to the arbitration agreement. Green Bay & M. C. Co. v. Kaukauna G., E. L. & P. Co. 412 2. In making their own independent investigation in this case the arbitrators were not guilty of misbehavior, but did only what the parties consented they might do. Ibid.
Justification. See DAMAGES, 5, 7. SHERIFFS, 2.
1. In an action for assault and battery by a watchman upon a tres- passer upon defendant's property, it being claimed by defend- ant that the watchman acted at first in protection of defend- ant's property and later in self-defense, and that he did not use unnecessary force in either instance, it was error, after rejecting questions proposed by defendant relating to both branches of the justification, to submit in the special verdict only the question whether the watchman "aggressively and otherwise than in self-defense" used "force upon plaintiff." Zimmerman v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 514
2. Testimony offered by defendant in such case tending to show that the watchman did not use excessive force, that his hand was wounded by a knife carried by plaintiff, that plaintiff had several times taken wood and coal from defendant's yards, and that he had been at one time arrested by another watchman for stealing wood, was erroneously excluded.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 1-3, 9, 13-21. TAXA-
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS. See TRIAL, 3, 4.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK. See RAILROADS, 7.
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