him of the necessity of introducing a copy | trover, as for a fraudulent conversion, inof the entire proceedings, so that he might stead of assumpsit for a balance due on obtain the benefit of his discharge by the open account. Crawford v. Burke, 195 U. mere production of a certified copy of the S. 177, 193, 49 L. ed. 147, 153, 25 Sup. Ct. order. Rep. 9. There are only a few cases dealing with the subject, but they almost uniformly hold that where the bankrupt is sued on a debt existing at the time of filing the petition, the introduction of the order makes out a prima facie defense, the burden being then cast upon the plaintiff to show that, because of the nature of the claim, failure to give notice, or other statutory reason, the debt sued on was by law excepted from the operation of the discharge. B. F. Roden Grocery Co. v. Leslie, 169 Ala. 579, 53 So. 815; Tompkins v. Williams, 206 N. Y. 744, 100 N. E. 1134, affirming the opinion in 137 App. Div. 521, 122 N. Y. Supp. 152; Van Norman v. Young, 228 Ill. 425, 81 N. E. 1060; Beck & G. Hardware Co. v. Crum, 127 Ga. 94, 56 S. E. 242; Laffoon v. Kerner, 138 N. C. 281, 50 S. E. 654. Compare Hancock Nat. Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 645, 44 L. ed. 621, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 506. There were some decisions to the contrary under the act of 1841 [5 Stat. at L. 440, chap. 9]. Among them was Sorden v. Gatewood, 1 Ind. 107, which held that when the bankrupt was sued on a valid claim, he was obliged to show that the plaintiff's debt was among those which had in law and in fact been discharged. It was probably because of this decision of the state court that the defendant Kreitlein felt compelled to offer the schedule in order to show that Ferger was one of the creditors listed in the bankruptcy proceedings. The issue now is whether the prima facie defense made out by the production of the certified copy of the order was disproved by the introduction of the bankruptcy record. That question can best be answered by considering the various reasons the defendant in error advances in support of his contention that the discharge of 1905 did not operate to relieve Kreitlein from the debt now presented by the judgment of 1897. 3. Ferger next insists that there is a want of identity between the debt sued on and that said to have been discharged. This contention is based upon the fact that the schedule lists an "account for merchandise for $271 in 1895 in favor of C. Ferger," while the present suit is on a "judgment for $300 damages rendered in favor of Charles Ferger in 1897." The difference between the two amounts is probably explained by the fact that there had been an accrual of two years' interest before the judgment was rendered. Besides, the books of the debtor and of the creditor may not have exactly agreed, and in the absence of fraud and injury such discrepancy would not invalidate the schedule or vitiate the effect of the discharge. Nor would the bankrupt be deprived of the benefit of the order because the debt was described as an "account for merchandise" rather than as a judgment into which the liability for the flour had been merged. See Matteson v. Dewar, 146 Ill. App. 523, where it was held not to be a fatal defect for the bankrupt to schedule the debt as an "account," even though a note had been given in settlement. The prima facie effect of the order, to relieve the bankrupt from liability on all debts prior to 1905, was not defeated because there may have been a difference between the account and the judgment. The burden of showing that there was such difference was upon the creditor, and in this case there was not only no evidence tending to sustain such a contention, but the two claims seem to have been treated as identical in the trial court, for there the objection to the admission of the schedule was based on the contention that it referred to an account "which had been reduced to a judgment in 1897." 4. Another question-and the one on which the appellate court based its decision-was whether the schedule, listing the creditor as C. Ferger, Indianapolis,-using an initial and omitting the street number of his residence,-met the requirements of § 7 (8), making it the duty of bankrupts to "prepare, make oath to, and file . . a list of his creditors showing their residences if known, if unknown that fact to be stated." 2. On the part of Ferger it said that this suit is on a judgment for $300, rendered in an action not "founded upon a contract, express or implied," — and it seems to have been claimed that the judgment was not a provable debt within the meaning of § 63a (4), of the bankruptcy act. But the special finding of the jury in that case showed that in purchasing the flour Kreitlein had not made any fraudulent concealment or misrepre- While this only involves a determination sentation as to his financial condition. Be- of what is a sufficient designation of a sides, the judgment was a provable debt person's name and residence, yet it is one even though rendered in a suit where the of those apparently simple questions which creditor had elected to bring an action in have been the occasion of an immense 5. Of a like nature, and to be governed by the same principle, is the contention that, even if C. Ferger is a suflicient listing of the name, the schedule was fatally de amount of controversy. The difficulty grows out of the impossibility of applying a general and uniform rule where there are so many varying methods by which men's names and residences are designated. Some fective because it failed to give the street men have a well-known and constantly used Christian name; others are addressed by an abbreviation for the Christian name; others by initials for the Christian name; others are known by nickname. Some men use one name in business and another among their acquaintances. Some men, while personally addressed by their full Christian name, use initials in signing letters, notes, checks, and other papers. and number of his residence in Indianapolis. This objection is more diflicult of solution than any of the others presented by this record. But, like them, must be considered in the light of the fact that the statute was intended for business men, and should receive not only a practical but a uniform construction. Its provisions are applicable to creditors who live in the country, in villages, in towns and cities. The statute is general in its terms and the courts cannot add to its requirements. All of the cases dealing with the subject recognize the necessity of having claims. properly listed, and point out that failure to comply with the statutory requirement to file a list of his creditors, showing their residence, if known, will render the discharge inoperative against any who did not receive actual notice of the bankruptcy proceeding in time to have their claims allowed. Birkett v. Columbia Bank, 195 U. S. 345, 49 L. ed. 231, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 38; Troy v. Rudnick, 198 Mass. 567, 85 N. E. 177. The authorities, however, differ as to whether, under § 17 (3), the burden is The bankruptcy act fails to prescribe which form of designation shall be used in listing creditors in the schedule. The statute must be construed in the light of the fact that it not only applies to transactions growing out of dealings between those personally acquainted, but, in large degree, relates to matters growing out of transactions between persons living in distant states, and who may never have met. In many instances the only knowledge the debtor has as to the name of his creditor is derived from signatures, letterheads, drafts, and like instruments-in which the name of the creditor may be designated by initials, or by abbreviation, or by full Christian name. To say that the use of an in- on the plaintiff to show that he had no itial in listing a creditor was improper notice, or on the bankrupt to show that when the creditor himself may have used the creditor had notice in time to have an initial in signing letters addressed to proved his claim and had it allowed. Steele the bankrupt, or may himself have con- v. Thalheimer, 74 Ark. 518, 86 S. W. 305; stantly received letters addressed to him Van Norman v. Young, 228 Ill. 430, 81 N. in that manner, would not only ignore a E. 1060; Alling v. Straka, 118 Ill. App. common business practice, but would, in 184 (2); Hallagan v. Dowell, Iowa, —, many instances, work a great hardship. 139 N. W. 883; Parker v. Murphy, 215 This has been recognized in other branches Mass. 72, 102 N. E. 85; Wineman v. Fisher, of the law; for while, of course, in all legal 135 Mich. 608, 98 N. W. 404; Laffoon v. proceedings it is safest to designate per- Kerner, 188 N. C. 285, 50 S. E. 654; Fields sons by their Christian names,-and inv. Rust, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 351, 82 S. W. some states this is even required by statute, 331; Bailey v. Gleason, 76 Vt. 117, 118, 56 -yet it has likewise been held that the use of the initials is an irregularity, and not a fatal defect. Reg. v. Dale, 17 Q. B. 64. 20 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 240, 15 Jur. 657; State v. Webster, 30 Ark. 166; Perkins v. McDowell, 3 Wyo. 203, 19 Pac. 410: Minor v. State, 63 Ga. 320; State v. Johnson, 93 Mo. 73, 5 S. W. 699. Atl. 537; Custard v. Wigderson, 130 Wis. 414, 110 N. W. 263, 10 Ann. Cas. 740. In view of the scope of his testimony that he did not know of the bankruptcy, it is not necessary in this case to discuss that mooted point, unless it must be held that, because of the failure to set out the number of Lerger's house in Indianapolis, his claim There have, no doubt, been multitudes, was not duly scheduled. of instances in which initials have been The question as to the necessity of givused in listing creditors in bankrupt sched-ing the street address has sometimes arisen. ules, but the only decision found which deals in suits against indorsers, who claimed that with this question is Gatliff v. Mackey, they were relieved from liability because 31 Ky. L. Rep. 947, 104 S. W. 379. It holds, that the listing of the creditor by an initial, instead of the full Christian name, is not sufficient to deprive the debtor of the benefit of the order discharging provable debts. See also Matteson v. Dewar, supra. the notice of nonpayment and protest was addressed to them at the city where they lived, but without adding the street and number of their residence. It seems generally to have been held that mailing a notice. thus addressed is prima facie sufficient. True v. Collins, 3 Allen, 438; Clarke v. We also find that the bankruptcy rules Sharpe, 3 Mees. & W. 166, 1 Horn & H. 35; of force in the southern district of New Mann v. Moors, Ryan & M. 250; People's York provide (italics ours) that the schedBank v. Scalzo, 127 Mo. 188, 29 S. W. 1032;ules "as respects creditors in the city of Marton v. Westcott, 8 Cush. 425; Bartlett New York should state the street and numv. Robinson, 39 N. Y. 187. See also Bank ber of their address or place of business of Columbia v. Lawrence, 1 Pet. 578, 581, so far as known." Weidenfeld v. Tilling7 L. ed. 269, 270; Bank of United States hast, 54 Misc. 93, 104 N. Y. Supp. 712. See v. Carneal, 2 Pet. 550, 551, 7 L. ed. 516, also Cagliostro v. Indelle, 17 Am. Bankr. There are only a few instances, under the Rep. 685; McKee v. Preble, 154 App. Div. bankrupt act, in which the courts have 156, 138 N. Y. Supp. 915. had occasion to deal with the subject, or to construe § 7 (8),-requiring claims to be duly listed,-in connection with § 17, which provides that a discharge shall release the debtor from all provable debts "except such as . (3) have not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of the creditor if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy It دو But without considering the effect of such rule, it is sufficient to say that, in the present case, there was nothing to show that any similar regulation had been made in the Indiana district, nor is there proof as to what was Ferger's street address; or that Kreitlein knew such address at the time he made the schedule; or that the notice may not have been delivered during Ferger's absence from the city, and not received by him on his return. Nor is there any evidence to show that Ferger did not constantly and promptly receive letters addressed to him at Indianapolis without the street number being given. has been held that a claim is not duly scheduled if the name of the creditor is improperly spelled (Custard v. Wigderson, 130 Wis. 416, 110 N. W. 263, 10 Ann. Cas. 740); or if the street number is given, but 7. It is said that Kreitlein might have the name of the city of his residence is examined the directory, but the suggestion omitted (Troy v. Rudnick, 198 Mass. 563, presupposes that at the time of making the 85 N. E. 177); E. 177); or if the creditor is schedule the bankrupt had access to a dilisted as residing in one city when he actual-rectory, and overlooks the fact that even if ly lives in another (Marshall v. English- the address given therein was correct when American Loan & T. Co. 127 Ga. 376, 56 made, the creditor may have moved before S. E. 449); or if the creditor's name is the book was issued, so that if notice was given, but the schedule falsely recites mailed to an incorrect street address the "Residence unknown" (Birkett v. Colum- creditor might contend that such specific adbia Bank, 195 U. S. 345, 49 L. ed. 231, 25 dress was not required by statute, and that Sup. Ct. Rep. 38; Miller v. Guasti, 226 U. the burden of the mistake was cast on the S. 170, 57 L. ed. 173, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 49; bankrupt. We are here dealing with a Parker v. Murphy, 215 Mass. 72, 102 N. E. general rule applicable to cases where the 85). These decisions, however, were based parties reside in different parts of the on extrinsic proof and on a finding that, country, as well as to instances where they as a matter of fact, the name was mis- lived in the same city. The rule is the spelled, or the creditor's residence was im- same as to both. There certainly is no properly listed, or that the bankrupt knew presumption that bankrupts have access the creditor's address and falsely stated to directories containing the street addressthat the residence was "Unknown." None of them holds that, as a matter of law, the discharge was rendered inoperative merely because the street number was not given in the schedule. 6. Indeed, it is not claimed that the act requires that this street address should be stated in every instance where the creditor lives in a city having a postal delivery system. Evans v. Fleming & A. Co. 62 Kan. 813, 64 Pac. 591. But it is argued that this should be done where he resides in one of the very large cities of the country. And we find that in some districts the referee examines the schedule, and, in his discretion, requires it to be amended so as to give the street number (Re Brumelkamp, 95 Fed. 814; Re Dvorak, 107 Fed. 76). 35 S. C.-44. es of their creditors throughout the land; and, if the fact was essential, the question as to whether the bankrupt had access to a directory, or whether it was correct, were matters of proof, none of which was made in the present case. 8. Both as to the use of initials and omission of street address the act must be given a general construction, as in the light of the fact that letters directed to persons by their initials are constantly, properly, and promptly delivered in the greatest cities of the country even when the street number is not given. When it is considered that the schedule must not only include claims of recent origin, but debts which have accrued many years before, and where the creditor may have changed his residence, it becomes evident that to from the schedules or so incorrectly given lay down the general rule that the schedule that they had no actual notice of the bankmust give the name of the creditor and ruptcy proceedings, unless the omission or the city and street number of the residence incorrect statement was fraudulent or inof those living in the largest cities would, tentional. (See the cases under the former in a multitude of cases, destroy the bene-act, collected in Black on Bankruptcy, § ficent effect of the bankruptcy act. 727.) These schedules are often hurriedly pre- As this court pointed out in Birkett v. pared, long after the date of the transac-Columbia Bank, 195 U. S. 345, 49 L. ed. tion out of which the debt grew, and when 231, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 38, the act of 1898 books and papers which might otherwise devolved upon the bankrupt certain duties, have furnished a fuller and more complete "all directed to the purpose of a full and address have been lost or destroyed. Bearing unreserved exposition of his affairs, propin mind the general purpose of the statute erty, and creditors." Under § 7, he is reto relieve honest bankrupts, considering that quired to prepare, make oath to, and file in the act does not expressly require the street the court, within ten days, a schedule of his address to be stated or the residence to be property containing, among other things, given unless known, and giving proper legal "a list of his creditors, showing their resi effect to the order of discharge, we hold that dences, if known, if unknown, that fact to be a sele lule listing the creditor's residence as stated, the amounts due each of them, the Indianapolis is, at least, prima facie sufli- consideration thereof, the security held by cient. In view of this conclusion the judg- them, if any, and a claim for such exempment of the Appellate Court of Indiana is tions as he may be entitled to." These reversed and the case remanded for further schedules were to be in triplicate, one copy proceedings not inconsistent with this opin- of each for the clerk, one for the referee, and one for the trustee. "To the neglect of this duty," this court declared in the Birkett Case, "the law attaches a punitive consequence," which is set forth in § 17, I am unable to agree with the conclusion and provides that "a discharge in bankjust announced. It seems to me to establish ruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all a rule by which many creditors will find his provable debts, except such as their debts paid by a discharge in bank have not been duly scheduled in time for ruptcy when they have had no knowledge proof and allowance, with the name of the or means of knowing that such proceedings creditor, if known to the bankrupt, unless were pending, and are not able to partici- such creditor had notice or actual knowlpate in such dividends as are paid to credi-edge of the proceedings in bankruptcy. . . . It follows from this decision that, if a ion. Reversed. Mr. Justice Day, dissenting: tors. It is admitted in this record that Ferger, discharge is to have the effect to cancel the creditor, had a provable claim against the debt of a creditor who had no notice Kreitlein in the bankruptcy proceeding. of the proceedings, the burden is upon the After the institution of this suit, the de-bankrupt to show a compliance with the fendant Kreitlein pleaded his discharge in act. The provisions of the act (§ 21f) makbankruptcy, and the state court refused to ing the certified copy of the discharge evipermit it to avail as a defense, because it dence of the jurisdiction of the court, the did not appear that Ferger's debt was prop-regularity of the proceedings, and the fact erly scheduled, or that he had been given that the order was made, should be read the notice which the bankruptcy act dein connection with the provisions of § 17, clares shall be given to creditors of the excepting from the benefit of a discharge pendency of the proceedings. The fact that claims which the bankrupt has failed to Ferger had no notice of the proceedings is duly schedule. not contested. In that situation, under the act of 1898 [30 Stat. at L. 544, chap. 541, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 9585], in order to bar the claim sued upon, it was essential for the bankrupt to show that he had complied with the act, in so far as he could, by giving or attempting to give Ferger notice of the pendency of the proceedings. To this effect are a number of well-considered cases in the state courts. In Columbia Bank v. Birkett, 174 N. Y. 112, 102 Am. St. Rep. 478, 66 N. E. 652, affirmed in 195 U. S. 345, 49 L. ed. 231, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 38, the court, speaking through Judge Gray, said: "While there may be some difficulty in the way of statutory construcUnder the bankruptcy act of 1867 [14 tion, I think the plaintiff's claim has never Stat. at L. 517, chap. 176, Comp. Stat. 1913, been discharged, as the result of the bank991), creditors who had provable claims ruptcy proceedings. In my opinion, there were barred by the bankrupt's discharge, are features in the present bankruptcy act although such creditors' names were omitted' which differentiate it from preceding acts, the names and residences of creditors is a most important one. It is in compliance with the generally recognized principle that one shall not be barred of his claim with and which indicate a legislative intent that greater strictness shall prevail in notifying the creditor of the various proceedings in bankruptcy. It is provided that the voluntary bankrupt must file 'a list of his cred-out the opportunity of having his day in itors, showing their residence, if known,' court. It is for the benefit of the creditors and that notices must be sent to the cred- and in the interest of fair dealing with itors at their respective addresses as they them, and is to be construed in harmony appear in the list of creditors of the bank- with this purpose. It is essential in order rupt, or as afterwards filed . by that notices in the bankruptcy proceedings the creditors.' . While in the pre- may be sent him. It has been construed vious act of 1841 [5 Stat. at L. 440, chap. 9] with some strictness. Birkett v. Columbia and 1867, substituted service of notices by Bank, 195 U. S. 345, 49 L. ed. 231, 25 Sup. publication was provided for; in the pres-Ct. Rep. 38; Custard v. Wigderson, 130 ent act it is actual notice that is required Wis. 412, 110 N. W. 263, 10 Ann. Cas. 740." to be given. The schedule of debts, which In Custard v. Wigderson, supra, the court the bankrupt is to file with his petition, said: "Under the bankruptcy law of 1867 furnishes the basis for the notices which this court held, in harmony with the general the referee, or the court, is to give there- current of authority, that a debt was disafter to the creditors, and thus the bank-charged, even though not scheduled. rupt appears to be made responsible for the correctness of the list of his creditors. That he is to suffer in the case of his failure to state the name of the creditor, to whom his debt is due, if known to him, seems to me very clear from the reading of § 17 of the act. That excepts from the release of the discharge all debts which 'have not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of the creditor.' That is very emphatic language, and how is it possible to obviate its effect by the argument that the plaintiff still had time left, after the discharge was granted, to prove his claim? I think it was intended that the decree discharging the voluntary bankrupt should be confined in its operations to the creditors who had been duly listed and who were enabled to receive the notices which the act provides for." In Parker v. Murphy, 215 Mass. 72, 102 N. E. 85, this question was discussed, and the court said: "Section 17 of the bankruptcy act provides that a discharge in bankruptcy shall release the debtor from all provable debts 'except such as .. have not been duly scheduled unless such creditor But it will be seen that under the act of This provision is a marked departure from former bankruptcy acts, and decisions under such acts to the effect that scheduling was not necessary in order to bring the debt within the order of discharge [are not pertinent]. The words of the present act, however, are plain and unambiguous, and there can be no doubt that they mean what they say; and, if so, unless the debt is duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance, or the creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy, it is not affected by the discharge." In McKee v. Preble, 154 App. Div. 155, 138 N. Y. Supp. 915, the schedules had given the address as 212, 9th avenue, New York, which was the place of business. Plaintiff's residence was elsewhere, with the correct address given in the city directory, where the bankrupt might have discovered it with a slight effort. The creditor swore he received no notice. The discharge was held ineffective as against this creditor. Mulberry street, where he had resided for fifteen years last past. had notice or actual knowledge of the pro- Rep. 685, the residence, as stated in the In Cagliostro v. Indelle, 17 Am. Bankr. ceedings in bankruptcy.' Claims are not schedules, was "Mulberry street, New York duly scheduled unless the names of the debt-city." Creditor's residence, in fact, was 141 or's 'creditors, showing their residences, if known,' are on the list of creditors filed. Section 7, cl. 8. The burden of proving that he did all things required of him under the bankruptcy law to give notice to the respondent creditor of the bankruptcy proceedings, or that the latter had actual knowledge of them, rests upon the plaintiff [the bankrupt] in this case. Wylie v. Marinofsky, 201 Mass. 583, 88 N. E. 448. Wineman v. Fisher, 135 Mich. 604, 608, 98 N. W. 404. This fact appeared in the directory, and could have easily been discovered. It was held that the bankrupt did not use due effort to ascertain the address of the creditor, and the discharge did not affect this debt, the court saying: "I am satisfied that the petitioner, when he made up the schedules, failed to use due efforts to learn the street number of the judgment creditor, and that it was owing to such failure on his part "The requirement for duly scheduling that the judgment creditor received no no |