CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME SUPREME COURT. OCTOBER TERM, 1914. (235 U. S. 27) UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err., V. ELIE PORTALE and Juliette Portale, ALIENS (§ 56*) - WHITE SLAVE TRADE PERSON." Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: This is an indictment alleging that an alien woman entered the United States from Great Britain in 1913; that the defendants knowingly harbored her in Denver for the purpose of prostitution, and that they, so The requirement of the act of June knowingly harboring her for that purpose, 25, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 825, chap. 395, U. S. wilfully failed to file, within thirty days Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1343), § 6, that from the date of the commencement of such "every person" harboring an alien woman harboring, with the Commissioner General for the purpose of prostitution within three of Immigration, a statement in writing years after she shall have entered the setting forth her name, the place where she United States from any country, party to the arrangement for the suppression of the was kept, and the facts as to the date of her white slave traffic, adopted July 25, 1902 entry into the United States,, the port (35 Stat. at L. 1979), shall file a state-through which she entered, her age, nament of the facts with the Commissioner General of Immigration, cannot be construed as confined to persons who have had to do directly or indirectly with the bringing in or sending forth of such alien woman. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Aliens, Cent. Dig. §§ 113-116; Dec. Dig. § 56.* tionality, and parentage, and concerning her procuration to come to this country within the knowledge of the defendants. The proceeding is under the act of June 25, 1910, chap. 395, § 6, 36 Stat. at L. 825, 827, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, pp. 1343, 1345, which requires every person harboring an alien woman for the above purpose within three years after she shall have entered the Argued October 22, 1914. Decided Novem- United States from any country, party to For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Every.] [No. 382.] ber 2, 1914. N ERROR to the District Court of the United States for the District of Colorado to review a judgment sustaining a demurrer to an indictment charging the harboring of an alien woman for the purpose of prostitution. Reversed without prejudice to further proceedings. The facts are stated in the opinion. Assistant Attorney General Wallace for plaintiff in error. No appearance for defendants in error. the arrangement for the suppression of the white slave traffic, adopted, July 25, 1902, 35 Stat. at L. 1979, to file a statement as aforesaid. A failure to do so is made a misdemeanor, and is punished by fine or imprisonment or both. Great Britain is a party to the arrangement. There was a demurrer to the indictment and it was sustained, as appears by a bill of exceptions, upon the ground set forth in the opinion, that, as the court construed the statute, the above requirement was confined to "per *For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes 35 S. C.-1. sons who have had to do, directly or in- | Laws 19.7, chap. 5596, § 47, will not be directly, with the bringing in or sending forth of such women or girls." We see no sufficient reason for the limitation thus read into the generality and literal meaning of the words of the act. It is true that persons who have had to do with bringing the alien into the country are more likely than others to know the facts to be stated, and it may be assumed that others are not required to know them at their peril. It is true that the immunity from prosecution under the laws of the United States for any fact truthfully reported which the section grants most obvious ly applies to those who have taken part in bringing the woman in. But others who have not taken part are very likely to know the facts or some of them, and their knowledge may be of a kind to raise suspicion of guilt under the act. The requirement is that "every person" harboring a woman as above shall file the statement. It is, and purports to be, in furtherance of the international agre ment. That agreement, among other things, is "to procure, within the limits of the laws, all information of a nature to discover a criminal traffic" (art. 2, 35 Stat. at L. 1982), although, perhaps, those words look more immediately to the points of departure and arrival and the journey. Taken literally the statute required the defendants to file a statement of any of the facts mentioned that were within their knowledge, and to read it otherwise would deprive the government of a considerable source of information, to no good end that we can perceive, held invalid as discriminatory because it does not fall upon railroads operating their own sleeping and parlor cars, where it does not appear that any railroad in the state does operate its own sleeping or parlor cars. Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 43-45; Dec. Dig. § 46.] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 284)-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-HEARING. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Constitutional 2. Sleeping and parlor car companies which have failed to make a return for tax purposes of their gross receipts from business done between points within the state, as have no right, under the due process of law required by Fla. Laws 1907, chap. 5596, § 47, clause of U. S. Const., 14th Amend., to a hearing when the state comptroller, conformably to that section, proceeds to estimate the gross receipts and to add 10 per cent of the amount of the taxes as a penalty incurred because of the companies' failure to obey the law. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 893-896; Dec. Dig. § 284.*] COURTS (363)-RULES OF DECISION QUESTION NOT YET DECIDED BY STATE COURT. 3. The Federal Supreme Court will not adjudge a state tax upon gross receipts of sleeping and parlor car companies to offend against the state Constitution because it is not a license tax, in advance of a decision of that question by the state supreme court, especially where the state court has held other gross earning taxes to be license taxes. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 939-949; Dec. Dig. § 363.] [Nos. 383, 384.] ber 2, 1914. "We therefore reach the conclusion that Argued October 21, 1911. Decided Novemthe court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the .. indictment, so far as that APPEALS from the District Court ruling is based upon the construction off the United States for the Northern the statute in question." United States v. Stevenson, 215 U. S. 190, 199, 54 L. ed. 153, 157, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35. That is the only question brought up; United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, 398, 53 L. ed. 230, 244, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 123; and the reversal of the judgment is without prejudice to further action of the court below, consistent with the opinion that we have expressed. Judgment reversed. District of Florida to review decrees denying injunctive relief against the collection of a tax on gross receipts of sleeping and parlor car companies. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Frank B. Kellogg, Gustavus S. Fernald, and John E. Hartridge for appellant. Mr. Thomas F. West, Attorney General for Florida, for appellee. Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: These are suits to prevent the collection of a tax on gross receipts for different years, derived from business done by the appelInnt in the state of Florida, and to have the laws under which the tax would be assessed declared contrary to the 14th Amendment. The bills are like those stated in 231 I. S. 571, 58 L. ed. 375, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182, and aver the following facts: Chapter 5597 of the Laws of Florida for 1907, now Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes sion in case of their failure to report is not, as it seemed to be suggested in argument, an alternative left open for the companies to choose. It is a provision for their failure to do their duty. In that event their chance and right to be heard have gone by. § 44 of chapter 6421 of the Laws of 1913, ed. 892, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533. The proviimposes a license tax, which has been paid. Section 46 of chapter 5596 of the Laws of 1907, imposes a tax ad valorem, which also has been paid, with immaterial exceptions. Up to 1907 this property tax had not existed, but sleeping and parlor car companies had been required to make a return of gross receipts from business done between points within the state, and to pay a percentage upon such returns, which it paid in lieu of all other taxes. But by § 47 of said chapter 5596 (now § 45 of chapter 6421 of the Laws of 1913), the last-mentioned tax was continued in force alongside of the new ad valorem tax of § 46, and the appellant contends that after the levying of a property tax the tax on gross returns became void. An application for a preliminary injunction was heard before three judges and was denied, whereupon this appeal was taken and a supersedeas was granted upon payment of the sum in dispute into court. The cases come here upon an alleged infringement of the Constitution of the United States, but are argued mainly upon the Constitution of the state. Of course the latter is not taken up into the 14th Amendment. Castillo v. McConnico, 168 U. S. 674, 42 L. ed. 622, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229; Burt v. Smith, 203 U. S. 129, 135, 51 L. ed. 121, 126, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 37. It can be considered only because the cases come from the district court upon the other ground. We will deal with the Federal question first. It is suggested that there is an arbitrary classification because the tax is confined to sleeping and parlor car companies, and does not fall upon railroads operating their own sleeping and parlor cars. If otherwise this were a valid objection, as to which we need express no opinion, it is enough to say that a tax is not to be upset upon hypothetical and unreal possibilities, if it would be good upon the facts as they are. Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 58 L. ed. 1288, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 856. It does not appear that any railroad in Florida does operate its own sleeping or parlor cars, and the attorney general of the state denies that such a case exists. The other objection urged is that the taxpayer is not given a hearing. The statute, as we have said, requires the companies to make a report and fixes a percentage ($1.50 per $100) to be paid. If the report is not made, the comptroller is to estimate the gross receipts and add 10 per cent of the amount of the taxes as a penalty. If the companies do as required there is nothing to be heard about. They fix the amount and the statute establishes the proportion to be paid over. Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. We do not feel called upon to discuss the objections under the Constitution of the state at length. Starting with the conceded proposition that the tax, to be valid, must be either ad valorem or a license tax, the appellant argues that this cannot be a license tax, as was held by the judges who refused the injunction, because the payment of it is not made a condition of the right to do business; because another tax is imposed in terms for a license; and because the history of the law shows that for years it took the place of a property tax. These considerations undoubtedly are very strong. But as we are dealing with the validity of the law under the state Constitution, a matter that must be decided finally by the state court, and as the state court has held other gross earning taxes to be license taxes (Afro-American Industrial & Benefit Asso. v. State, 61 Fla. 85, 89, 54 So. 383), we are of opinion that if this act is to be overthrown, it should not be overthrown by us. It is true that there are possible distinctions between this case and the Florida decision cited, but it seems to us not improbable that the supreme court had in view a principle broad enough to cover the case at bar. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 305, 58 L. ed. 229, 239, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48. Decree affirmed. 1. The reservation from sale or other disposal until final action of Congress, made by the act of July 22, 1854 (10 Stat. at L. 308, chap. 103), § 8, in favor of such Mexican or Spanish land claims as should be presented to the surveyor general of New Mexico for his report to Congress, did not prevent the location of the grant made by the act of June 21, 1860 (12 Stat. at L. 71, chap. 167), of vacant lands to be Mexican land grants, upon lands embraced in Mexican land claims which were not disclosed until after such selection and selected in lieu of lands common to two *For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes |