and Walker, and it is admitted that this agreement was made and executed at the instance of the manager. As this arrangement was made after plaintiff's written contract had expired, he contends that it corroborates his claim that a new oral contract had been made, while defendant contends that its manager acted upon the assumption that the written contract had been extended to September first as proposed in the circular. Although the circular was not received in evidence, the manager testified that it related to extensions of contracts, and in answer to a question as to why the subagency contract with Walker was made to expire September 1, 1912, he stated: "It was made to expire at that time to expire concurrently with the contract which we had with Mr. Farmer, which was extended." These statements were received without objection, and show that the manager placed before the jury his claim that the subagency contract was made while plaintiff's written contract was in force and did not extend beyond the period covered by such written contract. Under the rule applied in Glassberg v. Olson, 89 Minn. 195, 94 N. W. 554, the circular might properly have been received as tending to explain the conduct of the manager; but the reception of such evidence rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and we cannot say that such discretion was abused in the present instance.

Defendant also assigns as error that plaintiff was permitted to relate a conversation with one of defendant's salesmen, but, as it appears that the manager, being busy, directed plaintiff to confer with this salesman instead of himself, the conversation was admissible. Defendant also insists that the court erred in certain instructions given to the jury and in refusing to give certain other instructions requested by defendant, but we discover no reversible error therein. Order affirmed.

ADA M. COX v. WILLIAM RUFUS EDWARDS.1

July 10, 1914.

Nos. 18,648—(177).

Breach of promise - release — evidence.

In an action to recover for a breach of promise of marriage it is held (1) That the evidence justifies a finding of the jury that a marriagepromise was made.

(2) That it justifies a finding that a release of plaintiff's cause of action. was procured by fraud.

(3) That the damages are not excessive.

Action in the district court for Ramsey county to recover $25,000 for breach of promise of marriage. The facts are stated in the opinion. The case was tried before Dickson, J., and a jury which returned a verdict for $17,425 in favor of plaintiff. From an order denying defendant's motion for judgment in his favor notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, defendant appealed. Af firmed.

Owen Morris, for appellant.

Drill & Drill and Stan J. Donnelly, for respondent.

DIBELL, C.

This is an action for the breach of a promise of marriage. There was a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals from the order denying his alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.

There are three questions:

(1) Was there a mutual promise of marriage?

(2) If so, did the plaintiff, induced by fraud, release her cause of action for its breach?

(3) Was the verdict excessive?

1 Reported in 148 N. W. 500.

1. The case has been here before and is reported in 120 Minn. 512, 139 N. W. 1070.

The plaintiff claims that on October 10, 1910, she and defendant entered into a contract of marriage. Neither will gain by a recital of the evidence and none will be made. The story which the plaintiff tells is a strange one. It is discredited by occurrences in her lifeprior to the promise claimed. It is discredited by letters written by her before and afterwards. Witnesses testifying for the defendant offer testimony which, if believed, thoroughly discredits it. To a considerable extent many of these witnesses are discredited by their own testimony and the character of their living, and the jury well enough might have disregarded much of it. The defendant did not deny the promise on this trial. It appears that he denied it on the former trial.

The case has been twice tried. Twenty-four jurors have found that a promise was made. Two trial judges, in the exercise of their discretion, have declined to interfere with the result. Is is not for us to interfere. We properly affirm the order without affirming or disaffirming our belief in the truth of the plaintiff's contention.

2. The plaintiff executed to the defendant on July 11, 1911, a release of her cause of action in consideration of $250 then received. She admits that she knew what it was. She claims that the defendant by fraud and trickery induced her to sign it under the claim that he wanted to get rid of the suit; that it was a matter between them alone; that he still had affection for her; and that he would marry her afterwards. She also claims that he threatened that unless she settled he would have her put out of town; that he had influence with the police; that they would do this for him; that he had influential friends; and that he had matters so arranged that she would not be able to get employment at her usual vocation.

We have scrutinized the evidence carefully in the light of the settled rule of law for determining such an issue as it is stated in Winter v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 118 Minn. 487, 136 N. W. 1089, and other cases. We are of the opinion that the question of fraud The trial court declined to interfere with the result and we should not.

was for the jury.

3. It is claimed that the damages are excessive.

The plaintiff admits that he is worth from $75,000 to $100,000. He declines to swear either that he is or that he is not worth $300,000. A matrimonial alliance with a man of such wealth was of pecuniary value to the plaintiff. The first jury fixed the damages at $15,208, which was reduced conditionally to $12,500 by the trial court, and was accepted in lieu of a new trial by the plaintiff. The present verdict is for $17,425. The trial court declined to interfere with it. We should not.

The questions discussed are all questions of fact ultimately for a jury. The trial was entirely fair, no errors were committed against the defendant, questions of fair doubt were resolved in his favor, and his interests were well protected by his counsel. The defendant has had the fair trial to which he is entitled under the law and it is not for an appellate court to interfere with the result which the jury reached.

Order affirmed.

A. A. ANDERSON v. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY

COMPANY.1

July 10, 1914.

Nos. 18,654-(194).

Evidence-letter inadmissible.

Where, in an action to recover damages for rough handling and delay in transit of cars of live stock, one of the material issues was as to what were defendant's regular stock shipping days, on which special service was provided, it was reversible error to admit a letter from defendant's claim agent to a third party containing declarations sufficient to turn the scales in plaintiff's favor on such issue, there being nothing to show the agent's authority in the premises.

1 Reported in 148 N. W. 462.

Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $300 for injury to a consignment of live stock. The amended answer set up the contention mentioned in the third paragraph of the opinion. The case was tried before Bardwell, J., and a jury which returned a verdict for $172.41 in favor of plaintiff. From an order denying defendant's motion for judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, defendant appealed. Reversed.

ent.

Cobb, Wheelwright & Dille and H. C. Mackall, for appellant. Stiles & Devaney, D. C. Edwards and C. L. Nichols, for respond

PHILIP E. BROWN, J.

Appeal by defendant from an order denying its alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.

The action was to recover damages for rough handling and delay in transit of cars of live stock shipped Monday, March 31, 1913, from La Bolt, Sout' Dakota, to South St. Paul. The former is located on one of defendant's branch lines, over which it operated only one freight train each way daily. The proofs were sufficient to take the case to the jury on each claim and both were submitted, whereupon a general verdict was returned for full damages.

Defendant contended that when the shipment was made, and for some time previous, it ran a regular stock train over the branch. line on Wednesday of each week, scheduled so as to effect delivery at South St. Paul for the next morning's market, this result being accomplished by starting the run three hours earlier than on other days having only the ordinary freight train service, whereby connection on the main line was made and rapid transit secured; that plaintiff knew of this special Wednesday service, and that such was not available on other days, but nevertheless shipped on Monday and received the regular service afforded on that and other days than Wednesday. On the other hand plaintiff claimed that Mondays were also stock shipping days, the same as Wednesday, with an 18-hour schedule theretofore maintained on both days, as against 39 hours consumed in the transit in question.

The issue raised by these contentions was as important as any

126 M.-23.