Peritonitis Plaintiff was injured by being struck by an automobile. followed and phlebitis and pneumonia supervened. Held: (1) That the evidence sustains the finding that the injury was caused by the negligence of defendant without contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff. (2) That there is evidence to support the finding that these diseases resulted as a consequence of the injury. (3) That the verdict is not so excessive as to justify this court in interfering therein. (4) That the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a new trial for misconduct of plaintiff's attorney. (5) That there were no errors in the charge to the jury. Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $15,'000 for personal injury. The case was tried before Booth, J., who denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and a jury which returned a verdict for $6,182. From an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed. Watson & Abernethy, for appellant. TAYLOR, C. This is an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by being struck by an automobile at a street crossing in the city of Minneapolis. Plaintiff had a verdict. Defendant made a motion 1 Reported in 148 N. W. 568. for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and, in case such motion should be denied, that a new trial be granted. Both motions were denied and defendant appealed. The evidence made the charge of negligence on the part of defendant and the countercharge of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff questions for determination by the jury, and is sufficient to sustain the verdict. Two weeks after the accident plaintiff was taken to a hospital where an operation was performed. The operation disclosed that her bowels were floating in pus and that a fallopian tube was diseased. This and the pus were removed. It appeared at the operation that she was suffering from peritonitis. Not long thereafter phlebitis and pneumonia also developed. Whether these diseases. resulted from the injuries sustained in the accident or from independent causes was sharply contested and became the principal issue at the trial. The testimony of the attending physician strongly supported the contention of plaintiff. The testimony of two experts called by defendant strongly supported the contention of defendant. Where a question involving the weight of evidence has been determined by the verdict of a jury and such verdict has been approved by the trial court, this court is rarely justified in interfering therewith, even if its opinion as to the fact does not accord with that of the jury. Defendant insists that the attending physicianbased his conclusions upon conjecture merely, and not upon facts established by the evidence; and that the case is similar to and governed by the case of Mageau v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 106 Minn. 395, 119 N. W. 200, in which Justice Elliott remarked: "The difficulty with the plaintiff's case is that it rests entirely upon conjectures and beliefs, which do not seem to have any substantial, established facts back of them." In that case peritonitis developed after a stillborn child had been forcibly delivered by means of instruments, and the plaintiff, instead of attributing the infection to such cause, advanced the theory that it originated in an injury received nearly five months before, but that the germs remained comparatively innocuous until the injuries caused by the forcible delivery permitted them to spread through the system, when they became active and virulent. The court held that a verdict based upon nothing more tangible than such a surmise could not be sustained. In the present case the evidence shows that plaintiff was in good health at and prior to the accident, and that after the accident she was sore and lame and grew worse, until her condition became so serious two weeks. later that an operation became necessary. The operation disclosed that she was suffering from peritonitis. This disease may result from many causes, but the only basis for the contention that, in this instance, it resulted from causes other than the injury are the inferences drawn by defendant's experts from the conditions disclosed by the operation, and their testimony that it could not result from an injury of the character sustained by plaintiff. The attending physician testified that it could, and in his opinion did, result from such injury. The existence of the causes to which defendant sought to attribute the disease was negatived by the testimony of plaintiff. The jury have found that her contention is true and we cannot say as a matter of law that there is no substantial basis of fact for their conclusion. The verdict does not rest wholly upon conjecture as in the case cited. The verdict is large and could not be sustained, unless based upon the disabilities resulting from the diseases which followed the accident. There is no controversy as to the fact that these diseases supervened. The jury have necessarily found that they were a consequence of the injuries received, and the evidence made the question a matter for them to determine. Even when based upon such disabilities the verdict is large, but plaintiff is a young woman 26 years of age, and in consequence of the phlebitis was walking with a crutch at the time of the trial, and may never recover from that disease. It is the province of the jury to determine the amount of damages. The amount fixed by them has been approved by the trial court, and under the facts and circumstances disclosed by the record we do not feel justified in interfering with it. Defendant assigns certain improper conduct on the part of plaintiff's attorney as error. The conduct was improper and merited a rebuke, but the trial court held that it was not of sufficient importance to justify a new trial, and upon the facts shown by the record the determination of the question was within the discretion of that court. The charge to the jury clearly and correctly covered all issues in the case and the exceptions thereto are without merit. Order affirmed. COUNTY OF REDWOOD v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS.1 July 24, 1914. Nos. 18,695-(220). Settlement cost of relief furnished a poor person. 1. The place of a person's settlement, as that term is used in the poor laws of this state, is the place where he has a legal right to support if he becomes a public charge. It is not necessary that a person be poor or dependent in order to have a settlement. Every person, with certain defined exceptions, has a settlement upon residence for a given length of time. In this case plaintiff county furnished support and relief to a person who all his life, and up to a little more than two months before an injury, had been a legal resident of the city of Minneapolis. Held, under G. S. 1913, § 3071, she had a settlement in Minneapolis, and under G. S. 1913, § 3083, plaintiff has a claim against said city for all proper expenses in furnishing support and relief. Judgment statutory relief county physician. 2. Defendant was not, under the evidence in the case, entitled to judg ment because of irregularities of procedure. All obligatory requirements of the statute appear to have been complied with. The statute does not require that the medical relief given in a case of this kind must be furnished by a county physician. Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $741.80 for medical, surgical and burial expenses incurred in behalf of Nellie L. Risch. The case was tried before Waite, J., who denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict in its favor, and jury 1 Reported in 148 N. W. 469. which returned a verdict in favor of defendant. From an order granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed. Daniel Fish, City Attorney, and W. G. Compton, Assistant City Attorney, for appellant. Albert H. Enersen, County Attorney, and John F. Bernhagen, for respondent. HALLAM, J. Nellie Risch was born in Minneapolis in 1886. She continued to reside there with her mother until 1903, when she was committed to the Minnesota school for feeble-minded at Faribault by order of the probate court of Hennepin county. There is evidence that her mother, with whom she lived, was in indigent circumstances, and that Hennepin county paid a statutory amount during all the time Nellie Risch was an inmate of said school, which was until August 10, 1911. On that day she went to live with a sister who was married and living at Redwood Falls. She remained with her sister until September 23, when employment was obtained for her as a domestic in a household at Redwood Falls at $3 a week with room and board. She was not then dependent nor a public charge. While so employed, and on October 21, 1911, she was seriously burned, so seriously that it was necessary that she have immediate care and medical attention, and she was then entirely without means of procuring relief or support. She could not have been moved to Minneapolis. Redwood county had a poor farm, but had no facilities for caring for her there. It had no county physician, but had followed the practice of calling a physician specially when need required. She was cared for by parties employed by a member of the board of county commissioners, and the action of this member was later approved and ratified by the board. Up to the time of her injury the family home continued to be in Minneapolis. On December 7, 1911, the county attorney of Redwood county notified the city attorney of Minneapolis by letter of the facts of the case, and the city attorney referred the matter to the board of charities and corrections, under whose jurisdiction such matters 126 M.-33. |