which, in its principal, is obligatory on him, Bradley v. Pratt, 23 Vermont, 380.]

In all cases, the question seems to be, whether the debtor is legally in default. When a bond, note, or other instrument is expressly payable at a time certain, the debtor is in default if he does not pay at that time, and interest runs from the day of payment.(1) And if a note be payable at a fixed time, as at one day after date, and there be a subjoined agreement that suit shall not be brought so long as the maker is alive, or the payee is satisfied that he is solvent, interest still runs from the time the debt is legally due (2) Where an obligation was payable" in the month of June next," it was decided that interest did not commence until after the last day of the month.(3) Where a note is for *the payment *507] of a sum in several annual instalments, interest is payable on the instalments as they become due, and not annually on the whole sum.(4) A note or bond payable without any time specified, is in law payable immediately;(5) and interest runs from the day of the date.(6) But where a note or bond is payable on demand, or on request, although it is suable at once, yet the debtor is not considered in default until demand is made, and therefore interest runs only from the time of a demand in pais, or of suit brought, which is a judicial demand;(7) and the rule that interest runs from the time of demand applies to a note payable on demand for money lent on the day of the date; Schmidt v. Limehouse, 2 Bailey, 276; Pullen v. Chase, 4 Pike, 210, confirmed in Walker v. Wills, 5 Id. 167, which allowed interest from the date of a note payable on demand, proceeded on the construction of a statute. See Ringo v. R. E. Bk., 8 Eng. (13 Ark.) 584. In cases of a contingent liability, such as that of a surety, the party is not considered as in default until notice or demand, and interest does not begin to run till then. Thus, on a guaranty of the payment of notes, not exceeding in all, a certain amount, that should be discounted by a bank for another, it was decided that the

(1) Jacobs v. Adams, Executor, 1 Dallas, 52.

(2) Powell, Adm'r, v. Guy, 3 Devereux & Battle, 70; Rollman, Adm'r, v. Baker, &c., 5 Humphreys, 406.

(3) Pollard v. Yoder, 2 Marshall, Kentucky, 264, 267.

(4) Bander v. Bander, 7 Barbour's S. Ct. 560.

(5) Sheehy v. Mandeville, 7 Cranch, 208, 217.

(6) Farquhar v. Morris, 7 Term, 124; Francis v. Castleman, 4 Bibb, 282; Collier s. Gray, Overton, 110; Rogers v. Colt, 1 Zabriskie, 19; Purdy v. Phillips, 1 Duer, 369;* confirmed 1 Kernan, 406.

(7) Dodge v. Perkins, 9 Pickering, 369, 386; Hunt v. Nevers, 15 Id. 500, 505; National Lancers v. Lovering, 10 Foster, 511; Breyfogle v. Beckley, 16 Sergeant & Rawle, 264; Bartlett v. Marshall, 2 Bibb, 467, 471; Patrick v. Clay, 4 Id. 246; Dillon v. Dudley, 1 Marshall's Kentucky, 66; Nelson v. Cartmel's Adm'r, 6 Dana, 7; Cannon v. Beggs, 1 McCord, 370; Wells v. Abernethy, 5 Connecticut, 222, 228; Scudder et al. v. Morris, Pennington, 419, o; Vaughan v. Goode, Minor, 417; or something equivalent to a demand; Ringo v. R. E. Bank, 8 English (13 Ark.), 584; Etheridge v. Binney, 9 Pickering, 272,

party was liable to the extent of the guaranty, for all unpaid notes, with interest from the time that notice of non-payment was given.(1) The same principle applies to an action on the bond of a surety in an indemnity bond: for though it is said in some cases, in a general way, the judgment may be entered for the penalty, with interest from the time of the first breach, or the time it is due by the breach ;(2) yet it is to be understood that, in general, interest, as against the surety, begins to accrue on the penalty, and on the debt if less than the penalty, only from the time of a demand on the surety or notice to him, in pais, or by suit, or something equivalent to a demand or notice; (3) such as an order of the court fixing his liability, in case of an administration bond.(4) Bail are liable for interest on the judgment, from the return of the ca. sa., for they are fixed from that time, and are bound to take notice of the proceedings, of the court.(5) *Where a note is stipulated not to be [*508 payable until the payee shall do some act, notice of the performance of the act must be given before interest begins to accrue, as the act lies more in the knowledge of the party who is to do it ;(6) but where there is an agreement to pay money on the happening of a particular event, not particularly within the power or knowledge of the creditor, interest begins to run from the time when the event occurs, without a necessity for notice; accordingly, where on a sale of land, and a partial payment, an engagement was given to pay the residue of the purchase money on extinction of the wife's dower by release or death, it was decided that interest ran from the wife's death, and not merely from notice of it, the occurrence being equally within the knowledge of either party.(7) In Lang v. Brailsford, 1 Bay, 222, and Admr's of Ash v. Ex'rs of Brewton, Id. 243, the distinction was taken, that where a bill of exchange, payable at so many days, is accepted generally, the acceptor is liable for interest from the expiration of the time without a demand, but that where it is made or accepted payable at a particular banking house, a demand must be made at that place, to entitle the party to interest: but in Miller v. Bank of Orleans, 5 Wharton, 503, this distinction was not supposed to exist, and it was held that the acceptor of a bill payable at a bank was liable for interest, though the bill was not

(1) Washington Bank v. Shurtleff, 4 Metcalf, 30, 33.

(2) Carter v. Carter, 4 Day, 30, 36; Lewis v. Dwight, 10 Connecticut, 96, 103; United States v. Arnold et al., 1 Gallison, 348, 360; S. C., 9 Cranch, 104; Perit v. Wallis, 2 Dallas, 252; and see Judge of Probate v. Heydock et als., 8 New Hampshire, 492, 494. (3) Bank of the United States v. Magill et al., 1 Paine, 662, 670; S. C., 12 Wheaton, 512; Mower v. Kip, 6 Paige, 89, 92; Heath v. Gay, 10 Massachusetts, 371; Boyd v. Boyd, 1 Watts, 365, 369; State v. Bird, 2 Richardson, 99; Campbell v. Bruen, 1 Bradford's Surrogate, R. 225, 234.

(4) Richardson v. Richardson & Spann, 1 McMullan's Equity, 103.

(5) Constable v. Colden, 2 Johnson, 480.

(6) Hodges v. Holeman, 2 Dana, 396.

(7) Troubat v. Hunter, 5 Rawle, 257.

presented for payment at the bank, if he had not funds in the bank ready to be appropriated to the payment of the bill; and was not liable if he had. Interest is due from the State as from individuals ;(1) but unless expressly agreed to be paid, is due in general only from the time of demand.(2)

There has been much discussion with regard to the allowance of interest on rent arrear: and the distinction appears to be between rent, in the strict sense, as a real estate in the person reserving it, and a personal contract to pay a certain sum as rent. In the former view, interest is not due on rent in arrear, because rent issues out of the land, and because it is demandable on the land, and because the landlord has in his own hands the means of taking it by distress or entry. Accordingly, when the landlord proceeds against the land by real remedy, he does not recover interest on the rent in arrear. On a distress, therefore, [unless as in Virginia where statute gives it(3)] interest cannot be distrained for, but only the precise rent due ;(4) and if the landlord enter under a clause giving a right to re-enter and hold till the arrears of rents are discharged, he can hold only till the arrears, without interest, are paid; and therefore, in Pennsylvania, the lien of arrears of rent, which is created by that clause of re-entry, extends only to the arrears and not to interest upon them.(5) *But where a personal action, as cove*509] nant or debt, is brought for rent agreed to be paid at a certain time, it stands like any other debt due at a time certain, and interest accrues after the time fixed for payment:(6) the limitations mentioned in Obermyer v. Nichols, 6 Binney, 159, being apparently no others than those which qualify the right to interest on all debts. In Virginia, however, without regard to this distinction, the principle established is, that interest is not due on rent as a matter of law;(7) but that under circumstances it may be given by the jury.(8) In New York, it had been held

(1) Respublica v. Mitchell, 2 Dallas, 101; The People v. The Canal Commissioners, 5 Denio, 401.

(2) Attorney General v. Cape Fear Navigation Co., 2 Iredell's Equity, 444, 455; Milne v. Rempublicam, 3 Yeates, 102; see Adams v. Beach, 6 Hill's N. Y. 272; and Auditor v. Dugger et al., 3 Leigh, 241; see also Pawlet v. Sandgate, 19 Vermont, 622, 633.

(3) Brooks v. Wilcox, 11 Grattan, 419.

(4) Lansing v. Rattoone, 6 Johnson, 43; Longwell & Ege v. Ridinger, 1 Gill, 57 (but see Albright v. Pickle, 4 Yeates, 264).

(5) Bantleon v. Smith, 2 Binney, 146, 153; Dougherty's Estate, 9 Watts & Sergeant, 189; see Gaskins v. Gaskins and others, 17 Sergeant & Rawle, 390.

(6) Clark v. Barlow, 4 Johnson, 183; Van Rensselaer v. Jones, 2 Barbour, 644, 665; Dennison v. Lee and Wife, 6 Gill & Johnson, 383, 886; Obermyer v. Nichols, 6 Binney, 159, 162; Buck v. Fisher, 4 Wharton, 516; Newman v. Keffer, 33 Penna. 449; a note to McQuesney v. Hiester, 1d.; Guthrie v. Stockton's Adm'r, 5 Harrington, 123; S. C., Id. 204; Honore v. Murray, 3 Dana, 31; Elkin & Perry v. Moore, 6 B. Monroe, 462.

(7) Cooke v. Wise; and Newton v. Wilson, 3 Hening & Munford, 483; Skipwith v. Clinch, Ex'r, and others, 2 Call, 253.

(8) Dow v. Adam's Administrators, 5 Munford, 21, 23; Mickie v. Wood, 5 Randolph,

in one case, that in covenant for rent arrear, payable in wheat, interest was not recoverable;(1) but afterwards it was decided that in covenant for rent payable in wheat on a certain day, interest on the value of it on the day was to be allowed ;(2) and the latter decision has been confirmed on error.(3)

Interest is incident at law to judgments ;(4) (although the reverse has been held in South Carolina and Mississippi,(5) and apparently assumed in California;(6) yet, independently of statutes, the only remedy by which it can be recovered is an action of debt on the judgment; scire facias, writ of execution against property, and commitment on execution, being remedies only for the amount of the judgment. In an action of debt, interest may be recovered from the time of the entry of the judgment, as damages for the detention ;(7) even where it is the judg ment of a justice of the peace of another State :(8) and the rule applies where the original judgment is for a cause of action that does not bear interest, as for unliquidated damages, (9) or is for a penalty, and the judgment with the interest exceeds the penalty.(10) But at common law, on an execution on a judgment, interest cannot be levied, because the execution must pursue the judgment, and there is nothing on the record to authorize the collecting of interest; and this applies even where the judgment has been reduced by partial payments, and the amount which the plaintiff orders to be collected is less than the face of [*510 the judgment;(11) but a qualification of this exists in the case of a bond with a penalty, for here the cautionary judgment is for the whole penalty, which at law is the debt, to be discharged, according to the

571; see Kyles v. Roberts's Ex'r, 6 Leigh, 495; see Mulliday v. Machir's Adm'r, 4 Grattan, 2, 9.

(1) Ex'rs of Van Rensselaer v. Adm'rs of Platner, 1 Johnson, 276.

(2) Lush v. Druse, 4 Wendell, 313, 317.

(3) Van Rensselaer's Executors v. Jewett, 5 Denio, 135; S. C., on error, 2 Comstock, 135; see Phillips et als. v. Williams, &c., 5 Grattan, 259, 264.

(4) Gwinn v. Whitaker, 1 Harris & Johnson, 754, 755; and see Tazewell v. Saunders, 13 Grattan, 368; but not as to costs unless actually paid; then from the date of payment; Rogers. Burns, 27 Penna. 525.

(5) Trenholm v. Bumpfield, 3 Richardson, 376; Hamer v. Highwood, 25 Mississippi, 95; cited in Rogers v. Burns, 27 Penna. 528.

(6) Thompson v. Monrow, 2 California, 99.

(7) Sayre v. Austin, 3 Wendell, 496; Williams, Administrator, v. American Bank and others, 4 Metcalf, 317, 322; Fishburne, Ex'r of Snipes v. Sanders, 1 Nott & McCord, 242; Norwood v. Manning, 2 Id. 395; Administrator of Pinckney v. Singleton, Ex'r, 2 Hill's So. Car. 343; Hodgdon v. Hodgdon, 2 New Hampshire, 169.

(8) Mahurin v. Bickford, 6 New Hampshire, 568, 572.

(9) Klock v. Robinson, 22 Wendell, 157; Lord v. The Mayor, &c., of New York, 3 Hill's N. Y. 427; Marshall v. Dudley, 4 J. J. Marshall, 244; Harrington v. Glenn, 1 Hill's So. Car. 79.

(10) Smith v. Vanderhorst and Wife, 1 McCord, 328.

(11) Watson v. Fuller, 6 Johnson, 283; Mason v. Sudam, 2 Johnson's Chancery, 172,

statute of 4 Anne, c. 16, by bringing into court all the principal money and interest due on the bond, together with costs.(1) As a consequence of the right to levy execution only for the judgment and not for the interest, a judgment is a lien on lands only for the principal amount, and not interest upon it.(2) But the right to include in an execution on a judgment, interest as well as principal, is now given by statute in most States, as in New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Kentucky, &c., &c.(3) A commitment on execution, also, is, at common law, a remedy only for the amount of the judgment, and when that is satisfied, the person cannot be detained for the additional interest ;(4) and yet, as was held in the latter case, in an action on the case against the sheriff for an escape, interest on the judgment may be recovered in damages. On a scire facias on a judgment, no interest can be recovered, for it merely revives the judgment for its original amount.(5) In Pennsylvania, how ever, under the statute of 1700, interest is an incident to all judgments;(6) and a judgment in scire facias includes interest on the original judgment, and every such judgment carries interest;(7) and decrees in the Orphans' Court are judgments.(8) And even a judgment in scire facias against a garnishee in foreign attachment, gives interest on the judgment in the foreign attachment, although the first judgment includes interest.(9)

[In England-a general rule-and notwithstanding some variation in it, and its still being open to exceptions, interest cannot be recovered on a bond with a penalty for a sum beyond the penalty, either at law or in equity.(10) But this rule apparently does not hold with us either in one jurisdiction or in the other.(11)]

(1) Thomas v. Wilson, 3 McCord, 166.

(2) De La Vergne v. Evertson, 1 Paige, 182; Mower v. Kip, 6 Id. 89, 91; but see McClung v. Beirne, 10 Leigh, 395, 400.

(3) See Sayre v. Austin, 3 Wendell, 496; Berryhill v. Wells, 5 Binney, 56, 59; Thomas v. Wilson, 3 McCord, 166; Administrators of Kirk v. Executors of Richbourg, 2 Hill's So. Car. 352; Chamberlain v. Maitland & Co., 5 B. Monroe, 448, 449; Martin v. Kilbourne, 11 Vermont, 93; Ijams & Carr v. Rice, 17 Alabama, 404.

(4) Allen v. Adams & Allen, 15 Vermont, 16; Bowen v. Huntington, 3 Connecticut, 423, 426.

(5) Hall v. Hall, 8 Vermont, 156; Allen v. Adams & Allen, 15 Vermont, 16.

(6) Fitzgerald v. Caldwell's Executors, 4 Dallas, 251; The Commonwealth v. Miller's Administrators, 8 Sergeant & Rawle, 452, 457; Mohn v. Hiester, 6 Watts, 53.

(7) Fries v. Watson, 5 Sergeant & Rawle, 220; Meason's Estate, 5 Watts, 464.

(8) Wither's Appeal, 16 Penna. State, 153.

(9) Flanagin v. Wetherill, 5 Wharton, 280, 286.

(10) The law is thus stated by Moncure, J., in Tazewell v. Saunders, 13 Grattan ; citing Lord Lansdale v. Church, 2 Term, 288; Knight v. McLean, 3 Brown's Chancery Cases, 496; Wild v. Clarkson, 6 Term, 303; 1 Saunder's Rep. 58, (b), and cases in note; and note to Hellen v. Ardley, 14 E. C. L. 186; and for the exceptions to the rule, McClure v. Durkin, 1 East, 436; Shower's Parl. Cases, 15; 6 Vesey, Jr., 79; Clarke v. Lord Abingdon, 17 Vesey, Jr. 106.

(11) Tazewell v. Saunders, 13 Grattan, 366-368; citing and relying on Tennants v.