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the court expressly took the distinction between home, in respect to settlement, and domicile in its broadest sense, and held that the former ceased upon abandonment, though no new home was at once acquired; "If a party abandon his former residence," said the court," with an intention not to return, but to fix his home elsewhere, while in the transit to his new, and it may be distant, destination, we are of opinion, that, whatever may be said of his domicile, his home has ceased at his former residence within the meaning of the statute for the support and relief of the poor:" and the decision in Jamaica v. Townshend, 19 Vermont, 267, is to the same effect; and see the argument of counsel in Baird v. Byrne, 3 Wallace, Jr. 3. However, the maxims, that every man has, in law, a domicile somewhere, and that one domicile is not extinguished until another is acquired, seem to be founded in policy and reason; and perhaps they ought to receive a general application: and this was, the opinion on the circuit of GRIER, J., in the interesting case of Baird v. Byrne, 3 Wallace, Jr. 1.

*The domicile of a feme covert, as a general principle, follows *757] that of her husband:(1) but this will not be applied in a case of adversary relations between the parties, so as to oust the jurisdiction of a court of a libel for divorce, for the husband might change in his domicile perpetually, and defeat the application altogether; for the purpose, therefore, of filing a libel for divorce, although the husband has moved away, the wife's domicile will be held to continue, or to be where she actually resides.(2)

The domicile of a minor not emancipated, is that of his parents, or the survivor of them, and changes with it. If they be dead, his domicile is usually that which was theirs at the time of their death. Warren v. Hooper, 13 Indiana, 167; Grimett v. Withrington, 16 Arkansas, 377. ["No infant," says the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,(3) "who has a parent, sui juris, can, in the nature of things, have a separate domicile. This springs from the status of marriage, which gives rise to the institution of families; the foundation of all domestic happiness and virtue which is to be found in the world. The nurture and education of the offspring make it indispensable that they be brought up in the bosom and as a part of their parent's family, without which the father could not perform the duties he owes them, or receive from them the service that belongs to him. In every community, therefore, they are an integrant part of the domestic economy, and the family continues for a time to

(1) Greene v. Greene, 11 Pickering, 411, 414, 415; Lane v. Pardee, 2 Meigs, 232; Brown v. Lynch, 2 Bradford, 218.

(2) Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pickering, 181; Harding et ux. ». Alden, 9 Greenleaf, 140, 147; Irby v. Wilson, 1 Devereux & Battle's Equity, 568, 582; Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 107.

(3) School Directors v. James, 2 Watts & Sergeant, 571.

have a local habitation and a name, after its surviving parent's death. The parents' domicile, therefore, is consequently and unavoidably the domicile of the child." But sometimes, as, e. g., where a child is permanently left with other near relations-as with his grandparents-in the place of his birth, a place different from that of some new domicile of his parents, it might perhaps be different. It is different, where the child's father has died and his mother re-married and gone with her husband away, leaving the child behind in the place of his birth. By her marriage she assumes her husband's domicile, and while it is a rule of law that the domicile of the child is the domicile of the father, or of the mother while she has a domicile of her own, it is not a rule that children take the domicile of their step-father, or follow their mother's into it, when she surrenders her own.(1)] The domicile of a minor whose parents are dead, or of a person non compos, may be changed by the authority or with the assent of his guardian, or those who have the legal care of him;(2) But the guardian being an officer of the law, will not be allowed to employ his authority in this respect for the disadvantage of the ward; and no greater effect ought to be given to his acts on this subject than the nature of the case reasonably requires. Its consequences should be limited, so as not to affect the rights of the infant on the succession to his property.(3)

The principles relating to domicile, as will be seen, are simple, and suggest themselves naturally. Several-all no doubt which existed in that case are presented with great force and beauty, by the Roman orator in his Oratio pro Archia Poeta, particularly the residence of Archias, who was a native of Antioch, for many years at Rome, and that there was the "sedes omnium rerum et fortunarum suarum." There exists however, often much difficulty in the application of the principles admitted. An interesting case, since the publication of the first edition of this work, will be found in Rue High, Appellant, 2 Douglass, 515; and another, still more curious and perplexing, in White v. Brown, so often referred to, in 1 Wallace, Jr. 217.

(1) Brown v. Lynch, 2 Bradford, 218, and 2 Meigs, 536.

(2) Holyoke v. Haskins et ux., 5 Pickering, 20; Leeds v. Freeport, 1 Fairfield, 356. (3) See what is said Ex parte Bartlett, 4 Bradford, 221; and in Grimmett v. Withrington, 16 Arkansas, 377; and in Trammell v. Trammell, 20 Texas, 418.

INDEX

ΤΟ

THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS IN THE NOTES TO VOL. I.

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ratification of unauthorized agency,
717.

respective liabilities of principal and

agent on sealed contracts, 722, 740.
respective liabilities on parol contracts,
express and implied, 757, 771.
of the personal liability of the agent of
a foreign principal, 771, 772.
respective rights of action of principal
and agent on parol contracts, 772,
778.

of the principal's ownership of prop-
erty in the hands of his agent, and
his right to recover it, in specie, in
case of the agent's death, or insol-
vency, 822, 825.

AGENCY-continued.

duty of an agent, is, to use diligence,
obey instructions, keep his principal
informed, and account upon demand
or at reasonable times, 826, 852.
rights of agent, against his principal

are, to indemnity, and compensa-
tion, 856, 877.

when interest is due to and by agents,
636.

infant cannot appoint an agent, 304,
306.

of notice given by agent, of present-
ment and refusal of negotiable paper,
476, 477.

agent of agent; or sub-agent, 713, 714;
876.

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ANTECEDENT DEBT, 422.

See NEGOTIATION OF BILLS and NOTES.
APPLICATION OF PAYMENT, 330, 363.
The rules on this subject stated:
I. The debtor may at or before payment
prescribe the application, 339, 342.
if the creditor accepts the payment at
all, he is bound to apply it as the
debtor has directed, 339, 340.
the debtor's directions may be necessa-
rily implied, 340.

directions necessarily inferred from
debtor's interests, as, e. g., that a
payment be made to a debt due
rather than to one not due; to a
debt due by the payer absolutely
rather than to one due contingently,
340.

or inferred from the source from which
the payment comes, i. e., where
money comes from a particular fund,
as from a mortgage on an assign-
ment of it and a release of part of
the mortgaged premises, it will go to
payment of the mortgage, 341.
II. If the debtor do not prescribe the appli-

cation at or before the time of payment,
and if there be no consideration which,
without his act, control the appropria-
tion, the creditor may, generally speck-
ing, apply it as he pleases, and at any
time, even on a trial, 341, 347.

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but having once, in any way made it,
he cannot afterwards change it, 344,
345.

III. If neither the debtor nor creditor have
made the application, the application
will be made by the court, 347, 363.
Two cases considered under this head:
(1.) Where money has been volunta-

rily paid by the debtor, 347, 359.
(2.) Where the payment has been
made by the law, either under
execution or under an assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors,
359, 363.

In the first case, i. e., where money has
been voluntarily paid by the debtor,
without any discoverable appropria-
tion whatever by him, or by the credi-
tor, the court will be guided by a
general presumption of intention,
founded on reason, probability and
justice, which intention is inferred
by the interests of the respective
parties, 347.

by the rule of the civil law, and by
some decisions in the United States,
the court regard the debtor's inter-
ests as entitled to superior regard,
and make the application which is
most beneficial to him, 348.
but by the fundamental principles of
the common law, and by the course
of adjudicated cases, of the highest
authorities, both in England and this
country, the rule of our system is
directly the reverse; and the general
and predominant principle is that,
that application will be made by law,
which it is to be presumed that the
creditor would have made, or which
it is his interest to have made, 348.
this subject examined fully on princi-
ple and authorities, 348, 354.
this position not affected adversely by
the rule of law that applies a pay-
ment to interest rather than to prin-
cipal: on the contrary, is directly
supported by it, 356, 358.

this last rule stated, and the true mode

of applying payments on a debt bear-
ing interest, where the debtor has not
designated to which payment it shall
go, 357, 358.

rule of application in the case of mu-
tual accounts, is that the payments
shall be applied, as they are paid, to
the charges in the order of time in
which they accrue, 358.

where the payment is made by law exclu-
sively, the rule of law, and the rule
prevailing in most of our States, is
to apply the payment to all the debts
ratably, 359, 361.

difficult to determine when this princi-

ple becomes properly applicable, 359.
the rules by which the application of
indefinite payment is to be governed
in the common law, shown to be of

APPLICATION OF PAYMENT -con-
tinued.

native origin and growth, and not to
be derived, as Sir William Grant, and
some American judges of less general
accuracy, have thought, from the
civil law, 361, 363.

ASSIGNMENTS FOR BENEFIT OF
CREDITORS, 61, 86.

lawful in the absence of statutory pro-
hibitions and bankrupt laws, 71.
preferences allowable, whether the as-
signor be a natural person or corpo-
ration, 71, 72.

but preferences by corporations are
not sustainable on principle, and are
confessedly ground of forfeiture of
charter, 71, 72.

assignment may provide for security

of future or contingent liabilities, 73.
where made directly to creditors, their
assent is necessary, but not when it
is made to a trustee, whose assent,
in the absence of counter-evidence,
may be presumed for the purpose of
giving operation to the deed, 72.
creditors may, in equity, compel as-
signee to execute the trust, 73.
Of the circumstances which render as-
signments fraudulent, 73, 84.
any provision tending to hinder or de-
lay creditors, as the assigning of
property, which, on the face of the
assignment, is more than the assignee
is empowered to distribute, 73.
or postponing to an unreasonable time
the period of sale and payment, 73.
or in certain States, though not in
others, an authority to the assignee
to sell on credit, 74.

or the reservation of a power in the as-
signee or debtor to revoke the deed,
or the introduction of any limitations
giving the debtor a control of the
property, 68.

or preferring fictitious debts, or ex-
empting the assignee from his proper
and legal liabilities, 77.

or the appointment of a person as as-
signee, clearly and manifestly incom-
petent to act, 77.

or stipulations tending to coerce credi-
tors unreasonably, as, power to either
assignor or assignee, subsequently to
declaration, or alter preferences, or,
perhaps, a power to the assignee to
compound with creditors, 78.

or the reservation of any use or benefit
to the grantor; as a stipulation, for
the maintenance of him or his family;
or that he shall be employed as agent
or manager at a fixed salary; or a
reservation of a specific sum of
money, or of so much a year to the
grantor, 78, 79.

this rule is not, however, applied in all
the states, as an inflexible rule, with-
out regard to circumstances or
amounts, 79.

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