employments, are fit subjects for legislative action. The lawmaking power may provide means for remedying such evils as, in its opinion, may exist in the management of these public agencies of transportation, and in doing so it may sometimes impose restrictions which are deemed to be necessary upon the use and enjoyment of property. A man is not deprived of his property unless it is taken away from him, so that he is divested of his title and possession. To limit the use and enjoyment of property by legislative action is not to take it away from the owner when the property, whose use and enjoyment are so limited, is invested in a business 607 affected with a public use, or is used as an accessory in carrying on such business: Munn v. People, 69 Ill. 80; Commonwealth v. Wilson, 14 Phila. 384. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the act under consideration does not violate section 2 of the bill of rights.

2. The act is alleged to contravene the provisions of the federal and state constitutions, which forbid the passage of laws impairing the obligation of contracts: U. S. Const., art. 1, sec. 10; Ill. Const., art. 2, sec. 14; 1 Starr and Curtis' Ann. Stats., 31, 105.

The tickets proven to have been sold by plaintiff in error contain only the name of the railroad company, the words "Cairo to Chicago," the signature of the general ticket agent, and certain figures or numbers. It has been held that such a ticket is not a contract, but merely the evidence of a contract, or a mere receipt taken or voucher adopted for convenience, to show that the passenger had paid his fare from one place to another: Logan v. Hannibal etc. Ry. Co., 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas., 141; 2 Redfield on Law of Railroads, 6th ed., 303; Ray's Negligence of Imposed Duties, 495; Commonwealth v. Wilson, 14 Phila. 384. But, if it be admitted that the ticket is a contract, the statute would only be inoperative and of no effect as to contracts existing at the time of its passage; it would be valid and constitutional as to future contracts. It cannot be said that the act of 1875 impaired the obligation of any contract connected with the tickets upon the sale of which the present indictment is predicated. The tickets sold by plaintiff in error were issued by the railroad company in 1893, eighteen years after the passage of the act. The plaintiff in error must be presumed to have known that the sales of the tickets by him were criminal acts: Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 552; 30 Am. Rep. 238; Commonwealth v. Wilson, 14 Phila. 384.

3. The act is charged with contravening the third clause of section 8 of article 1 of the federal constitution, which 608 confers upon Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several states: 1 Starr and Curtis' Ann. Stats. 30.

In the present case the tickets sold only entitled the holder to travel between points located wholly within the state of Illinois. But the portion of the act upon which the present objection is founded is the prohibition, contained in the second section, against the sale of tickets entitling the holder to travel on any railroad or steamboat, "whether the same be situated, operated, or owned within or without the limits of this state."

It is held by the supreme court of the United States that interstate commerce, the regulation of which is within the exclusive power of Congress, includes interstate transportation of passengers. But the deposit in Congress of the power to regulate commerce between the states was not intended to deprive the states of their police power. Under its police power a state may legislate to promote domestic order, morals, and safety; to protect the lives, limbs, quiet, and property of all persons within the state; to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state; to prevent crime, pauperism, disturbance of the peace, and all forms of social evils. The state cannot invade the domain of the national government, or assume powers properly belonging to Congress. In relation to the subject of commerce, including interstate passenger travel, the state cannot place any obstacle in the way of such travel or impose any burden upon it. But many acts of a state may affect or influence commerce without amounting to a regulation of it. State legislation, which is not an obstacle to interstate commerce, and imposes no burden upon it, and which comes within a proper exercise of the police power, is not unconstitutional as infringing upon the powers of Congress. The act of 1875 is, we think, such a species of state legislation. The duties which it imposes upon the carriers therein named and their agents cannot interfere with the freedom of interstate travel. 609 Such travel is not impeded, because tickets are required to be purchased from agents of the carrier who are provided with certificates of their authority. The limitation of the sale of tickets to such agents may be a restraint upon the business of scalpers and ticket brokers, but cannot be regarded as a burden upon interstate commerce.

If the body of the act of 1875 be read in

connection with its title it must have been the opinion of the legislature that the restriction of sales of tickets to authorized agents was necessary to prevent frauds upon travelers and carriers, and to remedy the evils growing out of the practices of scalpers and ticket brokers, as described by Mr. Ray in his work on Negligence of Imposed Duties, Passenger Carriers, at pages from 491 to 498, inclusive. Viewed in this light the act in question amounts to nothing more than the regulation of a public employment under the police power of the state.

The business of the carrier being a proper subject for the exercise of the police power its necessary incidents and adjuncts are also subject thereto. As the issuing and use of tickets are required in such business, their sale is an incident thereof, and may be regulated by legislative action. It is the province of the legislature to determine the nature and character of such regulations, and the judiciary is not called upon to consider whether they are wise or unwise. The views herein expressed are sustained by the following authorities: Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 552; 30 Am. Rep. 238; Commonwealth v. Wilson, 14 Phila. 384; People v. Walser, 11 Legal News, 12; Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465; Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., marg. pp. 574, 597.

We do not think that the act violates the constitutional provision conferring upon Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce.

4. It is claimed that the act violates that part of section 22 of article 4 of the constitution of Illinois, which provides that the general assembly shall not pass special laws 610 "granting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise whatever": 1 Starr and Curtis' Ann. Stats., 119, 120.

Counsel contend that, by the terms of the act, a certain class of persons, namely, railroad ticket agents, are permitted to sell tickets, and are thereby granted a special privilege. We do not think that there is any force in this contention. It is disposed of by what has already been said in regard to the validity of the act as an exercise of the police power of the state. The requirement that tickets shall only be sold by agents authorized so to do is merely a police regulation as to the manner in which the business of the carrier shall be conducted. From the nature of things, only common carriers can, in the first instance, issue or sell tickets for passage in

their own conveyances or over their own lines. They have no more a monopoly of the ticket business than a manufacturer has of the articles which he manufactures. The authority to the agent is not an authority to sell tickets generally for all other carriers, but only to sell them for the particular carrier providing the certificate of authority. The act would seem to impose upon the carrier a burden and not to grant a privilege or immunity, as the repurchase of unused tickets is required, and, in order to prevent frauds, the sale of tickets can only be made through agents authorized to sell in the particular mode designated by the statute.

Substantially the same phraseology contained in section 1 of the present act, to which counsel object as amounting to special legislation, is to be found in an act passed by the legislature of Indiana, which was upheld by the supreme court of that state, as being consistent with a constitutional requirement forbidding the legislative grant of exclusive privileges or immunities to any citizen or class of citizens: Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 552; 30 Am. Rep. 238. We see no good reason for adopting a different conclusion.

611 Nor can it be said that the law abridges "the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States": U. S. Const., art. 14, sec. 1, of Amendments; 1 Starr and Curtis' Ann. Stats., 38. The privileges or immunities referred to in the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution are those which are fundamental, such as "protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole." No privilege or immunity of the plaintiff in error has been abridged by the act of 1875. The right of conducting the business of selling railroad and steamboat tickets is curtailed and hedged about by certain restrictions, which the legislature deemed necessary to prevent frauds upon travelers and public carriers. But these restrictions amount only to "such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole": Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371; Slaughter House cases, 16 Wall. 36.

In the case at bar our conclusion is, that the statute of this state above quoted is not in conflict with the federal constitution or with the constitution of this state, but was a

AM. ST. REP., VOL. XLL-22

legitimate exercise by the legislature of the police powers of the state. Accordingly, we hold that no error was committed by the court below in its rulings above indicated.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

RAILROADS.-Legislative REGULATION OF: See Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 Ill. 361; ante, 278, and note, and the extended note to People v. Budd, 15 Am. St. Rep. 490.

STATUTES-DUE PROCESS OF LAW DEFINED.-"Due process of law" means at least some legal procedure in which the person proceeded against, if he is to be concluded thereby, shall have an opportunity to defend himself: Doyle, Petitioner, 16 R. I. 537; 27 Am. St. Rep. 759, and note. Due process of law is such an exercise of the powers of government as the settled maxims of the law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as these maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs: Wulzen v. Board of Supervisors, 101 Cal. 15; 40 Am. St. Rep. 17, and note. See, also, the extended notes to Embury v. Conner, 53 Am. Dec. 337; Bank v. Cooper, 24 Am. Dec. 538; and Bardwell v. Collins, 20 Am. St. Rep. 554.

STATUTES-DUE PROCESS OF LAW.-DEPRIVING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT: See Wadsworth v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 18 Col. 600; 36 Am. St. Rep. 309, and note; and Burlington etc. Ry. Co. v. Dey, 82 Iowa, 312; 31 Am. St. Rep. 477, and note.

RAILROADS-TICKETS.-A railway ticket is a mere token that fare has been paid and that the passenger has the right to be carried to the destination it indicates according to the reasonable rules of the company: Pennsyl vania R. R. Co. v. Parry, 55 N. J. L. 551; 39 Am. St. Rep. 654. See, also, the extended note to Kansas City etc. R. R. Co. v. Rodebaugh, 5 Am. St. Rep. 723.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE-REGULATION OF.-A state cannot regulate interstate commerce: Osborne v. State, 33 Fla. 162; 39 Am. St. Rep. 99, and note; Gunn v. White etc. Machine Co., 57 Ark. 24; 38 Am. St. Rep. 223, and note; and any attempt by a state to regulate interstate commerce is void as an attempted exercise of a power which has been surrendered by the states to the national government: Norfolk etc. R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 95; 29 Am. St. Rep. 705, and note.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE.-TO WHAT EXTENT STATE MAY REGULATE: See the extended notes to Norfolk etc. Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 29 Am. St. Rep. 714, and People v. Wemple, 27 Am. St. Rep. 547.