The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment

Εξώφυλλο
Cambridge University Press, 20 Μαρ 2006
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanation. In this 2006 volume, which was the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the Principle Reason. Discussing various forms of the PSR and selected historical episodes, from Parmenides, Leibnez, and Hume, Pruss defends the claim that every true contingent proposition must have an explanation against major objections, including Hume's imaginability argument and Peter van Inwagen's argument that the PSR entails modal fatalism. Pruss also provides a number of positive arguments for the PSR, based on considerations as different as the metaphysics of existence, counterfactuals and modality, negative explanations, and the everyday applicability of the PSR. Moreover, Pruss shows how the PSR would advance the discussion in a number of disparate fields, including meta-ethics and the philosophy of mathematics.
 

Περιεχόμενα

Ενότητα 1
20
Ενότητα 2
41
Ενότητα 3
75
Ενότητα 4
82
Ενότητα 5
97
Ενότητα 6
126
Ενότητα 7
160
Ενότητα 8
163
Ενότητα 11
189
Ενότητα 12
209
Ενότητα 13
231
Ενότητα 14
249
Ενότητα 15
252
Ενότητα 16
254
Ενότητα 17
280
Ενότητα 18
295

Ενότητα 9
171
Ενότητα 10
184
Ενότητα 19
299
Ενότητα 20
321

Άλλες εκδόσεις - Προβολή όλων

Συχνά εμφανιζόμενοι όροι και φράσεις

Πληροφορίες βιβλιογραφίας