ing the sword to destroy Jerusalem, was directly against the commands of God; but it was in perfect coincidence with the purpose of God, not only by the testimony of the scriptures, but also by the concession of my antagonist, who allows that God has a right to send the sword; and I conclude that he will not dispute but that he has a right to send it in the hand of just such a man as the proud king of Assyria. I also conclude, that if it does not appear inconsistent that God should send a man to break his commands, (as the wicked Sennacherib evidently did,) it will not appear inconsistent that he should purpose to send him.

If the Most High purposed that Christ should be crucified by wicked hands, (which I am persuaded will appear to the most of my readers an incontrovertible truth,) the harmony of the divine conduct is illustrated. The command to all, is the same; This is my beloved Son, hear ye him-Reverence my Son. The purpose was, that some should not hear and reverence him, but put him to death. Where is the consummate duplicity and folly of the Divine Father in this matter? Was it foolish for him to require all to reverence his Son? Could he have required less?-could he have exempted an individual from obligation to this command? All must say, The requirement was perfectly consistent. Then let me ask, Was it inconsistent that the Father should determine his Son should be crucified by wicked hands? Dare any one say, that this was a foolish determination? And yet it could not go into operation without the most flagrant violation of divine commands. But does the command, to reverence the Son, and the purpose, to have him hated and crucified, really make our heavenly Father appear like a doubleminded Being? Does he not, in determining upon the crucifixion of his Son, by wicked hands, manifest a very great regard to that holy law which was so palpably transgressed by the wicked crucifiers?

The objection which we now have in view, takes a thing for granted which is by no means true, viz. that if God purposes things shall be done, which will be contrary to his commands, that then he acts against his own commands-that he shows two sides, manifesting by the commands, that he loves what is command

ed, and by his decree, that he loves the transgression of his commands. If the purpose of God, that his commands should, in a certain instance, be broken, were the same as a counter command, it would, we must acknowledge, make the divine Law-giver appear inconsistent with himself, If the God of Israel had said to Pharaoh, I require you to let my people go; and, I require you not to let my people go, there would have been no consistency in it: But he uniformly required' Pharaoh to let his people go; and yet it was evidently his purpose, that he should not let them go, until he had wrought all his signs in Egypt, and his wonders in the land of Ham. To say, that the Almighty never had any purposes which, by going into effect, would' issue in creatures' disobeying his commands, is to say, that he had no purpose about the means of bringing Joseph and Jacob and his family into Egypt ;-also that he had no purpose about making his name to be declared in all the earth by Pharaoh ;-or by the forty years sojourning of the Israelites in the wilderness. It would be to say; that God had no purpose about all the chastenings which his people received from the heathen who dwelt among them, and round about them; for the inflicting of all these chastenings implied disobedience to his commands, on the part of the heathen. If it should be said, that God purposed to make use of the heathen, to scourge his people, but it was after they had transgressed; I answer, This does not relieve the difficulty at all; for however late the purpose was formed to use such a scourge, and however great his provocation, it was a purpose, to make use of their disobedience to his law, to answer the ends of his holy go vernment. Going on the ground of the objection, He, who ruleth among the kingdoms of men, had no plan about the rise and fall of the four successive monarchies, spoken of in the book of Daniel; for the sin of men was the great thing used in their rise and fall. He had no plan about the flight of the infant Saviour into Egypt, for it was the malice of Herod which drove him thither. He had no purpose that he should be tempted in the wilderness, for Satan was the tempter. He had no purpose concerning his being betrayed, for none but a wicked man would betray him; and no wick

edness must be included in his plan. There must be no purpose about Peter's denying his Master, for that would suppose decree against command. There must be no purpose about the crucifixion, for it would involve the same difficulty. It would not, on the ground of the objection, be consistent for God to determine to make use of the Roman guard to watch the sepulchre, so as to give greater proof of the resurrection of the Saviour, for on the part of man, it was sin, which provided this guard. Now on the plan of the objector, the omniscient Being foresaw all these things, but he had no purpose about them; nor could he make any arrangement in his scheme of providence to give existence to these events, for then he would set his decrees in battle array against his commands. But can any man read the Bible representations of these things, and not feel himself compelled to acknowledge, Here is something more than prescience ;-This is the finger of God?

7. It is objected, That divine decrees, in connexion with divine efficiency on the hearts of creatures, destroy moral government, and render commands and motives perfectly nugatory. "Indeed," says Mr. B. p. 280. " if a man be compelled by a secret, almighty power in all he does," (which is the way in which he chooses to express our doctrine of an invisible influence on the heart,) " he is no more actuated by external motives, by commands or promises, nor by any part of revelation, than the skip driven by the, fierce winds" Perhaps he thinks, that we suppose the moral world can be kept by the mere power of God, as much as the natural. It is believed, however, that we hold more fully to the use and necessity of moral means, to preserve holy creatures from falling, than they do who oppose our doctrine. We believe, that all that display of truth which is made by creation and providence; by the apostasy of some creatures, and by the recovery of some; by the law, and the gospel ; by the feelings the divine Being manifested towards holy and unholy characters;-that all this varied display of truth is made, and will be kept in the view of God's holy kingdom, as the means of preserving, and perfecting their character and blessedness. All

this varied display of divine truth, will not render the influence of the Holy Ghost unnecessary; nor will the influence of the Holy Ghost render the display of truth unnecessary. The prayer of Christ for his disciples was," Sanctify them through thy truth." Now, our opponents are not willing to acknowledge the necessity, or the use, of so many moral means, to keep the intelligent system in order. They think it derogatory to the Supreme Ruler, to suppose that he needed to make a display of sin, by the existence of sinful characters; and of his opposition to sin, by the actual punishment of it, or by an atoning sacrifice ;-and that he needed to display the goodness of his heart, by forgiving and saving sinners through this atoning sacrifice; in order to build up and establish an everlasting kingdom of holiness.

But our opponents will say, If you do believe in the use of commands and motives, and other moral means, there is no consistency between believing thus, and believing that God is the efficient cause of all we do. So they think,--so they say: But shall these pass for incontrovertible arguments? Is not the sentiment familiar to christian experience, (whatever philosophers may think about it,) that means of instruction are useful, and yet their usefulness depends on the invisible operations of the Spirit: that we must keep ourselves in the love of God, though we are kept by the power of God? How familiar was this to the experience of St. Paul. Take this for a specimen : *Whereunto I also labor, striving according to his working, which worketh in me mightily." Col. i. 29. The apostle referred to the work of a Divine Agent, who wrought in him mightily. Was not this a secret and almighty power? And was it not that which produced this labor and striving of which he speaks? And yet he speaks of himself as an agent, who labored and strove.

8. It is objected that our doctrine of decrees is selfcontradictory. How does our author substantiate this charge? My reader shall hear: "In the first place you say, every event is brought about by the Almighty; and in p. 11, you quote 2. Sam. xvii. 14, For the Lord had appointed to defeat the good counsel of Ahithophel, and then add, "Ahithophel's counsel was frustrated,

because it was contrary to the counsel of him who says, My counsel shall stand, I will do all my pleasure." Was not the counsel of Ahithophel an event? and you say all events are brought about by the Lord; and yet here you say," it was contrary to the Lord's counsel," p. 28. Ans. There is quite a difference between Ahitho phel's giving counsel, and that counsel's going into effect. Now it was by no means contrary to the counsel of the Lord, that Ahithophel should give counsel, and that he should give just such counsel; but it was manifestly contrary to the counsel of the Lord, that the counsel of Ahithophel should be followed. We know that the Lord, in mercy to David, did not suffer Absalom to follow it; therefore I said," Ahithophel's counsel was frustrated." Does the word, "frustrated," in this con nexion mean, that Ahithophel never gave any counsel ? for it must mean this, to make out any inconsistency. I am willing to acknowledge that Ahithophel's giving counsel was an event, and this event most indubitably came to pass.

In this connexion I would just notice Mr. B's. comment on Prov. xix. 21; There are many devices in a man's heart; nevertheless the counsel of the Lord, that shall stand. "Here," says Mr. B. " the counsel of the Lord is put in opposition to the many devices in a man's heart." p. 49. Ans. The devices of a man's heart mean sometimes the things devised to be done, and some times the purpose of the mind about those thingsThe text before us most evidently means, that men often form projects which God does not suffer them to carry into effect. In the same page Mr. B. proceeds to say, "Is it not surprising, that you should quote this text to prove that "every sin in the universe is decreed," and then in your comment admit, that there were many sinful devices in the heart of Joseph's brethren, which." did not agree with the counsel of the Lord?" I ask, could my antagonist fail to understand me? And if he understood me, could he have added this exulting sentence: "Are all things agreeable to God's counsel, and many things disagreeable to it? O error, how dost thou bind thy admirers in the knot of contradiction!" Is there a child who reads this book, who does not see, that there is not the least contradic