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of necessity interests a meeting of lawyers, and a I need no excuse for dwelling at some length on this subject. It is a matter of common knowl edge that the volume of business in the superior courts, more especially on the common law side, 5 has greatly diminished of late years, and that there is among the public a strong and widely spread feeling of dissatisfaction with the procedure for administering justice in civil proceedings in the superior courts; and the causes are not I think, far to seck. Many and important improvements have been made in procedure since the introduction, in 1873, of the first Judicature Act and among these improvements are two which stand out pre-eminently beyond the rest; I mean, of course, the facilities for summary judgment, given under Order XIV., and the power under Order LV. of obtaining expeditiously and cheaply judgment upon questions arising in the administration of a trust, without the necessity of an administration in court of the whole trust estate. I hope that the time is not far distant when we shall at least sce the provisions of Order XIV. greatly extended, a course which has, as you know, been strongly recommended by the committee of our society, which reported in 1892 on suggested changes in our legal procedure. But though much has been done in the right direction, it is impossible for any of us who are engaged in large practice to maintain that our system meets with or merits the approval of those for whose benefit it should be designed, namely, our clients, the litigants themselves. The whole manner in which commercial business is conducted in this country has changed enormously of late years, and men of business are accustomed to transact their business rapidly, and expect to have their ordinary business transactions settled up promptly and expeditiously. Can it be said that the improvements in our procedure have kept pace with the ever-changing conditions under which business is carried on, or that our system is, to use a slang expression "up to date"? At no time in the history of this country has the confidence of business men in the ability and integrity of our judges been greater than it is at present at no time have we had a more distinguished Bar - and as to our own branch of the profession, who is there who is ignorant of the strides which have of late years been made in meriting and obtaining public esteem? If therefore, the public, as they have, have full confidence in those who administer the law, how is it that business men have for many years been more and more shy of resorting to our tribunals for the settlement of their disputes? We have heard many explanations offered. Some optimists among us have been known to put it all down to depression in trade, and to assert that our legal procedure

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is all that is desired. think that the answer is that our procedure does not satisfy the requirements of business men. An institution to flourish in a free country must offer to the people the thing that they want. Our legal procedure is far too complex, too dilatory and uncertain as to time, and too expensive for the requirements of business men in ordinary transactions at the end of the nineteenth century. I say advisedly, "for ordinary transactions; " for however complex, expensive and dilatory procedure may be, people who have sensational libel cases to bring before the public, cases where questions of character are involved, or cases involving very large sums of money, will not be deterred by any considerations of expense and difficulty from bringing them before the most suitable and competent tribunal to which they can resort. But ordinary business men, having a dispute to settle, arising in the ordinary course of business, have for many years past been found to prefer to resort to lay arbitration, and other unsatisfactory methods of settling their disputes, rather than submit to the expense and delay involved in recourse to the tribunals of the country. The object of procedure is to settle disputes; disputes must and will in the course of business arise, and they are a necessary evil. They interfere with business, and all time and money expended in consequence is from an economical point of view "waste," and the problem which those who are responsible for settling the procedure of our law courts have to set themselves is, how to place before the public a machinery for satisfactorily determining these disputes with the least possible waste of time and money. I shall have something to say later on with reference to the recent establishment in London of a separate court for the trial of commercial cases, in respect of which a giant's stride has been made in the right direction; but for the moment I am dealing only with our system generally, and I desire to call your attention to what I consider some of the most salient defects in it, and in doing so I must remind you that the views which I express must be considered as personal to myself, and that the president for the time being in delivering his annual address does not in any sense speak as representing the views of his colleagues on the council over whom he has the honor for the year to preside. (1) Our procedure is regulated by the Judicature Acts 1873 to 1894, and the rules (more than 1,000 in number) made under them, forming altogether a mass of complex provisions constantly being changed, and in the interpretation of which it is inevitable that doubts and difficulties will from time to time arise. These difficulties when they arise are not determined by the rule-making au

I am not of that opinion, but

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thority for the benefit of litigants as a whole, but are judicially settled at the expense of particular litigants, so that a plaintiff and defendant who embark in litigation may not only have to pay the expense of settling their own particular dispute, but may find themselves involved in a heavy expense in settling what is the meaning of some statutory provision or some rule of procedure. I find that in the Annual Practice for 1895 there are between seven and eight thousand reported cases referred to as indicating the effect and construction of the existing rules, and where rules have been altered to meet difficulties which have arisen, a reference to the case is of course no longer necessary; and there are, moreover, a number of cases which are never reported in which litigants have had to pay expenses for determining obscure points of procedure. From the mere fact, however, that there are upwards of 7,000 reported cases which it is necessary to refer to in order to ascertain what the existing rules mean, some idea may be formed of the number of cases which have arisen and the enormous expense to which litigants have been put in determining not their own particular disputes, but what is the meaning of the complicated procedure under which they have to work if they desire to bring their disputes for settlement in the High Court. Is not this in itself enough to deter would-be litigants? (2) Then the course of litigation is, or may be, the same whether the amount involved is large or small, whether the case is a simple one or complex, whether the facts are really disputable or not, and, except in the limited application of Order XIV., there is no summary process by which in an ordinary action a defendant having no defense, or a plaintiff having no case, can be prevented at an early period from putting his opponent to the expense and delay involved in carrying the action through all its possible stages. (3) The third point I wish to refer to is the long vacation. How in the name of common sense can it be expected that the public will voluntarily patronize an establishment, the doors of which, in addition to other "vacations," are substantially closed from the 12th of August to the 24th of October in every year? What other business establishment conducts its affairs in this fashion? Bear in mind that in our own offices we carry all our administrative work at all times of the year, and it is only in respect of litigious business that we have a long vacation. In the city of London we have probably as much general work then as at any other time of the year. Each and every hard worker in every branch of life requires sufficient and regular holidays. The officers and the staff of all great banking institutions, of all railways, all without difficulty get their proper periods of repose from work, but the banks do not

close their doors, nor do the railway companies refuse to carry us during a close time of over ten weeks every summer, to say nothing of other holidays in the year. What in the nature of the case is there which makes lawyers different in this respect from every other class of workingmen in England, and why should the establishment which we all co-operate in carrying on be administered on such unbusiness-like principles as these? We are all so used to our long vacation that some of us think that we could not live without it, and we are astonished that outsiders should consider its continuance in its present form a blot on our institution. Believe me the long vacation as such is an anachronism, and the sooner it is done away with the better for us and the clients whom we serve. (4) The fourth point I will refer to is this, and I will only devote a few words to it, for it is a matter only too well known and recognized; I mean the great waste of judicial strength arising out of the present circuit system. The remedy has been pointed out again and again; but we are, I fear, as a nation, slow, only too slow, in applying known remedies to known defects. This is a matter which I feel cannot and will not, be allowed to remain in its present unsatisfactory position. (5) The next point in reference to our present system to which I would call attention is that of the relations between counsel and client. It is, of course, a subject of some delicacy, and upon which I desire to speak with all consideration for the other branch of the profession, among whom are numbered some of my most valued and intimate friends; but I for one think that the relations of the bar to the client are one of the other anachron

isms in our system. In theory the services of counsel are gratuitous, and their fees are honoraritheory has been left in the lurch by practice. In reality, counsels' fees are bargained for by their clerks. The junior counsel requires a fixed proportion of the leader's fee, however eminent the leader may be, however junior the junior. The clerk of the leading counsel on the side where, perhaps, fecs are marked lower than by the adversary, requires to have his master's fee raised to the level of that of his opponent, and so on through a variety of phases with which we are all familiar. I have nothing to say against the practice of a professional man demanding for valuable services as much as he can get, as much as the public will pay him. But let it be done openly by the master, and not by a clerk acting ostensibly against his master's orders and in violation of the gratuitous service and honorarium theory which are said to rule the relations between counsel and client. Though the barrister cannot sue for his fees, the bar can and do bring the pressure of the society to bear upon

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solicitors who are members with the view of compelling payment of fees in arrears. We hold, and have always held, that it is unbecoming a member of our society not to pay his counsel's fees; and though fees are not recoverable at law, they can, to a great extent, be, in fact, recovered as effectively as if they could be sued for, and I doubt whether there is any other vocation in which so small a percentage of bad debts is made as in the case of counsel fees. It is time, I think, that these anomalies should cease to exist; then, if the fees are payments for services contracted for, it would follow that the services would be performed or the fees returned, and we should no longer have the unedifying spectacle of counsel holding briefs in cases they cannot possibly give attention to, or putting in an appearance for short periods at intervals during the hearing of a case. Believe me, there is nothing in the administration of justice with which the lay client finds so much fault as paying for services the benefit of which he does not obtain, and knowing that in the most favorable circumstances he must needs feel anxiety as to whether or not counsel, to whom he has paid heavy fees, will attend to and conduct his case. (6) Another strong deterrent is to be found in the very strict and technical rules of evidence acted on in our courts. Something in the right direction has, you know, been done in this respect, but much remains to be done before business men will come to our courts and risk failure in litigation, in consequence of the rules of evidence in reference to facts, which, to their lay minds, admit of no dispute, or in respect of which they are in the habit of acting upon materials which the courts, at present, refuse to look at as evidence. Consider, too, how much unnecessary expense and delay arises in practice from the necessity of having, in some cases, to prove, under a commission abroad, facts which are notorious and documents which are recorded. (7) Then there is the well founded grivance as to party and party costs, and much dissatisfaction exists as to the practice in taxing costs as between party and party. A distinguished member of the Court of Appeal alluded, at a public meeting in June last, to this as the principal deterrent cause which keeps the public away from the law courts. A successful litigant thinks he should have a complete indemnity from his unsuccessful adversary in respect of all costs reasonably and properly incurred by him in the litigation, and so he should. In theory the court gives him this; but when he comes to the taxing master's office he finds by experience that he only gets about two-thirds of what he has been obliged to spend. Some misapprehension, I think, exists in many quarters as to this subject, and I have heard it suggested that legislation is required to place the

matter on a satisfactory basis, but I do not think that this is the case. To the question what costs should a successful litigant be able to recover from his opponent, the answer must be, "all that he has reasonably and properly incurred in the litigation." And what does the rule say on the subject? Only that the taxing master is not to allow costs "not necessary or proper for the attainment of justice, or which have been incurred through over-caution, negligence, or mistake, or merely at the desire of the party." No alteration of the rule seems necessary. No one, I suppose, will desire to make an unsuccessful litigant pay costs for work "not necessary for the attainment of justice," or "incurred through over-caution, negligence or mistake," or "merely at the desire of the party." In theory the rules are all that can be desired; but where the shoe pinches and where alteration is needed is in the practice and application of the rules in the masters' offices. This was the view acted on by the committee of judges in 1892, who spoke of the matter as "the practice as to the taxation of costs which at present distinguishes costs as between solicitor and client from costs between party and party," and who did not suggest that any alteration in principle was needed or that any new statutory powers were required. And, if my memory serves me, the late Sir Henry Jackson, who some years ago brought a bill into parliament on the subject, found on consideration that the grievance could be remedied without legislation; but unfortunately the grievance exists, and no effectual steps have been taken to remedy it. The taxing masters, following the practice of many years and various decided cases which they are bound to follow, take far too narrow a view of what is necessary for the attainment of justice, and if the powers that be would see that the rules are more liberally interpreted and would lay down regulations for the guidance of the taxing masters, successful litigants would more nearly attain the indemnity to which they are entitled from their unsuccessful opponent. It must not, however, be overlooked that the more competent the practitioner and the more calm-headed the client, the less is the difference between party and party and solicitor and client costs. It is, in my judgment, not a practical suggestion that an unsuccessful litigant should be expected to pay for the incapacity of his opponent's advisers, or for any and every fancy of a nervous adversary. The principle laid down in the rules is in this respect good enough. What we want is a liberal and proper interpretation of the rules in practice. I have indicated some of what I think are the most salient defects of our system of procedure, and some of these defects can easily be remedied. It would be a simple remedy to have all

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questions of practice settled without litigation by a are, of course, some cases in which it might be diffismall rule committee, whose duty it should be to cult to arrive at a just conclusion as to the merits remedy all defects, and clear up all doubts arising without formal pleadings and particulars, and within practice on the rules, and to do this as the points out going through the processes of discovery and inarise, and without cost to the litigants. There terrogatories and all the rest of it; but in nine cases should be no great difficulty (in spite of the opposi- out of ten in, I would almost say, ninety-nine tion from small places), in rearranging the circuit cases out of a hundred-none of this is necessary; system so as to prevent the present waste of judicial only a very small percentage of actions commenced strength. The Council of Judges, in reporting to really proceed through all the preliminary stages to the Secretary of State in 1892, indicated how this trial and judgment in many cases the parties could be best done, and added that, unless the cir- know perfectly well beforehand what are the points cuit system be rearranged, "all the other sugges- in dispute - what, if any, are the material facts tions (for the improvement of legal procedure) will upon which there may be doubt; and in many cases be of little effect, and the most valuable part of the the rights of the parties depend merely on the conproposed reform in the present administration of struction of some written instrument; there are; the law will be frustrated." The long vacation and under the existing rules some facilities for obtainthe present anomalous relations between counsel ing a speedy decision in such cases; but the existand client will probably die hard; but, in my judging rules and the manner in which they are ment, go they must if we are to have any efficient reform such as to render our system likely rather to attract than, as it does now, repel suitors. I trust that the strong views held by Lord Justice Smith on the subject and his influence will have the effect of regulations being laid down for the taxing masters, so that a successful litigant may, on taxation, be allowed all his costs and expenses reasonably and properly incurred. But there are other important reforms which are, I think, imperatively called for. Our system, which we call procedure, is a far too highly polished and complicated machine for the requirements of everyday cases. It is a terrible weapon in the hands of an unscrupulous litigant. In theory it is all simple enough; we have our summons for directions and many other apparently useful rules; but we know that, except in cases which the courts consider to come under Order XIV, a defendant who has in reality no title of a defense can keep his adversary months, and, in some cases and under favorable circumstances, years, from getting a judgment, and that either party can, for an undue length of time, put off the inevitable moment of coming face to face with his adversary before the court. Much has been done in the right direction by Order XIV, much by order LV; much has been done by the establishment in London of a court for the trial of commercial cases, hampered in practice by no technical rules of procedure and presided over by judges whose whole lives have been spent in the conduct of commercial cases, and who possess the confidence of men of business. If such a tribunal had been established twenty years ago we should have heard less, if anything, of the commercial classes refusing to resort to our courts for the settlement of their disputes, and inserting in their sale and purchase contracts clauses for compulsory reference to lay arbitrators. With respect to litigation generally, there

interpreted are not, I think, such as to satisfy in this respect the reasonable expectations of the public. Compromises and settlements of litigation usually arise in consequence of one party to an action learning something which he has not before known, or has not appreciated, of the strength of his opponent's case. If a settlement of the dispute in the early states of a litigation is an object, as I think it is, to de desired, it is important that each litigant should as speedily as can be learn something of the strength of his opponent's case, and I should like to see what I will call the underlying principle of Order XIV extended to every kind of case, and I would give to every litigant, be he plaintiff, defendant, applicant or respondent, the right immediately that all necessary parties are before the court to apply to the court in a summary way for any judgment to which he may think himself entitled in reference to the subject-matter of the litigation; and to do this on such materials as he may then be able to bring before the court. There are a vast quantity of cases in which a short investigation performed by an able judge would show that the applicant had no reasonable ground for his application, or that the respondent had no such grounds for objection; and it should be the duty of the judge to enter judgment on the materials before him either for the applicant or respondent, or in such manner as he thought just, unless for special reasons he should consider that the particular case ought to be carried through in the manner prescribed by existing rules; but I would let it be possible to make such judgment a provisional judgment only, and allow the aggrieved party, on giving security for costs, or on such other conditions as the court might impose, to have the action or proceeding tried or brought to hearing in the ordinary way. I am confident that, if the court possessed such a power as this, and if the parties

were at an early stage of the proceedings brought face to face before the court, a settlement between the parties themselves would in the vast majority of cases take place, or a satisfactory judgment would be pronounced, and further proceedings avoided. I cannot leave the question of legal procedure without saying something on the subject of "costs." Much misapprehension, I am sure, exists on the subject the word costs ought, perhaps, only to be used to indicate the solicitors' fees and disbursements, but it is often used to indicate the whole of the expenses of litigation, and few, except those who have made a special study of it, know how small a part of the expenses of litigation represents

the solicitor's own renumeration for his services. It would, I know, astonish some persons to be told, but it is a fact, that from ten to twelve per cent of the costs of litigation is what represents the solicitor's own renumeration — that is to say, he must have work passing through his hands costing in the aggregate £1,000 in order that he can earn for his own renumeration £100. In some special circumstances, such, for instance, as in a small office where

the solicitor himself does all the work performed in larges offices by clerks, or in a very large office with a numerous staff and an unusually large amount of work, the percentage may be higher, but about ten per cent is all that a solicitor usually gets as his net renumeration, including interest on the capital in his business. The expenses of ordinary litigation, and which are vulgarly referred to as costs, include — (a) court and judicature fees; (b) counsels' fees; (c) witnesses' renumeration; (d) the solicitor's charges and disbursements. The court and judicature fees represent a very considerable amount; in administrative actions they are very heavy. Counsels' fees have increased with the altered value of money, but they have also increased to a very great extent beyond this, and they constitute a very large percentage of the expenses of litigation. Payments to witnesses, especially skilled witnesses, may and do form another important heading of expense. The solicitor's Own renumeration is in the main based upon a scale of allowances fixed in the year 1807, and which have undergone no increase; and if, in 1807, they were adequate allowances for the work done and the skill employed, they are certainly not SO Money has decreased in value, the remuneration of all other professional men has been increased; we alone have to content ourselves with a scale fixed nearly a century ago, and this notwithstanding that the average education of solicitors has enormously increased, and the practice of our profession has certainly not become less anxious or more easy with the altered times; our remuneration in litigious matters is a bare pittance, and we are hampered by

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rules which in some cases make the solicitor's remuneration payable in an inverse ratio to the responsibility and labor involved; for instance, it is more remunerative to a solicitor to instruct a counsel to attend in chambers than to attend and conduct his case himself. On the question of legal procedure I have, I am sure, said enough to show you that our house wants putting in order, and when those in authority think that the time has come for doing so, I hope that some alteration of our fees will be effected by which, at least, we shall be adequately rewarded for all necessary work, and in which there shall be no temptation to any practitioner to increase his client's disbursements as a means of adding to his own fees.

I propose in conclusion to say a few words on two of the more important duties of our society, and on its organization and its finances. It was so long ago as 1877 that the whole control of the examination of articled clerks passed into the hands of the society. Previously to this the council, as delegates of the judges, had practically had charge of the examinations, but since 1877 the responsibility for, and the whole conduct of, the examinations has

due to the Examination Committee of the Council

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been vested in the society; and a very important duty this is, and the thanks of the profession are for the exemplary and painstaking manner in which they superintend and regulate this department of the society's function: It is a satisfaction to myself personally, and I think it will be so to many of us, that we are getting year after year a larger proportion of graduates, and men who have passed the London University Matriculation Examination, coming into our ranks — when young men have to undergo a five years' service under articles, there is unfortunately too great a temptation for them to leave school at an early age a University degree delays only by one year the date of admission, and the advantages, where they can be afforded, largely in my judgment overbalance the disadvantage of beginning professional life a year later. I may mention that in 1864 the number of graduates and four-year men was only seven and one-third per cent of the whole number of members admitted; in 1874 the proportion had risen only to nine and two-thirds per cent, in 1884 it had increased to fifteen per cent, and last year it was nearly twentythree per cent. Turning now to the duties imposed upon us respecting disciplinary control over members of our profession, it was in 1888 that under the Solicitors Act of that year was transferred to us from the masters practically the whole of the work of investigating into and reporting upon charges of misconduct on the part of members of our profession, and in the Statutory Discipline Committee is now vested the duty of hearing in the first instance of all complaints against solicitors. The satisfactory manner in which this duty has been performed leads me to hope that the time is not far distant when we shall be vested with yet fuller powers over our members, and that those who

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