can entertain no doubt that a dramatic composition is equally under the protection of the law with any other literary work. Courts will not interfere to vindicate the claims of any party to the exclusive enjoyment or disposal of an immoral or licentious production; but the particular application once made of this rule of the common law in conformity with the peculiar opinions, sentiments or prejudices of one generation of men, will not control its application in a state of society where different views prevail. If our ancestors prohibited all scenic exhibitions, it was because they regarded them as immoral and pernicious. If we do not so regard them, the reason ceasing, the rule ceases with it." In the case of Boucicault v. Fox,20 it is said that a person who agrees to write a play to be acted at the theater of another person, and who agrees to act in the play himself, so long as it will run, receiving a share of the profits as a compensation, does not thereby confer upon any one the legal or equitable title to the play, and he is entitled to take out copyright for it after it has been so acted in such theater. But in England, by the statute of 5 & 6 Victoria, ch. 45, sec. 20, the representation upon the stage of a dramatic piece, is declared to be equivalent to publication, and defeats all claim of the author to copyright. We now pass to a consideration of the right of property in letters. Cicero speaks of the publication of private letters as being a gross offense against common decency.21 Not only is it an offense against common decency, but it is an offense against the law, being a violation of the writer's rights therein. This subject was very fully considered by Mr. Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh,22 and the following quotation from his decision is of such interest, and states the law so fully and satisfactorily, that its length may well be pardoned. author of any letter or letters," says Judge Story (and his representatives), "whether 20 3 Blatchford, 88. "The 21 Quis enim unquam, qui paulum modo bonorum consuetudinem nosset, literas, ad se ab amico missas, offensione aliqua interposita, in medium protulit, palamque recitavit? Quid est aliud, tollere e vita societatem, quam tollere amicorum colloquia absentium? Quam multa joca solent esse in epistolis, quæ, prolata si sint, inepta videantur! Quam multa seria, neque tamen ullo modo divulganda! Orat. Philip. ii., c. 4. 22 2 Story, 100, 110. they are literary compositions, or familiar letters, or letters of business, possess the sole and exclusive copyright therein; and no persons, neither those to whom they are addressed, nor other persons, have any right or authority to publish the same upon their own account, or for their own benefit. But, consistently with this right, the persons to whom they are addressed may have, nay, must by implication possess, the right to publish any letter or letters addressed to them, upon such occasions, as require or justify the publication or public use of them; but this right is strictly limited to such occasions. Thus, a person may justifiably use and publish, in a suit at law or in equity, such letter or letters as are necessary and proper to establish his right to maintain the suit or defend the same. So, if he be aspersed or misrepresented by the writer, or accused of improper conduct in a public manner, he may publish such parts of such letter or letters, but no more, as may be necessary to vindicate his character and reputation, or free him from unjust obloquy and reproach. If he attempt to publish such letter or letters on other occasions, not justifiable, a court of equity will prevent the puba breach of lication by an injunction, as private confidence or contract, but it is a violation of the exclusive copyright of the writer. In short, the person to whom letters are addressed, has but a limited right or special property in such letters, as a trustee, or bailee, for particular purposes, either of information or of protection, or of support of his own rights and character. The general property, and the general rights incident to property, belong to the writer, whether the letters are literary compositions or familiar letters, or details of facts, or letters of busiThe general property in the manuscripts remains in the writer and his representatives, as well as the general copyright." There is no doubt that letters may be produced in court to vindicate the rights of the person who received them,23 and the necessity of vindicating one's character is a complete justification of their publication.24 But the government, it seems, has a right to publish or to withhold all letters addressed to the public offices. 25 ness. 23 See Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 403. 24 Woolsey v. Judd, 4 Duer, 379. 25 Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 100. Is a fair, bona fide abridgment of an original work to be regarded as a piracy of the copyright of the author? In Newberry's Case, 26 decided in 1774, an injunction was asked to restrain the publication of an abridgment; but Lord Chancellor Apsley was of the opinion that an abridgment was not any violation of the author's property rights. The act of abridgment was, in his judgment, an act of the understanding employed in carrying a larger work into a smaller compass, and rendering it less expensive and more convenient-an abridgment being in the nature of a new and meritorious work. Lord Hardwicke, in Gyles v. Wilcox,27 stated the rule as follows; "Where books are colourably shortened only, they are undoubtedly within the meaning of the Act of Parliament, and are a mere invasion of the statute, and can not be called an abridgment. But this must not be carried so far as to restrain persons from making a real and fair abridgment; for an abridgment may, with great propriety, be called a new book, because not only the paper and print, but the invention, learning and judgment of the author is shown in them, and in many cases they are extremely useful." That a bona fide abridgment does not violate the rights of the author of the original work, seems to be no longer disputed.28 But to constitute an infringement, it is not necessary that the larger part of a work protected by copyright should be appropriated. If so much is taken that the value of the original work is diminished materially, or the labors of the author are appropriated to an injurious extent, such appropriation amounts to an invasion of the copyright.29 And where A published a life of Washington, containing 866 pages, of which 353 pages were copied from Sparks' Life and Writings of Washington, sixty-four pages being official letters and documents, and 255 pages being private letters of Washington, originally published by Mr. Sparks under a contract with the owners of the original papers of Washington, the court held the work to be an invasion of the copyright of Mr. Sparks, as it The sensibly diminished the value of the original work.3 30 It is useless, however, to refer to any particular cases as to quantity, as the question of infringement does not necessarily turn upon the quantity taken, but upon the value of that which is appropriated.31 principle has been well stated by Copinger, an English writer as follows: "The general principle is that the proper object of the copyright is the peculiar expression of the author's ideas, meaning by this, the structure of the work, the sequence of his remarks, and, above all, his language. If this view be correct, it follows that any abridgment of the work in the original author's language, is an infringement of his right; and, indeed, any quotation will be pro tanto a violation, unless excused on the ground of its inconsiderable extent."32 A clear distinction exists between an abridgment and a compilation. An abridgment, it is said, necessarily adopts the same arrangement and conveys the same knowledge in a condensed form, but a compiler can neither adopt the arrangement, nor convey by his extracts the same knowledge contained in that from which the compilation is made.3 33 Mr. Justice Shipman, in Banks v. McDivitt,34 has examined very fully the rights of compilers of books which are not original in their character, the compilations being of facts from common and universal sources of information, such as are contained in directories, digests, guide books, maps and statistical tables. While the compiler of such a book does not have a monopoly of the subject of which the book treats, any other person being free to make a similar book, yet the subsequent investigator must investigate for himself, from the original sources open to all. He will not be allowed to use the labors of the previous compiler, saving his own time by copying the results of the previous compiler's study. "The compiler of a digest, a road book, a directory, or a map," says Judge Shipman, "can search and survey for himself in the fields which all laborers are permitted to Occupy, but he can not 30 Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 100. 31 Saunders v. Smith, 3 Mylne & Craig, 711, 736; Bromhall v. Halcombe, ib. 737, 738. 32 Copinger on Copyright, 37. 33 Story's Executors v. Holcombe, 4 McLean, 306. 34 13 Blatchford, 163. adopt as his own, the products of another's toil."35 Doubt existed for a long time whether one could have rights of property, copyright, in translations—whether the mere act of giving to a literary composition the new dress of another language, added to the case an element which ought to take it out of the rule by which reproductions in other forms are prohibited. It is now settled that a man has a right to copyright a translation.36 If a foreigner translates an English work, and then the foreign work is re-translated into English, it is an infringement of the original copyright.3/ And in Stowe v. Thomas,38 it is said that to translate a work is no infringement of the copyright, although the author has previously had it translated into the same language, and secured a copyright for that translation. A reviewer may be guilty of an infringement of the copyright of the author of the book reviewed. "The extracts must not be made too freely. Sufficient may be taken to form a correct idea of the whole; but no one is allowed, under the pretense of quoting, to publish either the whole or the principal part of another man's composition; and, therefore, a review must not serve as a substitute for the book reviewed. If so much be extracted that the article communicates the same knowledge as the original work, it is an actionable violation of literary property."39 A reporter has a copyright in his marginal notes, and in the argumente of counsel as prepared and arranged by him, though he has none in the opinions of the court.40 Ab 35 See, also, Jarrold v. Houlston, 3 K. & J. 708; Kelley v. Morris, L. R. 1 Eq. 697; Scott v. Stanford, L. R. 3 Eq. 718; Lewis V. Fullerton, 2 Beaver, 6; Holten v. Arthur, 1 Hemming & Miller, 603; Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Vesey, 215; Matthewson v. Stockdale, 12 Vesey, 270; Longman v. Winchester, 16 Vesey, 269; Gray v. Russell, 1 Story, 11; Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 100; Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story, 768. 36 Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr, 23, 48; Barnet v. Chetwood, 2 Mer. 441; Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G. & S. 693; Wyatt v. Barnard, 3 Ves. & B. 77; Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story 768, 780; Shook v. Rankin, 6 Bissell, 480. 37 Murray v. Bogue, 17 Jur. 219; 1 Drew, 353. 38 2 Wallace, Jr., 547. 39 Story's Executors v. Holcombe, 4 McLean, 306; Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 106; Rowarth v. Wilkes, 1 Campbell, 94, 97; Wilkins v. Aikin, 17 Vesey, 422; Cary v. Kearsley, 5 Esp. N. P. 170. 40 Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591; Gray v. Russell, 1 Story, 11. 41 stracts of title are subjects of copyright A sheet of music is a subject of copyright,42 but a newspaper is not.43 The author of a libelous or immoral work can not maintain an action against any person for publishing a pirated edition of such work.44 And Con gress could not pass a law conferring the privilege of copyright upon immoral or indecent works. 45 Whatever right in the nature of copyright exists in this country, is created by, and exists only to the extent and upon the conditions specified in the acts of Congress, but relief from infringements is to be sought in the State courts, unless the residence of the parties in different States confers jurisdiction upon the Federal Courts. 46 Publication and delivery to the librarian of Congress of two copies of the work sought to be copyrighted, is as much a condition to the creation of a valid copyright, as is the filing a copy of the title page; and a bill to restrain an infringement is said to be demurrable, unless it avers performance of both these conditions.47 HENRY WADE ROGERS. ADULTERATION OF FOOD AND DRUGS. "What a contrast between now and. say, only a hundred years ago! At that later date, or still more conspicuously for ages before that, all England awoke to its work with an invocation to an Eternal Maker to bless them in their day's labor, and help them to do it well. Now, all England, shopkeepers, workmen, and all manner of competing laborers, awaken as with an unspoken but heartfelt prayer to Beelzebub:-Oh, help us, thou great lord of shoddy, adulteration and malfeasance, to do our work with the maximum of slimness, swiftness, profit and mendacity, for the devil's sake, and an amen." So wrote the pungent pen of the late Thomas Carlyle; while Mr. Ruskin, less indisputably, will have it that "it is merely through the quite bestial ignorance of the moral law in which the English bishops have 41 Banker v. Caldwell, 3 Minn. 94. 42 Clementi v. Golding, 2 Camp. 25; Clayton v. Stone, 2 Paine, 382. 48 Clayton v. Stone, supra. 44 Stockdale v. Onwhyn, 11 Eng. C. L. 191; Hirne v. Dale, 2 Camp. 27, note b.; Fores v. Johnes, 4 Esp. 97; Gale v. Leckie, 2 Starkie, 107; Lawrence v. Smith, 1 Jac. 471. 45 Daly v. Palmer, 6 Blatchford, 256. contentedly allowed their flocks to be brought up that any of the modern English conditions of trade are possible." But, traders have to contend with the positive law too, which places a potent veto on contamination and sophistication in most respects, although something more might have been expected to result from the Parliamentary inquiry on the subject of some three years since; while we find that France has made her laws more stringent, Belgium has promulgated a really efficient measure, Spain has appointed inspectors at the ports to prevent the importation of adulterated drugs from England, and Australia has empowered a committee to inquire into the subject. Even in relation to the important conflict of opinion between the authorities of Somerset House and the Society of Public Analysts, as to the proper standard of pure milk (which has already notoriously ed to the miscarriage of prosecutions, as in the case of Pembroke Township Commissioners v. Byrne, Sept. 1. 1880), the legislature has not thought fit to intervene; though a precedent for an enactment on the subject may be found in the United States, as we learn from Commonwealth v. Luscomb, decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in November last. There the indictment-which was under Stat. 1880, ch. 209, sec. 3, creating the offense of having in possession "adulterated milk, or milk to which water or any foreign substance has been added,” and sec. 7, providing "that in all prosecutions under the Act, if the milk shall be shown, upon analysis, to contain more than eighty per centum of watery fluid, or to contain less than thirteen per centum of milk solids," it shall be deemed adulterated-alleged that the defendant had in his possession one pint of adulterated milk, "to which milk, water had been added;" and it was held (without deciding whether the purpose of the Act was to prevent the sale of milk found by analysis to fall below the required standard of purity, and whether such milk is to be treated as adulterated, without regard to what may have caused its inferior quality), that under the allegations of this indictment, the jury should have been instructed that the defendant could not be properly convicted, if they were satisfied that the milk in question was as it naturally came from the cow, although they should also find it fell below the legal standard in quality. So that the strict letter of the statute was prevented from operating unjustly to the prejudice of the accused, who escaped for a reason, the converse of that which, according to Wilmot, C. J., procured the acquittal of a Warwick innkeeper, who, being tried for poisoning a customer with noxious "port wine,” escaped by proving that there had never been one drop of real port wine in the hogshead. But, we know not what Dr. Cameron would say as to the standard of milk-quality legislatively laid down in Massachusetts. Be this as it may, however, and though milk adulteration is certainly decreasing, there can be no doubt that, as the Local Government Board state in their report for 1879, the money loss sustained by the consumers must amount in the aggregate to an enormous sum-London alone paying between £70,000 and £80,000 a year for water sold under the name of milk; figures which, large as they are, need surprise us little when we remember that returns obtained from the railway companies show that nearly twenty million gallons of milk are now brought to London annually by railway, in addition to a considerable quantity either produced within the metropolitan area, or brought thither otherwise than by railway. He In reference to this transit of milk by railway. the recent case of Rouch v. Hall (6 Q. B. D. 17; 50 L. J. M. C. 6), may be referred to. It appeared that a farmer named Hall, living near Coventry, was charged on April 8, 1880, with having on March 18, at the Euston station, sold, to the prejudice of the purchaser, a pint of milk adulterated with 16 per cent. of water. Hall had contracted to supply milk to a dealer in London, to be delivered free of charge at the London terminus. On March 18, Mr. Rouch, being at the station, and seeing a milk-can arrive, required a porter to give him a sample, as he suspected the milk to be adulterated, and wished to have it analyzed. at once gave notice to the porter of his intention to have such analysis made, and handed him a third portion of the sample, thus treating him as the agent of Hall, under section 14 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875. Under this section, the person purchasing with the intention of submitting the article to analysis, must forthwith notify to the seller, or his agent selling the article, his intention to have it analyzed by the public analyst. Under section 3 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act Amendment Act, 1879, any medical officer of health, inspector of nuisances, etc., may procure at the place of delivery any sample of any milk in course of delivery to the purchaser or consignee in pursuance of any contract for the sale to such purchaser or consignee of such milk, and he is to submit the same to be analyzed, and the same shall be analyzed, and proceedings shall be taken, and penalties on conviction be enforced in like manner in all respects as if such officer, etc., had purchased the same from the seller or consignor under section 14 of the principal Act,” -i. e., that of 1875. The summons was dismissed by the magistrate, who assumed that the steps made necessary by section 14 of the Act of 1875, ought to have, but had not, in fact, been taken by Mr. Rouch, who, in handing to the porter the third portion of the milk obtained by him for analysis, had not handed it to the agent of the seller. On appeal from this decision in November last, Field and Manisty, JJ., held that section 14 of the Act of 1875 is not incorporated into section 3 of the Act of 1879; that, though the analysis was to be "the same in all respects," those words did not include the proceedings in the earlier stage; and that, while giving the sample to the railway porter was not a compliance with the former section, as he was not the seller's agent, the case came within the latter section, because ་ the delivery by Hall to the dealer in London had not been completed at the time at which Mr. Rouch, a person duly authorized, had procured the sample of the milk; and this had therefore been done in the course of delivery, as required by the Act. In Toler v. Grevan, a point worth noting has been decided by one of the metropolitan police magistrates. The defendant was summoned for refusing to sell to the corporation inspector a sample of milk for analysis; it appeared that the inspector had required the milk to be taken from a particular vessel, and Mr. O'Donel, holding that the inspector had, in this respect, exceeded his powers, dismissed the case. See, also, as to refusing to give a sample for analysis, under section 4 of the Act of 1879. 14 Ir. L. T. 385; and as to the proper mode of delivering samples to the analysts, see 13 Id. 494. A couple of other recent cases in reference to analysts' certificates, not indeed of high authority, but still useful and suggestive, may here be noticed. In a note to the form of certificate given in the act of 1875, it is declared that, in the case of articles liable to decomposition, the analyst "shall specially report whether any change had taken place in the constitution of the article that would interfere with the analysis;" and on an appeal heard at the Middlesex Sessions, in Peart v. Barston (L. T., Oct. 30, 1880), where this requirement had not been complied with, the assistant judge quashed the conviction, observing that it was most important that the very special conditions for the protection of the seller should be minutely observed when legal proceedings were to be instituted. And in a case at Wolverhampton, where the analyst certified that the mixture sold was "practically" chicory (sold for coffee), not defining the quantity, the magistrate held that this was not sufficient evidence of adulteration. 14 Ir. L. T. 479. In Horder v. Meddings, decided by the English Queen's Bench Division in February last (only reported as we can find, in 14 Ir. L. T. 125), the assistant of an inspector went into a grocer's shop and asked for a quarter of a pound coffee. The shop-woman weighed out that quantity of a mixture known as "Symington's coffee," in which way the canister was labeled; and more than three-fourths of it consisted of chicory. The purchaser then stated that he wanted it for the purpose of analysis; and upon that the shopwoman, after consulting her master, labeled the wrapper with the words, "This is sold as a mixture of chicory and coffee." It was urged that the purchaser knew, before the sale was complete, what the mixture was; that he was not "prejudiced;" and that the mixture was not made by the grocer, but bought from a wholesale dealer. Lush, J., said that to allow it to be a defense that the mixture was made by, and purchased from some one else, would open a wide door for fraud, and, in effect, neutralize the act; and that the purchaser having been told, before the sale was completed, the nature of the mixture, would only afford a defense provided it was not sold with any fraudulent intention to conceal its real nature, on which there should have been a finding by the magistrate. As to the old objection of the purchaser not being prejudiced, of course it was of no avail since Hoyle v. Hitchman, 40 L. T. (N. S.) 252, (see 13 Ir. L. T. 205), and the act of 1869; see, also, Horder v. Scott, infra. But, certainly, we agree with the learned judge that, considering the large proportion of the adulterating ingredient, there was evidence on which the magistrate might have found that the intention existed, as to which he had omitted to say anything; and unquestionably the public are sorely in need of protection against the many mendacious mix ures that usurp the name of coffee. Nay, if we are to believe M. Vigue, who has recently contributed an article on the subject to a French journal, even the berry itself is simulated in clay or earth, moistened, moulded, dried and colored, or by flour and similar substances mixed with treacle. Horder v. Scott (42 L. T. N. S. 660, 49 L. J. M. C. 78), is another "coffee" case, in which a very important question was decided last May. It there appeared that H was an inspector, duly nominated and appointed under the act of 1875. T was an assistant of his, and purchased of the respondent two ounces of the "best coffee," having been directed to make the purchase by H, who was not present. T said the purchase was for analysis, and was told, after the purchase, but before he left the shop, that it was a mixture of coffee and chicory. T handed it to H, who thereupon sent it to the public analyst, who reported that this "best coffee" contained 41 per cent. of chicory. H instituted proceedings under the Act against respondent, but the magistrates dismissed the summons, on the grounds that H, having laid the information, should have personally purchased the article, or that T having purchased, should have laid the information, and have submitted the article to the analyst. But, on a case stated, it was held that it was competent for the inspector to employ a deputy to purchase articles for the purpose of analysis; that the inspector might properly institute the proceedings, and that he was the proper person to do so, though an ordinary person might have been originally the person prejudiced; while Lush, J., said he was unable to see that the respondent's saying the article was a compound of chicory and coffee, would bring her within the protection of section 8 of the act of 1875. This case was subsequently discussed in Stace v. Smith, which we find reported in the Justice of the Peace of the 26th ult. There Stace, the sanitary iuspector, went with Donovan to a shop where butter was sold, and sent Donovan in, who bought a pound of butter for a shilling. Donovan then gave it to Stace, who had remained outside, and who, within two minutes, went inside and gave notice to the shopkeeper that he had bought it for analysis, and he then and there divided it into parts, etc. Stace laid the information for selling butter not of the |