sion during a temporary interruption of intercourse with the noble secretary? Was the fortune of war so certain as to make the want of such foresight pardonable? Or was the danger voluntarily incurred, for the sake of exalting the importance of the noble secretary at the expense of his colleagues, and of the public interest? In looking at every side of this part of the transaction, he professed that he could not discover any honourable explanation of it. But the most serious question undoubtedly remained! Napoleon was an independent prince. It would be an insult to his dignity to watch his movements. It would be a violation of his independence to restrain them. They who had starved Norway into subjectionthey who sanctioned the annihilation of Poland, and the subjugation of Venice-they whose hands were scarcely withdrawn from the instrument which transferred Genoa to a hated master-were suddenly seized with the most profound reverence for the independent sovereign of Elba, and shrunk with horror from the idea of saving the peace of Europe by preventing the departure of Napoleon Bonaparte from Porto Ferrajo! He must believe that if the danger had been discussed at the congress of Vi enna, and if any paradoxical minister had made any scruples about the independence of Elba, his scruples would have been received with a general laugh. Count Nesselrode could quote the precedent of Stanislaus at Moscow. Prince Talleyrand would have been ready with that of Ferdinand at Valencay. The congress would scarcely have avowed that all their respect for independence was monopolised by Napoleon... Most assuredly Napoleon was VOL. I. a sovereign prince. The faith of Europe was irrevocably pledged to him, and could not be questioned without dishonour. He was a sovereign for dignity; he was a sovereign for security: he was a sovereign in the theory of international law, and was entitled to all the immunities as well as honour of the sovereign character. But he was not a sovereign for the practical purpose of taking a part in the system of Europe. It was true, though it might seem quaint to say, that he was a legal, but not a political sovereign. The state of the world had, in effect, reduced the right of war in all small states to little more than an honorary distinction. He was a sovereign by the convention of Fontainbleau; and he could not carry his sovereign rights to the destruction of that compact from which his sovereignty was derived. The abdication of Napoleon, his perpetual renunciation of the crown of France, were so perfectly the essence of the treaty of Paris, that it is now universally acknowledged to be dissolved by their violation. But such conditions would have been nugatory if they had not implied the right of the parties interested to watch over their observance. Every legal right carries with it the legality of the means necessary to secure its exercise. When the demolition of the works at Dunkirk was stipulated by the treaty of Utrecht, it was a violation of the independence of France to stipulate that English commissaries should reside at Dunkirk to watch over the observance of that stipulation. It might be resented by France as a curb on her ambition, as a wound to her pride, as an affront to her dignity; but it continued in force for four-score years, without ever been called an inva-. Y sion of her independence. Every precaution manifestly necessary to security, must be perfectly inoffensive to any prince against whom it is taken. The state of France was a permanent ground of apprehension; and as any nation in Europe has a right to ask an explanation of the ground of unusual armaments, and to require that they shall not seem to threaten the general tranquillity, so every power which had directly or indirectly participated in the convention of Fontainbleau, had a most indisputable right to require that Napoleon should consent to every precaution clearly necessary to the quiet of France, and consequently of Europe. His resistance would have converted apprehension into proof. It would have been a demonstration of his hostile designs, and a just ground of preventive war against him. He desired not to be misunderstood. He justified no discourtesy, no insult, no wanton inquisition, no attack under the false pretence of danger. God forbid! He justified only the vigilance and precaution necessary to prevent the sovereign authority of Elba, granted by the convention of Fontainbleau, from being turned into the means of remounting the throne of France, the renunciation of which was the grand, the essential, and almost the sole condition of the compact. These precautions were to be adopted with all the personal respect due to the faith of Europe, due also to the genius and renown of the individual, due to the dignity of the great nation whom he had governed, and due from the sovereigns of the continent to their own character, after the intimate connexion which they had formed with him. If, in the course of an ordinary war with France, our first infor mation of a French fleet having sailed from Toulon, were to be that it had effected the capture of Jamaica, a cry of just indignation would infallibly drive a supine admiralty from their seats. It would be vain for them to say, that they had no information of the design. They would be truly told, that the want of information was their crime, not their justification. They would be told, that it was their duty to have information of the first preparations of such an armament, that it was the duty of the government to demand an explanation of their object, and that if no explanation, or no satisfactory explanation was given, it was their duty to send a squadron into the Mediterranean, and watch the movements of the French squadron, with such instructions as the circumstances of the case might justify, and the safety of the West Indies might demand. Could they make any defence on such a charge? But it differed from the present in no respect, but in the unspeakable inferiority of any colony, however valuable and respectable, to the general tranquillity and safety of the civilized world. What, then, was wanting to the completeness of this case? The ministers had avowed the fact of non-vigilance. They had not proved the impossibility of taking some precautions against the danger. It was demonstrated that such precautions were necessary, and that their necessity was obvious at the time. It was demonstrated also that such precautions were perfectly lawful. To all this no direct answer was in truth attempted. But it was said, that the whole was retrospective wisdom; that we were wise after the event, and that we as little foresaw it as the ministers. To this negligence, or rather, as a natural inference from appearances otherwise so unaccountable, there must be some secret articles in the convention of Fontainbleau, which secured the world against the seeming improvidence of its public stipulations, the means of enforcing which were in the hands of the allies, and justified that security, without some such supposition incomprehensible, in which they appeared to be lulled. It was natural enough to believe that such conditions had been kept secret out of courtesy to Napoleon, or tenderness to the feelings of those great princes with whom he was connected. On the other side, credit was given to Napoleon for a moderation which would have been a miracle in Marcus Aurelius. On this side it was only believed that the English ministers would exercise common sense. And now they were told, that by this excess of confidence, they had forfeited their right of accusation. A robbery had been committed. The watchmen were asleep. The poor householders naturally complained of the negligence of their watchmen. The watchmen rather impudently answered, that the householders were asleep as well as they. The reply was final and fatal. The householders slept in perfect security, because they trusted in their watchmen being awake. retort, substituted for a defence, that, notwithstanding the apparent he should very shortly reply:That the danger was seen and spoken of throughout Europe; that it was scarcely possible to enter a society where it was not discussed, and that it had been mentioned in almost every newspaper for months. What would have been thought of those on this side of the house, if they had made such a matter the subject of parliamentary discussion? They would have been told, that they showed an unwarrantable distrust of the common sense of ministers; that they dragged into light secrets of state, which were of a most delicate nature. They would have been told, as they were told on other occasions, with less speciousness, that this was not the affair of England, but of the sovereigns of Europe assembled at Vienna, where negotiations to remedy the defects, or to enforce the observance of the convention of Fontainbleau, might be altogether defeated by the premature and tumultuary debates of a popular assembly. Could they have discussed the question without noticing the breaches of treaty to Napoleon, and would they not, in that case, justly have incurred the imputation of stimulating him to escape? On the other hand, might they not have been justly charged with stimulating the congress of Vienna to acts of violence and perfidy towards him? Did not this seem much the more probable evil? Could any man have believed that the same congress which sacrificed all the nations of Europe to their ambition, should have shrunk from the exercise of their most legitimate rights against their only formidable enemy? In truth, it was the opinion of the greatest statesmen whom he had the good fortune of knowing, Lord GRENVILLE'S Speech on the Lord Grenville said, he considered the present ruler of France as the common enemy of Europe, and had no doubt that if he had been placed in the situation the prince regent's 'ministers had been placed in, that he should have given the same advice as to the present state of war. Now that parliament was called upon for its support, he could not, after all the consideration he had been able to give the subject, bring himself to doubt that it was their duty to declare their determined resolution to support the crown to the utmost in the prosecution of the war. But if any hesitation had appeared on the part of the executive government, strong as his impression was, he should not have presumed, upon the imperfect, and perhaps erroneous information which a member of parliament was able to pick up, to advise the government to commence a war which ministers did not think expedient. He expressed some concern that the house were not called upon to consider this subject earlier, for the sake of giving more satisfaction to the country, of connteracting many unfounded opinions, and removing many groundless prejudices. But the delay had afforded him the opportunity of examining and re-examining opinions, of the correctness of which he had so much reason to doubt, when he found they differed from those of his noble friend-of whose judgment he thought so highly. To give an opinion in favour of a continuance of the calamities of war, was a painful task to any man; but it was some consolation to feel that that was the opinion of a man whose whole public life had expressed a general abhorrence of war, and who thought that in order to be just, a war must not only be necessary, but unavoidable. The first question was, whether we had just grounds to consider ourselves at war. There was a saying of Mr. Burke, recorded in those volumes in which, if so many things were often applicable, it was because they were founded on the solid principles of truth-that neither a profitable wrong, nor an unprofitable right, were fit objects to be pursued by war. Even though it were demonstrable, that the greatest possible advantage might be derived from the prosecution of war, yet if it could be shown that the war was unjust, the waging such a war was more unprofitable to its interests than any advantage could benefit them. Much had, of necessity, been said respecting the general right of interfering with the government of other nations. In the abstract principle, that no government had a right to interfere with another, every body would agree. The right was unquestionable, like the rights of men in a state of nature; and if any political state could be found in a state of nature, the rights of a state so separated from the other states would be absolute and undeniable; but it was with societies as with individuals, with governments as with men-when they stand in any relation to each other, they must be contented to see their rights regulated with a view to the mutual rights of all. The rights of others in relation to that state were as sacred as the rights of the state itself. He did not apprehend that this principle would be denied; every page in the history of every country furnished examples of its being acted upon. His noble friend had mentioned two striking instances which had lately occurred. That this principle must not be made the pretext of oppression and injustice, was true of every other ground of war; and there was no legitimate ground of war which might not by abuse and all that could be required was, to impose on both parties the duty of performing what they undertook. The intention to perform the contract must be made known to all parties, and this was the case respecting the exclusion of Bonaparte and his family from the French throne. The question, therefore, was not on the abstract be distorted to the purposes of in- | justice. There was no country which had not tried the effect of a treaty with Bonaparte-which had not experienced that in restraining his power, or diminishing his aggressions, treaties were of no avail whatever. If the house had not been of this opinion, the moment for them to have declared it was when the Prince Regent's mi-right of interference in the choice nisters signed the declaration to that effect: they should then have required ministers to have with drawn such declaration in the name of England. He cordially approved of the declaration: on that foundation France accepted the offers of the allies; and that government-which was originally a military usurpation-had it been the most legitimate in the world, would, by the misconduct of the sovereign, have forfeited its title to its king, and have produced the extreme case of the necessity of driving from the throne the person who had so abused his authority. If France possessed the right of choosing her own government, and had, after so many years of war, by which she had been so great a sufferer, made some sacrifices for the advantages of the restoration of tranquillity, her own limitation of that right could not be doubted; and so the bargain was made at Paris. This would appear the true sense of the treaties, looking on the whole business as one great transaction. In civil transactions, some competent tribunal or jurisdiction was referred to, which prescribed certain forms as necessary to be attended to for the regulation of a contract; which he who did not act upon, neglected at his peril. But in affairs between nations, there was no common authority or tribunal to refer to, or which had authority to prescribe: of a government for France, but on the right of enforcing a solemn treaty. It mattered not what was the case of right, if it was allowed, as no man denied, that France had the right to conclude lawfully the treaty. That gave to the allies the right of enforcing it. The treaty was made, and it could not be lawful for France to break it. It was founded on certain stipulations: but France breaks it, and retracts from part of the bargain; her obligation was the exclusion of Bonaparte's dynasty. The moment that violation was committed, a just cause of war ensued. Their lordships might, though it was not necessary, look back to the war of the succession, and the original principle on which that war was founded. The allies, he would not say wisely or not, did relax from the original principle of excluding the Bourbon family from the Spanish throne; but they insisted on the means for preventing the crowns of the two nations being worn by the same person. It might then have depended on the life of a weak and sickly child, whether Philip would not become the rightful heir of France. Had the contemplated event occurred, then France would have desired and attempted the annexation of Spain as a province of France; not as it was afterwards, a virtual province, but an actual added province or kingdom. If the policy, then, was |