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parte, aided by Marshals Jourdan and Victor, and neral Anson's brigade of cavalry, and supported by General Sebastiani.

"On the 26th, General Cuesta's advanced guard was attacked near Torrijos, and obliged to fall back, and the general retired with his army on that day to the left bank of the Alberché; General Sherbrooke continuing at Cassalegos, and the enemy at Santa Olalla. It was then obvious, that the enemy intended to try the result of a general action, for which the best position appeared to be in the neighbourhood of Talavera; and General Cuesta having consented to take up this position on the morning of the 27th, I ordered General Sherbrooke to retire with his corps to its station in the line, leaving General Mackenzie with a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, as an advanced post in the wood, on the right of Alberché, which covered our left flank.

General Payne, with the other four regiments of cavalry, in the plain between Talavera and the wood, withdrew in good order, but with some loss, particularly by the second battalion eighty-seventh regiment, and second battalion thirty-first regiment, in the wood. Upon this occasion, the steadiness and discipline of the forty-fifth regiment, and the fifth battalion sixtieth regiment, were conspicuous; and I had particular reason for being satisfied with the manner in which Majorgeneral Mackenzie withdrew his advanced guard.

"As the day advanced, the enemy appeared in large numbers on the right of the Alberché, and it was obvious that he was advancing to a general attack on the combined army. General Mackenzie continued to fall back gradually upon the left of the position of the combined armies, where he was placed in the second line,

in the same situation further upon the left, in the rear of the king's German legion. The enemy immediately commenced his attack in the dusk of the evening, by a cannonade upon the left of our position, and by an attempt, with his cavalry, to overthrow the Spanish infantry, posted, as I have before stated, on the right: this attempt failed entirely. Early in the night, he pushed a division along the valley, on the left of the height occupied by General Hill, of which he gained a momentary possession; but Major-general Hill attacked it instantly with the bayonet, and regained it. This attack was repeated in the night, but failed, and again at daylight in the morning of the 28th, by two divisions of infantry, and was repulsed by Major-general Hill.

"The position taken up by the troops at Talavera ex-in the rear of the guards, Colonel Donkin being placed tended rather more than two miles; the ground was open upon the left, where the British army was stationed, and it was commanded by a height, on which was, in echelon and in second line, a division of infantry, under the orders of Major-general Hill. There was a valley between this height and a range of mountains still further upon the left, which valley was not at first occupied, as it was commanded by the height before mentioned; and the range of mountains appeared too distant to have any influence upon the expected action. The right, consisting of Spanish troops, extended immediately in front of the town of Talavera down to the Tagus. This part of the ground was covered by olive-trees, and much intersected by banks and ditches. The high road leading from the bridge over the Alberché was defended by a heavy battery in front of a church, which was occupied by Spanish infantry. All the avenues to the town were defended in a similar manner; the town was occupied, and the remainder of the Spanish infantry was formed in two lines behind the banks, on the roads leading from the town and the right, to the left of our position. In the centre, between the two armies, there was a commanding spot of ground, on which we had begun to construct a redoubt, with some open ground in its rear. Brigadier-general A. Campbell was posted at this spot with a division of infantry, supported in his rear by General Cotton's brigade of dragoons, and some Spanish cavalry.

"At about two o'clock on the 27th, the enemy appeared in strength on the left bank of the Alberché, and manifested an intention to attack General Mackenzie's division. The attack was made before they could be withdrawn; but the troops, consisting of General Mackenzie's and Colonel Donkin's brigades, and Ge

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Major-general Hill has reported to me, in a particular manner, the conduct of the 29th regiment, and of the first battalion forty-eighth regiment, in these different affairs, as well as that of Major-general Tilson, and Brigadier-general Richard Stewart. We have lost. many brave officers and soldiers in the defence of this important point in our position; among others I cannot avoid to mention Brigadier-major Fordyce and Brigadier-major Gardiner; and Major-general Hill was himself wounded, though, I am happy to say, but slightly.

"The defeat of this attempt was followed about noon by a general attack with the enemy's whole force, upon the whole of that part of the position occupied by the British army. In consequence of the repeated attempts upon the height on our left by the valley, I had placed two brigades of British cavalry in that valley, supported in the rear by the Duc d'Albuquerque's division of Spanish cavalry. The enemy then placed light-infantry in the range of mountains on the left of the valley, which were opposed by a division of Spanish infantry, under Lieutenant-general De Bassecourt.

thousand men. Generals Lapisse and Morlot are killed; Generals Sebastiani and Boulet wounded. I have particularly to lament the loss of Major-general Mackenzie, who had distinguished himself on the 27th, and of Brigadier-general Langworth, of the King's German Legion, and of Brigade-major Becket, of the Guards. Your lordship will observe, that the attacks of the enemy were principally, if not entirely, directed against the British troops.

The general attack began by the march of several co- | reduced in numbers. By all accounts, their loss is ten lumns of infantry into the valley, with a view to attack the height occupied by Major-general Hill. These columns were immediately charged by the first German light dragoons, and twenty-third dragoons, under the command of General Anson, directed by Lieutenantgeneral Payne, and supported by General Fane's brigade of heavy cavalry; and although the twenty-third dragoons suffered considerable loss, the charge had the effect of preventing the execution of that part of the enemy's plan. At the same time he directed an attack "The Spanish commander in chief, his officers, and upon Brigadier-general Alexander Campbell's position troops, manifested every disposition to render us assistin the centre of the combined armies, and on the right ance, and those of them which were engaged did their of the British. This attack was most successfully re- duty; but the ground which they occupied was so impulsed by Brigadier-general Campbell, supported by portant, and its front at the same time so difficult, that the king's regiment of Spanish cavalry and two bat- I did not think it proper to urge them to make any talions of Spanish infantry; and Brigadier-general movement on the left of the enemy, while he was enCampbell took the enemy's cannon. The brigadier-gaged with us. I have reason to be satisfied with the general mentions particularly the conduct of the ninety- conduct of all the officers and troops. I am much inseventh, the second battalion seventh, and of the second debted to Lieutenant-general Sherbrooke, for the assistbattalion fifty-third regiments; and I was highly satis-ance I received from him, and for the manner in which fied with the manner in which this part of the position. was defended.

he led on his division to the charge with bayonets. To Lieutenant-general Payne and the cavalry, particularly General Anson's brigade; to Major-generals Hill and Tilson, Brigadier-generals A. Campbell, R. Stewart, and Cameron, and to the divisions and brigades of infantry under their commands respectively, particularly the twenty-ninth regiment, commanded by Colonel White; the first battalion forty-eighth, by Colonel Donnellan, afterwards, when that officer was wounded, by Major Middlemore; the second battalion seventh, by Lieutenant-colonel Sir W. Myers; the second battalion fifty-second, by Lieutenant-colonel Bingham; the ninetyseventh, by Colonel Lyon; the first battalion of de

“An attack was also made, at the same time, upon Lieutenant-general Sherbrooke's division, which was on the left and centre of the first line of the British army. This attack was most gallantly repulsed by a charge with bayonets, by the whole division; but the brigade of guards, which were, on the right, having advanced too far, they were exposed on their left flank to the fire of the enemy's battery, and of their retiring columns ; and the division was obliged to retire towards the original position, under cover of the second line of General Cotton's brigade of cavalry, which I had moved from the centre, and of the first battalion forty-tachments, by Lieutenant-colonel Bunbury; and the eighth regiment. I had moved this regiment from its - original position on the heights, as soon as I observed the advance of the guards; and it was formed in the plain, and advanced upon the enemy, and covered the formation of Lieutenant-general Sherbrooke's division. "Shortly after the repulse of this general attack, in which, apparently, all the enemy's troops were employed, he commenced his retreat across the Alberché, which was conducted in the most regular order, and was effected during the night, leaving in our hands twenty pieces of cannon, ammunition, tumbrils, and some prisoners. Your lordship will observe, by the inclosed return, the great loss which we have sustained of valuable officers and soldiers in this long and hard-the officers of those departments respectively, and from fought action, with more than double our number: that of the enemy has been much greater. I am informed that entire brigades of infantry have been destroyed; and, indeed, the battalions that retreated were much

second battalion thirty-first, by Major Watson; and of the forty-fifth, by Lieutenant-colonel Guard; and fifth battalion sixtieth, commanded by Major Davy, on the 27th. The advance of the brigade of guards was most gallantly conducted by Brigadier-general Campbell; and, when necessary, that brigade retired, and formed again in the best order. The artillery, under Brigadiergeneral Howorth, was also throughout these days of the greatest service; and I have every reason to be satisfied with the assistance I received from the chief engineer, Lieutenant-colonel Fletcher, the adjutantgeneral, Brigadier-general the Honourable C. Stewart, and the quarter-master-general, Colonel Murray, and

Colonel Bathurst and the officers of my personal staff.
I also received much assistance from Colonel O'Lawler,
of the Spanish service, and from Brigadier-general
Whittingham, who was wounded when bringing up the

two Spanish battalions to the assistance of Brigadier- that Sir R. Wilson should be sent there with his corps. general Campbell. I send this by Captain Lord Fitzroy Somerset, who will give your lordship any further information, and whom I beg to recommend.

"A. WELLESLEY."

Immediately after the battle of Talavera, our hero was declared generalissimo of the Spanish armies ;-a circumstance which, it was expected, would produce more unity of design in the Spanish proceedings, both civil and military.

Sir Robert was on that day at Talavera, but his corps
was in the mountains towards Escalona; and as he had
already made himself very useful in that quarter, and
had been near Madrid, with which city he had had a
communication, which I was desirous of keeping up, I
proposed that a Spanish corps should be sent to Banos
without loss of time. I could not prevail with General
Cuesta, although he certainly admitted the necessity of
a reinforcement when he proposed that Sir Robert Wil-
son should be sent to Banos; and he was equally sen-
sible, with myself, of the benefit to be derived to the
cause from sending Sir Robert back to Escalona.
"At this time we had no further intelligence of the

Although the battle of Talavera was so honourable to the victors, its results did not immediately prove beneficial to the Spanish cause; for Sir Arthur Wellesley was shortly after obliged to fall back, and to take a de-enemy's advance, than that the rations were ordered; fensive position at Deleytosa, on the Tagus; as will appear from the following despatch:

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"I apprised your lordship, on the 1st instant, of the advance of a French corps towards the Puerto de Banos, and of the probable embarrassments to the operations of the army which its arrival at Placentia would occasion; and these embarrassments having since existed to a degree so considerable as to oblige us to fall back, and to take up a defensive position on the Tagus, I am induced to trouble you more at length with an account of what has passed upon this subject.

and I had hopes that the enemy might be deterred from advancing by the intelligence of our successes on the 28th, and that the troops in the Puerto might make some defence; and that, under these circumstances, it was not desirable to divert Sir Robert Wilson from Escalona. On the 30th, however, I renewed my application to General Cuesta, to send there a Spanish division of sufficient strength, but without effect; and he did not detach General Bassecourt till the morning of the 2d, after we had heard that the enemy had entered Bejar, and it was obvious that the troops in the Puerto would make no defence.

"On the 2d, we received accounts that the enemy had entered Placentia in two columns. The Marquis "When I entered Spain, I had a communication with de la Reyna, whose two battalions consisted of only six General Cuesta, through Sir R. Wilson and Colonel hundred men, with only twenty rounds of ammunition Roche, respecting the occupation of the Puerto de Ba-each man, retired from the Puerto and from Placentia nos and the Puerto de Perales, the former of which, it was at last settled, should be held by a corps to be formed under the Marquis de la Reyna, to consist of two battalions from General Cuesta's army, and two from Bejar; and that the Puerto de Perales was to be taken care of by the Duke de Parque, by detachments from the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo. I doubted of the capacity of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo to make the detachment of the latter; but had so little doubt of the effectual operation of the former, that, in writing to Marshal Beresford on the 17th of July, I desired him to look to the Puerto de Perales, but that I considered Banos as secure, as appears by the extract of my letter, which I inclose.

"On the 30th, intelligence was received at Talavera that twelve thousand rations had been ordered at Fuente Duenos for the 28th, and twenty-four thousand at Los Santos for the same day, for a French corps, which it was believed was on its march towards the Puerto de Banos. General Cuesta expressed some anxiety respecting this post, and sent me a message, to propose

without firing a shot, and went to the bridge of Almaraz, which he declared that he intended to remove; the battalions of Bejar dispersed without making any resistance. The general called upon me on that day, and proposed that half of the army should march to the rear to oppose the enemy, while the other half should maintain the post at Talavera. My answer was, that, if by half the army he meant half of each army, I could only answer, that I was ready either to go or stay with the whole British army, but that I could not separate it. He then desired me to choose whether I would go or stay; and I preferred to go, from thinking that the British troops were most likely to do the business effectually, and without contest; and from being of opinion it was more important to us than to the Spanish army, to open a communication through Placentia, although very important to them. With this decision, General Cuesta appeared perfectly satisfied.

"The movements of the enemy in our front since the 1st, had induced me to be of opinion, that, despairing of forcing us at Talavera, they intended to force a pas

this corps would have amounted to twenty-five thou sand. We could extricate ourselves from this difficult situation only by great celerity of movement, to which the troops were unequal, as they had not had their allowance of provisions for several days, and by success in two battles. If unsuccessful in either, we should have been without a retreat; and if Soult and Ney, avoiding an action, had retired before us, and had waited the arrival of Victor, we should have been exposed to a general action with fifty thousand men, equally without

sage by Escalona, and thus to open a communication | men to watch Vanegas, and allowing him from ten to with the French corps coming from Placentia. This eleven thousand killed and wounded in the late action, suspicion was confirmed on the night of the 2d, by letters received from Sir Robert Wilson, of which I enclose copies; and, before I quitted Talavera, on the 3d, I waited on General O'Donoghue, and conversed with him upon the whole of our situation; and pointed out to him the possibility, that, in the case of the enemy coming through Escalona, General Cuesta might find himself obliged to quit Talavera before I should be able to return to him; and I urged him to collect all the carts that could be got, in order to remove our hospital. At his desire, I put the purport of this conversation in writing, and sent him a letter to be laid before General Cuesta, of which I inclose a copy.

a retreat.

"We had reason to expect that, as the Marquis de la Reyna could not remove the boats from the river Almaraz, Soult would have destroyed them. Our only retreat was, therefore, by the bridge Arco Bispo; and, if we had moved on, the enemy, by breaking that bridge while the army should be engaged with Soult and Ney, would have deprived us of that only resource.

thereby left open the road to the bridge of Arco Bispo from Talavera by Calera; and, after considering the whole subject maturely, I was of opinion that it was advisable to retire to the bridge of Arco Bispo, and to take up a defensive position upon the Tagus.

"The British army marched, on the 3d, to Oropesa, General Bassecourt's Spanish corps being at Centinello, where I desired that it might halt the next day, in order that I might be nearer it. About five o'clock in the evening, I heard that the French had arrived from Placentia, at Navalmoral, whereby they were between-We could not take a position at Oropesa, as we us and the bridge of Almaraz. About an hour afterwards, I received from General O'Donoghue the letter and its inclosures, of which I inclose copies, announcing to me the intention of General Cuesta to march from Talavera in the evening, and to leave there my hospital, excepting such men as could be moved by the means he already had, on the ground of his apprehensions, that I was not strong enough for the corps coming from Placentia, and that the enemy was moving upon his flank, and had returned to Santa Olalla in his front. I acknowledge that these reasons did not appear to me sufficient for giving up so important a post as Talavera, for exposing the combined armies to an attack in front and rear at the same time, and for abandoning my hospital; and I wrote the letter of which I inclose a copy. This unfortunately reached the general after he had marched, and he arrived at Oropesa shortly after daylight on the morning of the 4th.

"The question, what was to be done, was now to be considered. The enemy, stated to be thirty thousand strong, but at all events consisting of the corps of Soult and Ney, either united or not very distant from each other, and supposed by Marshal Jourdan and Joseph Buonaparte, to be sufficiently strong to attack the British army, stated to be twenty-five thousand strong, were on one side, in possession of the high road to the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, the bridge at which place we knew had been removed, although the boats still necessarily remained in the river. On the other side we had reason to expect the advance of Victor's corps to Talavera, as soon as General Cuesta's march should be known; and, after leaving twelve thousand 28.

"I was induced to adopt this last opinion, because the French have now at least fifty thousand men disposable to oppose to the combined armies, and a corps of twelve thousand to watch Vanegas; and I was likewise of opinion, that the sooner the defensive line should be taken up, the more likely were the troops to be able to defend it. Accordingly, I marched on the 4th, and crossed the Tagus by the bridge of Arco Bispo; and have continued my route to this place, in which I am well situated to defend the passage of Almaraz and the lower parts of the Tagus. General Cuesta crossed the river on the night of the 5th, and he is still at the bridge of Arco Bispo. About two thousand of the wounded have been brought away from Talavera, the remaining fifteen hundred are there; aud I doubt whether, under any circumstances, it would have been possible, or consistent with humanity, to ȧttempt to remove any more of them. From the treatment which some of the soldiers wounded on the 27th, and who fell into the hands of the enemy, experienced from them, and from the manner in which I have always treated the wounded who have fallen into my hands, I expect that these men will be well treated; and I have only to lament that a new concurrence of events, over which, from circumstances, I had and could have no control, should have placed the army in a situation to be obliged to leave any of them behind. *4 P

"ARTHUR Wellesley."

naced Oporto with twelve thousand men; and Regnier threatened Alentejo in the south, with about eighteen thousand men; whilst the remaining small divisions occupied such posts as were most convenient for procuring forage, &c.

With such overwhelming numbers, it is not sur

However unprofitable the victory of Talavera proved to the Spanish patriots, the good conduct and bravery of the army and its illustrious commander did not fail of exciting the admiration of their country. The thanks of both Houses of Parliament were voted to them; and Sir Arthur Wellesley, as a reward for his eminent services, was raised to the dignity of the peer-prising that Massena and his master should have conage, being created Viscount Wellington, on the 26th of August, 1809; and an annuity of 2000l. a-year was voted by Parliament to him and his two next heirs. Soon after the retreat of his army, our hero suffered severely from the fatigues of the campaign; but his health being re-established in October, he was, about that period, appointed by the Regency captain-general of all the forces serving in Portugal; and his army was now in excellent order, having all its provisions and stores supplied from Lisbon and Abrantes.

The unfortunate result of the battle of Oçana, in which the army of La Mancha, under the command of Lieutenant-general Areisaja, was totally defeated and dispersed, laid the south of Spain completely open to the incursions of the enemy; and it became no longer necessary or desirable, in a military point of view, to retain the British army on the borders of Estremadura. Lord Wellington, therefore, withdrew his army from Spain in the month of December; and, in the course of three weeks, the whole of his force was placed on a new and extended position along the frontiers of Portugal: his head-quarters being at the city of Vizen. The British troops passed the following six months in a state of comparative tranquillity, while the French were making the most vigorous preparations for the conquest of Portugal.

Passing over the military events which occurred in Spain during the inactivity of Lord Wellington's army, we shall proceed to the relation of those which took place in Portugal in the year 1810.

sidered the conquest of Portugal as certain; yet even this immense force was baffled by the superior skill and address of the British general, whose defensive conduct in this situation seems equally entitled to admiration with his most brilliant victories.

During their encampment between Merida and Badajoz, the British army were exposed to a dangerous disorder, in consequence of the unhealthiness of the situation: but, having regained their health on removing to the vicinity of Lisbon, they were enabled, in February, to occupy an extended line, from Santarem, on the Tagus, to Oporto, on the Douro; having been joined by the Portuguese, who were now in a good state of discipline, through the exertions of Marshal Beresford; whilst General Hill was in advance, with a considerable body of cavalry on the banks of the Guadiana, in order to check the approach of the enemy, who had appeared before Badajoz. During the operations of the French army against Ciudad Rodrigo, the British and allied troops were cantoned in five distinct bodies: one was at Celerico, consisting of about six thousand men, under General Spencer; General Hill bad eight thousand between the Tagus and Guadiana; General Cole had about ten thousand at Guarda, which was the principal post; General Picton lay with four thousand at Pinhel; and General Craufurd was stationed in advance, between Guarda and the French army.

On the 11th of June, the French invested Ciudad Rodrigo with a force of thirty thousand infantry and The command of the French army was now entrusted five thousand cavalry. On the night of the 25th, the to General Massena, and amounted to nearly one hun- batteries were opened against the city; and, after a dred and ten thousand men, who were distributed as most obstinate defence, the governor, seeing no hopes follows: General Loison, with fifteen thousand men, of relief, and his provisions and ammunition being invested Almeida; whilst the remainder of Ney's corps, nearly exhausted, surrendered by capitulation, on the about ten thousand, were at Fort de la Conception. 10th of July. The next operation of the enemy was About three miles north-west from Ciudad Rodrigo, at against the fortress of Almeida, the strongest in PortuSt. Felix, was Junot, with twenty-five thousand men; gal. The trenches were opened in the night between whilst a force, to the same amount, occupied Ciudad the 15th and 16th of August. In the night between Rodrigo and its vicinity. These three corps were within the 24th and 25th, the second parallel was opened, in two days' march of Lord Wellington's army, and part the rock, within less than one hundred and fifty fathoms of them not more than seven or eight miles distant; of the place. On the 26th, at five o'clock in the mornwhilst Massena, the commander-in-chief, was at Valde-ing, eleven batteries, mounted with sixty-five pieces of mula, a village near Ciudad Rodrigo, which, a short cannon, opened a fire on the fortress, which was retime before, had been occupied by Lord Wellington. turned by the garrison with great vigour. Towards Kellermann was in the north of Portugal, and me-eight in the evening, a bomb fell within the walls of

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