vided. These governments the Constitution did not change. They were accepted precisely as they were, and it is, therefore, to be presumed that they were such as it was the duty of the States to provide. Thus we have unmistakable evidence of what was republican in form, within the meaning of that term as employed in the Constitution. As has been seen [in the argument that has gone before], all the citizens of the States were not invested with the right of suffrage. In all, save perhaps New Jersey,. this right was only bestowed upon men and not upon all of them. Under these circumstances it is certainly now too late to contend that a government is not republican, within the meaning of this guaranty in the Constitution, because women are not made voters." 16 Precedents have established the principle that where there is a dispute in a State as to the de jure character of a particular organ of its government, as, for example, as to which of two individuals has been elected as chief executive, or which of two courts or legislatures is entitled to authority, the Federal Government will not ordinarily interfere, being governed by the principle that each state government has a tribunal for the decision of such contests, and that the General Government will consider itself bound by the decision which that tribunal renders, just as the federal courts hold themselves bound by the decisions of the state courts as to the existence and, in general, the interpretation of their respective state statutes.17 In two classes of cases, however, the Federal Government exercises the right to decide which of two contesting state officials or organs is to be recognized as the de jure authority. The first of these includes those cases in which a decision becomes necessary in order to determine a matter of direct federal concern. Thus, for example, when each of two contesting state legislatures select and send senators to Congress, it is necessary for the United States. Senate to decide which of the two electing bodies is endowed with the authority to act on that behalf for the State. So, also, as in 16 In this case was also negatived the assertion that to deny women the suffrage is to deprive them of a right guaranted to them by the Fourteenth Amendment. 17 See post, Chapter LII. the case of Dorr's Rebellion, where federal aid is needed to suppress domestic disorder, it is necessary for the President or Congress to determine which government, claiming authority, it will recognize. The second class of cases in which the Federal Government, through its Supreme Court, will assume jurisdiction where there is dispute between parties as to who is entitled to a state office, include those in which there is a question whether the state laws, as applied by the state authorities, have violated that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment which declares that no State" shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," or have violated the tenth section of Article One of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that no State shall pass a law impairing the obligation of a contract. § 82. Public Office not a Property or Contract Right. The Supreme Court of the United States has held in an unqualified manner, that as between a State and an office-holder, there is no contract right possessed by the latter either to the office or to the salary attached to it, and that, therefore, in the absence of express constitutional provision otherwise, his removal from office or the abolishment of the office itself gives to him no cause of action against the State. Thus in Butler v. Pennsylvania's after defining vested private rights of property, the court said: "The contracts designed to be protected by the tenth section of the first article of that instrument are contracts by which perfect rights, certain definite, fixed, private rights of property, are vested. These are clearly distinguishable from measures or engagements adopted or undertaken by the body politic or state government for the benefit of all, and from the necessity of the case, and according to universal understanding, to be varied or discontinued as the public shall require. The selection of officers, who are nothing more than agents for the effectuating of public purposes, is matter of public convenience or necessity, and so, too, are the periods for the appointment of such agents; but neither 18 10 How. 402; 13 L. ed. 472. the one nor the other of these arrangements can constitute any obligation to continue such agents, or to reappoint them, after the measures which brought them into being shall have been found useless, shall have been fulfilled, or shall have been abrogated as even detrimental to the well-being of the public. The promised compensation for services actually performed and accepted, during the continuance of the particular agency, may undoubtedly be claimed, both upon principle of compact and of equity; but to insist beyond this on the perpetuation of a public policy either useless or detrimental, and upon a reward for acts neither desired nor promised, would appear to be neither reconcilable with natural justice nor with common sense. The establishment of such a principle would arrest necessarily everything like progress or improvement in government; or if changes would be ventured upon, the government would have to become one great pension establishment on which to quarter a host of sinecures. It would especially be difficult, if not impracticable, in this view, ever to remodel the organic law of a State, as constitutional ordinances must be of higher order and more immutable than common legislative enactments, and there could not exist conflicting constitutional ordinances under one and the same system. It follows, then, upon principle, that, in every perfect and competent government, there must exist a general power to enact and to repeal laws; and to create, and change or discontinue, the agents designated for the preservation of the body politic, and for the safety of the individuals of the community. It is true that this power or the ex tent of its exercise may be controlled by higher organic law or the Constitution of the State, as is the case in some instances in the state Constitutions, and is exemplified in the provision of the federal Constitution relied on in this case by the plaintiffs in error, and in some other clauses of the same instrument; but where not such restriction is imposed, the power must rest in the discretion of the government alone." Again, summing up the law on this subject, the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Beckham1 say: The decisions are numerous to the 19 178 U. S. 548; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 890; 44 L. ed. 1187. effect that public offices are mere agencies or trusts, and not property as such. Nor are the salary and emoluments property secured by contract, but compensation for services actually rendered. Nor does the fact that a constitution may forbid the legislature from abolishing a public office or diminishing the salary thereof during the term of the incumbent, change its character or make it property. True, the restrictions limit the power of the legislature to deal with the office, but even such restrictions may be removed by constitutional amendment. In short, generally speaking, the nature of the relation of a public officer to the public is inconsistent either with a property or contract right." 20 § 83. Suits between Two or More Claimants to State Office. When the dispute is not one between the State and one of its officers, but between two individuals cach claiming the office and its emoluments, when, in other words, the office itself is not disturbed nor the salary changed, the question is a different one. Then, it would seem, the office has often to be treated as a piece of property of which the owner may not be deprived without due process of law even by the State itself. In Kennard v. Louisiana21 an action in the nature of quo warranto was brought against the plaintiff in error, a justice of the Supreme Court of the State, by a Mr. Morgan, and the decision of the Louisiana courts was in his favor. Thereupon Kennard took an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States upon the ground that, through her judiciary, the State had deprived him of his office without that due process of law which the Fourteenth Amendment secured to 20 It is to be observed, however, that where a State in a fiscal capacity enters into contracts with private persons for services to be rendered or materials to be furnished, it is to be regarded pro hac vice as a private person and as bound accordingly. "When a State becomes a party to a contract as in the case before us, the same rules of law are applied to her as to private persons under like circumstances. When she or her representatives are properly brought into the forum of litigation, neither she nor they can assert any right or immunity as incident to her political Sovereignty." Davis v. Gray (16 Wall. 203; 21 L. ed. 447). See also Curran v. Arkansas (15 How. 304; 14 L. ed. 705). 21 92 U. S. 480; 23 L. ed. 478. him. In its opinion the Supreme Court of the United States say: "The question before us is, not whether the courts below, having jurisdiction of the case and the parties, have followed the law, but whether the law, if followed, would have furnished Kennard the protection guaranteed by the Constitution. Irregularities and mere errors in the proceedings can only be corrected in the state courts. Our authority does not extend beyond an examination of the power of the courts below to proceed at all." And, directing its examination to this point, the court found that in fact due process of law had been provided in the trial of his right to office which he claimed. In thus assuming jurisdiction of the case, and in examining as to whether in fact due process of law had been had, it is apparent that the Supreme Court must have held that the right to the office in question was a property right within the terms of the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment which declares that no State shall deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Again, in Foster v. Kansas,22 the federal court assumed jurisdiction in a case where the Supreme Court of Kansas had ousted the plaintiff in error from office, the court in its opinion saying: "As the question of the constitutionality of the statute was directly raised by the defendant, and decided against him by the court, we have jurisdiction and the motion to dismiss must be overruled;" thus affirming the decision of the state court on the ground that the proceedings showed due process of law. In Boyd v. Nebraska23 the state supreme court had ousted Boyd from the office of governor and installed Thayer therein. On error to the federal Supreme Court, the judgment of the state Supreme Court was reversed, Thayer ousted, and Boyd reinstated as governor of the State, the ground for this action being that in the proceedings by which Boyd had been originally ousted, the state court had incorrectly decided that he was not a citizen of the United States and therefore disqualified for office. In its opinion, the court say: "As the allegation [of citizenship] sets up a right and privilege claimed under the laws of the United 22 112 U. S. 205; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 8; 28 L. ed. 696. |