stitution and in almost all if not in all of the state constitutions that all laws shall be uniform, make it necessary that the assessment of all persons and property within the class or district selected for taxation shall be according to a uniform rule. Cooley states the principle as follows: "As to all taxation apportioned upon property, there must be taxing districts and within these districts the rule of absolute uniformity must be applicable. A state tax must be apportioned through the State, a county tax through the county, a city tax through the city; while in cases of local improvements, benefiting in a special and peculiar manner some portion of the State or of a county or city, it is competent to arrange a special taxing district within which the expense shall be apportioned." 31 And again: "The rule of apportionment must be uniform throughout the taxing district, applicable to all alike, but the legislatures have no power to arrange taxing districts arbitrarily, and without reference to the great fundamental principles of taxation that the burden must be borne by those upon whom it justly rests. The Kentucky and Iowa decisions hold that, in a case where they have manifestly and unmistakably done so, the courts may interfere and restrain the imposition of municipal burdens on property which does not properly belong within the municipal taxing district at all." 32

All that the rule of uniformity requires is this, that within the classes or districts taxed the law shall operate according to a uniform rule. Thus, for example, it has been generally held that a city levying a general tax may not discriminate between different wards or sections, for all property within a taxing district must be taxed alike.33

31 Cooley, Const. Lim., 7th ed., 711.

32 Const. Lim., 7th ed., 724. The cases referred to are Morford v Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; City of Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Monr. 491; Arbegust v. Louisville, 2 Bush, 271; Swift v. Newport, 7 Bush, 37.

33 This does not hold true where, by special contract made at the time a rural district is incorporated into the city, special treatment with reference to taxation has been promised. The exemption of certain pieces of property from taxation where this exemption has been for some public purpose or in return for consideration received, does not violate this principle.

§ 272. What Constitutes Uniformity Throughout the United States?

In the Head Money Cases, speaking with reference to the requirement of the federal Constitution that all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States, the court say: "The uniformity here prescribed has reference to the various localities in which the tax is intended to operate. 'It shall be uniform throughout the United States.' Is the tax on tobacco void, because in many of the States no tobacco is raised, or manufactured? Is the tax on distilled spirits void, because a few States pay three-fourths of the revenue arising from it? The tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject is to be found. The tax in this case, which, as far as it can be called a tax, is an excise duty on the business of bringing passengers from foreign countries into this by ocean navigation, is uniform and operates precisely alike in every port of the United States where such passengers can be landed. It is said that the statute violates the rule of uniformity and the provisions of the Constitution, that no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another,' because it does not apply to passengers arriving in this country by railroad or by other inland mode of conveyance. But the law applies to all ports alike, and evidently gives no preference to one over another, but is uniform in its operation in all ports of the United States. It may be added that the evil to be remedied by this legislation has no existence on our inland borders, and immigration in that quarter needed no such regulation. Perfect uniformity and perfect equality of taxation, in all the aspects in which the human mind can view it, is a baseless. dream, as this court has said more than once. (State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575; 23 L. ed. 663.) Here there is substantial uniformity within the meaning and purpose of the Constitution."

The principles of uniformity and of reasonable classification for purposes of taxation have been especially examined by the courts with reference to inheritance tax laws.

§ 273. State Inheritance Taxes.

So-called inheritance taxes, that is to say, taxes collected from persons receiving property by inheritance, are levied in many of the civilized States of the world. In the United States they have several times been imposed by federal law, and at present (1910) they are to be, found in about thirty-five States. In many cases these taxes have been progressive, the rate being higher for larger than for smaller bequests, and collateral heirs often taxed more heavily than direct descendants. In most cases small inheritances have been wholly exempted from the operation of the tax, as have been also bequests and inheritances of real estate. In some cases state inheritance tax laws have been held questioned because containing some special obnoxious provisions, but the ground upon which they have usually been attacked has been that they have violated the requirements of equality and uniformity, because of their progressive features and because of the exemptions referred to above. In general, however, the laws have been upheld.3

34

31 The constitutionality of laws exempting small estates is asserted in State v. Clark, 30 Wash. 439; State v. Alston, 94 Tenn. 674; In re Wilmerding, 117 Cal. 281; Estate of Stanford, 126 Cal. 112; State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495; Minot v. Winthrop, 162 Mass. 113; Crocker v. Shaw, 174 Mass. 266; Gelstherpe v. Furnell, 20 Mont. 299; High v. Coyne, 93 Fed. Rep. 450; Morris' Estate, 50 S. E. Rep. 682; Union Trust Co. v. Wayne, 125 Mich. 487; Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Iowa, 290; Hickok's Estate (Vt.), 62 Atl. Rep. 724; Frothingham v. Shaw, 175 Mass. 59; Appeal of Nettleton, 56 Atl. Rep. 565; Estate of Magnes, 32 Colo. 527; Pullen v. Commissioners of Wake Co., 66 N. C. 361; Black v. State, 113 Wis. 205.

The constitutionality of a law discriminating between lineal and collateral descendants and between relatives and strangers in blood has been sustained in the following cases: State v. Alston, 94 Tenn. 674; State v. Henderson, 160 Mo. 190; State v. Clark, 30 Wash. 439; Hagerty v. State, 55 Ohio, 613; Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190; In re McPherson, 104 N. Y. 306; State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495; Minot v. Winthrop, 162 Mass. 113; Billings v. State, 189 Ill. 472; State v. Dalrymple, 70 Md. 294; Tyson v. State, 28 Md. 577; Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Gratt. 422; Gelsthorpe v. Furnell, 20 Mont. 299; Wallace v. Myers, 38 Fed. Rep. 184; Union Trust Co. v. Wayne Probate Judge, 125 Mich. 487; Frothingham v. Shaw, 175 Mass. 59; Appeal of Nettleton, 56 Atl. Rep. 565; Estate of Magnes, 32 Colo. 527; Pullen v. Commissioners of Wake Co., 66 N. C. 361; Estate of Campbell, 143 Cal. 623; Thompson v. Kidder (N. H.), 65 Atl. Rep. 392.

In many cases the classifications of the state laws have been upheld as reasonable in themselves, but fundamentally the principle upon which the validity of the laws has been sustained is that an inheritance tax is not a tax upon the property inherited but upon the right to inherit; and that, inasmuch as this is a right which exists only by statute, it is one that may be regulated at the will of the legislature which creates it.35

A leading case in the federal courts as to the constitutionality of a state inheritance tax law as tested by the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, is that of Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank.36

In this case the doctrine was reaffirmed that an inheritance tax is not one on property but on the right to take property by devise or descent, and that this, being a right of legislative creation, the States may attach conditions thereunto. Ilence, it was held, that the States may, in taxing this privilege, discriminate between relatives and between relatives and strangers without violating state constitutional provisions requiring uniformity and equality of taxation, or the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibiting the denial of the equal protection of the laws. The provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court say, does not require "exact equality of taxation. It only requires that the law imposing it shall operate on all alike under the same circumstances."

37

In Billings v. Illinois the court say: "It is insisted that the classification sustained in the Magoun Case 'related solely to the graduated feature of the tax.' In the case at bar, it is said, the question is whether or not the Illinois legislature can discrim

The constitutionality of a law laying the tax according to a progressively increasing rate has been upheld in the following cases: Kochersperger v. Drake, 167 Ill. 122; Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190; State ex rel. Foot v. Bazille, 97 Minn. 11; State v. Clark, 30 Wash. 439; Estate of Magnes, 32 Colo. 527; Morris' Estate, 138 N. C. 259; State v. Vinsonhaler (Nebr.), 105 N. W. Rep. 472.

The foregoing references are from a pamphlet on inheritance tax laws issued by the United States Government (U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1908).

35 For a full discussion of the constitutionality of inheritance tax laws, see Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, decided in 1906.

30 170 U. S. 283; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; 42 L. ed. 1037.

37 188 U. S. 97; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272; 47 L. ed. 400.

inate against constituents of a certain class, and apply different rules for the taxation of its members. Life tenants constitute but a single class, and the incidents of such an estate, the source thereof, the extent, the dominion over and the quality of interest in the tenant, is the same irrespective of the ultimate vesting of the remainder. The tax is not upon the property, but is upon the person succeeding to the property. Undoubtedly, life tenants, regarded simply as persons, may be in legal contemplation the same; estates for life, regarded simply as estates with their attributes also in legal contemplation, may be said to be the same, but that is not all to be considered, nor is it determinative. We must regard the power of the state over testate and intestate dispositions of property, its power to create and limit estates, and, as resulting, its power to impose conditions upon their transfer or devolution. It is upon this power that inheritance tax laws are based, and we said, in the Magoun Case, that the power could be exercised by distinguishing between the lineal and collateral relatives of a testator. There the amount of tax depended upon him who immediately received; here the existence of the tax depends upon him who ultimately receives. That can make no difference with the power of the State. No discrimination being exercised in the creation of the class, equality is observed. Crossing the lines of the classes created by the statute, discriminations may be exhibited, but within the classes there is equality." 38

38 See also Campbell v. California, 200 U. S. 87; 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182; 50 L. ed. 382.

Mr. Judson in his valuable treatise, summing up the question of classification for taxing purposes, says: "Classification for taxation is not necessarily based upon any essential difference in the nature or condition of the various subjects. It may be based as well upon the want of adaptability to the same methods of taxation, or upon the impracticability of applying to the various subjects the same methods so as to produce uniform results, or it may be based upon just and well grounded considerations of public policy." Mr. Judson adds, however, that "while classification may thus be based on differences in the nature or condition of the subjects of taxation, or their want of adaptability to the same methods of taxation, it must rest on some other reason than that of mere ownership." On Taxation, §§ 454, 455.