the poverty of language-merely to designate our belief of a real distinction in the Godhead; and not to describe independent, conscious beings possessing separate and equal essences and perfections. Why should we be obliged so often to explain ourselves on this point? Is there any more difficulty here, or any thing more obnoxious, than when you say, "God is angry with the wicked every day?" You defend yourself in the use of such an expression, by saying, that it is only the language o. approximation, i. e. that it is intended to describe that, in the mind of the Deity, or in his actions, which corresponds in some measure, or in some respect, to anger in men,-not that he is really affected with the passion of anger. You will permit me then to add, that we speak of person in the Godhead to express that which, in some respect or other, corresponds to persons as applied to men,-i. e. some distinction; not that we attach to it the meaning of three beings, with a separate consciousness, will, omnipotence, omniscience, &c. Where then is our inconsistency in this, or the absurdity of our language, provided there is a real foundation in the Scriptures, on which may rest the fact of a distinction that we believe to exist?

I could heartily wish, indeed, that the word person never had come into the symbols of the Churches, because it has been the occasion of so much unnecessary dispute and difficulty. But since it has long been in common use, it is difficult, perhaps inexpedient, or even impossible, altogether to reject it. If it must be retained, I readily

concede that the use of it ought to be so explained and guarded, as not to lead Christians into erroneous ideas of the nature of God. Nor can I suppose

that the great body of Christians have such ideas, or understand it to mean that which you attribute to us as believing. Then, surely, it is not the best mode of convincing your opponents, to take the word in a sense so different from that in which they understand it, and proceed to charge them with absurdities consequent upon the language of their creed. It has always been a conceded point, that, in the statement of difficult subjects, or the discussion of them, terms might be used in a sense somewhat different from their ordinary import. And what can declare in a plainer manner that Trinitarians do use the word person in this way, as applied to the divine Being, than the agreement among them that God is numerically one, in essence and in attributes?

It might have been justly expected likewise, that before they were charged with sentiments which subvert the divine Unity, the meaning of the word person, in the ancient records which describe its introduction into the technical language of the Church, should have been carefully investigated. One of your rules of exegesis, to which I have with all my heart assented, demands that "every word should be modified and explained, according to the subject which is discussed, according to the PURPOSES, feelings, circumstances, and principles of the writer." Do us the justice to apply this law of interpretation to our language, and the

dispute between us about the meaning of the word person, is for ever at an end.

What then, you doubtless will ask, is that distinction in the Godhead, which the word person is meant to designate? I answer, without hesitation, that I do not know. The fact that a distinction exists, is what we aver; the definition of that distinction is what I shall by no means attempt. By what shall I, or can I define it? What simile drawn from created objects, which are necessarily derived and dependent, can illustrate the mode of existence in that Being who is underived, independent, unchangeable, infinite, eternal? I confess myself unable to advance a single step here in explaining what the distinction is. I receive the FACT that it exists, simply because I believe that the Scriptures reveal the FACT. And if the Scriptures do reveal the fact that there are three persons in the Godhead (in the sense explained); that there is a distinction which affords ground for the appellations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghostwhich lays the foundation for the application of the personal pronouns, I, thou, he-which renders it proper to speak of sending and being sent, of Christ being with God, being in his bosom, and other things of the like nature; and yet that the divine nature belongs to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; then it is, like every other fact revealed, to be received simply on the credit of divine revelation.

Is there any more difficulty in understanding the fact that there is a distinction in the Godhead,

than there is in understanding that God possesses an underived existence? With what shall we compare such existence? All other beings are derived; and, of course, there is no object in the universe with whose existence it can be compared. To define it, then, is beyond our reach. We can approximate towards a conception of it, merely by negatives. We deny that the divine existence has any author or cause; and when we have done this, we have not defined it, but simply said that a certain thing does not belong to it. Here we must rest. The boundaries of human knowledge can never be extended beyond this.

The distinction in the Godhead which I have now mentioned, I ought to say here, we do not, and cannot consider as a mere subject of speculation, which has little or no concern with ardent piety, or the best hopes of the Christian. We believe that some of the most interesting and endearing exhibitions of the divine character, are founded upon it and connected with it; and that corresponding duties are urged upon us, and peculiar hopes excited, and consolations administered by it.

In regard to this distinction, we say, It is not a mere distinction of attributes, of relation to us, of modes of action, or of relation between attributes and substance or essence, so far as they are known to us. We believe the Scriptures justify us in these negations. But here we leave the subject. We undertake (at least the Trinitarians of our country, with whom I am acquainted, under

take) not at all to describe affirmatively the distinction in the Godhead. When you will give me an affirmative description of underived existence, I may safely engage to furnish you with one of person in the Trinity. You do not reject the belief of self-existence, merely because you cannot affirmatively define it; neither do we of a distinction in the Godhead, because we cannot affirmatively define it.

I may ask, moreover, What is the eternity of God? You answer by telling me, that there never was a time when he did not exist, and never can be one when he will not exist. True; but then, what was time before the planetary system, which measures it, had an existence? And what will time be when these heavens and this earth shall be blotted out? Besides, passing over this difficulty about time, you have only given a negative description of God's eternity; you deny certain things of him, and then aver that he is eternal. Yet, because you cannot affirmatively describe eternity, you would not refuse to believe that God is eternal. Why, then, should I reject the belief of a distinction in the Godhead, because I cannot affirmatively define it?

I do not admit, therefore, that we are exposed justly to be taxed with mysticism and absurdity, when we aver there is a distinction in the Godhead, which we are utterly unable to define. I am aware, indeed, that a writer, some time since, composed and published, in. a periodical work then edited at Cambridge, a piece in which he