says (p. 597), “if the defendant, with knowl- | them as the company's receipts for the back edge of the existence of the incumbrance, premiums, and did not know, hadn't a knowingly received assessments upon the thought that they were anything else but note involved in the controversy, such con- receipts for the money paid, or constituted duct would amount to a waiver of the a contract, or any evidence of a contract, breach of warranty, whether so intended or and of a contract by which Mr. Darrow was not." Here it is held that even a breach of bound to guarantee the present good health warranty may be waived by the acts of the of Higgins in very stringent terms. No warrantee. The waiver may be made either by such contract had been made between them, the conduct and acts of the party for nor intimation by Hopkins that such terms whose benefit the condition or warranty is would be required. Nothing had been said made, or by agreement express or implied. as to the health of Higgins, but upon being In the case under judgment there is proof put in possession of the facts of the case, tending to show an express agreement by which he had not known before, he thought the defendant to waive the right to avoid it would be unjust to Darrow to insist upon the policy, because of the non-payment ad a forfeiture, and agreed to waive it. This is diem of the quarterly premiums, due substantially the plaintiff's testimony. Mr. 373 22d of October, *1874, and 22d of Jan- Hopkins knew that Darrow was unwilling uary, 1875, and that the policy should to make application to have the policy reincontinue in force as if nothing had hap- stated upon the terms provided by the pol pened. Whether there had been such a icy for reinstating lapsed legacies; for he waiver was a question of fact for the jury. had sent him, before he himself was inAnd the court ought to have instructed the formed of the facts, the forms for its reinjury that if they believed from the evidence statement, which Darrow would not have that Darrow had failed to pay the quar- executed, but remitted him money to pay terly premiums ad diem on the 22d of Oc- the next premium before it was due; by tober, 1874, and the 22d of January, 1875, which he had reason to know that he did when they respectively fell due, and that not regard his policy as lapsed, and was by reason thereof he had forfeited his not willing to have it reinstated on the right to the policy, but further believed terms which he, Hopkins, proposed; and after from the evidence that the defendant had the explanation he received from Mr. Darwaived, or agreed to waive its right to the row's agent he himself was satisfied, and so forfeiture, and received the back premiums expressed himself that the company had made from the assured or Darrow, which were a mistake in cancelling the policy on its books paid on the faith of the waiver, they should as a lapsed policy for the non-payment of the find for the plaintiff. premium of July, 1874; and upon the whole case, as he then understood it, was sat375 isfied that the policy *should continue in force just as if nothing had happened, and so expressed himself to Darrow's agent, without intimating that he would still insist upon a medical examination of Higgins, as he had done before he was informed of the facts; but agreed to receive payment of the premiums, which before this he had refused to do without a medical examination, and directed the receipts to be filled up. But instead of giving such instruction, the court instructed the jury as follows: "That the printed receipts for the payment of premiums over due, delivered by the assistant secretary to the plaintiff's attorney in July, 1875, and exhibited by the plaintiff to the jury, are evidence which cannot be contradicted or varied by parol testimony, of the contract upon which the defendants agreed to reinstate the policy." It is not to be doubted that cotemporaneous parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict the terms, or the legal import of a valid written contract, unless in the case of fraud, accident or mistake. Towner v. Lucas' ex'or, 13 Gratt. 705. But that is not this case. The parol evidence was introduced for no such purpose; but to prove that the defendants' agent had waived any right he had to a forfeiture, not considering that the company was entitled to it when the facts of the case were understood by him, and that it would be unjust to Darrow, who he said was not to blame, but who had acted in good faith, and agreed to receive the money which had been previously remitted to him in payment of the back premiums, 374 and that the policy should continue in force as if nothing had happened; that he would waive the lapse and reinstate the policy as it had formerly been. In a short time the receipts were prepared and handed by Mr. Hopkins to Mr. Darrow's agent, saying that now everything was all right. They were not read to the agent, and were not read by him. He received Each of the five receipts contained the clause guaranteeing the health of Higgins the receipt for the premium due in July, 1874, as well as the others--although he admitted, and now admits, that that premium had been paid in due time, and that there was no default in its payment which should cause a lapse of the policy. If the receipt with the objectional clause was given for that premium for the reason, which he assigns, that he had no printed receipts in hand which did not contain that clause, for the same reason he had to use them in the other cases. The receipts thus handed to Mr. VanCott, he handed in a bundle, which had been unopened and never examined by him, to Mr. Darrow, telling him that the whole matter had been most satisfactorily adjusted, and there were his receipts. And Mr. Darrow testifies that he received them as receipts, and never opened them or examined them until he received a receipt for the next premium, in which he found the objectionable clause. The others were then examined by him and Mr. VanCott, and to their great surprise, they found the same curement of the instrument, which goes objectionable clause in each of them; and to its validity, or some breach of confidence Mr. Hopkins was informed that they never in using a paper delivered for one purpose made any such contract, and would not be and fraudulently perverting it to another. bound by it. In such cases the oral evidence tends to prove independent facts which, if established, avoid the effect of the written agreement by facts dehors the instrument, but do not tend to The doctrine thus contradict or vary it." clearly enunciated by that able jurist, covers this case. It could not be more appropriate if it had been written expressly for it. In The Southern Mutual Ins. Co. v. Yates, supra, there was no fraud, or imputation of fraud, or of any breach of confidence in using a paper delivered for one purpose and fraudulently using it for another." Now, the question is, Did Mr. Darrow ever make such a contract? Do the receipts evidence any contract made by him? He never signed them. The only ground upon which it could be claimed to be his contract, is, that the receipt was delivered to his 376 agent, and his receiving *it would imply that he approved of it. But how could this implication be made, if it was delivered to him merely as a receipt for the money he had paid, and he never read it, nor was it read to him; and he was not told that it contained in addition to the receipt, a clause evidencing a contract, and when he knew he had made no contract and no contract had been proposed; but what had previously passed between him and the company's agent was calculated to impress on his mind that they were merely receipts, and nothing had passed that would suggest to his mind that the papers handed to him as receipts might contain a clause evidencing a contract between the defendant and his principal? Upon the whole, the court is of opinion to reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and to remand the cause for further proceedings to be had therein in conformity with this opinion. Staples, J. I do not concur with Judge Anderson in the opinion that the policy was not forfeited by the failure to pay the preI think the judge of the circuit miums. court did not err in his instruction upon this point. In my opinion there was no 378 sufficient evidence in the case to *justify even the submission of the question to the jury whether the policy was or was not forfeited. If this evidence is to be believed (there is conflicting evidence, and it was a question for the jury, and the court does not intend to intimate an opinion on that point,) it I do concur, however, in that portion of would be a gross fraud upon Darrow to set up these receipts as evidence of a contract the opinion relating to the waiver of the between him and the defendant. And the forfeiture. If the plaintiff's version of the authorities uniformly hold that parol evi- transaction be correct, and there was an dence is not inadmissible to contradict the unconditional waiver of the forfeiture upon terms of a written contract, where there is sufficient consideration and under the cirfraud. It is only inadmissible to contradictcumstances described, it was a fraud upon or vary the terms of a valid contract. But in this case it is not offered to contradict or vary the terms of the written contract of the party who offers it, but to show by independent facts, dehors the instrument, that it is not his contract. Insurance Company v. Mahone, 21 Wall. U. S. R. 152, is a case in point, and fully supports this position. Justice Strong, speaking for the whole court, says: "The testimony was admitted, not to contradict the written warranty, but to show that it was not the warranty of Dillard, though signed by him." There the instrument was signed by the party; here it was not. This case is stronger than that in Mr. favor of the admission of parol testi377 mony. Insurance Company v. *Wilkinson, 13 Wall. U. S. R. 222, is also a strong case in point. the plaintiff to insert in the receipts a con- Burks, J., concurred in the results of the opinion of Anderson, J. Christian, J., dissented. The court having maturely considered the record in this cause, is of opinion, for reasons stated in writing and filed with the record, that the circuit court erred in excluding from the jury all parol evidence Towner v. Lucas' ex'or, supra, does not tending to prove a waiver by the defendant militate against the admissibility of the of a forfeiture by Darrow, the assignee, of parol evidence in this case, but is authority the policy, and in its instruction to the jury that such testimony was inadmissible. It is for it. Allen, J., says, p. 715: "I can find therefore ordered that the judgment of the no case which determines that oral cotem- circuit court be reversed and annulled, and poraneous evidence is admissible to contra- that the defendant pay to the plaintiff his dict the terms of a written agreement, or substantially vary the legal import thereof, costs expended in the prosecution of his And the cause is remanded provided the instrument was a valid instru- appeal here. ment and the party designed to execute it in its existing form. The fraud which will let in such proof must be fraud in the pro for further proceedings to be had therein LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE. (See note on Fire and Marine Insurance, Mutual etc., Co. v. Holt, 29 Gratt. 612.) A. The Contract. I. Life Insurance. 1. Definition and Nature. 2. Insurable Interest. (1) In General. (2) Parent in Life of Child. (3) Building Association in Life of Member. (5) Where Not Necessary. (6) When Insurable Interest Must Exist. 3. Application. (1) Where Made Part of Policy. a. In General. b. Under Statutory Enactment. 4. Declaration. (1) Statutory Form. (2) What Must Be Averred. (4) Amendment. 5. Recovery by Motion. (1) Removal of Cause. A. THE CONTRACT. 1. Life Insurance. 1. Definition and Nature.-"Insurance upon life is a contract whereby the insurer, in consideration of a certain premium, either in shape of a gross sum or by annual payment, undertakes to pay to the person for whose benefit the insurance is made a certain sum of money or an annuity, on the death of the person whose life is insured. If the insurance be for the (2) Where Policy Contains Incontestable Clause. whole life, he undertakes to make the payment when4. Payment of Premium. (1) In General. (2) Payment Prevented by Insurer. (5) Evidence of Payment. 5. Beneficiary. 6. Assignment. 7. Voluntary Conveyance of Policy. 8. Suicide. 9. Proof of Loss. 10. Agents. 11. Construction. 12. Evidence. (1) Fraud. (2) Assessments. (3) Parel Evidence. 13. Foreign Insurance Companies. (1) Attachment. a. In General. b. Measure of Recovery. (2) Garnishment. (3) License Tax. (4) Conflict of Laws. II. Accident Insurance. 1. Definition. 2. Voluntary Exposure. 3. bodily Infirmity. 4. Asphyxiation-Instructions. 5. Injuries Received in Discharge of Duty. 6. Rules of Construction. (1) In General. (2) Insufficient Statemeut Not Demurrable. B. Pleading and Practice. 1. Suits in Equity. 1. Clearness. 2. Multifariousness. 3. Right to Trial by Jury. 4. Dismissal of Suit. 5. Bill of Review. II. Actions on Policy. 1. Who May Sue. 2. Where Action Brought. 3. Service of Process. (1) Domestic Companies. (2) Foreign Companies. ever the death occurs; if otherwise, he undertakes to make it in case the death should happen within a named period, for which period the insurance is said to be made." 3 Min. Inst. (2d Ed.) pt. 2, p. 1189. The contract of insurance is not a contract of indemnity for a definite period, as a policy against fire, but it is a contract to pay a certain sum of money, for the consideration mentioned, upon the happening of an event, which is inevitable, and only uncertain as to the time it may transpire. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Warwick, 20 Gratt. 614, 3 Am. Rep. 218. The application for insurance is a mere proposal on the part of the applicant. When the answer signifies the acceptance of it to the proposer, and not before, the minds of the parties meet, and the contract is made. If anything remains to be done, if the agree ment is not consummated, if all the terms have not been mutually agreed upon, no contract arises between the parties. McCully v. Ins. Co., 18 W. Va. 782. 2. Insurable Interest. (1) In General.-In Roller v. Moore, 86 Va. 512, the court, quoting from the opinion of MR. Jus TICE FIELD in Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 779, says: "It is not easy to define with precision what will, in all cases, constitute an insurable interest. It may be stated generally, however, to be such an interest, arising from the relation of the party obtaining the insurance, either as creditor of, or surety for the assured, or from ties of blood or marriage to him, as will justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit from the continuance of his life. It is not necessary that the expectation of advantage or benefit should be always capable of pecuniary estimation, for a parent has an insurable interest in the life of his child, and a child in the life of his parent; a husband in the life of his wife, and a wife in the life of her husband. The natural affection in cases of this kind is considered as more powerful to protect the life of the 23sured than any other consideration. But in all cases there must be a reasonable ground, founded upon the relations of the parties to each other, either pecuniary or of blood, or affinity, to expect some benefit or advantage from the continuance of the life of the assured." See also, Tate v. Building Ass'n, 97 Va. 74, 5 L. R. A. 257; Richards on Insurance, sec. 27; May on Insurance, sec. 102; Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Luchs, 108 U. S. 498. As to the nature of a creditor's policy of life insurance and the quantum of the insurable interest, see extensive note, 5 Va. Law Reg. 801. only in respect of his interest in the life, but in respect of the premiums annually paid. And though the interest in the former may cease, the interest in The subject is learnedly dis the latter continues. cussed by JUDGE MAY, in his work on Insurance (3d Ed.) secs. 100-117." See Long v. Meriden Britannia (2) Parent in Life of Child.-It is well settled that a father has an insurable interest in the life of his child, and the child in the life of his father. Valley Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Teewalt, 79 Va. 421. (3) Building Association in Life of Mem-Co., 94 Va. 594, 3 Va. Law Reg. 287, and note, ber. A building association has no insurable interest in the life of a member who is in no wise indebted to it; and the fact that the member becomes surety for the association does not create an insurable interest. Tate v. Building Ass'n, 97 Va. 74. (4) Assignee.—An assignee of a policy having no insurable interest in the life of the insured can only retain so much of the proceeds, where the insurance was lawfully effected, as is necessary to reim and interest thereon. burse him for the premiums paid, expenses incurred, Tate v. Building Ass'n, 97 Va. 74; Roller v. Moore, 86 Va. 512; Long v. Meriden, Britannia Co., 94 Va. 594, 3 Va. Law Reg. 287, 832; Beaty v. Downing, 96 Va. 451; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 96 Va. 737. In order to constitute a valid assignment of a life policy, the assignee must have an insurable interest in the life of the insured. Roller v. Moore, 86 Va. 512. (5) Where Not Necessary. "The necessity of insurable interest in the life of another person to sustain a life policy is held, in Union Fraternal League v. Walton (Ga.), 46 L. R. A. 424, to be inapplicable where a person lawfully procures insurance upon his own life for the benefit of another person, and does so at his own expense." 5 Va. Law Reg. 868. See also, note, 25 L. R. A. 627. p. 382; Richards on Insurance, § 30; Conn. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 443. 3. Application. (1) Where Made Part of Policy. a. In General.-Where the application for a life insurance policy is made a part of the policy and its statements are deemed warranties, a false statement therein, whether material or not, will avoid the policy. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Rutherford, 95 Va. 773, 5 Va. Law Reg. 842, and note, p. 846; Home Ins. Co. v. Sibert, 96 Va. 403, 4 Va. Law Reg. 494. A breach of the warranty contained in the appli cation, that no proposal or application to insure the life of the applicant had ever been made to any company or agent upon which the insured had been rejected, or upon which a policy had not been issued Nat. Life and received by him, avoids the policy. Ass'n v. Hopkins, 97 Va. 167. If insurance be effected upon the life of a debtor for the benefit of his creditor, and misrepresentations of material facts inducing the contract be made by the debtor, the policy will be vitiated, although the beneficiary was ignorant of such misrepresentations. Burruss v. Ins. Co., 96 Va. 543. Section 3252 of the Code of Virginia, as to the size of type in which the conditions and restrictive provisions shall be printed, applies alike to the application and the policy, where the application is expressly made a part of the contract of insurance. Burruss v. Ins. Co., 96 Va. 543. If by the contract and policy the applicant warrants his answers to be true in all respects, then this removes their materiality from the consideration of the jury or of the court; and if the answers are any of them untrue, though they be such as the court or jury might believe could not have prejudiced the defendant or in any degree influenced him in entering into the contract or issuing the policy, yet the insured, or person for whose benefit the policy was taken, cannot recover upon it. Schwarzbach V. Valley Protective Union, 25 W. Va. 622. (6) When the Insurable Interest Must Exist. In fire and marine insurance the insurable interest must exist both at the commencement of the risk and when the loss occurs; but in life insurance it may exist when the policy was taken out or at any time thereafter. Hence, a creditor holding a policy taken out by himself on the life of his debtor would be entitled to recover the amount of the policy, even though the debt should be paid in the meanwhile. Any other rule would practically destroy the value of life insurance as security for debts. "This strik ing difference," says the editor, in 3 Va. Law Reg. 833, "between the interest which is required to sup port a contract of life insurance and that required in contracts of fire and marine insurance, grows out of the fact that the latter are contracts of indemnity, pure and simple. The loss may happen or it may not. A contract of life insurance on the other hand is not a mere contract of indemnity. In contracts of fire and marine insurance, the insurer does not contemplate that he will be called to pay anything; for a small premium he takes the chances of having to pay a large sum or nothing; and it is only in a comparatively few cases that he makes any return to the insured for the premiums received. On the other hand, in life insurance contracts, the loss in every case is certain; it is contemplated as a certainty at the very inception of the contract, and the only or false statements in the application, or suicide of questions are, how long before it will occur, and what amount, paid by the assured annually during the life, will place in the coffers of the insurer an amount sufficient to pay the loss and leave a profit besides. And, as life insurance is conducted as a money-making enterprise, and not from motives of benevolence, it is clear that in the majority of cases the insured really pays in more than he receives. If, therefore, the contract is one of indemnity at all, the indemnity for which the insured contracts is not b. Under Statutory Enactment.—In Virginia it has been provided by Act of Assembly approved February 26th, 1900, that no answer to any interrogations made by an applicant for a policy of insurance shall bar the right to recover upon any policy issued upon such application, by reason of any warranty in said application or policy contained, unless it be clearly proved that such answer was wilfully false or fraudulently made, or that it was material. (2) Where Policy Contains Incontestable Clause.-It seems that where the policy contains the incontestable clause, the company cannot set up fraud the insured. See extensive note on the Incontestable Clause, 42 L. R. A. 247. "A provision that a life insurance policy shall be incontestable after one year, is held, in Clement v. New York Life Ins. Co. (Tenn.), 42 L. R. A. 247, to be neither unreasonable nor contrary to public policy, but while it is held applicable to fraud in procuring the policy, it is held inapplicable to the de fense that the plaintiffs had procured the issue of the policy and its transfer to them as a speculation, and that it was therefore a gambling or wagering contract." 4 Va. Law Reg. 777. 4. Payment of Premium. (4) Extension of Time.-A letter from an insurance company, in reply to a request from the assured, agreeing to grant an extension of time of payment of the premium on a policy upon the execu tension note enclosed in the letter, is not of itself a completed contract binding the company to grant the extension without the execution and return of the note. Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Ragsdale, 95 Va. 579. (1) In General.-Payment of the premium is of tion and return, before the policy lapsed, of an exthe essence of the contract of insurance. Punctuality in such payment is essential. A failure to pay within the specified time will avoid the policy, unless the company has waived such payment or the delay is due to some omission on its part. Richards on Insurance (2d Ed) p. 205; So. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 33 Gratt. 743; Easley v. Ins. Co., 91 Va. 161. The payment of the first premium is a condition precedent to the liability of an insurance company upon a policy. Oliver v. Ins. Co., 97 Va. 134, 5 L. R. A. 260. A provision avoiding a policy unless the premium is actually paid is waived by the delivery of the policy without requiring prepayment of the premium. Eagan v. Ins. Co., 10 W. Va. 583. Where the company charges the premium personally to the agent, who gives credit to the insured, it amounts to a payment of the premium. Wytheville Ins. Co. v. Teiger, 90 (5) Evidence of Payment.-The possession of a policy of insurance is sufficient evidence of the pay ment of the premium thereon, on a demurrer to the evidence by the insurance company. Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Chambers, 93 Va. 138. 5. Beneficiary.-Where the insured took out a policy "for the benefit of his wife and their children" and had one child by his first wife and five children by his last wife, the child by the first, as well as the children by the last wife, is entitled to share the proceeds of the policy. Stigler v. Stigler, 77 Va. 163. Where the insured took out a policy for his wife, and in case she died before him, then to her children, Va. 277. In Croft v. Ins. Co., 40 W. Va. 508, 21 and his wife did die before him, the child's rights S. E. Rep. 854, where credit had been given in an in the policy, being derived from the company under oral contract for insurance, the court says: "Insurthe policy and not through her mother, vested imClemmitt ance can be sold on credit as well as anything else.mediately upon the death of her mother. v. Ins. Co., 76 Va. 355. The agent can give credit. Eagan v. Ins. Co., 10 W. Va. 583, 588; Wood on Insurance, sec. 28; May on Insurance, sec. 360 d; Ins. Co. v. Colt, 20 Wall. 560; Long v. Ins. Co., 137 Pa. St. 335, 21 Am. St. Rep. 883, note. Prepayment is not necessary to the conclusion of an oral contract. Wood on Insurance, secs. 22 a, 43 b." Where a policy provides that if a note given for the premium be not paid at maturity, such nonpayment shall terminate the insurance and the note shall be considered the premium for the risk thus terminated the policy is forfeited for nonpayment of the note when due. Muhleman v. Ins. Co., 6 W. Va. 508. The assistant secretary of a life insurance company has authority to waive the forfeiture of a policy for the failure to pay the premium on the day it was due, and to reinstate the policy. Piedmont, etc., Life Ins. Co. v. McLean, 31 Gratt. 517. 6. Assignment.-The insured, intending to a sign a policy on his life to a third party as a gift, executed an assignment thereof in duplicate and delivered one copy to the insurance company for its protection, and not as agent of the assignee. He failed, however, either to deliver the policy or the other copy of the assignment to the assignee. Held, that the assignment was incomplete and could not be enforced in law or equity. Spooner v. Hilbish, 92 Va. 333. An endorsement on a life insurance policy by the beneficiary therein which is testamentary in its character, but which has not been, and cannot be. admitted to probate, is not admissible in evidence to show title in the legatee named in said endorsement, and a payment of the policy by the insurer to such beneficiary is wrongful. Nor, in an action on the (2) Payment Prevented by Insurer.-policy, is evidence relevant which merely tends to Where the insurance company wrongfully determines the contract of insurance by refusing to receive a premium when it is due, and lapses the policy issued, the insured has a right to treat the policy as at an end and recover all the premiums he has paid under it. McCall v. Ins. Co., 9 W. Va. 237. (3) Payment Prevented by War.-Where the performance of the condition in a policy as to the payment of premiums is prevented by the existence of war, the contract of insurance is suspended, not abrogated thereby, and such nonpayment, where the insured was ready and willing to pay, does not relieve the company from liability under the policy. Man hattan Life Ins. Co. v. Warwick, 20 Gratt. 614, 3 Am. Rep. 218; Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 24 Gratt. 497, 18 Am. Rep. 652; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 24 Gratt. 536; Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Duerson, 28 Gratt. 630; Clemmitt v. Ins. Co., 77 Va. 366, 76 Va. 355; Abell v. Ins. Co., 18 W. Va. 400. Where the insured is prevented from paying the premiums on a life policy by reason of the existence of war, and the company annuls the contract on account of such nonpayment, the insured is entitled to have refunded the premiums paid, less enough to compensate the company for the actual cost of such insurance. Abell v. Ins. Co., 18 W. Va. 400. show that the endorsement was made in the presence of witnesses, at the special instance and request of the beneficiary, and that she made her mark as a sig nature thereto. A will must be proved before a probate court in a proceeding for that purpose. Grand Fountain U. O. T. R. v. Wilson, 96 Va. 594, 4 L. R. A. 839. 7. Voluntary Conveyance of Policy.Where one takes out a policy payable to his wife and children, and thus, to the extent of the premiums paid, decreases his own estate, his then existing creditors have a right to subject the proceeds of the policy upon his death to the extent of such premiums paid. regardless of whether the premiums paid were fraudulent or not, because it was a voluntary conveyance and void under Va. Code 1873, ch. 114, § 2. But it seems that only the premiums for five years can be reached under the statute. Stigler v. Stigler, 77 Va. 163. 8. Suicide. Where a policy of life insurance contains no clause prohibiting suicide, the suicide of the insured when insane, is no breach of the implied condition upon which the policy is issued. But if the insured, under such a policy, deliberately takes his own life, when sane, such act is a breach of implied conditions, and exonerates the insurer from liability. If, under such policy, the death is caused by the vol |