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JUDICIAL SALES.

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3. At the February term, 1857, of the court, a judgment was recovered against S and H as his surety, on a forthcoming bond, and it was docketed on the 1st of April, 1857. An execution was issued on this judgment, and it was paid by H. On the 8th of October, 1856, S, by written agreement under seal, sold to E a house and lot, and delivered possession, and on the 18th of the same month S conveyed the same to E. This deed was acknowledged on the same day, H being one of the justices who took the acknowledgment; but it was not presented in the clerk's office for record until March 9th, 1857. Upon a bill by H, against E and S, to be substituted to the lien of the judgment against SHELD:

1. His entitled to be substituted to the lien of the judgment.

Eidson v. Huff & al.,

338 2. The judgment having been docketed within twelve months from the date of its being rendered, and the deed not having been recorded within sixty days from its acknow edgment, the judgment is a lien upon the house and lot as against the deed. Idem, 338 3. Notice of a deed or written agreement for the sale of land does not affect a cred itor of the grantor. Idem, 338 4. It is error to enter final judgment, in the case of a judgment by default, in less than thirty days from the service of the process. Dillard v. Thornton,

392

5. How and when such final judgment upon a judgment by default may be corrected. See Practice at Common Law, No. 4, and Idem, 392 *6. When a judgment is or is not conclusive. See estoppel, No. 1, 2, and Chrisman's adm'x v. Harman & al.,

875

494 7. A judgment in the name of the Commonwealth, for W, treasurer of C county, founded on a notice in the name of the Commonwealth proceeding by W, late treasurer of C, against F, the collector of township M, and his sureties, upon his official bond, is a judgment in favor of the Commonwealth. Commonwealth by, &c, v. Ford &

als.,

1. The court of appeals having reversed a decree of the court below for the sale of land, and another confirming the sale and distributing the proceeds, in the absence of the owners of one moiety of the land, and having sent the case back, that they may be made parties and have an opportunity to defend their interests; though the decree is in other respects confirmed, these absent owners, when made parties, have the right to except to the sale and its confirmation; and are not prec'uded by the affirmation of the decree in other respects than those on which it was reversed.

Crockett v. Sexton & als.,

46

2. A commissioner appointed to sell land, makes a report of his sale in 1863, and whilst he states the amount for which the land sold, he does not say anything of the kind of money for which it was sold. Some of the owners of the land not having been parties in the cause wher the decrees for the sale and its confirmation were made, are afterwards made parties; and they except to the sale, if it was made for Confederate currency. The commissioner then presents a supplemental report, stating that the land was sold for good money, and the report is not excepted to, but is received and acted on by the court. It cannot be objected to in the appelIdem, 46

late court.

3. A commissioner for the sale of land is required to make report of his proceedings. If his report be incomplete, insufficient, or in any way imperfect, he may be required to make a further report; and so, if after he has made his report, and it has been received and accepted, at any time before final action upon it, he discovers any material mistake, or omission, or ambiguity in it, he may, by leave of the court, and it would be his duty, to file an amended, additional or supplemental report, correcting the mistake, supplying the omission, or explaining the ambiguity. Idem, 46

4. In such a case the report may be excepted to. But in all cases where exceptions are necessary, they shou'd specify with reasonable certainty the particular grounds of objection, so as to enable the opposite party to see clearly what he is to meet, and the court what it is to decide. Idem, 46

5. An ante war creditor refuses to receive from the purchaser of property sold under a decree in 1863 for payment of debts, Confederate currency in payment, and the purchaser obtains an order of the c urt to invest the amount in Confederate bonds. It is the purchaser's money which is invested, and he Idem, 46 must bear the loss.

6. In 1853, S and wife sold and conveyed to B land for $2,100, retaining a vendor's lien. B paid $1,500, and gave three bonds, each for $200, two of which were assigned to H and one to T. B conveyed the land to Tin trust to secure a debt of $627 to W. In May, 1858, B and T made a private sale of this land to 683 A and his wife for $2,100, payable $700 on

the 1st of August, 1858, and the balance in payments extending to 1863; and A and wife paid of the purchase money $592, which was applied to the debt of W. In 1860, H and T filed a bill against A and wife and others for specific execution of the contract, and to sell the land to pay the vendor's lien held by H and T. In May, 1860, before a decree in the cause, T, B and A and wife made a private sale of the land to R for $2.100, payable $1,000 October 1st, 1860, and three annual

payments. R paid to T $1,000, and gave his bonds to T for the balance. This 876 *sale was confirmed by the court at the

October term, 1860, and T was appointed a receiver to collect the money and pay it out to the parties entitled. But he was directed not to pay H until he filed the bonds held by him among the papers. T paid the debt of W, retained enough to pay H, and paid the balance to B. The bond of R, due in 1862, was assigned by B and T to S, who recovered a judgment upon it, and R then filed a bill against S to enjoin the judgment. The injunction was granted, and afterwards dissolved. And then R filed a bill of review, on the ground that the wives of B and A were entitled to a contingent right of dower in the land, and that H had a lien on the land. The bill of review was dismissed, and R appealed-HELD:

1. As the bonds of R were left in the hands of the receiver, to pay the debt of H. and were sufficient for that purpose, if R has paid them to T, H can have no lien on the land.

Robinson v. Shacklett,

99

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3. The land having been sold to satisfy the liens of H and T, the wife of B can have no right of dower in the lands in the hands of the purchaser R; any right she may have must be in the surplus of the purchase money, after satisfying the prior liens. Whether she has an interest in this surplus must depend upon the true construction of the statute. Code of 1849, ch. 110,3; Code of 1873, ch. 106, § 3. That is a question between the assignee S and the wife of B, in which R, the purchaser, is not concerned. But to avoid the hazard of a cortest with her, he may bring them before the court to have their respective rights settled by the court. Idem, 99 4. R allowed to amend his bill and make Mrs. B a party. And if the other suit is still pending, to make all the parties to it defendants, and the two cases may be heard together, and a final decree entered adjudicating the rights of all the parties.

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Long & als. v. Weller's ex'or &
als.,

347 8. The title to an easement on the land to which it is appurtenant is necessarily connected with the title to the land, and an objection referring to such easement must be governed by the same rules. Idem, 347

9. An objection by such a purchaser, after the sale has been confirmed, that owing to his misinformation as to the boundaries of the land, he does not get certain water privileges which he would have had if he had been correctly informed as to the said boundaries, can only be sustained on the ground of fraud or mistake; and if mistake is relied on, it must be the mistake of both parties.

Idem, 347 10. An objection of the kind should be made to the court as soon as it is discovered by the purchaser. Idem, 347

11. When a judicial sale of land is made upon a credit and the title retained as a security, upon a rule against the purchaser to show cause why the land should not be resold for his failure to pay the purchase money. before making a decree for the sale, the court should ascertain how much of the purchase money is due, and should in the decree give him a day in which to pay it; and if not paid in that time, the commissioner to sell.

Idem, 347

12. Whether the whole or only part of the land should be sold, or whether as a whole or in parcels, must be referred to the discretion of the court, and his act will not be disturbed unless plainly erroneous. Idem, 347

D became the purchaser of a tract of land in 13. At a judicial sale made in August, 1859, the county of Franklin, and gave his bonds, payable in one, two and three years. The

sale was confirmed, and the general 877 *receiver of the court was directed to collect the money-in advance-if the purchaser chose to pay it, deducting interest. D paid the first bond, and a part of the second before it was due, in his lifetime. Soon after his death D's administrator, in January and February, 1863, paid to the receiver in Confederate money the amount due upon the two last bonds, and took them in. October, 1863, the receiver reported the payment of the bonds, and his report was confirmed and the receiver directed to convey the land to D's heirs; which was done. It appearing that at the time of the payments and confirmation of the sale Confederate money was little depreciated in Frankof debts -HELD: The payments by D's adlin, and was generally received in payment ministrator were valid payments, and the bonds of D are fully discharged.

462

Dickinson's adm'r v. Helms & als., 14. A tract of land was fairly sold by commissioners, pursuant to a decree of court, to a purchaser for $27 50 per acre, subject to a contingent right of dower. The tract was assessed in 1870 at $30; and $30 per acre was the value fixed upon the land by a commis

sioner of the court, whose report had been confirmed without exception in the cause; in which valuation no allowance was made for the contingent right of dower. The owner of the land objected to a confirmation of the sale on the ground of inadequacy of price, and affidavits touching the value of the land were filed by both parties. The court below set the sale aside and ordered a resale; whereat the same party became the purchaser at the same price. In the meanwhile the assessment of the land had been reduced to $20 per acre. The owner of the land again objected to the confirmation of the sale on the same grounds as before; and the court again refused to confirm the sale, and again ordered a resale-HELD: The first sale should have been confirmed; and the decree setting it aside and all the subsequent proceedings were erroneous.

Curtis v. Thompson,

474

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1. § 106 of ch. 206 of the acts of 1874-75, 15. Quære: If inadequacy of price is alone is not repealed by the act of March 30, 1877, in relation to the sale of wine, &c, and sufficient to set aside a judicial sale. therefore the judge of the hustings court of the city of Richmond has authority to revoke a license given for keeping a bar for the sale of wine, &c.

Idem, 474 16. A purchaser at a judicial sale of land pays the purchase money to the commissioner; but the commissioner has not exected the bond required by the decree, or the bond executed by him is disapproved by the clerk. The purchaser has paid in his own wrong, and the land is liable for the purchase money received by the commissioner and misapplied, though the land has been conveyed by the commissioner to the purchasers, as the decree directed to be done when the purchase money was paid.

Lloyd v. Erwin's adm'r,

598

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1. Land is sold under a decree to satisfy

liens upon it, and a receiver is appointed and
directed to collect the purchase money and
If the pur-
pay it to the parties entitled.
chaser pays to the receiver, the parties en-
titled have no lien on the land in the hands
of the purchaser for their money.

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1. By a deed made on the 28th of July, 1821, certain land in said deed described, was granted by D to his grandson R, his executors, administrators and assigns, from and after the grantor's death, for and during his life only; and after his death the said piece of land to go to such person or persons as shall at that time answer the description of heir or heirs at law of the said R, and such person or persons shall take the said land under that description as purchasers under and by virtue of this deed, and not by inher

itance as heirs of R-Held:

1. R took but a life estate in the land; and the persons who at the time of R's death answered the description of his heirs at law took as purchasers under the deed. 443 Taylor v. Cleary & als.,

2. By the act of 1785 dispensing with the
word heirs" in the grant of an estate in
fee simple, the grant to the remaindermen
is a fee; but that act does not therefore
extend the rule in Shelly's case to the es-
tate given to R so as to enlarge it into a
fee.
Idem, 448

LIMITATIONS-STATUTes of.

1. The court cannot take judicial notice of
the military orders extending the time for a
stay of execution on judgments.

Johnston, trustee, &c. v. Wilson's
adm'r & als..

379

2. The object of the said orders was to ex-
tend ouly those provisions of the law which
related to the stay of executions and the
forced sales of property; and therefore, if
they had any validity, they did not operate
to suspend the running of the statute of lim-
itations.
Idem, 379
3. The statute of limitations, Code of 1849,
ch. 149, § 9, is a legislative declaration that
all the provisions of that chapter in regard
to the limitation of actions shall apply in
favor of the testator's debts, although there
is a devise of real estate for their payment,
unless it plainly appears that the testator

otherwise intended. The devise is not
819 of itself sufficient evidence *of the in-

tent. It must appear fron some pro-
vision or phrase independent of the devise,
which indicates the intention of the testator.
Idem,
379

4. A devise of real estate for the payment
of debts will not affect the operation of the
statute of limitations upon such debts,
whether they be barred at the testator's death
or not, unless the contrary intention on his
part plainly appears.
Idem, 379

5. When the statute is no bar to a claim
against a trustee. See Trusts and Trustees,
No. 9, and Rowe v. Bentley & als., 756

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

4. The defendant asks the court to instruct
the jury that if they shall be satisfied from
the evidence that A informed him that C. the
plaintiff, had attempted to bribe H to burn
defendant's wheat stacks, and that believing
the information to be true, he went before
O, a justice of B, and made complaint that
C did attempt to bribe H to burn his wheat,
and that said O caused C and witnesses to be
brought before him and examined into the
truth of the complaint, and decided that C
was guilty, as charged, and required her on
account thereof to enter into a bond and
recognizance for her good behavior, this was
a sufficient proof of probable cause for the
proceeding of the defendant; and the plain-
tiff cannot recover on account of said com-
plaint, or on account of the arrest and im-
prisonment of the plaintiff in pursuance
thereof, though they should find that the
complaint was subsequently dismissed by
the county court, the plaintiff discharged
and the said bond and recognizance quashed;
unless they shall be satisfied from the evi-
dence that the defendant knew the testimony
before the justice was false. The court re-
fused the instructions-HELD:

1. Quære: Whether the judgment of the
justice, though reversed, was or was not
conclusive evidence of probable cause for
the complaint of the defendant. On this
question the court was divided.

Idem, 192

2. The judgment of the justice, though
reversed, was prima facie evidence of such
probable cause.
Idem. 192

3. The court should have so modified the
instruction, and should have given it so
modified.
Idem, 192

MANDAMUS.

1. Fines collected by the sheriff of a county,
or by the sergeant of a city or town, are to
be paid by him to the treasurer of his county,
city or town, and not to the auditor of ac-
counts of the state; and therefore a manda-
mus will not lie at the suit of the sheriff or
sergeant, to compel the auditor to receive
coupons which have been paid to him in dis-
charge of a fine.

1. In an action for slander, malicious pros
ecution and false imprisonment, the plain-
tiff, in order to show the wealth and influence
of the defendant, offered in evidence certified
abstracts from the books containing the re-
turns of the assessments for taxation of the
land and personal property belonging to the
defendant in the year 1876, the year of the
trial of the cause. There being no objection
to the form of the abstracts, or that they did 880
not truly state what they purported, the evi-
dence was admissible.

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2. In such an action, what the defendant
did after making his complaint to the justice
to have the plaintiff arrested, is not evidence
in his behalf.
Idem, 192
3. The officer having returned the warrant
executed, and the plaintiff having appeared
before the justice in obedience to it, that is
a sufficient service of it, though he did not
take the plaintiff into his custody, but only
read it to her and requested her to appear.
And any instruction of the justice to the con-
stable as to not taking her into custody was
wholly immaterial.
Idem, 192

Tyler, sergeant, &c., v. Taylor, au-
ditor, &c.,

*MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS.
1. See settlements, No. 2, 3, 4, and
Herring & als. v. Wickham & wife
& als.,

MOFFETT REGISTERS.

765

628

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1. In February, 1841, S conveyed to a
rustee a tract of land, in trust to secure a
debt of $1,422 he owed to D, with power of
sale after four years. In October, 1842, S
was taken on two ca. sas., took the insolvent
debtor's oath, and conveyed to the sheriff all
Lis right, title and interest in this land. In
January, 1843, the sheriff sold the land out
and out, when D bought it for $1,500; less
than his debt. In December, 1843, S and his
wife, the sheriff, and the trustee united in a
conveyance of the land to D, and in May,
1845, D a d wife conveyed the land to P. P
died in 1873; and in 1874 S filed his bill
against the heirs of P, claiming that the
deed to P was a mortgage to secure money
which P had advanced for him to pay D's
debt, and asking to be permitted to redeem.
It appeared that before D's purchase he
agreed with S that if D bought the land for
less than his debt, S might redeem it by pay-
ing his debt in twelve months; and it was
clearly proved by parol testimony, that be-
fore the year was out S applied to P, his
brother-in-law, to advance the money to pay

the debt of D, and it was agreed that the
land should be held by P until he was repaid,
and he should have possession of the land,
except the house and some lots around it, to
keep down the interest of the debt. This
agreement was carried out. P recognized
the rights of S under this agreement until
1859, and did not dispute them until 1869,
when he denied the right of S to redeem ;
but several times afterwards he admitted S's
right in conversations with third persons,
and he offered to compromise with S, but
never could be induced to carry his agree-
ment into effect-HELD:

1. The sale by the sheriff of the land out
and out was a nullity, and D acquired no
right to it by his purchase.

Snavely v. Pickle & als.,

27

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4. It is essential to a mortgage that there
should be a debt to be secured. And the
agreement in this case that P should ad-
vance for S to D the amount of his debt
and interest, and the actual payment of the

debt and made S the debtor of P for the
Idem,
amount so advanced.
27

5. For the circumstances which will be
looked to to determine whether a mortgage
or conditional sale is intended, see the
opinion of Burks, J.
Idem, 27

6. The presumption from lapse of time
that will bar the right to enforce a mort-
gage, when the mortgagor is in possession,
or will bar the right to redeem where the
mortgagee is in possession, is a mere pre-
sumption, which may be repelled by
*any circumstances sufficient to satisfy
the mind that in the particular case it
ill-founded; and in this case the cir-
cumstances repel the presumption.

881

is

Idem, 27

7. An account should be settled; S to be
charged with the amount paid for him by
P to D, and P charged with rents and any
timber cut by him, to be credited at the
end of each year, first upon the interest,
and if more than that, then upon the prin-
cipal of the debt.
Idem, 27

8. The administrator of P is a necessary
party in the suit, and plaintiff must make
him a defendant before any further pro-
ceedings in the court below. Idem, 27

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

1. The common and select councils of the
city of N having granted leave to C, who was
him to extend the steps of said building out
then erecting a building on a lot owned by
upon the public street, afterwards ordered
the removal of said steps. Upon a bill filed
by C to enjoin such removal-HELD:

1. Streets in a city or town, though gen-
erally subjected to the supervision and
control of the municipality, are public
highways, the use whereof is for the pub-
lic at large.

Norfolk City v. Chamberlaine.

534

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MUTUAL ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF
VIRGINIA.

1. M leases to F a lot in Norfolk for ten

same by P under the agreement, created a 'vears, renewable every ten years until M

VR 29 Gratt-41

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