Whidden, H. D. Foss & Co. v. (Mass.) White v. Hershkovitz (Mass.)'

White v. Ottawa (Ill.).

Wildeman & Co., Puntenney v. (Ill.)
Willard v. Stone (Mass.)

Williams v. Hume (Ind. App.)
Williams v. State (Ind.).

Wilson, Loyal Protective Ins. Co. of Massachusetts v. (Ind.)

Wilson, Oakland Coal Co. v. (Ind.)
Wilson v. Wilson (Ind. App.)..

Wordell & Maguire Co., Rankin v. (Mass.) 609 679 Worst, Samuels v. (III.)

228

rior court, which court, upon hearing, approved the master's report, ordered foreclosure and sale of the premises described in the mortgage, and ordered that upon the payment of the $620, which had theretofore been tendered to appellant, the deed to appellant be removed as a cloud on the title. From the entry of this decree, appellant has perfected an appeal to this court.

[1, 2] It is the duty of parties bringing cases to this court for review to prepare and file complete abstracts of the record in accordance with the rules, which must be sufficiently full to enable the court to determine therefrom whether or not the errors assigned are well taken, and when this is not done the court will not explore the record to find errors to sustain the assignments of error. Gibler v. City of Mattoon, 167 Ill. 18, 47 N. E. 319; People v. Yuskauskas, 268 Ill. 328,

109 N. E. 319; Jackson v. Winans, 287 Ill. 382, 122 N. E. 611; Mantonya v. Reilly, 184 Ill. 183, 56 N. E. 425. In the present case, while the abstract shows that the cause was referred to the master in chancery to take proofs, that evidence was taken, and that the master made a report of his findings based thereon, the abstract of the master's report does not indicate what evidence was heard by him, or that the evidence abstracted was all the evidence heard by the master. While

the abstract shows that a certificate of evidence was filed in the superior court, it does not show any of the matters contained in the certificate. In this condition of the abstract, it is not our duty to explore the record, to determine whether the master's findings, upon which the court's decree was based, were supported by the evidence.

The abstract not showing any reversible error, the decree of the superior court will

be affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

(318 III. 139)

2. Corporations 121 (1) Purchaser's inability to tender back stock originally purchased held not to preclude recovery of price paid.

not comply with Securities Law, was later surWhere stock, purchased from seller who did rendered for other stock, tender of stock last purchased held, to support suit under Securities Law, § 37, to recover price paid for stock originally purchased.

3. Evidence 178 (6)-Testimony as to contents of letters received by plaintiff from defendants held properly admitted.

It was not error to permit plaintiff to testify as to contents of letters which she had received from defendants, where evidence showed that such letters had been destroyed and no attempt was made to introduce carbon copies in evidence.

on Appeal from Superior Court, Cook CounError to Appellate Court, First District, ty; Edward D. Shurtleff, Judge.

Action by Eleanor Puntenney against Wildeman & Co. and others. To review a judgment of Appellate Court, affirming a judgment for plaintiff, defendants bring certiorari. Affirmed.

William R. Brand, of Chicago, for plaintiffs in error.

Gullett, of Springfield, for defendant in Joseph H. Hinshaw, of Chicago, and Noah

error.

action against plaintiffs in error to recover STONE, J. Defendant in error brought an the sum of $975 paid to them for the purchase of certain shares of capital stock of the Harvey Crude Oil Company. At the time of the purchase the stock was what was known under the Securities Law as "Class D" securities; that company not having complied with the Securities Law by filing in the office of the secretary of state the statement or inventory required. The declaration charges that on December 5, 1919, plaintiff's in error, acting as agents and brokers of the Harvey Crude Oil Company, sold the stock to the defendant in error. It is also charged

(No. 16596.)

(Supreme Court of Illinois. June 18, 1925. Rehearing Denied Oct. 9, 1925.)

1. Appeal and error 1095-Findings in action to recover purchase price of stock sold without compliance with Securities Act held conclusive findings of fact.

In action by purchaser of stock to recover price paid under Securities Law, § 37, findings of Appellate Court that defendants had bought stock and sold it to plaintiff, placing her name on it, that check given in payment was made to one defendant and placed to defendants' account, and that defendants were acting as sellers of stock, held conclusive findings of fact, not reviewable.

acting as agents or brokers for the Harvey Oil Company, sold defendant in error 1,300 shares of stock of that company, and that the latter company had not complied with the requirements of the Securities Law; that in payment for the 1,300 shares defendant in error turned in the shares of stock of the Harvey Crude Oil Company purchased by her on December 5, 1919. The declaration alleges that plaintiff tendered to the defendants the 1,300 shares of the Harvey Oil Company stock, and is entitled to the return of the sum of $975 and the further sum of $325 attorney's fees. Upon the trial a jury was waived, and a hearing was had before the court. Judgment for plaintiff in the sum

The evidence showed that these letters had become destroyed, and a sufficient ground was thereby laid. There was no attempt to introduce carbon copies of such letters in dispute. It was not error to permit her to so testify.

"Every sale and contract of sale made in violation of any of the provisions of this act shall be void and the seller of the securities so sold and each and every solicitor, agent or broker of or for such seller, who shall have knowingly performed any act or in any way furthered such sale, shall be jointly and severally liable, upon tender to the seller or in court of the securities sold, to the purchaser for the amount paid, together with his reasonable attorney's fees in any action brought to recover such amount."

[1] The Appellate Court found that the evidence established that plaintiffs in error bought the stock and sold it to defendant in error and had it put in her name; that the check in payment for such stock was made to plaintiff in error Wildeman, and was put to the account of Wildeman & Co., and that plaintiffs in error were acting, not as the agents of the purchaser, but as the sellers of the stock of these oil companies, of which Wildeman was president and manager; and that defendant in error tendered back the stock. These were questions of fact, and are not open to review here.

[2] It is, however, contended that, because there was no tender back of the original

stock, the tender was not sufficient. The record shows that the original stock was at the request of Wildeman exchanged for stock of the Harvey Oil Company, and it is evident that the law requiring tender back of the stock was complied with. The Securities Law was passed to protect innocent purchasers from promoters of wild-cat schemes designed to fleece the unwary. such a promoter could induce his victim to surrender to him the original stock for stock

If

in another blue sky venture, and then take refuge behind the fact that the original stock, which had already been surrendered to him, could not, on suit, be tendered back, the primary purpose of the law would be thwarted.

Plaintiffs in error also complain that there was no evidence warranting the allowance of $250 attorney's fees. This allowance was made on hearing of evidence before the court, and the record amply sustains the finding.

[3] It is urged that the trial court erred in allowing defendant in error to testify concerning the contents of letters which she

The Securities Law is intended to cover fraudulent stock transactions and the sales of stock of corporations whose principal asset lies in the fluency of speech of their representatives. The situation in this case is one which the Securities Law was intended to cover. Stewart v. Brady, 300 Ill. 425, 133 N. E. 310. There is no error in the record, and the judgment will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

(318 111. 114)

PEOPLE v. SMITH. (No. 16670.)

(Supreme Court of Illinois. June 18, 1925.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 9, 1925.)

I. Indictment and information 139-Defendant's motion to quash indictment not considered, where plea of not guilty never withdrawn.

Motion to quash indictment cannot be considered, where plea of not guilty, entered before motion was made, was never withdrawn. 2. Statutes 107(3), 118(1)-Statute held not unconstitutional, as embracing more than one subject, not expressed in its title.

Statute adopted in 1921 (Laws 1921, p. 401), declaring its title to be "An act to punish persons for destroying property, or inflicting injury to persons, by means of any

bomb, dynamite or other explosive," etc., held not violative of Const. art. 4, § 13, providing that no act shall embrace more than one subject, and that it be expressed in the title.

3. Criminal law 1043 (2)-Court's ruling in admitting in evidence letters written by defendant, to establish standards of comparison, held not preserved for review.

Court's ruling admitting letters written by defendant to attorneys before offense was committed, for comparison with anonymous letter, not objected to because letters were privileged communications, held not preserved for review by objection made on a hearing to impound the letters about two weeks before trial. 4. Witnesses 201 (1)-Letters written by defendant held competent in determining whether they were written by same person who wrote anonymous letter to prosecutor.

an

5. Criminal law ~491(1)-Statute relating to proof of handwriting by comparison applies to trial of criminal cases.

Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1923, c. 51, §§ 50-52, relating to proof of handwriting by comparison, applies to trial of criminal cases.

6. Criminal law 491(1)-Statute relating to proof of handwriting by comparison construed.

Under Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1923, c. 51, §§ 50-52, writings admitted or proved to be genuine, though not properly in the files or record of the case, may be received as standards of comparison, to prove handwriting.

7. Criminal law 478 (2)-Farmer, without special study, held not qualified as handwriting expert.

Farmer, who had never seen defendant write, was unfamiliar with his writing, and had never made any study of handwriting, held not competent to express opinion as to authorship of anonymous letter, after comparison with letters admittedly written by accused.

8. Criminal law 829(1), 830-Refusal of instructions, not correctly stating the law or governed by other instructions, held not

erroneous.

Refusal of instructions, not correctly stating the law, or which were covered by other instructions given, held not erroneous. 9. Criminal law 402 (1)-Proof of contents of letter held properly excluded.

dicted by the grand jury of Coles county for feloniously, willfully, and maliciously damaging the residence occupied by Charles C. Lee and family in Charleston, Coles county, Saturday night, May 10, 1924, by means of dynamite or some explosive the name of which was to the grand jurors unknown. He was tried, convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary, and has sued out this writ of error.

Charles C. Lee is a lawyer residing in Charleston, Coles county. He had some time prior to the damage to his residence as au attorney for Joe Rogers, secured a judg ment against Smith for $6,000 for alienating Rogers' wife's affections and had collected the judgment. The night of May 10, Lee, a little girl he had adopted, and a niece, were occupying the residence. About 12:25 a. m. he and the other occupants of the house were aroused by a loud explosion, which tore away porches, cracked and broke stone, broke windows, and damaged the brick walls and plastering of the building. None of the fam

He found a hole under ily were injured. the porch floor about 22 feet deep and a hole in the sitting room wall about a foot in diameter. Altogether the house was pretty badly damaged. It was heavily shaded by trees, and there was no light at that street intersection. Lee had no idea who had exploded the bomb, and did not think it was intended for him. He said it was undoubt

10. Criminal law 629-Permitting witnesses whose names were not furnished defendant to testify not error.

Error cannot be predicated on admission of testimony of witnesses whose names had not been furnished to accused.

"Mr. C. C. Lee-There was no mistaken identity. We tried to kill your wife and girl. We watched you in the east room, where you read a book until about 9 o'clock. We still expect to get revenge. If your wife ever comes back, we will kill or cripple her and the girl, and then in a few years we will kill you, you blackhearted

In prosecution for malicious destruction of a residence designed for human occupancy, evidence held to sustain conviction.

Error to Circuit Court, Coles County; J. H. Marshall, Judge.

Clinton Smith was convicted of feloniously, willfully, and maliciously damaging a residence designed for human occupancy, and he brings error. Affirmed.

inspector, but you will see your family die just the same.

"To kill you outright would let you off to easy.

"You must pay the price."

A few days after Lee received the letter he saw defendant on a street in Charleston. Defendant called Lee, who stopped, and defendant came up, facing him. Lee testified defendant said: "I want to know if you are going to pay me my money back; if you

Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., Charles H. Fletcher, State's Atty., of Mattoon, and C. F. Mansfield, of Decatur (E. C. Craig, of Chicago, and F. H. Kelly, of Mattoon, of counsel), for the People.

FARMER, J. Clinton Smith, plaintiff in error (hereafter called defendant), was in

ness said: "That is what you were trying to do when you bombed my house, was it?" Defendant said: "Don't you accuse me of doing that or I will smash you." Witness said: "No, you won't smash me; you are the one who is going to get smashed. A man can't do what you have done, and make this kind of talk, and not get into trouble and plenty of it." Defendant said: "I will have my