(149 N.E.) in B residential district, provided a permit is issued therefor by the city council. Section 11 provides: "Any lawful use existing at the time of the adoption of this ordinance of any building or premises may be continued although such use does not conform to the provisions of this ordinance for the district in which such use is situated. The area occupied by such use may be enlarged, provided such enlargement shall not exceed an area equal to 50 per cent. of the area of the ground floor of the building in which said nonconforming use is situated or such use may be extended throughout the building provided no structural alterations are made therein. If no structural alterations are made in the building a nonconforming use of such building may be changed to any other use permitted in the same use district as that in which the use existing at the time of the adoption of this ordinance is permitted. Whenever a nonconforming use of a building or premises has been changed to a conforming use or a more restricted use, such use shall not thereafter be changed to a less restricted use. If a nonconforming use is ever discontinued, any future use of such building or premises shall conform to the provisions of this ordinance. If a building housing a nonconforming use is destroyed to an extent of two-thirds or more of its assessed value such use shall be discontinued." Certain exceptions to height and area regulations are prescribed by the twelfth and thirteenth sections, respectively. The eighteenth section constitutes the commissioner of public health and safety the enforcing officer, with authority to issue permits in conformity with the ordinance. The nineteenth section establishes the board of appeals, and provides for the holding of its meetings and the adoption of rules for its procedure. The meetings must be open to the public, and a record of them is required to be kept. Section 20 provides for appeals from the commissioner of public health and safety to the board of appeals, and confers upon that board power and authority, under conditions defined, to vary the provisions of the ordi nance. Appellants make two contentions for the reversal of the city court's decree. The first is that the Enabling Act of 1921 is void because: (a) The General Assembly has no power to declare a grocery store a nuisance per se and to restrict its location; (b) the owner of property has a constitutional right to make such use of it as he desires so long as he does not injure or threaten the safety, health, comfort, or general welfare of the public; and (c) legislation to interfere with private property rights cannot be sustained for purely æsthetic purposes. The second contention is that the Enabling Act, and the zoning ordinance passed by appellee pursuant thereto, are void because: (a) They are not uniform in their operation, are unreasonable and create a monopoly; (b) they invest city officers with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few; and (c) they deny to appellants the equal protection of the laws, and create unjust and illegal class discriminations. [1, 2] The police power may be exercised, not only in the interest of the public health, morals and safety, but also for the promotion of the general welfare. Booth v. People, 186 Ill. 43, 57 N. E. 798, 50 L. R. A. 762, 78 Am. St. Rep. 229; People v. Freeman, 242 Ill. 373, 90 N. E. 366, 17 Ann. Cas. 1098; Public Utilities Com. v. City of Quincy, 290 Ill. 360, 125 N. E. 374; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Co. v. Drainage Com'rs, 200 U. S. 561, 26 S. Ct. 341, 50 L. Ed. 596, 4 Ann. Cas. 1175; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 S. Ct. 186, 55 L. Ed. 112, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 487; Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 29 S. Ct. 567, 53 L. Ed. 923; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. Ed. 989; Opinion of Justices, 234 Mass. 597, 127 N. E. 525. The power need not be constitutionally delegated, for it is inherently necessary to the effective conduct and maintenance of government. It can neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and it is inalienable even by express grant, and all contract and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise. People v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422, 134 N. E. 815, 22 A. L. R. 835; County of Cook v. City of Chicago, 311 Ill. 234, 142 N. E. 512, 31 A. L. R. 442; Public Utilities Com. v. City of Quincy, supra; Atlantic Coast Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 34 S. Ct. 364, 58 L. Ed. 721. [3] The authority of the states to enact such laws as they deem reasonably necessary to promote the public health, morals, safety, and general welfare comprehends a wide range of judgment and discretion in determining the matters which are of sufficiently general importance to be subjected to state regulation and administration. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 S. Ct. 260, 61 L. Ed. 685, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642. Nor do the limitations of the federal Constitution deny to a state the power to establish all regulations reasonably necessary to advance and secure the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the community. People v. Robertson, supra; Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, 35 S. Ct. 678, 59 L. Ed. 1204. [4, 5] The police power, however, has constitutional limits, and any measure enacted or adopted in its exercise, to be sustained, must bear some reasonable relation to the purposes for which the power may be exercised. The Legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private rights. The legislative determination as to what is a proper exercise of the police power is not conclusive, but is subject to review by the courts. City of Chicago v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 275 Ill. 30, 113 N. E. 849, L. R. A. 1917C, 238; Koy v. City of Chicago, 263 | the suppression of disorder, the extinguishIll. 122, 104 N. E. 1104, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 67; People v. Elerding, 254 Ill. 579, 98 N. E. 982, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 893; Booth v. People, supra; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 14 S. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385. If the means employed have no real, substantial relation to public objects within the state's power, or if those means are arbitrary and unreasonable, the judiciary will disregard mere forms and interfere for the protection of rights injuriously affected by such illegal action. Booth v. People, supra; People v. Robertson, supra; Condon v. Village of Forest Park, 278 Ill. 218, 115 N. E. 825, L. R. A. 1917E, 314; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Co. v. Drainage Com'rs, supra; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 10 S. Ct. 862, 34 L. Ed. 455. [6] The constantly increasing density of our urban populations, the multiplying forms of industry, and the growing complexity of our civilization, make it necessary for the state, either directly or through some public agency by its sanction, to limit individual activities to a greater extent than formerly. With the growth and development of the state the police power necessarily develops, within reasonable bounds, to meet the changing conditions. Public Utilities Com. v. City of Quincy, supra. The power is not circumscribed by precedents arising out of past conditions, but is elastic and capable of expansion in order to keep pace with human progress. Mr. Justice Holmes well defined the nature and extent of the power in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, supra: ment of fires, and the enforcement of traffic "It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518tion of the community as a whole and a com(17 S. Ct. 864, 42 L. Ed. 260). It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare." Koy prehensive view of its needs. An arbitrary creation of districts, without regard to existing conditions or future growth and development, is not a proper exercise of the police power and is not sustainable. No gen without incurring complaints of hardship in particular instances. But the individual whose use of his property may be restricted is not the only person to be considered. The great majority, whose enjoyment of their property rights requires the imposition of restrictions upon the uses to which private property may be put, must also be taken into consideration. The exclusion of places of business from residential districts is not a declaration that such places are nuisances, or that they are to be suppressed as such, but it is a part of the general plan by which the city's territory is allotted to different uses in order to prevent, or at least to reduce, the congestion, disorder, and dangers which often inhere in unregulated municipal development. The state imposes restraints upon individ-eral zoning plan, however, can be inaugurated ual conduct. Likewise its interests justify restraints upon the uses to which private property may be devoted. By the protection of individual rights the state is not deprived of the power to protect itself or to promote the general welfare. Uses of private property detrimental to the community's welfare may be regulated or even prohibited. v. City of Chicago, supra; Booth v. People, supra. The harmless may sometimes be brought within the regulation or prohibition in order to abate or destroy the harmful. The segregation of industries, commercial pursuits, and dwellings to particular districts in a city, when exercised reasonably, may bear a rational relation to the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the community. The establishment of such districts or zones The building zone ordinance of the city may, among other things, prevent congestion of Aurora, pursuant to the requirement of of population, secure quiet residence districts, the Enabling Act (Laws of 1921, p. 180), perexpedite local transportation, and facilitate mits lawful uses of buildings at the time of (149 N.E.) the passage of the ordinance, although not in | In City of Chicago v. Rumpff, supra, the city conformity with its provisions, to continue sought to give a meat packing company the thereafter. This exception is made so that exclusive right to do slaughtering at a parthe ordinance shall not have a retroactive op- ticular location within the city and to proeration. It would be manifestly unjust to hibit others from engaging in that business. deprive the owner of property of the use to It was held that the power to pass such an orwhich it was lawfully devoted when the ordi- dinance or to make such a contract had not nance became effective. Fire limits are es- been delegated to the city, and that the orditablished within which the subsequent erec- nance or contract was unreasonable because tion of wooden buildings is prohibited, yet it created a monopoly. The court said that existing wooden buildings are permitted to the city undoubtedly had the power to desremain. King v. Davenport, 98 Ill. 305, 38 ignate the particular quarter within which Am. Rep. 89; County of Cook v. City of Chi- the business might be conducted, and to procago, supra. Limitations upon the height of hibit it in other parts of the city, in order buildings, varying according to different dis- to prevent its becoming offensive or injurious, tricts, have been sustained. Welch v. Swas- but that in doing so all persons should be ey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745, 23 L. R. A. free to engage in the business within the des(N. S.) 1160, 118 Am. St. Rep. 523, affirmed ignated area by conforming to the municiin 214 U. S. 91, 29 S. Ct. 567, 53 L. Ed. 923. pal regulations. The fact that an ordinance which prohibits the piling of lumber for storage or drying within 100 feet of a residence does not apply to one built after the lumber is piled does not render the ordinance invalid for unjust discrimination, since the difference between vacant property and property already occupied by a residence is, in view of the object of the ordinance, a reasonable classification. City of Chicago v. Ripley, 249 Ill. 466, 94 N. E. 931, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1186, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 160. [8, 9] These, among many others, are police regulations which create discriminations, and yet are of undoubted validity. To exempt buildings already devoted to a particular use from a prohibition against such use of buildings thereafter erected in a specified area is not an unlawful discrimination. Such a classification has a sound basis and is reasonable. Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 32 S. Ct. 192, 56 L. Ed. 350; Welch v. Swasey, supra; Ayer v. Commissioners on Height of Buildings, 242 Mass. 30, 136 N. E. 338; Spector v. Building Inspector of Milton, supra; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53. Even if appellants' property could be used more profitably for business than for residential purposes, that fact would be inconsequential in the broad aspects of the case. Every exercise of the police power relating to the use of land is likely to affect adversely the property rights of some individual. Uncompensated obedience to proper police regulations has been often required. Fischer v. St. Louis, 194 U. S. 361, 24 S. Ct. 673, 48 L. Ed. 1018; California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U. S. 306, 26 S. Ct. 100, 50 L. Ed. 204; Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171, 35 S. Ct. 511, 59 L. Ed. 900; Hadacheck v. City of Los Angeles, supra. To sustain their contentions that the Enabling Act and the ordinance are void, the appellants rely principally upon City of Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 Ill. 90, 92 Am. Dec. 196, Tugman v. City of Chicago, 78 Ill. 405, and People v. Kaul, 302 Ill. 317, 134 N. E. 740. [10] The board of health of the city, in Tugman v. City of Chicago, supra, adopted a regulation prohibiting the erection or operation after January 1, 1872, within certain limits, comprising practically the whole city, of any distillery, slaughter house, rendering establishment, or soap factory. Tugman erected a slaughter house within the restricted area after the date specified, and was prosecuted for a violation of the regulation. The measure was held void on two grounds: First, the board of health was without power to adopt it; and second, because it created a monopoly. In People v. Kaul, supra, it was sought by a writ of mandamus to compel certain officers of the village of Forest Park to issue a permit for the erection of a factory within an area from which factories were excluded by ordinance. No suitable site for the proposed factory was available in the village outside of the restricted area. The ordinance tended to create a monopoly, and was therefore unreasonably discriminatory. To segregate factories and places of business from residence districts under a communitywide zone plan is altogether different from the arbitrary exercises of power shown by these cases. No monopoly is fostered or created by requiring stores and factories to be located in districts allotted to them. [11] Zoning is regulation by districts and not by individual pieces of property. The classification, as a whole, must be fair, but an absolute identity of treatment of particular parcels of land is not required. The power must be reasonably exercised. The question is not whether we approve the ordinance under review, but whether we can pronounce it an unreasonable exercise of power, having no rational relation to the public health, morals, safety or general welfare. The ordinance is the result of more than seven months of study and planning, with the aid of expert advice. All of the territory of the city is included within the several districts created by the ordinance. Appellants are treated exactly as any other property owner within the same district. Nothing in the ordinance | An amended bill was filed, which was sub indicates that it operates oppressively or in- sequently amended and answered by the deequitably. Should any discrimination develop fendants. A cross-bill by the defendants folit can be removed by the administrative ac- lowed, in which they alleged that the comtion of the board of appeals, for which provi- plainant had brought another suit against sion is made both by the Enabling Act and them by which she sought the same relief the ordinance. Such action is subject to re- with respect to another parcel of real estate, view by the courts. that the suit had been determined against her, and that the adjudication in that suit was conclusive against her right to a decree in this case. An answer denying that such was the effect of the prior adjudication was interposed to the cross-bill, and replications to the answers to the bill and cross-bill were filed. After a hearing the bill was dismissed for want of equity, and the complainant The decree of the city court will be af firmed. Decree affirmed. FARMER and DUNCAN, JJ., dissent. (319 Ill. 226) DEYNZER v. CITY OF EVANSTON et al. prosecutes this appeal. (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 16, 1925.) Zoning ordinance, adopted by city of Evanston after public hearing on notice to property owners, dividing city into five use districts, held not unreasonable, unconstitutional, nor did it deprive property owners of property for public use without just compensation, nor of property without due process of law. 2. Injunction ~~7-Classification under zoning ordinance held not to warrant injunction, in view of remedy by appeal. Classification of valuable acreage under zon ing ordinance, so as to preclude its use for apartment building for which it would be much more valuable than for residence purposes, held not to warrant injunctive relief, in view of owner's remedy by appeal to municipal board of appeals, whose action is reviewable by courts. Farmer and Duncan, JJ., dissenting. The council of the city of Evanston on November 18, 1919, adopted a resolution appointing a committee for the study of the subject of zoning. On September 21, 1920, it passed an ordinance by which a zoning commission was appointed. The commission held a number of meetings and visited the entire city, studying existing conditions and considering future developments. Upon notice to the property owners, public hearings were given in various parts of the city. An expert, with experience in the preparation of comprehensive zoning plans for a number of cities throughout the country, was employed to assist the zoning commission in the study of the subject and in the formulation of the draft of an ordinance. Under his supervision a series of maps was prepared which showed, first, the uses to which the various parcels of property in the whole city were put; second, the different types of structures used for residential purposes; third, commercial and industrial uses, and the location and classification of every store or industry within the Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; city limits; fourth, the heights of buildings Oscar Hebel, Judge. by stories; fifth, the percentage of lot occupancy by each building in the city; and, sixth, all new buildings erected since 1915. The preparation and verification of these maps occupied about three months. The survey of the city showed the following divisions of property among various uses: Suit by Sarah V. Brown Deynzer against the City of Evanston and others. Decree for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Malcolm B. Sterrett, of Chicago, for ap pellant. Tenney, Harding, Sherman & Rogers, and Frank T. Murray, Corp. Counsel, all of Chicago (Horace Kent Tenney and S. Ashley Guthrie, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees. DE YOUNG, J. Sarah V. Brown Deynzer, on June 15, 1923, filed her bill of complaint in the superior court of Cook county against the city of Evanston, Harry P. Pearsons, its mayor, Frank S. Anderson, its building commissioner, and Charles W. Leggett, its chief of police, seeking to have the zoning ordinance of that city declared unconstitutional and removed as a cloud upon the title to certain real property, and for an injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance. (149 N.E.) pared and submitted to the zoning commis-, after changed, any then existing, nonconforming sion. It was considered by the commission use in such changed district may be continued at a series of conferences, changes were made or changed to a use of a similar character, in it, and a draft of the ordinance as changed provided, all other regulations governing the new use are complied with. Whenever a nonwas published. Public hearings upon the re- conforming use shall be changed to a conformvised draft followed, at which persons inter- ing use, such premises shall not thereafter be ested were heard, and further changes were changed to a nonconforming use." made in the draft. After these hearings had been concluded the proposed ordinance in its final form was submitted to the city council. It was passed by that body January 18, 1921. The first section of the zoning ordinance contains definitions of various terms used in the ordinance. The second section, in order to classify, regulate, and restrict the location of trades, industries, and buildings erected or altered for specified uses, divides the city into five "use districts," known as A residence district, B residence district, C commercial district, D industrial district, and E unrestricted district. The boundaries of these districts are shown upon a map which is made a part of the ordinance. The section concludes with the paragraph: "Except as hereinafter provided, no building shall be erected or altered, nor shall any building or premises be used for any purpose other than is permitted in the use district in which such building or premises is located." By section 9 of the ordinance the city is divided into three "height districts," known as the 35-foot height district, the 45-foot height district, and the 80-foot height district. The boundaries of these districts are also shown upon a map attached to and made a part of the ordinance. The section. provides that no building shall be erected or altered to exceed in height the limit established by the ordinance for the district in which such building is located. The tenth, eleventh, and twelfth sections, respectively, provide that no building in the 35-foot height district shall exceed 35 feet, or 21⁄2 stories and basement in height; in the 45-foot height district 45 feet, or 3 stories and basement in height; and in the 80-foot height district 80 feet, or 7 stories and basement in height. The requirements in the height districts are, by section 13, made subject to certain specific exceptions and regulations. In order to regulate and limit the intenSection 3 provides that all buildings and sity of the use of lot areas, and to regulate premises in the A residence district, except and determine the area of the yards, courts, as otherwise provided, shall be erected for and other open spaces within and surroundand used exclusively as (1) single-family ing buildings thereafter erected, the city is, dwellings; (2) churches and temples; (3) by section 14 of the ordinance, divided into schools and colleges; (4) libraries; and (5) three "area districts," known as the A area farming and truck gardening. The usual ac- district, the B area district, and the C area cessories located on the same lot are permit- district. The boundaries of these districts ted. By the fourth section all buildings and are shown upon a map which is made a part premises in the B residence district, except as of the ordinance, and the section concludes otherwise provided, shall be erected for and with the provision that no building shall be used exclusively as: (1) Any use permitted in erected, nor shall an existing building be althe A residence district; (2) tenement hous-tered, enlarged, or rebuilt, nor shall any open es; (3) hotels; (4) private clubs and fraternispaces surrounding any building be ty houses; (5) boarding and lodging hous-croached upon or reduced in any manner, exes; (6) institutions of an educational, phil- cept in conformity with the regulations esanthropic, or eleemosynary nature; (7) nurs-tablished by the ordinance for the district in eries and green houses; and (8) public garages and their accessories, subject to compliance with present or future ordinance requirements. In the fifth, sixth, and seventh sections, the uses to which buildings and premises may be put in C commercial district, D industrial district and E unrestricted district, respectively, are defined, but it is not necessary for the purposes of this case to specify them here. The eighth section provides: en which such building is located. Sections 15, 16, and 17 prescribe the minimum dimensions of yards, or yards and courts, and the intensity of use of lot areas by buildings in the A, B, and C area districts, respectively. The eighteenth section subjects the requirements in the area districts to certain exceptions and regulations. The nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first sections provide for the issuance of occupancy, building, and use permits. Section 22 concerns the interpretation "The lawful use of a building or premises ex- and purpose of the ordinance. Penalties for isting at the time of the adoption of this or- violation of the ordinance are prescribed by dinance or thereafter destroyed or partially the twenty-third section. In case of a condestroyed by fire or other casualty or by volun-flict between the zoning ordinance and existtary act of the owner may be continued, although such use does not conform with the provisions hereof; and such use may be extended throughout the building or premises, subject to lawful regulations now or hereafter enacted. Whenever a use district shall be here ing ordinances, section 24 provides that the former shall govern. Section 25 sets forth certain rules which shall apply where uncertainty exists with respect to the boundaries of the various districts shown on the maps, |