1814.

WARNED TOO LATE.

207

the communications that had been made to me. M. de Talleyrand corresponded directly with the King, and I doubt not that my information at length reached the ears of his Majesty. But when Louis XVIII. was informed of what was to happen it was too late to avert the danger.

answer attributed to him by Metternich, he informs the King that he "cannot believe that he (Napoleon) would dare to make any attempt upon our southern provinces" (vol. ii. p. 72). At p. 108 of the same volume he tells Jaucourt that "We have no reason to fear; our cause is safe," and, "I think this last dreadful attempt of Bonaparte's will not last long."

CHAPTER XVI.1

1814-1815.

Napoleon at Elba-His conversations and transactions there-His escape from Elba-His landing near Cannes-March on Paris.

LORD EBRINGTON visited Napoleon at Elba in the winter of 1814, and the memoranda of his conversations with the ex-Emperor give an interesting picture of Napoleon's feelings at this time and reflections on past events.

"PORTO-FERRAJO, Monday, 6th December 1814.

"I went by appointment at eight o'clock in the evening to the palace, and after waiting a few minutes was shown into the room of Napoleon.

"After some questions about myself and my family, he asked eagerly about France, saying, 'Tell me frankly, are they contented ?' I said, ' Comme ça.' He replied, 'They cannot be; they have been too much humbled by the peace-they have had a king imposed upon them, and imposed upon them by England. Lord Wellington's appointment must be very galling to the army, and so must the great attentions shown him by the King, as if opposing his own feelings to those of the country.2 The Bourbons were not calculated to be popular with a people like the French.' Madame d'Angoulême, he had heard, was plain and awkward. 'For the angel of peace a witty or a pretty woman was required at least.' The King and Monsieur were too much influenced by priests. The Duc d'Angoulême, he had been told, was weak, and the Duc de Berry, according to report, has been committing a great many follies of late.' Besides, they had been the

1 This chapter first appears in the edition of 1834, and is not by M. de Bourrienne.

2 As British Ambassador on the conclusion of the campaign of 1814.

1815.

THE EMPEROR AND THE ARMY.

209

instruments of making a peace on terms to which he (Napoleon) never would have consented; giving up Belgium, which the nation had been taught to consider as an integral part of the dominions of France, and of which it would never quietly submit to be stripped. He said he spoke not from what he had heard, 'for I have no news except from the newspapers, or from the reports of travellers; but I know the French character well: it is not proud, like the English, but it is much more vainglorious; vanity is its principal feature, and the vanity of a Frenchman makes him capable of undertaking anything.' The army was naturally attached to him (Napoleon), 'for I had been their comrade. I had had some success with them, and they knew that I recompensed them handsomely: but at present they feel that they are nothing. There are at this moment in France 700,000 men who have borne arms, and the last campaigns have only served to show them how superior they are to their enemies. They render justice to the valour of your British troops; but they despise all the rest.'"1

This last assertion was, doubtless, insincere. More than one bloody campaign had taught the French soldiery that the Russians and their iron columns were not to be despised, and in the course of the war in 1813 and 1814 the Austrians and Prussians (particularly the latter) had commanded respect.

Bonaparte then talked about the conscription, and spoke of corps of a higher description for gentlemen to serve in, “For," said he, "I know it is hard for a gentleman to be taken for a common soldier." He said he had always been

1 The Allies most imprudently restored, without any stipulation whatever, all the French prisoners they had taken during the war. In this manner more than 150,000 men, for the most part tried soldiers, were thrown like a lava-stream into France, where they soon openly expressed their old enthusiasm for Napoleon, and their contempt and hatred of the new Government. They toasted the ex - Emperor as "the Little Corporal," or "Corporal Violet," and they confidently repeated wherever they went, "He will come back with the spring." It was impossible to prove to these men that had they been present in France, instead of being, as they were, prisoners to the Russians, the Prussians, and the Austrians, Paris could ever have been taken by the Allies: there was no convincing them that Napoleon had not been betrayed, for when did the French ever acknowledge to have been defeated, except through treachery?—Editor of 1836 edition. 81

VOL. III.

desirous of bringing forward the nobility, and that he had had in his army many young men of old families who behaved very well.

"He felt that France wanted an aristocracy: 'but for that it required time. I have made Princes and Dukes, and given them large estates, but I could not make real noblemen of them.' He meant, however, gradually to have intermarried them with the old nobility, as he had done in some instances, and if,' said he, 'the twenty years I demanded for the grandeur of France had been granted me, I would have done a good deal: but fate has determined otherwise.’ The King, he thought, ought to follow the same plan, instead of advancing those so much who, for the last twenty years, had been buried in the garrets of London.'

"He considered the House of Peers as the great bulwark of the English Constitution, but in France,' he observed, 'I could make you forty Senates just as good as the one they have got.'

"He had read most of the pamphlets published in France since his abdication. 'Some of them,' said he, 'call me a traitor a coward; but it is only truth that wounds-the French well know that I am no coward. The wisest plan of the Bourbons would be to follow, with regard to me, the same rule I observed with respect to them, which was not to suffer people to speak either ill or well of them.'

"Speaking of the finances of France, Napoleon said, 'All that I directed to be printed upon this subject is strictly true.' The civil list was 30,000,000 francs, but the expenditure seldom exceeded 18,000,000, and with that he had completed two or three of the palaces. His table cost 1,000,000 francs. His stable and chasse, including 700 horses, 2,000,000. Besides this he had the disposal of the 'Domaines extraordinaires,' a fund of 200,000,000, out of which he made presents, and rewarded those who distinguished themselves. To my question, 'Whence was this fund derived?' he answered, 'Out of the contributions of my enemies. Austria, for two treaties of peace, paid me by secret articles 300,000,000 francs, and Prussia just as enormously.' I inquired if he had received anything from

1815.

CROWNED HEADS AT TILSIT.

211

Russia? He said, 'No!' the Emperor Alexander. cannot rely on him. He is, however, intelligent, and has certain liberal ideas with which he was imbued by one of our French philosophes-Laharpe, who brought him up.

I asked him what he thought of 'Oh, he is a true Greek! one

But

he is so fickle that one can never know whether the sentiments he utters proceed from his real conviction or from a species of vanity to put himself in contrast with his real position.'

"In elucidation of this he mentioned an argument they had had upon forms of Government, in which Alexander maintained a preference for elective monarchy. His (Napoleon's) opinion was quite contrary, for 'who is fit to be so elected? A Cæsar or an Alexander, who is not to be found once in a century: so that the election must after all be a matter of chance, and the law of succession is surely better than the dice.' During the fortnight that they were at Tilsit the two Emperors dined together nearly every day, but we rose early from table to get rid of the King of Prussia, who bored us. About nine o'clock the Emperor Alexander returned in plain clothes to drink tea with me, and remained conversing very agreeably on different subjects, for the most part philosophical or political, sometimes till two or three o'clock in the morning.' The Emperor Francis, he said, had more honesty but less capacity. 'I would rely upon him sooner than on the other, and if he gave me his word to do such or such a thing, I would be persuaded that at the moment of giving it he meant to keep it; but his mind is very limited-no energy- no character.' The King of Prussia he called 'un caporal,' without an idea beyond the dress of a soldier, and 'infinitely the greatest fool of the three.' The Archduke Charles was 'un esprit très-médiocre,' who had, however, on some occasion, shown himself not to be without military talent.

"He spoke lightly of the talents of his Marshals, but having once elevated them it had been his system to maintain them. He had always been indulgent respecting military errors, as he evinced in not removing Marmont from his command after the loss of his artillery at Laon,