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1815.

RETURN TO THE TUILERIES.

235

when Lavalette hastened from a place of concealment and seized on the Post-office in the name of Napoleon. By this measure all the King's proclamations1 were intercepted, and the restoration of the Emperor was announced to all the departments. General Excelmans, who had just renewed his oath to Louis, pulled down with his own hands the white flag that was floating over the Tuileries, and hoisted the three-coloured banner.

It was late in the evening of the 20th that Bonaparte entered Paris in an open carriage, which was driven straight to the gilded gates of the Tuileries. He received the acclamations of the military and of the lower classes of the suburbs, but most of the respectable citizens looked on in silent wonderment. It was quite evident then that he was recalled by a party-a party, in truth, numerous and powerful, but not by the unanimous voice of the nation. The enthusiasm of his immediate adherents, however, made up for the silence and lukewarmness of others. They filled and crammed the square of the Carrousel, and the courts and avenues of the Tuileries; they pressed so closely upon him that he was obliged to cry out, "My friends, you stifle me!" and his aides de camp were compelled to carry him in their arms up the grand staircase, and thence into the royal apartments. It was observed, however, that amongst these ardent friends were many men who had been the first to desert him in 1814, and that these individuals were the most enthusiastic in their demonstrations, the loudest in their shouts!

And thus was Napoleon again at the Tuileries, where, even more than at Fontainebleau, his mind was flooded by the deep and painful recollections of the past! A few nights after his return thither he sent for M. Horan, one of the physicians who had attended Josephine during her last illness. "So, Monsieur Horan," said he, "you did not leave the Empress during her malady ?"-" No, Sire."-"What was the cause of that malady?"-"Uneasiness of mind . . . grief.”

...

1 On the 12th of April Louis XVIII. issued a Declaration to the French people at Ghent, but even that paper could not be circulated in France until after the battle of Waterloo.

"You believe that ?" (and Napoleon laid a strong emphasis on the word believe, looking steadfastly in the doctor's face). He then asked, "Was she long ill? Did she suffer much ?"

"She was ill a week, Sire; her Majesty suffered little bodily pain."-"Did she see that she was dying? Did she show courage?"-"A sign her Majesty made when she could no longer express herself leaves me no doubt that she felt her end approaching; she seemed to contemplate it without fear."—"Well! . . . well!" and then Napoleon much affected drew close to M. Horan, and added, "You say that she was in grief; from what did that arise?"—"From passing events, Sire; from your Majesty's position last year."—“Ah! she used to speak of me then?"-"Very often." Here Napoleon drew his hand across his eyes, which seemed filled with tears. He then went on. "Good woman!-Excellent Josephine! She loved me truly-she-did she not? . . . Ah! She was a Frenchwoman !"—" Yes, Sire, she loved you, and she would have proved it had it not been for dread of displeasing you she had conceived an idea. . . ."—"How? . . . What would she have done?"-"She one day said that as Empress of the French she would drive through Paris with eight horses to her coach, and all her household in gala livery, to go and rejoin you at Fontainebleau, and never quit you more."—"She would have done it—she was capable of doing it!"

Napoleon again betrayed deep emotion, on recovering from which he asked the physician the most minute questions about the nature of Josephine's disease, the friends and attendants who were around her at the hour of her death, and the conduct of her two children, Eugène and Hortense.

1815.

237

CHAPTER XVII.

1815.

Message from the Tuileries-My interview with the King-My appointment to the office of Prefect of the Police-Council at the Tuileries-Order for arrests -Fouché's escape-Davoust unmolested-Conversation with M. de Blacas -The intercepted letter, and time lost-Evident understanding between Murat and Napoleon-Plans laid at Elba-My departure from Paris-The post-master of Fins-My arrival at Lille-Louis XVIII. detained an hour at the gates-His Majesty obliged to leave France-My departure for Hamburg -The Duc de Berri at Brussels.

THOSE who opposed the execution of the treaty concluded with Napoleon at the time of his abdication were guilty of a great error, for they afforded him a fair pretext for leaving the island of Elba.1 The details of that extraordinary enterprise are known to every one, and I shall not repeat what has been told over and over again.2 For my own part,

2

1 The island of Elba appears to have been (at least publicly) suggested by Marshal Ney. It is said that Bonaparte originally demanded Corfu, which was refused as too valuable a possession, under the ludicrous pretext that his residence there might disturb the tranquillity of Turkey! The island to which he was sent united every property which Bonaparte could have desired for new plans of ambition. Its small size and population disarmed jealousy, and gave it the appearance of a mere retreat. It contained an impregnable fortress, capable of being defended by a handful of faithful soldiers. It was within a few hours' sail of the coast of Italy, even then dreading the yoke of her old masters. Through Italy and Switzerland communications with the French army might be opened through unsuspected channels, and in the long line of the Alps and the Jura, it was scarcely possible to intercept them. The distance from the coast of France somewhat diminished the facility of watching the port, and he was near enough to Provence for such a sudden enterprise as his situation allowed. If the globe had been searched for that residence in which Napoleon was most dangerous to France all sagacious searchers must have pointed to Elba.-Editor of 1836 edition.

2 In 1815 it was customary and convenient to treat Napoleon's return from Elba as a breach of faith justifying his eventual removal to St. Helena and making him an outlaw. All the petty but rankling annoyances inflicted on him, such as denying to the man who had made kings any higher title than that of General,

as soon as I saw with what rapidity Bonaparte was marching upon Lyons, and the enthusiasm with which he was received by the troops and the people, I prepared to retire to Belgium, there to await the dénouement of this new drama.

Every preparation for my departure was completed on the evening of the 13th of March, and I was ready to depart, to avoid the persecutions of which I expected I should be the object, when I received a message from the Tuileries stating that the King desired to see me. I of course lost no time in proceeding to the Palace, and went straight to M. Hue to inquire of him why I had been sent for. He occupied the apartments in which I passed the three most were supposed to be justified by this act of his. It is now certain that when Napoleon left Elba he knew that his removal to St. Helena or some similar and detestable residence was practically determined on. Further, the Bourbons, by withholding the pensions due to him and his family, not only had broken the treaty with him, but had made it difficult for him to maintain himself in his little State. The determination not to pay the pensions and to remove him from Elba can be seen in the Correspondence of Talleyrand during the Congress of Vienna, (London, Bentley), especially vol. ii. p. 27, where the Czar says to Talleyrand at Vienna, "Why do you not execute the treaty of 11th of April (giving the pensions)? . . . The treaty has not been executed, we ought to insist on its execution; our honour is at stake, we cannot possibly draw back; the Emperor of Austria insists on it as much as I do." Talleyrand goes on to tell the King (vol. ii. p. 28), "Lord Castlereagh also spoke to me warmly about the treaty of the 11th of April, and I have no doubt he will mention it to your Majesty. This subject has been revived lately, and is now in every one's mouth. I ought to tell your Majesty that it is constantly recurring, and in a disagreeable way." Talleyrand's only hope of getting the treaty performed by his master seems to have been to make a disgraceful bargain by which France should abandon the slave trade, in return for which piece of humanity his neighbours, the eccentric islanders, were to undertake the performance of the contract by which Louis held his throne. As for the removal, see the same Correspondence, vol. i. p. 48, where Talleyrand writes to the King on 13th October 1814, "A very decided intention of removing Bonaparte from the island of Elba is manifesting itself. I have proposed one of the Azores, it is 500 leagues from any coast.' This the King considers an excellent idea. It was not unnatural for Napoleon to suspect some worse motive for this step than the wish to place him at a distance, and the knowledge of this plot may have had some weight with him when he surrendered himself to a Government which at least would not go farther than imprisoning him. See a curious but probably unintentionally sinister allusion by Alexander to the King of Saxony, another monarch held in disgrace by the Allies. "If the King of Saxony does not abdicate he shall be taken to Russia: he will die there" (Talleyrand's Correspondence, vol. i. p. 87). The treaty is plain enough. "The island of Elba adopted by his Majesty Napoleon I. as his place of residence shall form during his life a separate principality which shall be possessed by him in full sovereignty and property" (Talleyrand's Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 37; Thiers, tome xvii. p. 790; Martens, tome vi. p. 696).

It must be remembered that this treaty was not a mere favour granted to Napoleon when helpless. It was a contract for which the Allies and certainly

1815.

LOUIS XVIII. AND BOURRIENNE.

239

laborious and anxious years of my life. M. Hue, perceiving that I felt a certain degree of uneasiness at being summoned to the Tuileries at that hour of the night, hastened to inform me that the King wished to appoint me Prefect of the Police. He conducted me to the King's chamber, where his Majesty thus addressed me kindly, but in an impressive manner, "M. de Bourrienne, can we rely upon you? I expect much from your zeal and fidelity."—" Your Majesty," replied I, “shall have no reason to complain of my betraying your confidence." -"Well, I re-establish the Prefecture of the Police, and I appoint you Prefect. Do your best, M. de Bourrienne, in the discharge of your duties; I count upon you.'

By a singular coincidence, on the very day (the 13th of March) when I received this appointment Napoleon, who

the Bourbons had received full value. So well was this understood at the time that it was only when the Allies had actually signed the treaty that Caulaincourt handed to Talleyrand the formal abdication of Napoleon; see Thiers, tome xvii. P. 792. The cession of Elba was a bargain, not a gift. Napoleon was far from helpless. It was the extraordinary step taken later by Talleyrand in surrendering the fortresses held by French troops which placed France at the feet of the Allies. Napoleon could have protracted the war: the bond which held the Allies was not one to stand much strain, and a petty island left to Napoleon was a small price to pay for the cessation of a struggle in which they had little more to gain and everything to lose. The Emperor of Austria had given Napoleon his daughter, the Czar had treated him as a brother, Bavaria and Würtemberg were Kings by his grace; not a sovereign on the Continent had scrupled to accept any gift from him in his days of power; witness the acceptance of Hanover by Prussia. Even England had recognised him as Consul. Why no faith was to be kept with him in his fall is difficult to explain. As for there being ground for surprise at his return, see the same Talleyrand Correspondence. D'Hauterive writes to Talleyrand then at Vienna, on the 14th of February 1815, "Savary said to me with an air of extraordinary conviction, We shall see Bonaparte again, and it will be entirely their (the Bourbons') fault.' I feel that Daru and Maret agree with him” (vol. ii. pp. 9, 10). Daru, it should be remarked, was very far from an enthusiastic partisan of Napoleon, and indeed had a personal distrust of him. Jaucourt himself, then in temporary charge of the French Foreign Office, if he did not believe in the return could not have been surprised at the catastrophe of the Bourbons, for he writes on 25th January 1815 (vol. ii. p. 12), "We are really going on very badly, and we (the Government) must do better if we do not wish to perish utterly;" and after the return he writes on 10th April 1815 (vol. ii. p. 143), "To express it in one word,-the road led straight to the island of Elba." There can be no doubt that the whole conduct of the Allied sovereigns at this period towards Napoleon, France, and the nations of Europe dealt a blow to the so-called principle of legitimacy at the very time it seemed triumphant in Talleyrand's mouth, which it never recovered from. The number of independent monarchs has rapidly lessened since 1815, and a strange sacrosanctity has become attached to the act of conquest. Napoleon was not far wrong when he said that if he fell the whole system would fall with him.

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