(40 Sup.Ct.) and that this presumption should obtain un- [ fraud. We mean by that to say that the claim less evidence to the contrary was adduced. of complainants cannot be the subject of proof The Regulations of the Army (No. 378, Edi- as of an ordinary fact; it cannot be proved as tion of 1913, p. 88) provide that if the Na- a fact to be a fraud or false pretence or promtional Anthem is played in any place those ise, nor can it properly be said that those who present, whether in uniform or in civilian assume to heal bodily ills or infirmities by a re sort to this method of cure are guilty of obclothes, shall stand until the last note of the taining money under false pretenses, such as anthem. The regulation is expressly limited are intended in the statutes, which evidently in its operation to those belonging to the do not assume to deal with mere matters of military service, although the practice was opinion upon subjects which are not capable of commonly observed by civilians throughout proof as to their falsity." *266 the war. There was no federal law imposing The cause of a war-as of most human such action upon them. The Attorney General, action-is not single. War is ordinarily the who does not enforce Army Regulations, was result of many co-operating causes, many diftherefore not engaged in sending men to pris- ferent conditions, acts and motives. Historion for that offense. But, when the passage in ans rarely agree in their judgment as to question is read in connection with the rest of what was the determining factor in a parthe chapter, it seems clear that it was intend- ticular war, even when they write under cired, not as a statement of fact, but as a criti- cumstances where detachment and the availcism of the Department of Justice for devot- ability of evidence from all sources minimizes ing its efforts to prosecutions for acts or both prejudice and other sources of error; omissions indicating lack of sympathy with for individuals, and classes of individuals, the war, rather than to protecting the com- attach significance to those things which are munity from profiteering by prosecuting vio significant to them, and, as the contributing lators of the Food Control Act. Act August causes cannot be subjected, like a chemical 10, 1917. c. 53, 40 Stat. 276 (Comp. St. 1918, combination in a test tube, to qualitative Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, 88 3115% and quantitative analysis, so as to weigh and 3115r). Such criticism of governmental op-value the various elements, the historians erations, though grossly unfair as an inter- differ necessarily in their judgments. One pretation of facts or even wholly unfounded finds the determining cause of war in a great in fact, are not "false reports and false state- man; another in an idea, a belief, an economments with intent to interfere with the oper-ic necessity, a trade advantage, a sinister ation or success of the military or naval forces." (c) The remaining sentence, set forth in count 3 as a false statement, was culled from the sixth chapter of the leaflet and is this: "Our entry into it was determined by the certainty that if the Allies do not win, J. P. Morgan's loans to the Allies will be repudiated, and those American investors who bit on his promises would be hooked." machination, or an accident. It is for this reason largely that men seek to interpret anew in each age, and often with each new generation, the important events in the world's history. That all who voted for the Joint Resolu $268 tion of April 6, *1917, did not do so for the reasons assigned by the President in his address to Congress on April 2, is demonstrated by the discussions in the House and in the Senate. 3 That debate discloses, also, that both in the Senate and in the House the loans to the Allies and the desire to insure their repayment in full were declared to have been instrumental in bringing about in our country the sentiment in favor of the war. ♦ To prove the falsity of this statement the government introduced the address made by the President to Congress on April 2, 1917, which preceded the adoption of the Joint Resolution of April 6, 1917, declaring that a state of war exists between the United States and the Imperial German government. 40 Stat. 1, c. 1. This so-called statement of fact-which is alleged to be false-is merely a conclusion or a deduction from facts. True, There is no doubt in any mind but the it is the kind of conclusion which courts enormous amount of money loaned to the Allies in call a conclusion of fact, as distinguished about a public sentiment in favor of our country this country has been instrumental in bringing from a conclusion of law, and which is some-taking a course that would make every debt bond times spoken of as a finding of ultimate fact, worth a hundred cents on the dollar and making as distinguished from an evidentiary fact. the payment of every debt certain and sure." But in its essence it is the expression of a *267 judgment-like the *statements of many socalled historical facts. To such conclusions and deductions the declaration of this court in American School of Magnetic Healing V. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 104, 23 Sup. Ct. 33, 37 (47 L. Ed. 90), is applicable: "There is no exact standard of absolute truth by which to prove the assertion false and a See 55 Cong. Rec. 253, 254, 344, 354, 357, 407. Cong. Rec. p. 213. 55 Discussion in the House April 5, 1917. "Since the loan of $500,000,000, was made by Morgan to the Allies their efforts have been persistent to land our soldiers in the French trenches." 55 Cong. Rec. p. 342. "Already we have loaned the Allies, through our banking system, up to December 31, 1916, the enormous sum of $2,325,900,000 in formal loans. Other huge sums have been loaned and billions have been added since that date. 'Where your treasures are, there will be your heart also.' That is one of the reasons why we are about to enter this war. No 269 However strongly we may believe that these statement. All and I cannot believe that Congress in passing, and the President in approving it, conceived that such a construction was possible. Thus Second. But even if the passages from the leaflet set forth in the third count could be deemed false statements within the meaning of the act, the convictions thereon were unjustified because evidence was wholly lacking to prove any one of the other essential elements of the crime charged. there was not a particle of evidence that the defendants knew that the statements were false. They were mere distributors of the leaflet. It had been prepared by a man of some prominence. It had been published by the national organization. Not one of the defendants was an officer even of the local organization. One of them, at least, was absent from the meetings at which the proposal to distribute the leaflet was discussed. There is no evidence that the truthfulness of the statements contained in the leaflet had ever been questioned before this indictment was found. The statement mainly relied upon to sustain the conviction-that concerning the effect of our large loans to the Allies—was merely a repetition of what had been declared with great solemnity and earnestness in the Senate and in the House while the Joint Resolution was under discussion. The fact address worthy grounds for our entry into the war was not evidence that these defendants knew to be false the charge that base motives had also been operative. The assertion that the great financial interests exercise a potent, subtle, and sinister influence in the important decisions of our government had often been made by men high in authority. Mr. Wilson, himself a historian, said before he was President and repeated in the The presiding judge ruled that expressions of opinion were not punishable as false state-that the President had set forth in his noble ments under the act; but he left it to the jury to determine whether the five sentences in question were statements of facts or expressions of opinion. As this determination was to be made from the reading of the leaflet unaffected by any extrinsic evidence the question was one for the court. To hold that a jury may make punishable statements of conclusions or of opinion, like those here involved, by declaring them to be statements of facts and to be false would practically deny members of small political parties freedom of criticism and of discussion in "The masters of the government of the Unittimes when feelings run high and the ques-ed States are the combined capitalists and mantions involved are deemed fundamental.ufacturers of the United States." 5 *270 *There is nothing in the act compelling or indeed justifying such a construction of it, wonder the Morgans and the munition makers de- "I believe that all Americans, except that limited, the European war. New Freedom that: 271 We may be convinced that the decision to enter the great war was wholly free from such base influences, but we may not, because such is our belief, permit a jury to find, in the absence of evidence, that it was proved beyond a reasonable doubt that these defendants knew that a statement in this leaflet to the contrary was false. Nor was there a particle of evidence that these statements were made with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military and naval forces. So far as there is any evidence bearing on the matter of intent, it is directly to the contrary. The fact that the local refused to distribute the pam Page 57. Then follows: "It is written over every 55 Cong. Rec. 372. "These war germs are both epidemic and contagious. They are in the air, but somehow or other they multiply faster in the fumes about the munition factories. You will not find many in our cli-intimate page of the records of Congress, it is writmate. They also multiply pretty fast in Wall Street and other money centers. I am opposed to declaring war to save the speculators." 55 Cong. Rec. p. 376. ten all through the history of conferences at the White House, that the suggestions of economic policy in this country have come from one source, not many sources." (40 Sup.Ct.) phlet until Judge Rose had directed a verdict | to create a clear and present danger of causof acquittal in the Baltimore case shows ing either insubordination, disloyalty, muthat its members desired to do only that tiny or refusal of duty in the military or which the law permitted. The tenor of the naval forces. The leaflet contains lurid and leaflet itself shows that the intent of the perhaps exaggerated pictures of the horrors writer and of the publishers was to advance of war. Its arguments as to the causes of the cause of Socialism, and each defendant this war may appear to us shallow and grosstestified that this was his only purpose inly unfair. The remedy proposed may seem to distributing the pamphlet. Furthermore, the us worse than the evil which, it is argued, nature of the words used and the circumstances under which they were used showed affirmatively that they did not "create a clear and present danger," that thereby the operations or success of our military and naval forces would be interfered with. will be thereby removed. But the leaflet, far from counseling disobedience to law, points to the hopelessness of protest, under the existing system, pictures the irresistible power of the military arm of the government, and indicates that acquiescence is a necessity. Insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of duty in the military or naval forces are very serious crimes. It is not conceiv The gravamen of the third count is the charge of willfully conveying in time of war false statements with the intent to interfere with the operation and success of our mili-able that any man of ordinary intelligence tary or naval forces. One who did that would be called a traitor to his country. The defendants, humble members of the Socialist party, performed as distributors of the leaflet what would ordinarily be deemed merely a menial service. To hold them guilty under ⚫272 the third *count is to convict not them alone, but, in effect, their party, or at least its responsible leaders, of treason, as that word is commonly understood. I cannot believe that there is any basis in our law for such a condemnation on this record. and normal judgment would be induced by Third. To sustain a conviction on the second or on the sixth count it is necessary to prove that by cooperating to distribute the The fundamental right of free men to leaflet the defendants conspired or attempted strive for better conditions through new legwillfully to "cause insubordination, disloyal-islation and new institutions will not be prety, mutiny or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces." No evidence of intent so to do was introduced unless it be found in the leaflet itself. What has been said in respect to the third count as to the total lack of evidence of evil intent is equally ap plicable here. A verdict should have been directed for the defendants on these counts also because the leaflet was not distributed under such circumstances, nor was it of such a nature, as served, if efforts to secure it by argument to fellow citizens may be construed as criminal incitement to disobey the existing lawmerely because the argument presented seems to those exercising judicial power to be unfair in its portrayal of existing evils, mistaken in its assumptions, unsound in reasoning or intemperate in language. No objections more serious than these can, in my opinion, reasonably be made to the arguments presented in "The Price We Pay." MEMORANDUM DECISIONS (250 U. S. 679) No. 315. CHAMPAIGN COUNTY v. PEOPLE OF STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. CITY OF CHAMPAIGN, et al. August 21, 1919. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois. For opinion below, see People ex rel. v. Champaign County, 286 Ill. 363, 121 N. E. 635. Dis (251 U. S. 543) DISPOSED OF AT OCTOBER TERM, 1919 No. 152. EVANSVILLE & BOWLING GREEN PACKET COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. M. M. LOGAN et al., etc. Jan. 26, 1920. In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky. For opinion below, see 180 Ky. 216, 202 S. W. 492. Mr. Malcolm Yeaman, of Henderson, Ky., for plaintiff in error. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction, upon the authority of section 237 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156) as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. St. § 1214). (251 U. S. 544) No. 176. V. & S. BOTTLE COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. MOUNTAIN GAS COMPANY. Jan. 26, 1920. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania. For opinion below, see 261 Pa. 523, 104 Atl. 667. Mr. C. La Rue Munson, of Williamsport, Pa., for plaintiff in error. Mr. Samuel S. Mehard, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant in error. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction, upon the authority of California Powder Works v. Davis, 151 U. S. 389, 393, 14 Sup. Ct. 350, 38 L. Ed. 206; Sayward v. Denny, 158 U. S. 180, 183, 15 Sup. Ct. 777, 39 L. Ed. 941; Harding v. Illinois, 196 U. S. 78, 80, 25 Sup. Ct. 176, 49 L. Ed. 394; Seaboard Air Line v. Duvall, 225 U. S. 477, 481, 487, 32 Sup. Ct. 790, 56 L. Ed. 1171; Cleveland & Pittsburgh R. R. Co. v. Cleveland, 235 U. S. 50, 53, 35 Sup. Ct. 21, 59 L. Ed. 127. (251 U. S. 544) 674, 170 Pac. 884. Mr. W. Martin Jones, Jr., of Rochester, N. Y., for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Edward D. Tittmann, of Hillsboro, N. M., and Charles T. Tittmann, of Washington, D. C., for defendant in error. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of section 237 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156) as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. St. § 1214). (251 U. S. 545) No. 189. The BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. John S. COFFLAND. Jan. 26, 1920. In error to the Court of Appeals, Harrison County, Seventb Appellate District of the State of Ohio. Mr. D. A. Hollingsworth, of Cadiz, Ohio, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Ernest Sidney McNamee, of Cadiz, Ohio, for defendant in error. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of (1) Schlosser v. Hemphill, 198 U. S. 173, 175, 25 Sup. Ct. 654, 49 L. Ed. 1000; Louisiana Nav. Co. v. Oyster Commission of Louisiana, 226 U. S. 99, 101, 33 Sup. Ct. 78, 57 L. Ed. 138; Gray's Harbor Co. v. Coats-Fordney Co., 243 U. S. 251, 255, 37 Sup. Ct. 295, 61 L. Ed. 702; Bruce v. Tobin, 245 U. S. 18, 19, 38 Sup. Ct. 7, 62 L. Ed. 123; (2) section 237 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156) as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. St. § 1214). (251 U. S. 566) No. 193. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAIL& No. 180. SUPERIOR WAY COMPANY, petitioner, v. J. J. GRAY. PITTSBURGH Jan. 26, 1920. On writ of certiorari to the SuCOPPER COMPANY, plaintiff in error, V. preme Court of the State of South Carolina. Steve DAVIDOVICH, sometimes known as Steve DAVIS. Jan. 26, 1920. In error to the For opinion below, see 102 S. E. 512. See, also, Supreme Court of the State of Arizona. For 248 U. S. 557, 39 Sup. Ct. 19, 63 L. Ed. 420. opinion below see 19 Ariz. 402, 171 Pac. 127. Mr. Jo-Berry S. Lyles, of Columbia, S. C., for Mr. Cleon T. Knapp, of Bisbee, Ariz., for plain-petitioner. Messrs. Fred H. Dominick, of NewMr. Samuel Herrick, of Washing-berry, S. C., and Wallace D. Conner, of Brunson, S. C., for respondent. Dismissed per stipulation. tiff in error. ton, D. C., for defendant in error. PER CURIAM. Affirmed upon the authority of Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct. 553, 63 L. Ed. 1058. (251 U. S. 545) No. 181. Gertrude Minnie JONES, plaintiff in error, v. Max HILTSCHER. Jan. 26, 1920. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico. For opinion below, see 23 N. M. (251 U. S. 567) No. 194. James A. KEOWN, petitioner, v. Mary E. KEOWN, et al. Jan. 26, 1920. On writ of certiorari to the Superior Court of the State of Massachusetts. For opinion below, see 230 Mass. 313, 119 N. E. 785. Mr. James A. Keown, of Lynn, Mass., in pro. per. Dismissed for want of prosecution. (251 U. S. 567) No. 195. (40 Sup.Ct.) (251 U. S. 560) OHIO STATE TELEPHONE No. 675. Edwin REITZ, petitioner, v. The COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. CITY OF UNITED STATES of America. Jan. 26, 1920. COLUMBUS, Ohio. Jan. 26, 1920. In Error For opinion below, see 257 Fed. 731. Mr. L. to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio. W. Crofoot, of Aberdeen, S. D. (Messrs. L For opinion below, see 98 Ohio St. 454, 121 N. T. Van Slyke, of Aberdeen, S. D., and N. B. E. 902. Mr. Clarence Brown, of Toledo, Ohio, | Bartlett, of Sioux Falls, S. D., of counsel), for for plaintiff in error. Mr. Henry L. Scarlett, petitioner. Messrs. Robert P. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Harry S. Ridgely, of Washington, D. C., for the United States. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. of Columbus, Ohio, for defendant in error. Dismissed with costs, pursuant to the sixteenth rule, on motion of Mr. Frederick S. Tyler in behalf of counsel for the defendant in error. No. 206. Frank P. CHESBROUGH, plaintiff in error, v. Mary L. HOTCHKISS et al. Jan. 27, 1920. See, also, Chesbrough v. Woodworth, 251 Fed. 881, 164 C. C. A. 97. Mr. Thomas A. E. Weadock, of Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff in error. Mr. Edward S. Clark, of Bay City, Mich., for defendants in error. Death of Mary Schreiber, formerly Mary L. Hotchkiss, one of the defendants in error herein, suggested, and appearance of Northern Trust Company, executor of the last will of Mary Schreiber, deceased, as a party defendant in error, filed and entered, on motion of Mr. E. S. Clark for the defendant in error. (251 U. S. 567) No. 216. EVERGLADES DRAINAGE LEAGUE et al., appellants, v. NAPOLEON B. BROWARD DRAINAGE DISTRICT et al. Jan. 30, 1920. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Florida. For opinion below, see 253 Fed. 246. Mr. Clair D. Vallette, of Washington, D. C., for appellants. Dismissed with costs on motion of counsel for the appellants. (251 U. S. 546) No. Original. Ex parte In the matter of J. E. BROUSSARD et al., petitioners. Feb. 2, 1920. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus herein denied. (251 U. S. 545) No. 596. MOUNTAIN STATES TELE PHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY et al., plaintiffs in error, v. The City and County of DENVER. Feb. 2, 1920. In error to the SuFor preme Court of the State of Colorado. opinion below, see 184 Pac. 604. Messrs. Milton Smith, W. H. Ferguson, and Charles R. Brock, all of Denver, Colo. (Elmer L. Brock, of Denver, Colo., of counsel), for plaintiffs in Messrs. James A. Marsh and Norton error. Montgomery, both of Denver, Colo., for defendant in error. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction, upon the authority of City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Company, 250 U. S. 394, 39 Sup. Ct. 526, 63 L. Ed. 1054. See City of Chicago v. Dempey, 250 U. S. 651, 40 Sup. Ct. 53, 63 L. Ed. 1189, decided November 10, 1919. No. 666. Marie EQUI, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. Jan. 26, 1920. For opinion below, see 261 Fed. 53. Messrs. Austin Lewis, of San Francisco, Cal., and James E. Fenton and C. E. S. Wood, both of Portland, Or., for petitioner. Messrs. Robert P. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Harry S. Ridgely, of Washington, D. C., for the United No. 640. J. E. BROUSSARD et al., petitionStates. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the ers, v. Walter J. CRAWFORD, trustee. Feb. United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the | 2, 1920. For opinion below, see 260 Fed. 122. Ninth Circuit denied. Messrs. Sol. E. Gordon, of Beaumont, Tex., and (251 U. S. 560) |