(40 Sup.Ct.) 1920. Motion for leave to file petition for a for complainant. writ of prohibition or mandamus granted, and a rule to show cause awarded returnable Monday, October 4 next. No. 7, Original. The STATE OF ARKANSAS, complainant, v. The STATE OF MISSISSIPPI. June 7, 1920. See, also, 252 U. S. 344, 40 Sup. Ct. 333, 64 L. Ed. 605. Messrs. Walter P. Armstrong and J. M. Moore, of Little Rock, Ark., and Herbert Pope, of Chicago, Ill., for complainant. Messrs. Garner W. Green, of Jackson, Miss., Gerald Fitz Gerald, of Clarksdale, Miss., and Ross A. Collins, of Jackson, Miss., for respondent. Motion to stay further proceedings in this cause denied. (253 U. S. 477) No. 22, Original. The STATE OF GEORGIA, complainant, v. The STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA. June 7, 1920. See, also, 39 Sup. Ct. 258, 64 L. Ed. -. Mr. Clifford Walker, of Monroe, Ga., for complainant. Messrs. A. M. Lumpkin, of Columbia, S. C., and Sam M. Wolfe, Atty. Gen., for respondent. Motion for the appointment of a special master to take such testimony as may be necessary and to receive in evidence such exhibits as may be offered by the parties hereto, granted, and, on the suggestion of counsel for both parties, Mr. Charles S. Douglas, of Washington, D. C., appointed as such special master and directed to report the testimony and exhibits to the court without conclusions of law or findings of fact. (253 U. S. 478) No. 3. The UNITED STATES of America, appellant, v. READING COMPANY et al.; and No. 4. READING COMPANY et al., appellants, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For former opinion, see 253 U. S. 26, 40 Sup. Ct. 425, 64 L. Ed. The Attorney General, for the United States. Messrs. Henry S. Drinker, Jr., Charles Heebner, Abraham M. Beitler and William Jay Turner, all of Philadelphia, Pa., and Jackson E. Reynolds, of New York City, and William Clarke Mason, of Philadelphia, Pa., for respondents. Motions to modify the decree in these cases denied. No. 27, Original. The STATE OF OKLAHOMA, complainant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS. June 7, 1920. See, also, 40 Sup. Ct. 585, 64 L. Ed. Messrs. W. A. Led. better and H. L. Stuart, both of Oklahoma City, Okl., for complainant. Ordered that this cause be set down for hearing on the 15th day of November, 1920, upon certain questions, and that the parties be permitted to take and present testimony, and Ernest Knaebel, Esq., of the District of Columbia, appointed commissioner to take said evidence and report the same to the court without findings or conclusions. No. 27, Original. The STATE OF OKLAHOMA, complainant, v. The STATE OF TEXAS. June 7, 1920. See, also, 40 Sup. Ct. 585, 64 L. Ed. -. Messrs. W. A. Ledbetter and H. L. Stuart, both of Oklahoma City, Okl., Leave granted to file in tervening petitions on behalf of Judsonia Developing Association, the Burke Divide Oil Company Nos. 2 and 3, and Mellish Consolidated Placer Oil Mining Association; and similar leave is granted to any and all other parties claiming any title to or interest in the lands in the possession of the receiver herein by virtue of the orders of April 1, 1920, and June 7, 1920. No. 810. LINCOLN GAS & ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, appellant, v. The CITY OF LINCOLN et al. June 7, 1920. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska. Messrs. Charles A. Frueauff, of New York City, Max V. Beghtol, of Lincoln, Neb., and Frueauff, Robinson & Sloan of New York City (Mr. Robert Burns, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant. Mr. C. Petrus Peterson, of Lincoln, Neb., for appellees. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Heike v. United States, 217 U. S. 423, 429, 30 Sup. Ct. 539, 54 L. Ed. 821; United States v. Beatty, 232 U. S. 463, 466, 34 Sup. Ct. 392, 58 L. Ed. 686; Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke Collander Co., 228 U. S. 339, 346, 33 Sup. Ct. 515, 57 L. Ed. 864; and see Eichel v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 239 U. S. 629, 36 Sup. Ct. 165, 60 L. Ed. 475. (253 U. S. 492) No. 854. R. L. MAYFIELD, petitioner, v. The STATE OF TENNESSEE ex rel. F. M. GERARD. June 7, 1920. Mr. R. L. Mayfield, (Mr. James A. Cobb, of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for petitioner. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee denied. (253 U. S. 492) No. 874. Fred B. SULLIVAN, petitioner, v. P. SANFORD ROSS, Inc. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 263 Fed. 348. Mr. Henry J. Bigham, of New York City, for petitioner. Mr. A. Leo Everett, of New York City, for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 493) No. 882. Angel VARGAS, petitioner, v. F. M. YAPTICO & COMPANY. June 7, 1920. Mr. Ernest Wilkinson, of Washington, D. C., for petitioner. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands denied. (253 U. S. 493) 64 L. Ed. —. No. 884. Harmon P. MacKNIGHT, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 263 Fed. 832. See, also, 251 Ú. S. 543, 40 Sup. Ct. 180, Mr. Harmon P. MacKnight, of East Cambridge, Mass., in Pro. Per. for petiMr. Robert P. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mr. Harry S. Ridgely, of Washington, D. C., for the United States. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. tioner. (253 U. S. 493) No. 895. George W. CANFIELD et al., petitioners, v. Ira E. CORNELIUS et al. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 188 Pac. 1040. Messrs. John Devereux, Bird McGuire and Chas. W. Grimes, all of Tulsa, Okl. (Mr. William J. Hughes, of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for petitioners. Messrs. D. A. MeDougal, W. V. Pryor, and C B. Rockwood, all of Sapulpa, Okl., for respondents. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma denied. (253 U. S. 494) No. 902. C. B. SCHOBERG, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 264 Fed. 1. Messrs. Sherman T. McPherson, of Cincinnati, Ohio and O. M. Rogers, of Covington, Ky., for petitioner. Mr. Robert P. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mr. William C. Herron, of Washington, D. C., for the United States. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 494) No. 903. Henry KRUSE, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 264 Fed. 1. Messrs. Sherman T. McPherson, of Cincinnati, Ohio, and O. M. Rogers, of Covington, Ky., for petitioner. Mr. Robert P. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mr. William C. Herron, of Washington, D. C., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 494) No. 904. Henry FELTMAN, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 264 Fed. 1. Messrs. Sherman T. McPherson, of Cincinnati, Ohio, and O. M. Rogers, of Covington, Ky., for petitioner. Mr. Robert P. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mr. William C. Herron, of Washington, D. C., for the United States. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 494) No. 905. Peter WIMMER, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 264 Fed. 11. Mr. Frederick W. Schmitz, of Covington, Ky., for petitioner. Mr. Robert P. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mr. Harry S. Ridgely, of Washington, D. C., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 494) No. 908. The FIDELITY & CASUALTY Wallace L. SCHAMBS, trustee in bankruptcy for the estate of Hudson D. Fowler. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 263 Fed. 895. Messrs. H. Melvin Roberts, of Cleveland, Ohio, and J. Wilmer Latimer, of Washington, D. C., for petitioner. Messrs. Newton D. Baker and Payer, Winch, Minshall & Karch, all of Cleveland, Ohio, for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. No. 894. George W. CANFIELD et al., pe- | COMPANY OF NEW YORK, petitioner. v. titioners v. Lusanna BRINK. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 187 Pac. 223. Messrs. John Devereux, Bird McGuire and Chas. W. Grimes, all of Tulsa, Okl., (Mr. William J. Hughes, of Washington, D. C. of counsel), for petitioners. Messrs. D. A. McDougal, W. V. Pryor and C. B. Rockwood, all of Sapulpa, Okl., for respondents. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma denied. (253 U. S. 495) (40 Sup.Ct.) No. 912. Joseph BIVENS, Sr., petitioner, v. UNITED TIMBER CORPORATION. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 264 Fed. 308. Messrs. Julian Mitchell, of Charleston, S. C., Thomas M. Boulware, of Barnwell, S. C., and Charles A. Douglas and Hugh H. Obear, both of Washington, D. C., for petitioner. Messrs. Legare Walker, of Summerville, S. C., and L. D. Lide, of Marion, S. C., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 495) No. 913. Joseph BIVENS, Sr.. petitioner, v. UNITED TIMBER CORPORATION. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 264 Fed. 308. Messrs. Julian Mitchell, of Charleston, S. C., Thomas M. Boulware, of Barnwell, S. C., and Charles A. Douglas and Hugh H. Obear, both of Washington, D. C., for petitioner. Messrs. Legare Walker, of Summerville, S. C., and L. D. Lide, of Marion, S. C., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 495) No. 919. Orville ANDERSON, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 264 Fed. 75. Messrs. Joe Kirby, Joe H. Kirby and Thos. H. Kirby, all of Sioux Falls, S. D. for petitioner. Mr. Robert P. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mr. Harry S. Ridgely, of Washington, D. C., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 495) No. 925. Day AMMERMAN, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 262 Fed. 124. Mr. Robert S. Morrison, of Denver, Colo., (Messrs. O. N. Hilton, of Denver, Colo., John E. Kelley and Caesar A. Roberts and Leslie M. Roberts, both of Denver, Colo., of counsel), for petitioner. Mr. Robert P. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mr. Raymond S. Norris, of Washington, D. C., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 482) No. 926. EUGENE SOL LOUIE, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 264 Fed. 295. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted. (253 U. S. 496) No. 928. COMMERCIAL CREDIT COMPANY, petitioner, v. SPONGE EXCHANGE BANK OF TARPON SPRINGS. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 263 Fed. 20. Messrs. M. B. Macfarlane, and N. B. K. Pettingill, both of Tampa, Fla. (Mr. Leo Oppenheimer, of New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff. Mr. James F. Glen, of Tampa, Fla., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. v. (253 U. S. 497) No. 949. G. SANDAA, Master and Claimant, etc., et al.. petitioners, The UNITED STATES of America et al. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 265 Fed. 921. Messrs. Henry H. Little and Leon T. Seawell, both of Norfolk, Va. (Messrs. Hughes, Little & Seawell, of Norfolk, Va., of counsel) for petitioners. Mr. Thomas J. Spellacy, Asst. Atty. Gen, and Messrs. J. Frank Staley and James W. Ryan, Special Assts. Atty. Gen. for respondents. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 497) No. 957. PECK, STOW & WILCOX COMPANY, petitioner, v. The H. D. SMITH & COMPANY. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 262 Fed. 415. Messrs. Frederick P. Fish, of Boston, Mass., and Harrie E. Hart, of Hartford, Conn., for petitioner. Messrs. Archibald Cox. of New York City, and Henry E. Rockwell, of New Haven, Conn., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 497) No. 960. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner, v. HAGEMEYER TRADING COMPANY; and No. 961. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner, v. Hugo A. THOMSEN et al. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 266 Fed. 14. Messrs. D. Roger Englar and Oscar R. Houston, both of New York City, for petitioner. Mr. Van Vechten Veeder, of New York City, for respondents. Petition for writs of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 498) (253 U. S. 498) No. 971. Pete MORGAN, petitioner, v. The STATE OF LOUISIANA. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 84 South. 589. Messrs. R. E. Milling, of New Orleans, La., Allan Sholars, of Monroe, La., W. J. Hammon, of Jonesboro, La., and J. B. Roberts, of Colfax, La., for petitioner. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana denied. (253 U. S. 350) No. 29, Original, STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. A. Mitchell PALMER, Atty. Gen.. et al. No. 30, Original. STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. A. Mitchell PALMER, Atty. Gen., et al. No. 696. George C. DEMPSEY v. Thomas J. BOYNTON, U. S. Atty., et al. No. 752. KENTUCKY DISTILLERIES & WAREHOUSE CO. v. W. V. GREGORY, U. S. Atty., et al. No. 788. Christian FEIGENSPAN v. Joseph I. BODINE, U. S. Atty., et al. No. 794. Hiram A. SAWYER, U. S. Atty., et al. v. MANITOWOC PRODUCTS CO. No. 837. ST. LOUIS BREWING ASS'N v. George H. MOORE, Collector, et al. June 7, 1920. *Mr. Justice CLARKE (dissenting). I concur in the first seven paragraphs and in the tenth paragraph of the announced "ConCOM-clusions" of the Court, but I dissent from the remaining three paragraphs. No. 965. ROXFORD KNITTING PANY, petitioner, v. MOORE & TIERNEY (Inc.). June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 265 Fed. 177. Mr. Walter S. Hilborn, of New York City (Mr. David J. Gallert, of New York City, of counsel), for petitioner. Mr. Thos. O'Connor, of Waterford, N. Y., (Mr. George E. O'Connor, of Waterford, N. Y., of counsel), for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 498) No. 966. ROXFORD KNITTING COMPANY, petitioner, V. WILLIAM MOORE KNITTING COMPANY. June 7. 1920. For opinion below, see 265 Fed. 177. Mr. Walter S. Hilborn, of New York City, for petitioner. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. No. 970. AMERICAN COLUMN & LUMBER COMPANY et al., appellants, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 263 Fed. 147. Motion for an order staying or superseding during the pendency of this appeal of a part of the final decree of the district court herein denied. The eighth, ninth and eleventh paragraphs, taken together, in effect, declare the Volstead Act (41 Stat. 305) to be the supreme law of the land-paramount to any state law with which it may conflict in any respect. Such a result, in my judgment, can be arrived at only by reading out of the second section of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution the word "concurrent," as it is used in the grant to Congress and the several states of "concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." This important word, which the record of Congress shows was introduced, with utmost deliberation, to give accurate expression to a very definite purpose, can be read out of the Constitution only by violating the sound and wise rule of constitutional construction early announced and often applied by this Court that in expounding the Constitution of the United States no word in it can be rejected as superfluous or unmeaning, but effect must be given to every word to the extent that this is reasonably possible. This rule was first announced in 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23; (40 Sup.Ct.) it was applied with emphasis in 1840 in Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 570, 10 L. Ed. 579; and in the recent case of Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 44 L. Ed. 969, it is referred to as an elementary canon of constitutional construction. tracts and agreements between states, which without it would be unconstitutional and void. The Wilson Act of 1890 (Comp. St. § 8738), the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913 (Comp. St. § 8739), and the Reed Amendment of 1917 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. The authoritative dictionaries, general and 1919, §§ 8739a, 10387a-10387c), are familiar law, and the decided cases, agree, that "con- examples of co-operative legislation on the Other incurrent" means "joint and equal authority," subject of intoxicating liquors. "running together, having the same author- stances could readily be supplied. When to ity." and therefore the grant of concurrent this we add that the Volstead Act is obviouspower to the Congress and the states shouldly in very large part a compilation from the #408 give to each equal, the same, *authority to enforce the Amendment by appropriate legislation. But the conclusions of the Court from which I dissent, by rendering the Volstead Act of Congress paramount to state laws, necessarily deprive the states of all power to enact legislation in conflict with it, and construe the Amendment precisely as if the word "concurrent" were not in it. The power of Congress is rendered as supreme as if the grant to enforce the Amendment had been to it alone, as it is in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and as it was in one proposed form of the Eighteenth Amendment which was rejected by Congress (Cong. Rec. July 30, 1917, p. 5548, and December 17, 1917, p. 469). Such a construction should not be given the Amendment if it can reasonably be avoided, as it very clearly may be, I think, with a resultant giving of a large and beneficent effect to the grant, as it is written. Giving to the word "concurrent" its usual and au prohibition codes of various states and is supposed to contain what is best in each of them, there is every reason to believe that if concurrent legislation were insisted upon, the act would be promptly approved by the Legislatures of many of the states and would thereby become the concurrent law of the state and nation throughout a large part of the Union. Under this construction, which I think should be given the Amendment, there would be large scope also for its operation even in states which might refuse to concur in congressional legislation for its enforcement. In my judgment the law in such a state would be as if no special grant of concurrent power for the enforcement of the first section had been made in the second section, but, nevertheless, the first section, prohibiting the manufacture, sale, transportation, importation or exportation, of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, would be the supreme law of the land within the nonconcurring states and they would be powerless to license, tax, or otherwise recognize as lawful anything #410 thoritative meaning would result in congres-violating that section, so that any state law sional legislation under this grant of power being effective within the boundaries of any in form attempting such recognition would state only when concurred in by action of be unconstitutional and void. Congress would Congress and of such state, which, however, have full power under the interstate comcould readily be accomplished by the approval by either of the legislation of the other or by the adoption of identical legislation by both. Such legislation would be concurrent in fact and in law, and could be enforced by the courts and officers of either the nation or the state, thereby insuring a more general and satisfactory observance of it than could possibly be obtained by the federal authorities alone. It would, to a great extent, relieve Congress of the burden and the general government of the odium to be derived from the antagonism which would certainly spring from enforcing within states federal laws which must touch the daily life of the people very intimately and often very irritatingly. *409 *Such co-operation in legislation is not unfamiliar to our Constitution or in our practical experience. By section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States the states are deprived of power to do many things without the consent of Congress, and that consent has frequently been given, especially to con merce clause, and it would be its duty, to prevent the movement of such liquor for beverage purposes into or out of such a state and the plenary police power over the subject, so firmly established in the states before the Eighteenth Amendment was adopted, would continue for use in the restricted field which the first section of the Amendment leaves unoccupied-and the presumption must always be indulged that a state will observe and not defy the requirements of the national Constitution. Doubtless such a construction as I am proposing would not satisfy the views of extreme advocates of prohibition or of its opponents, but in my judgment it is required by the salutary rule of constitutional construction referred to, the importance of which cannot be overstated. It is intended to prevent courts from rewriting the Constitution in a form in which judges think it should have been written instead of giving effect to the language actually used in it, and very certainly departures from it will return to plague the authors of them. It does not re |