(251 U. S. 537)

No. 59. Bert RUCKER, plaintiff in error, v. Marion A. TATLOW. Nov. 17, 1919. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas. For opinion below, see 95 Kan. 695, 149 Pac. 745. Messrs. Joseph G. Waters and Joseph M. Stark, both of Topeka, Kan., for plaintiff in error. Mr. Lee Monroe, of Topeka, Kan.. for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U. S. 71, 79, 29 Sup. Ct. 580, 53 L. Ed. 914; Brolan v. United States, 236 U. S. 216, 218, 35 Sup. Ct. 285, 59 L. Ed. 544; United Surety Co. v. American Fruit Produce Co., 238 U. S. 140, 142, 35 Sup. Ct. 828, 59 L. Ed. 1238; Sugarman v. United States, 249 U. S. 182, 184, 39 Sup. Ct. 191, 63 L. Ed. 550.

(251 U. S. 537)

Nov.

No. 69. Edward E. O'BRIEN et al., plaintiffs in error. v. The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE FIRST DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, etc. 17, 1919. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. For opinion below, see 217 N. Y. 61, 111 N. E. 658, which affirms 167 App. Div. 908, 151 N. Y. Supp. 766. Mr. Robert H. Elder, of New York City, for plaintiffs in error. Mr. William P. Burr, of New York City, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of (1) California Powder Works v. Davis, 151 U. S. 389, 393, 14 Sup. Ct. 350, 38 L. Ed. 206; Sayward v. Denny, 158 U. S. 180, 183, 15 Sup. Ct. 777, 39 L. Ed. 941; Harding v. Illinois, 196 U. S. 78, 86, 25 Sup. Ct. 176, 49 L. Ed. 394; (2) Thomas v. Iowa, 209 U. S. 258, 263, 28 Sup. Ct. 487, 52 L. Ed. 782; Bowe v. Scott, 233 U. S. 658, 664, 34 Sup. Ct. 769, 58 L. Ed. 1141; and see El Paso Sash & Door Co. v. Carraway, 245 U. S. 643, 38 Sup. Ct. 222, 62 L. Ed. 528.

(251 U. S. 537)

No. 75. Margaret SANGER, plaintiff in error, v. The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. Nov. 17, 1919. In Error to the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York for County of Kings, State of New York. For opinion below, see 179 App. Div. 939, 166 N. Y. Supp. 1107. Mr. Jonah J. Goldstein, of New York City, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Harry G. Anderson, of New York City, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of (1) California Powder Works v. Davis, 151 U. S. 389, 393, 14 Sup. Ct. 350, 38 L. Ed. 206; Sayword v. Denny, 158 U. S. 180, 183, 15 Sup. Ct. 777, 39 L. Ed. 941; Harding v. Illinois, 196 U. S. 78, 86, 25 Sup. Ct. 176, 49 L. Ed. 394; (2) Thomas v. Iowa, 209 U. S. 258, 263, 28 Sup. Ct. 487, 52 L. Ed. 782; Bowe v. Scott, 233 U. S. 658,

(251 U. S. 538)

No. 78. GULF, COLORADO & SANTA FÉ RAILWAY COMPANY et al., plaintiffs in error, v. George H. BOWLES. Nov. 17, 1919. In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Texas. Messrs. J. W. Terry, of Galveston, Tex., and Alex Britton and Evans Browne, both of Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs in error.

PER CURIAM. Reversed upon the authority of Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Rice, 247 U. S. 201, 38 Sup. Ct. 429, 62 L. Ed. 1071.

(251 U. S. 535)

No. 182. William J. GEARY, plaintiff in error, v. Alice GEARY. Nov. 17, 1919. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska. For opinion below, see 102 Neb. 511, 167 N. W. 778. Mr. T. M. Zink, of Lemars, Mr. R. E. Evans, Iowa, for plaintiff in error. of Dakota City, Neb., for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of section 237 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156) as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. St. § 1214).

(251 U. S. 550)

No. 183. JOSLIN MANUFACTURING COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. The CITY OF PROVIDENCE et al.;

No. 184. SCITUATE LIGHT & POWER COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. The CITY OF PROVIDENCE et al.; and

No. 185. Theresa B. JOSLIN, plaintiff in error, v. The CITY OF PROVIDENCE et al. Nov. 17, 1919. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Rhode Island. For opinion below, see 103 Atl. 935. Messrs. Robert H. McCarter, of Newark, N. J., and J. Jerome Hahn, Francis I. McCanna, and Alfred G. Chaffee, all of Providence, R. I., for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Albert A. Baker and Elmer S. Chace, both of Providence, R. I., for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Haseltine v. Bank, 183 U. S. 130, 22 Sup. Ct. 49, 46 L. Ed. 117; Schlosser v. Hemphill, 198 U. S. 173, 25 Sup. Ct. 654, 49 L. Ed. 1000; Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 418, 35 Sup. Ct. 625, 59 L. Ed. 1027; Bruce v. Tobin, 245 U. S. 18, 19, 38 Sup. Ct. 7, 62 L. Ed. 123; and see Collard, Adm'r, v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co., 246 U. S. 653, 38 Sup. Ct. 336, 62 L. Ed. 922. Petition for certiorari denied.

(251 U. S. 536)

No. 286. J. W. THOMPSON, plaintiff in error, v. R. B. DAY, Sheriff and Tax Collector, et al. Nov. 17, 1919. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. For opinion below, see 143 La. 1086, 79 South. 870. Mr. William C. Marshall, of St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiff in error. PER CURIAM. risdiction upon the

Dismissed for want of juauthority of Goodrich v.

ton, Mass., for appellant. Mr. Lucius F. Robinson, of Hartford, Conn., for respondent. Dismissed without costs to either party, per stipulation.

(251 U. S. 538)

No. 188. Georgia M. HOUSTON, administratrix, etc., plaintiff in error, v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY COMPANY. Nov. 24, 1919. In error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia. For opinion below, see 123 Va. 290, 96 S. E. 270. Mr. R. Randolph Hicks, of Norfolk, Va., for plaintiff in error. Mr. G. Hatton, of Portsmouth, Va.,

for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of section 237 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156) as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. St. § 1214).

(251 U. S. 539)

No. 334. SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. Leo L. D'UTASSY. Nov. 24, 1919. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. For opinion below, see 225 N. Y. 694, 122 N. E. 879, which affirms 174 App. Div. 547, 161 N. Y. Supp. 222. Mr. Fred H. Wood, of New York City, N. Y., for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Wilson E. Tipple and Arthur W. Clement, both of New York City, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of section 237 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156) as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. St. § 1214). See writ of certiorari denied, 1918 term, No. 944, 250 U. S. 639, 39 Sup. Ct. 490, 63 L. Ed. 1184.

(251 U. S. 552)

No. 449. Frank SHAFFER, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. Nov. 24, 1919. For opinion below, see 255 Fed. 886. Messrs. David A. Baer, of Washington, D. C., and John J. Sullivan, of New York City,

for petitioner. The Attorney General, for the United States. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

(251 U. S. 538, 552)

No. 544. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. G. W. BOLLIS. Nov. 24, 1919. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. Messrs. J. W. Canada and Prather McDonald, both of Memphis, Tenn. (Edward J. White, of St. Louis, Mo., of counsel), for petitioner. Messrs. Julian C. Wilson and Walter P. Arm

strong, both of Memphis, Tenn., for defendant.

PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of section 237 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156) as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 488, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. St. § 1214). Petition for writ of certiorari herein denied.

(251 U. S. 552)

No. 563. INTER-URBAN RAILWAY COMPANY et al., petitioners, v. Mrs. Fred SMITH. Nov. 24, 1919. For opinion below, see 171 N. W. 134. Mr. Frank J. Hogan, of Washington, D. C., and J. L. Parrish, of Des Moines, Iowa, for petitioners. Mr. R. M. Haines, of Des Moines, Iowa, and Messrs. Dunshee, Haines & Brody, of Des Moines, Iowa, for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa denied.

(251 U. S. 553)

No. 598. Bascom C. THOMPSON, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. Nov. 24, 1919. For opinion below, see 258 Fed. 196. Messrs. Thomas T. Fauntleroy, Patrick H. Cullen, and Charles M. Hay, all of St. Louis, Mo., for petitioner. Mr. R. P. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., and W. C. Herron,_of Washington, D. C., for the United States. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.

"DISCOUNT" BY NATIONAL BANK.

In view of Civ. Code Ga. 1910, §§ 3426, 3427, 3436, establishing a maximum interest rate of 8 per cent., permitting discount at the state rate, under Rev. St. §§ 5136, 5197, 5198 (Comp. St. §§ 9661, 9758, 9759), a national bank in the state did not subject itself to the penalties prescribed for taking usury by discounting short time notes in the ordinary course of business and charging therefor at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum in advance, the federal statutes completely defining what constitutes taking of usury by a national bank, and referring to the state law only to determine the maximum permitted rate, while to "discount" implies reservation of interest in advance.

[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Discount.]

Mr. Justice Pitney, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Clarke, dissenting.

On a Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Apveals of the State of Georgia.

Suit by S. F. Cooper and others, receivers of the Citizens' & Screven County Bank, against the National Bank of Savannah. To review a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the amended petition, plaintiff brought error to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, which affirmed (Cooper v. Same, 21 Ga. App. 356, 94 S. E. 611), and Thomas J. Evans, sole surviving receiver of the Citizens' & Screven County Bank, petitions for certiorari. Affirmed.

therefor at the rate of eight per centum per annum in advance? And we think it correctly answered that question in the negative. [1] Respondent is a national bank. Its powers in respect of discounts, whether transactions by it are usurious and the consequent penalties therefor, must be ascertained upon a consideration of the National Bank Act. Act June 3, 1864, c. 106, 13 Stat. 99, 101, 108; R. S. § 5133 et seq. (Comp. St. § 9658); Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, 23 L. Ed. 196; Barnet v. National Bank, 98 U. S. 555, 558, 25 L. Ed. 212; Haseltine v. Central Bank of Springfield, 183 U. S. 132, 134, 22 Sup. Ct. 50, 46 L.

Ed. 118. Section 8 declares:

re

1 Sec. 30. That every association may take, ceive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange, or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the state or territory where the bank laws of any state a different rate is limited for is located, and no more, except that where by the banks of issue organized under state laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for associations organized in any such state under this act. ritory, the bank may take, receive, reserve, no rate is fixed by the laws of the state or tercharge a rate not exceeding seven per centum, and such interest may be taken in advance, reckoning the days for which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt has to run. And the knowingly taking, receiving, reserving, or charging a rate of

And when

or

Messrs. Edward S. Elliott and William Garrard, both of Savannah, Ga., for respondent.

adjudged a forfeiture of the entire interest which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt carries with it, or which has been agreed to be paid thereon. And in case a greater rate of interest has been paid, the person or persons paying the same, or their legal representatives, may recover back, in any action of debt, twice the amount of

The court below rightly construed the pleadings as presenting only one substantial

*109

federal question: Diu *respondent subject itself to the penalties prescribed for taking usury by discounting short-time notes in the ordinary course of business and charging

or receiving the same: Provided, that such action is commenced within two years from the time the usurious transaction occurred. But the purchase, discount, or sale of a bona fide bill of exchange, payable at another place than the place of such purchase, discount, or sale, at not more than the current rate of exchange for sight drafts

in addition to the interest, shall not be considered as taking or receiving a greater rate of interest. 13 Stat. 108.

*111

*The National Bank Act establishes a system of general regulations. It adopts usury laws of the states only in so far as they severally fix the rate of interest. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Dearing, supra; National Bank v. Johnson, 104 U. S. 271, 26 L. Ed. 742; Haseltine v. Central Bank of Springfield, supra.

must be specified in writing, but in no event to exceed eight per cent. per annum.

"Sec. 3427. What is Usury. Usury is the reserving and taking, or contracting to reserve and take, either directly or by indirection, a greater sum for the use of money than the lawful interest."

112

"Sec. 3436. Beyond Eight Per Cent. Interest Forbidden. *It shall not be lawful for any person, company, or corporation to reserve, charge, or take for any loan or advance of money, or

R. S. § 5197. Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the state, territory, or district where the bank is located, and no more, except that where by

the laws of any state a different rate is limited for banks of issue organized under state laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for associations organized or existing in any such state under this title. When no rate is fixed by the laws of the state, or territory, or district, the bank may take, receive, reserve, or charge a rate not exceeding seven per centum, and such interest may be taken in ad

vance, reckoning the days for which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt has to run. And the purchase, discount. or sale of a bona fide bill of exchange, payable at another place than the place of such purchase, discount, or sale, at not more than the current rate of exchange for sight drafts in addition to the interest, shall not be considered as taking or receiving a greater rate of interest.

R. S. § 5198. The taking, receiving, reserving or charging a rate of interest greater than is allowed by the preceding section, when knowingly done, shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest which

of money, any rate of interest greater than eight per centum per annum, either directly or indirectly by way of commission for advances, discount, exchange, or by any contract or contrivance or device whatever."

Construing these sections, in Loganville Banking Co. v. Forrester (1915) 143 Ga. 302, 305, 84 S. E. 961, 962 (L. R. A. 1915D, 1195), the Georgia Supreme Court held that charges reserved in advance by a state bank at the highest permitted rate of interest on a loan, whether short or long time, constitute usury, and said:

Earlier opinions by the court express a different view of the same sections. In Mackenzie v. Flannery (1892) 90 Ga. 590, 599, 16 S. E. 710, 713, it is said:

"Nor can we determine, without reference to the evidence, whether the taking of eight per cent. interest in advance by way of discount was usurious. Eight per cent. was legal if agreed upon in writing; * * * and it is well settled that the taking of interest in advance on short loans in the usual and ordinary course of business is not usurious, if the interest reserved does not exceed the legal rate."

See, also, Union Savings Bank v. Dottenheim, 107 Ga. 606, 614, 34 S. E. 217; McCall v. Herring, 116 Ga. 235, 243, 42 S. E. 468.

[2] Petitioner maintains the loans in question would have been usurious if made in Georgia by an individual or a state bank and that the same rule applies notwithstanding the lender happened to be a national bank. Respondent insists that the federal act permits it to discount short-time notes, reserving interest in advance at the maxi

113

mum *interest rate allowed by the state law -in this instance, 8 per centum.

der this title may be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said as