The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear WeaponsPrinceton University Press, 5 Μαΐ 2020 - 302 σελίδες Environmental tragedies such as Chernobyl and the Exxon Valdez remind us that catastrophic accidents are always possible in a world full of hazardous technologies. Yet, the apparently excellent safety record with nuclear weapons has led scholars, policy-makers, and the public alike to believe that nuclear arsenals can serve as a secure deterrent for the foreseeable future. In this provocative book, Scott Sagan challenges such optimism. Sagan's research into formerly classified archives penetrates the veil of safety that has surrounded U.S. nuclear weapons and reveals a hidden history of frightening "close calls" to disaster. |
Περιεχόμενα
Expecting the Unexpected | 3 |
The Origins of Accidents | 11 |
Nuclear Weapons Safety during the Cuban Missile Crisis | 53 |
Intelligence and Warning during the Cuban Missile Crisis | 117 |
Redundancy and Reliability The 1968 Thule Bomber Accident | 156 |
Learning by Trial and Terror | 204 |
The Limits of Safety | 250 |
| 281 | |
Άλλες εκδόσεις - Προβολή όλων
The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons Scott Douglas Sagan Περιορισμένη προεπισκόπηση - 1993 |
The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons Scott Douglas Sagan Δεν υπάρχει διαθέσιμη προεπισκόπηση - 1993 |
The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons Scott Douglas Sagan Δεν υπάρχει διαθέσιμη προεπισκόπηση - 1995 |
Συχνά εμφανιζόμενοι όροι και φράσεις
accidental nuclear AFHRC Air Defense Command airborne alert aircraft alert operations authorities B-52 monitor BMEWS bomb alarm Charles Perrow civilian command and control command post crew Cuba Cuban Crisis Cuban missile crisis dangerous decision declassified DEFCON designed devices dispersal emergency emphasis added error evidence example failure Falling Leaves false warning incidents FOIA hazardous technologies high reliability organizations high reliability theorists History Ibid ICBM interactive complexity interceptor interceptor aircraft likelihood Memorandum military commands Minuteman missile launch Moorestown National Security NORAD normal accidents theory November nuclear alert nuclear command nuclear forces nuclear power nuclear weapons safety nuclear-armed occurred October October 24 officers organizational learning peacetime Perrow perspective pilot political possible procedures redundant risk Roberts SAC's safety problems safety rules scenario Secretary of Defense senior Soviet Union Strategic Air Command Thule tightly coupled tion U.S. Air Force U.S. military U.S. nuclear weapons United USAF warning system