REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT, JULY TERM, 1875. THE DOUGLAS COUNTY ROAD COMPANY, APPEL- RECORDS OF COUNTY COURTS-SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER BY THE CIRCUIT APPEAL from Douglas County. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. W. W. Thayer and E. C. Bronaugh, for Appellant. By the Court, SHATTUCK, J.: This suit, coming before the Court upon complaint and demurrer, presents the same question decided by this Court at 5 373 5 406 6 301 Opinion of the Court-Shattuck, J. the December Term, 1874, in the case of The Douglas County Road Company v. Abrahams et al.,-whether the alleged contract or agreement between the County Court of Douglas County, and the Douglas County Road Company, of date April 10, 1874, is enforceable, or can be made available in the form and condition in which the record of the County Court of Douglas County, relating to the matter, has been left-and, though all the members of the Court, in that case, did not concur in the decision and opinion given, yet that decision must stand as the decision of the Court, and, so far as the two cases are similar, must control this case. There are added, however, in this case, allegations concerning the proceedings in the County Court of Douglas County, upon which the Circuit Court was asked to exercise a supervisory control over the County Court by injunction, and by decree, in the nature of specific performance. It is not pretended that if the appellant's contract had been duly recorded, and a record of its authorization duly made in the County Court, the proceeding for injunction against the rival company (the Galesville and Canyonville Road Company), might not be sustained, no valid defense on other grounds being made; and it was more than intimated by this Court, in the case above alluded to, at the December Term, 1874, tlíat the proper remedy for the party, if there was any at all, was some proceeding to have the record of the County Court completed. This cannot be done by injunction, or suit in equity. The supervisory control exercised by the Circuit Court, as a general rule, is to be exercised by mandamus, the writ of review, or an appeal; and this case furnishes no exception to this general rule. We think the decree of the Circuit Court should be affirmed. Statement of Facts. STATE OF OREGON EX REL. J. W. CHURCH, APPELLANT, v. M. DUSTIN, RESPONDENT. PLEADING COMPLAINT IN ACTIONS TO TRY THE RIGHT TO AN OFFICE.--A complaint is insufficient in law, in a proceeding under § 354 of the Civil Code, to have an officer adjudged disqualified or ineligible to hold an office, under the laws of this State, on account of having promised to reward a voter, unless it appears affirmatively that such promise, if performed, would inure to the benefit of such voter. IDEM-WHAT WILL CONSTITUTE AN OFFER OF A REWARD.-A promise by a candidate for the office of county judge, made to the voters of his county, prior to his election, that he will, if elected, pay into the county treasury two hundred dollars per annum of his salary as judge, is not an offer to reward a voter, under § 7, Art. 2, of our State Constitution, unless it also appears that the voters influenced by such offer were taxpayers in such county, or would in some way be benefited by the performance of such offer. APPEAL from Grant County. This is a proceeding under ? 354 of the Civil Code, for the purpose of having the respondent adjudged ineligible to hold the office of county judge of Grant County, and to have him ousted therefrom. It is alleged in the complaint, in substance, that at the June election, 1874, the relator, the respondent, and Eli Lester were candidates for county judge of Grant County; that the respondent received two hundred and seventy-six votes; the relator, two hundred and seventeen; and Lester, one hundred and six; that at such election the respondent induced seventy voters to vote for him, upon the promise that, if he was elected to the office of county judge, he would pay two hundred dollars per annum out of his salary (eight hundred dollars), into the county treasury of Grant County; that the respondent received a certificate of election, and thereafter usurped the office, etc. The respondent demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained, and judgment rendered in favor of respondent for his costs, from which judgment this appeal is taken. B. Whitten, for Appellant. |