class of tradesmen, for a time, might suffer a negligent usage or practice to continue, and might not exercise that regard for the safety of others which should be exacted, but in the end the only standards known to the law are human, and such as men of reasonable prudence and care establish. It is apparent that the weight to be accorded to any such custom or usage must depend upon the extent or the universality of its use and its age or continuance in time, among other circumstances. Unless conditions and surroundings are shown to have been the same as those proven in the case at bar, such evidence is not admissible.10 Accordingly it has been held that in an action to recover for damages to adjacent property, caused by accidental fire originating in a sawmill, evidence of the practice and appliances used at other similar mills at different places, necessarily under different conditions and surroundings, is inadmissible to show negligence in the case under consideration.11

24. Use of Senses and Intelligence.-Every person in the enterprises which he conducts is bound to exercise his senses and intelligence to avoid injury to others.12 Even the enjoyment of a paramount right demands the exercise of one's senses. For example, a railroad in operating trains is bound to keep a lookout for persons who may be on its tracks. 13 Again, although the right of navigation is superior to that of fishing, a failure to see and avoid a fishing net set therein, when a navigator could have done so without detriment to the prosecution of his voyage, will render him liable for the injuries he occasions to the net.14

25. Reliance on Others to Use Senses in Avoidance of Injury.— Persons who own, operate or maintain dangerous instrumentalities have a right to rely upon others who may be imperilled thereby to take the usual and customary measures to avoid injury.15 They

note; Holland v. Tennessee Coal, etc., R. Co., 91 Ala. 444, 8 So. 524, 12 L.R.A. 232; William Laurie Co. v. McCullough, 174 Ind. 477, 90 N. E. 1014, 92 N. E. 337, Ann. Cas. 1913A 49; Elmer v. Mutual Steamship Co., 114 Minn. 257, 130 N. W. 1104, Ann. Cas. 1912B 1062.

Rep. 515; Wright v. Mulvaney, 78 Wis. 89, 46 N. W. 1045, 23 A. S. R. 393, 9 L.R.A. 807.

13. Southern R. Co. v. Chatman, 124 Ga. 1026, 53 S. E. 692, 4 Ann. Cas. 675, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 283; Greene v. Louisville R. Co., 119 Ky. 862, 84 S. W. 1154, 7 Ann. Cas. 1126; Schnur v. 9. William Laurie Co. v. McCul- Citizens' Traction Co., 153 Pa. St. 29, lough, 174 Ind. 477, 90 N. E. 1014, 25 Atl. 650, 34 A. S. R. 680; Mason 92 N. E. 337, Ann. Cas. 1913A 49. v. Southern R. Co., 58 S. C. 70, 36 10. McNally v. Colwell, 91 Mich. 527, 52 N. W. 70, 30 A. S. R. 494.

Note: 20 Ann. Cas. 1206. 11. McNally v. Colwell, 91 Mich. 527, 52 N. W. 70, 30 A. S. R. 494.

12. Continental Imp. Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161, 24 U. S. (L. ed.) 403; Stroher v. Elting, 97 N. Y. 102, 49 Am.

S. E. 440, 79 A. S. R. 826, 53 L.R.A. 913. See RAILROADS; STREET RAIL

WAYS.

14. Wright v. Mulvaney, 78 Wis. 89, 46 N. W. 1045, 23 A. S. R. 393, 9 L.R.A. 807.

15. Bresee v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 149 Cal. 131, 85 Pac. 152, 5 L.R.A.

may assume that others are in possession of their faculties and will exercise them in the normal and usual manner. 16 This proposition is well illustrated by the class of cases involving injuries to persons on railroad tracks. The driver, it is generally held, seeing a person on the track may assume that he will hear, see, and avoid the oncoming train.17 And, accordingly, a street car driver is ordinarily held to have the right to presume that a pedestrian or the driver of a vehicle approaching the street car track will stop until the car has passed.18

26. Known Dangers; Guards; Warnings.-Ultimately liability is to be determined with a view to the comparative knowledge of the parties to the transaction complained of respecting the danger thereof.19 Both parties are bound to take measures in order to know and be informed of the peril.20 And upon one who supports and maintains methods and instrumentalities that are untried, or according to common experience are capable of doing an injury, rests an affirmative duty of discovering hidden perils and preventing injuries by sufficient guards and warnings. Generally speaking, some safe

(N.S.) 1959; Herring v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 32 N. C. 402, 51 Am. Dec.

395.

16. Herring v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 32 N. C. 402, 51 Am. Dec. 395. See infra, par. 101.

17. Herring v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 32 N. C. 402, 51 Am. Dec. 395. See RAILROADS.

18. Driscoll v. Market St. Cable R. Co., 97 Cal. 553, 32 Pac. 591, 33 A. S. R. 203; Bresee v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 149 Cal. 131, 85 Pac. 152, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1059 and note; Markowitz v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 186 Mo. 350, 85 S. W. 351, 69 L.R.A. 389. 19. See supra, par. 10.

etc., R. Co. v. Woodruff, 4 Md. 242, 59 Am. Dec. 72; Sweeny v. Old Colony, etc., R. Co., 10 Allen (Mass.) 368, 87 Am. Dec. 644; Keyser v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 56 Mich. 559, 23 N. W. 311, 56 Am. Rep. 405; Cooper v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 66 Mich. 261, 33 N. W. 306, 11 A. S. R. 482; Camp v. Wood, 76 N. Y. 92, 32 Am. Rep. 282; Newby v. Harrell, 99 N. C. 149, 5 S. E. 284, 6 A. S. R. 503; Fisher v. New Bern, 140 N. C. 506, 53 S. E. 342, 111 A. S. R. 857, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 542; Henderson v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 144 Pa. St. 461, 22 Atl. 851, 27 A. S. R. 652, 16 L.R.A. 299. As to evidence of the subsequent erection of

20. As to the duty of the person in- guards, see infra, par. 148. jured, see infra, par. 98 et seq.

1. See infra, par. 28.

2. Mayer V. Thompson-Hutchison Bldg. Co., 104 Ala. 611, 16 So. 620, 53 A. S. R. 88, 28 L.R.A. 433; Strange v. Bodeaw Lumber Co., 79 Ark. 490, 96 S. W. 152, 116 A. S. R. 92; Davis v. Pacific Power Co., 107 Cal. 563, 40 Pac. 950, 48 A. S. R. 156; Nalley v. Hartford Carpet Co., 51 Conn. 524, 50 Am. Rep. 47; Indianapolis v. Emmelman, 108 Ind. 530, 9 N. E. 155, 58 Am. Rep. 65; Metzgar v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 76 Ia. 387, 41 N. W. 49, 14 A. S. R. 224; Baltimore,

3. Turlington v. Tampa Electric Co., 62 Fla. 398, 56 So. 696, Ann. Cas. 1913D 1213, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 72; Graves v. Thomas, 95 Ind. 361, 48 Am. Rep. 727; Mitchell v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 110 La. 630, 34 So. 714, 98 A. S. R. 472; Widing v. Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co., 95 Minn. 279, 104 N. W. 239, 111 A. S. R. 471; O'Mara v. Hudson River R. Co., 38 N. Y. 445, 98 Am. Dec. 61; Farrell v. Dixie Cotton Mills, 157 N. C. 528, 73 S. E. 142, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 64; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Hagan, 47 Pa. St. 244, 86 Am. Dec. 541; Freer v. Cameron, 4 Rich. L

6

guards are essential in every case to furnish protection from such dangerous agencies as fire, or electricity; and in many situations the law has deemed it expedient to require protective measures against injuries from dangerous machines; but the precise character of the cautionary measures must depend upon the surrounding facts and circumstances. Illustrations of the proposition under consideration are innumerable and may be found in every branch of the law which deals with negligence. In a frequently cited case it appeared that the plaintiff, while walking on a sidewalk in front of a building which the defendant was erecting, was struck and injured by a brick falling therefrom, and that there were no barriers to prevent the approach of foot passengers. The court held that the defendant might be liable for the injury on account of the omission to construct barriers, although there was no negligence in suffering the brick to fall." In another case involving the same principle it was shown that a city, in constructing a bridge, in continuation of a street, excavated the bed of the stream, and built a levee from the bank to the excavation, leaving it unwatched and without safeguards. A child, five years old, at play, fell into the excavation and was drowned. The city authorities knew the habit of young children to play in the neighborhood. It was held on appeal that the city was liable. Not infrequently particular sorts of guards are prescribed by statute." But in the absence of statutory enactment, no obligation rests upon anyone to guard against injuries that cannot be foreseen in the light of common experience.10 It has been held that the bursting of a pipe line, caused by a flow of burning oil over it from adjoining property, is not such element of danger as the pipe line company is bound

(S. C.) 228, 55 Am. Dec. 663; Dun v. Seaboard, etc., R. Co., 78 Va. 645, 49 Am. Rep. 388; Lauson v. Fond du Lae, 141 Wis. 57, 123 N. W. 629, 135 A. S. R. 30, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 40.

Note: 34 Am. Rep. 233.

4. Gerke v. California Steam Nav. Co., 9 Cal. 251, 70 Am. Dec. 650; Metzgar v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 76 Ia. 387, 41 N. W. 49, 14 A. S. R. 224; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Woodruff, 4 Md. 242, 59 Am. Dec. 72; McNally v. Colwell, 91 Mich. 527, 52 N. W. 70, 30 A. S. R. 494; Henderson v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 144 Pa. St. 461, 22 Atl. 851, 27 A. S. R. 652, 16 L.R.A. 299. See FIRES, vol. 11, p. 938.

5. McKay v. Southern Bell Tel., etc., Co., 111 Ala. 337, 19 So. 695, 56 A. S. R. 59, 31 L.R.A. 589; Fisher v. New Bern, 140 N. C. 506, 53 S. E. 342, 111 1. S. R. 857, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 542; R. C. L. Vol. XX.-3.

33

Ferrell v. Dixie Cotton Mills, 157 N. C. 528, 73 S. E. 142, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 64. See ELECTRICITY, vol. 9, p. 1184.

6. Davis v. Pacific Power Co., 107 Cal. 563, 40 Pac. 950, 48 A. S. R. 156.

7. Camp v. Wood, 76 N. Y. 92, 32 Am. Rep. 282. To like effect see Meier v. Way, 136 Ia. 302, 111 N. W. 420, 125 A. S. R. 254.

8. Indianapolis v. Emmelman, 108 Ind. 530, 9 N. E. 155, 58 Am. Rep. 65.

9. Delk v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 220 U. S. 580, 31 S. Ct. 617, 55 U. S. (L. ed.) 590; Burrows v. Delta Transp. Co., 106 Mich. 582, 64 N. W. 501, 29 L.R.A. 468.

10. Montgomery v. Muskegon Booming Co., 88 Mich. 633, 50 N. W. 729, 26 A. S. R. 308; Emerson v. Peteler, 35 Minn. 481, 29 N. W. 311, 59 Am. Rep. 337. See supra, par. 14.

to foresee and provide against for the protection of the property of third persons when constructing its line.11

27. Warning of Obvious or Patent Dangers.-Of course there is no absolute duty of giving warning of any particular peril; the necessity therefor depends upon the age, intelligence, and information of those to whom the warning might be due,12 and the obligation disappears entirely when it is shown that the alleged obligee did in fact fully appreciate the peril.13 And so in respect of such perils as may be said to be patent or obvious there is no obligation to give any sort of warning.14 One who is injured by such a peril is chargeable with having been guilty of contributory negligence.15 Accordingly, although a duty rests upon a municipality, where an obstruction is permitted to remain in a highway or street, to give notice to the traveling public of its presence, yet no other notice is needed than a view of the obstruction itself, when it can be seen in ample time to avoid injury.16 Again, where it appeared that a boy of twelve years had been injured by a machine of the defendant, the court concluded that the omission of the defendant in not instructing and protecting him does not constitute actionable negligence, since he had the knowledge which instruction would have given him, and knew how to avoid this particular danger.17

28. Discovery of Hidden Perils; Inspections; Tests. It is a corollary of the maxim "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" 18 that everyone shall investigate, inspect, and test the instrumentalities maintained by him,19 guided in so doing by the knowledge that common experience offers with respect to the possibility of peril. Every peril, it is safe to say-including such as are termed latent or hidden-need not be discovered; 20 for no man is an insurer of

11. Behling v. Southwest Pennsylvania Pipe Lines, 160 Pa. St. 359, 28 Atl. 777, 40 A. S. R. 724.

12. See infra, par. 104-107.

13. Hubbard v. Concord, 35 N. H. 52, 69 Am. Dec. 520; Stamford Oil Mill Co. v. Barnes, 103 Tex. 409, 128 S. W. 375, Ann. Cas. 1913A 111, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1218.

14. District of Columbia v. Moulton, 182 U. S. 576, 21 S. Ct. 840, 45 U. S. (L. ed.) 1237; Holland v. Tennessee Coal, etc., Co., 91 Ala. 444, 8 So. 524, 12 L.R.A. 232; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Fronk, 67 Md. 339, 10 Atl. 204, 307, 1 A. S. R. 390; Emerson v. Peteler, 35 Minn. 481, 29 N. W. 311, 59 Am. Rep. 337.

15. See infra, par. 93 et seq.

16. District of Columbia v. Moulton,

182 U. S. 576, 21 S. Ct. 840, 45 U. S. (L. ed.) 1237. To like effect see Hubbard v. Concord, 35 N. H. 52, 69 Am. Dec. 520.

17. Stamford Oil Mill Co. v. Barnes, 103 Tex. 409, 128 S. W. 375, Ann. Cas. 1913A 111, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1218. 18. See supra, par. 3.

19. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476, 10 Am. Rep. 623; Haynes v. Raleigh Gas Co., 114 N. C. 203, 19 S. E. 344, 41 A. S. R. 786, 26 L.R.A. 810; Koelsch v. Philadelphia Co., 152 Pa. St. 355, 25 Atl. 522, 34 A. S. R. 653. 18 L.R.A. 759; Mesher v. Osborne, 75 Wash. 439, 134 Pac. 1092, 48 L.R.A. (N. S.) 917. See supra, par. 11, 27.

20. Baddeley v. Shea, 114 Cal. 1, 45 Pac. 990, 55 A. S. R. 56, 33 L.R.A. 747; South Baltimore Car Works v.

the safety of others. But if common experience has demonstrated that dangers lurk in the method adopted or in the instrumentality maintained by a person he rests under the obligation of ascertaining the peril and taking precautions to avoid injury therefrom. For example, the owner of a boiler is liable for any defects in the manufacture thereof that might have been discovered by a reasonable inspection and test; but if an explosion results from defects that could not have been discovered by such an investigation, he will not be held responsible. Of course, the duty of inspection is such and such only as has been generally adopted by prudent persons similarly situated. In an instructive case it appeared that the plaintiff had sustained an injury from explosives left in building stone by the quarryman. The action was brought against the contractor who purchased the stone from the quarryman, and was based upon the theory that the contractor owed to the plaintiff a duty of inspecting all stone passing through his hands, but the court held that no such duty existed. Before responsibility for discoverable defects arises and becomes fixed, a reasonable time must have elapsed for the purposes of investigation and inspection, as well as the removal of the peril."

6

29. Inspection of Instrumentalities Purchased of Dealers.-To some extent, at any rate, one may rely upon the fact that an instrumentality has been purchased of a reliable maker or seller.8 According to some courts this fact, though not of itself sufficient to relieve the purchaser of the duty of inspection, is proper to be considered by the jury on the issue of due care. But it has been held that if

Schaefer, 96 Md. 88, 53 Atl. 665, 94 A. S. R. 560; Cork v. Blossom, 162 Mass. 330, 38 N. E. 495, 44 A. S. R. 362, 26 L.R.A. 256; Curtis v. Rochester, etc., R. Co., 18 N. Y. 534, 75 Am. Dec. 258; Mercer v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 154 N. C. 399, 70 S. E. 742, Ann. Cas. 1912A 1002; Hadley v. Cross, 34 Vt. 586, 80 Am. Dec. 699. 1. See supra, par. 3.

2. Lafayette, etc., R. Co. v. Huffman, 28 Ind. 287, 92 Am. Dec. 318; South Baltimore Car Works v. Schaefer, 96 Md. 88, 53 Atl. 665, 94 A. S. R. 560; Bahel v. Manning, 112 Mich. 24, 70 N. W. 327, 67 A. S. R. 381, 36 L.R.A. 523; Curtis v. Rochester, etc., R. Co., 18 N. Y. 534, 75 Am. Dec. 258. 3. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476, 10 Am. Rep. 623.

4. Baddeley v. Shea, 114 Cal. 1, 45 Pac. 990, 55 A. S. R. 56, 33 L.R.A.

747; Mooney v. Beattie, 180 Mass. 451, 62 N. E. 725, 70 L.R.A. 831; Ryder v. Kinsey, 62 Minn. 85, 64 N. W. 94, 54 A. S. R. 623, 34 L.R.A. 557. See supra, par. 19, 20.

5. Mooney v. Beattie, 180 Mass. 451, 62 N. E. 725, 70 L.R.Á. 831.

6. Ainsworth v. Lakin, 180 Mass. 397, 62 N. E. 746, 91 A. S. R. 314, 57 L.R.A. 132.

7. Schwartz v. Gilmore, 45 Ill. 455, 92 Am. Dec. 227; Ainsworth v. Lakin, 180 Mass. 397, 62 N. E. 746, 91 A. S. R. 314, 57 L.R.A. 132.

8. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Huntley, 38 Mich. 537, 31 Am. Rep. 321. See MASTER AND SERVANT, vol. 18, pp. 564-565.

9. Hegeman v. Western R. Corp., 13 N. Y. 9, 64 Am. Dec. 517; Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476, 10 Am. Rep. 623.