of the customer's family by its explosion when she attempts to use it supposing it to be kerosene.7 35. Intention of Legislature to Give Right of Action.-To give a person a right of action because of a violation of statute, it is plain that the legislature must have intended him to have such right of action. This is an elemental principle of statutory construction and must be conceded on every hand. The proposition is not, however, usually stated in these terms. Instead, the courts have found it convenient to express the concept in a narrower and somewhat more definite form; and the broader thought expression has been split into several less comprehensive formulas all of which are embodyments of the same general idea. In some of the opinions it is stated that the injury complained of must have been such as the legislation was intended to prevent; 10 in others the courts say that the legislature must have intended to create a private liability as distinguished from one of a public character; 11 and in still other opinions it is said that the plaintiff in order to be entitled to recover must show that he is within the class of persons for whose benefit or protection the law was enacted.12 It is not enough for the plaintiff to show that the defendant neglected a duty imposed by statute, and that he would not have been injured if the duty had been performed, but that he must also show that the duty was imposed for his benefit, or was one which the defendant owned to him for his security.18 The courts 7. Ives v. Welden, 114 Ia. 476, 87 N. W. 408, 89 A. S. R. 379, 54 L.R.A. 854. 8. Denton v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 90 Kan. 51, 133 Pac. 558, Ann. Cas. 1915B 639, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 820; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. State, 62 Md. 479, 50 Am. Rep. 233; Nixon v. Montana, etc., R. Co., 50 Mont. 95, 145 Pac. 8, Ann. Cas. 1916B 299 and note. 9. See STATUTES. 10. Indiana, etc., Coal Co. v. Neal, 166 Ind. 458, 77 N. E. 850, 9 Ann. Cas. 424 and note; Denton v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 90 Kan. 51, 133 Pac. 558, Ann. Cas. 1915B 639, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 820; Donahue v. Kelly, 181 Pa. St. 93, 37 Atl. 186, 59 A. S. R. 632. Note: LR.A.1915E 510. 11. See infra, par. 3. 12. Randall v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 109 U. S. 478, 3 S. Ct. 322, 27 U. S. (L. ed.) 1003; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Holland, 164 Ala. 73, 51 So. 365, 137 A. S. R. 25; Williams v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 135 Ill. 491, 26 N. E. 661, 25 A. S. R. 397, 11 L.R.A. 352; Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N. E. 182, 36 A. S. R. 376, 17 L.R.A. 588; Indiana, etc., Coal Co. v. Neal, 166 Ind. 458, 77 N. E. 850, 9 Ann. Cas. 424 and note; Gibson v. Kansas City Packing Box Co., 85 Kan. 346, 116 Pac. 502, Ann. Cas. 1912D 1103 and note; Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn. 323, 23 N. W. 237, 53 Am. Rep. 47; Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N. W. 693, 79 A. S. R. 350; Everett v. Great Northern R. Co., 100 Minn. 309, 111 N. W. 281, 10 Ann. Cas. 294, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 703; Burger v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 112 Mo. 238, 20 S. W. 439, 34 A. S. R. 379; Wakefield v. Connecticut, etc., R. Co., 37 Vt. 330, 86 Am. Dec. 711; Britton v. Great Western Cotton Co., L. R. 7 Exch. 130, 41 L. J. Exch. 99, 27 L. T. N. S. 125, 20 W. R. 525, 19 Eng. Rul. Cas. 42 and note. Notes: 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 343; L.R.A. 1915E 512. 13. Rosse v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., are entirely agreed upon this general principal, but in its application to the violation of particular enactments many diverse rules have been established, 14 and varied interpretations have been put upon laws imposing duties upon railroads,15 such as those requiring companies to give signals of the movement of trains, 16 or fence their tracks 17 or to limit the speed of trains,18 as well as to enactments of many other sorts.19 Some courts favor a liberal construction of statutes when their meaning is questioned in this connection, and it is held that a right of action may exist although the law was not enacted primarily for the plaintiff's benefit.20 For example, it has been held that one who beats a horse in violation of a statute for the prevention of cruelty to animals is liable for an injury caused by a blow falling on a bystander.1 36. Enactments Creating Liability of Public Character.-As has been observed, some courts attempt a distinction between statutes and ordinances which, as it is stated, create a public liability and those enactments which impose private responsibility. The principle is formulated as follows: Wherever a statute or ordinance creates a duty or obligation, though it does not in express terms give a remedy, the remedy which is properly applicable to that obligation follows as an incident; but whether a liability arising from the breach of a duty prescribed by a statute or ordinance accrues for the benefit of an individual specially injured thereby, or whether such liability is exclusively of a public character, must depend upon the nature of the duty enjoined, and the benefits to be derived from its performance. The indefiniteness of this formula and the consequent difficulty of applying it in any particular case have been recognized in 68 Minn. 216, 71 N. W. 20, 64 A. S. R. 472, 37 L.R.A. 591. 14. Notes: 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 343; L.R.A.1915E 511, 512. 15. Notes: L.R.A.1915E 511; 9 Ann. Cas. 430. See RAILROADS. 16. Randall v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 109 U. S. 478. 3 S. Ct. 322, 27 U. S. (L. ed.) 1003; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hall, 91 Ala. 112, 8 So. 371, 24 A. S. R. 863; East St. Louis Connecting R. Co. v. Eggmann, 170 Ill. 538, 48 N. E. 981, 62 A. S. R. 400; Wakefield v. Connecticut, etc., R. Co., 37 Vt. 330, 86 Am. Dec. 711; Ransom v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 62 Wis. 178, 22 N. W. 147, 51 Am. Rep. 718. Notes: L.R.A.1915E 511, 513; 9 Ann. Cas. 429; Ann. Cas. 1912D 1107. 17. Rosse v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 68 Minn. 216, 71 N. W. 20, 64 A. S. R. 472, 37 L.R.A. 591. Notes: L.R.A.1915E 511; 9 Ann. Cas. 430; Ann. Cas. 1912D 1107. 18. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Holland, 164 Ala. 73, 51 So. 365, 137 A. S. R. 25; Bluedorn v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 108 Mo. 439, 18 S. W. 1103, 32 A. S. R. 615. Note: Ann. Cas. 1912D 1107. 19. Notes: 9 Ann. Cas. 430; Ann. Cas. 1912D 1106. 20. Note: 9 Ann. Cas. 428. 1. Osborne v. Van Dyke, 113 Ia. 557, 85 N. W. 784, 54 L.R.A. 367. 2. See supra, par. 35. 3. Hayes v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 111 U. S. 228, 4 S. Ct. 369, 28 U. S. (L. ed.) 410; Taylor v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 45 Mich. 74, 7 N. W. 728, 40 Am. Rep. 457; Cook v. Johnston, 58 Mich. 437, 25 N. W. 388, 55 Am. Rep. 703: Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn. 323, 23 N. W. 237, 53 Am. Rep. 47; Frontier some of the opinions. In one of the more recent cases the court said: "If the duty imposed by the ordinance is clearly intended for the protection and for the benefit of individuals or of their property, the violation of the rule prescribed tends to show negligence for which a recovery may be had; but, where the duty is plainly for the benefit. of the public at large, then the individual acquires no new rights by virtue of its enactment, and a violation of the rule is of no evidential value upon the question of negligence. It is not always easy to draw the line between the two classes of enactments. In fact, in some cases their purpose is both for the welfare of the public at large, and also for the protection of the personal and property rights of individuals. In such a case the individual may adduce the failure to perform the duty enjoined as evidence of negligence. The rule which is applicable can only be ascertained from a consideration of the object and purpose of the enactment itself in each particular case." 37. Causal Connection between. Violation and Injury.-Although a violation of a statute is negligence per se, there must be a causal connection between the unlawful act and the injury, which must be shown in the pleading and by the proof-or the action fails. If the injury would have occurred regardless of the violation of the statute the defendant cannot be said to be liable therefor. And upon the plaintiff rests the burden of proving that the defendant's unlawful act was the cause of the injury. The meaning of proximate cause in this connection has been explained as follows: If the injury complained of is a natural and probable consequence of a violation of the statute, then that violation is correctly taken as the proximate cause of the injury. If the very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute law, that injury must be considered as directly caused by the nonobservance of the law. But if the injury is one that happened by causes independent of the violation of the statute, it is not actionable on the basis of that violation. If an intervening event, against which the statute evidently did not intend to provide, and the appearance of which was not antici Steam Laundry Co. v. Connolly, 72 Neb. 767, 101 N. W. 995, 68 L.R.A. 425. 4. Frontier Steam Laundry Co. v. Connolly, 72 Neb. 767, 101 N. W. 995, 68 L.R.A. 425. vania R. Co. v. Hensil, 70 Ind. 569, 36 Am. Rep. 188; Sowles v. Moore, 65 Vt. 322, 26 Atl. 629, 21 L.R.A. 723 and note; Butcher v. West Virginia, etc., R. Co., 37 W. Va. 180, 16 S. E. 457, 18 L.R.A. 519. Notes: 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 345; L.R.A. 1915E 516; Ann. Cas. 1912B 806; Ann. Cas. 1915B 643. 5. Cary v. Los Angeles R. Co., 157 Cal. 599, 108 Pac. 682, 21 Ann. Cas. 1329, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 764; Prest-0Lite Co. v. Skeel, 182 Ind. 593, 106 N. E. 365, Ann. Cas. 1917A 474 and note; Galena, etc., R. Co. v. Loomis, 7. Galena, etc., R. Co. v. Loomis, 13 13 Ill. 548, 56 Am. Dec. 471; Pennsyl- Ill. 548, 56 Am. Dec. 471. 6. Sowles v. Moore, 65 Vt. 322, 26 Atl. 629, 21 L.R.A. 723 and note. pated by the spirit and purpose of the act, has in fact caused the injury, that event is plainly the proximate cause. But while the courts are generally agreed that a causal connection must be shown between the violation of the statute and the injuries complained of, the cases disclose a sharp conflict as to what is to be considered a sufficient causal connection. It has been held that the mere sale of a gun to a fifteen-year-old boy in violation of 'an ordinance does not render one liable for an injury done by his loading and firing the gun, if there was no reason to anticipate probable injury because of the carelessness of the boy or his lack of skill in the use of firearms. 10 38. Municipal Ordinance as Foundation of Action.-In a majority of jurisdictions it has been held that a municipal ordinance may impose a legal duty of such a character that a civil action may be maintained for a breach thereof.11 Other courts, however, have taken the position that a municipal ordinance cannot create a civil liability against a person violating it, and in favor of persons injured by its violation, for this is a power which belongs alone to the sovereign power of the state. 12 According to this view, the only liability which attaches to the infraction of an ordinance is the penalty it 9. Denton v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 90 Kan. 51, 133 Pac. 558, Ann. Cas. 1915B 639 and note, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 820; Stone v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 171 Mass. 536, 51 N. E. 1, 41 L.R.A. 794; Butcher v. West Virginia, etc., R. Co., 37 W. Va. 180, 16 S. E. 457, 18 L.R.A. 519. 8. Norman V. Virginia-Pocahontas v. Young, 81 Ga. 397, 7 S. E. 912, 12 Coal Co., 68 W. Va. 405, 69 S. E. 857, A. S. R. 320; Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Skeel, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 504. See PROXIMATE 182 Ind. 593, 106 N. E. 365, Ann. Cas. CAUSE. 1917A 474; Correll v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 38 Ia. 120, 18 Am. Rep. 22; Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn. 323, 23 N. W. 237, 53 Am. Rep. 47; Murray v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 101 Mo. 236, 13 S. W. 817, 20 A. S. R. 601; Mitchell v. Raleigh Electric Co., 129 N. C. 166, 39 S. E. 801, 85 A. S. R. 735, 55 L.R.A. 398; Brasington v. South Bound R. Notes: 21 L.R.A. 723; Ann. Cas. Co., 62 S. C. 325, 40 S. E. 665, 89 1916E 629 (citing cases both pro and A. S. R. 905; Hays v. Gainesville St. con on the question whether failure R. Co., 70 Tex. 602, 8 S. W. 491, 8 by the defendant to comply with a A. S. R. 624; Virginia Midland R. Co. statute, requiring fire escapes, coupled v. White, 84 Va. 498, 5 S. E. 573, 10 with the fact of the death of a person A. S. R. 874. in the building burned, is sufficient proof that the defendant's neglect was the proximate cause of the death to warrant giving the case to the jury). 10. Hartnett v. Boston Store of Chicago, 265 Ill. 331, 106 N. E. 837, L.R.A.1915C 460 and note. 11. Driscoll v. Market St. Cable R. Co., 97 Cal. 553, 32 Pac. 591, 33 A. S. R. 203; Cragg v. Los Angeles Trust Co., 154 Cal. 663, 98 Pac. 1063, 16 Ann. Cas. 1061; Western, etc., R. Co. 12. Caughlin v. Campbell-Sell Baking Co., 39 Colo. 148, 89 Pac. 53, 121 A. S. R. 158, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1001; Rockford City R. Co. v. Blake, 173 Ill. 354, 50 N. E. 1070, 64 A. S. R. 122; Flynn v. Canton Co., 40 Md. 312, 17 Am. Rep. 603; Moran v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 134 Mo. 641, 36 S. W. 659, 56 A. S. 543, 33 L.R.A. 755; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Ervin, 89 Pa. St. 71, 33 Am. Rep. 726. §§ 39, 40 imposes, 13 Ordinances are but police regulations, enforceable by penalties, recoverable by actions of debt or otherwise, as may be prescribed, but if not so enforced they come to nothing. An ordinance cannot create a civil duty enforceable at common law. For if a city council has power so to do-if it has the power to create such obligation it must also have the power to restrict it, in other words, to prescribe the sole consequences arising therefrom, but it will, we apprehend, be conceded that a power like the one here indicated is wholly beyond the province of such a body.14 But admitting this to be the rule some courts have held that the violated ordinance may be introduced in evidence "as bearing on the question of negligence" and tending to establish that fact.15 39. Admissibility of Ordinance Not Pleaded.-The question has been presented in a number of cases whether, in an action for negligence, evidence of an ordinance imposing a duty upon the defendant may be considered in arriving at the determination of negligence vel non, in the absence of any allegation in regard to the ordinance. 16 According to some of the decisions, evidence of a municipal ordinance is not admissible to show negligence by reason of its violation, when the declaration, complaint, or petition contains no allegation of its existence.17 But according to other cases, an ordinance which prescribes a duty to be performed by the defendant is admissible for the purpose of proving negligence although it is not pleaded.18 III. EXISTENCE AND FOUNDATION OF DUTY TO EXERCISE CARE Generally 40. Basis of Duty to Exercise Care.-To constitute an act or omission the foundation of an action at law it must appear that a duty was due from the actor to the person claiming to have been injured by the act.19 The rule of reasonable care necessarily includes two persons, or one person and some right or property of another. It 13. Moran v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 134 Mo. 641, 36 S. W. 659, 56 A. S. R. 543, 33 L.R.A. 755. 14. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Ervin, 89 Pa. St. 71, 33 Am. Rep. 726. 15. Caughlin v. Campbell-Sell Baking Co., 39 Colo. 148, 89 Pac. 53, 121 A. S. R. 158, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1001. 16. Note: 16 Ann. Cas. 1064. 17. Note: 16 Ann. Cas. 1064. 18. Cragg v. Los Angeles Trust Co., 154 Cal. 663, 98 Pac. 1063, 16 Ann. Cas. 1061 and note; Brasington v. South Bound R. Co., 62 S. C. 325, 40 S. E. 665, 89 A. S. R. 905. 19. Western Union Tel. Co. V. Schriver, 141 Fed. 538, 72 C. C. A. 596, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 678; Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900, 52 A. S. R. 88, 31 L.R.A. 862; Turlington v. Tampa Electric Co., 62 Fla. 398, 56 So. 696, Ann. Cas. 1913D 1213, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 72; Morris v. Rounsaville, 132 Ga. 462, 64 S. E. 473, 131 A. S. R. 207; Brown v. Smith, 121 Minn. 165, 141 N. W. 2, Ann. Cas. 1914A 874. Note: 111 A. S. R. 701. |